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Abstract 
  Prior approaches to the politics of stock market development associate 
consensual political institutions with the stagnation rather than the growth of equity 
markets. Other research suggests that independent regulatory agencies will almost 
invariably be captured by industry interests thereby lessening their ability to protect 
minority shareholders and retail investors. This paper challenges both of these assertions. 
While politicians do have difficulty credibly committing to investor protection and 
market integrity, more numerous veto players, proportional elections, and regulatory 
independence can at least partially ameliorate their credibility problems. Using 
preexisting measures of political institutions as well as an original dataset of public and 
private securities market regulatory organizations, I find that consensualism and 
regulators’ political independence are positively related to stock market size and 
performance. Furthermore, regulatory independence appears to be especially important 
for stock market development when consensual political institutions are absent.    
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  Despite chronic political instabilities and stubborn energy shortages, the 
Bangladesh economy was on relatively solid footing in the first decade of the 2000s. A 
booming garment industry and a steady stream of remittances pumped cash into the 
nation’s economy and banking system. Aided by lax regulatory supervision, loose 
monetary policy, and unprofessional management, commercial banks began investing an 
increasing percentage of their swelling deposits in the country’s stock markets. As equity 
prices soared and inflation ate away at the real value of their deposits, ordinary 
Bangladeshis followed the banks and entered the stock market in unprecedented numbers. 
After numbering a mere half million in 2007, retail brokerage accounts increased to over 
3.5 million by 2010. What had begun as a rational response to higher inflation was 
growing into a speculative bubble the scale of which is difficult to exaggerate. 
  Between 2000 and 2010, Bangladesh’s stock market capitalization as a percentage 
of financial system assets increased from less than five percent to just over 30 percent. 
During the same period, share turnover as percentage of market capitalization 
experienced a roughly fivefold increase. The tremors in the bull market were first felt in 
October 2009 with the initial public offering of the nation’s largest telecommunications 
provider. Despite pushing the country’s main benchmark market index to a 13-year-high 
on the day of the IPO and contributing to a single-day 22 percent increase in November, 
the market swung violently as the New Year approached. Panicked investors threatened 
hunger strike and authorities realized that something had to be done. The initial response 
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was poorly coordinated and half-hearted. Throughout 2010 the country’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission issued 81 notifications, circulars, and directives aimed at calming 
volatility and popping the speculative bubble. However, these actions were largely 
ineffective, and the regulator gained only a “record of changing [its] own decision within 
an hour of making it… its members made some very sensitive decisions 
whimsically”(Ullah et. al 2012). The nation’s largest benchmark index was unaffected by 
these indecisive regulatory measures and rose 95 percent during the year to reach an all-
time peak on December 5, 2010. Citing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
failure and recognizing that the economy was dangerously overheating, the Central Bank 
of Bangladesh initiated a policy of monetary tightening. They announced aggressive 
interest rate hikes, raised banks’ minimum cash reserve ratios, and promised to more 
aggressively enforce limitations on banks’ stock market investment activities. In the 
words of The Economist, the market response to these counter-cyclical policies led “fresh 
innocents to the slaughter.” 
  After years of obscuring the true extent of their stock investments and struggling 
to generate the cash needed to cover higher reserve requirements, banks began liquidating 
their equity investments. The country’s 3.5 million retail investors followed suit. Many 
had borrowed considerable sums to enter the market during the boom and now struggled 
to cover margin calls. The real panic took hold on December 13, 2010 when the country’s 
benchmark index dropped three percent in one day. After briefly stabilizing, the Dhaka 
Exchange’s general index declined an additional seven percent on December 19 marking 
the largest single day price reduction in the exchange’s 55-year history (Jewel 2012). 
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Riots broke out in the streets outside the exchange with protestors starting tire fires and 
engaging in running battles with police. Instead of closing bells, rocks, batons, and the 
screeching of police sirens brought numerous trading sessions to a halt. In just the first 
six weeks of the correction, the country’s stock index had lost just under half of its value. 
An additional 30 percent drop in February and a 25 percent drop in May of 2011 further 
punished investors (Mansur 2014). 
  Authorities quickly understood that this was more than a mere market correction: 
it was a full blown political crisis. Upcoming subnational elections and protestors calls 
for the prime minister and finance secretary’s resignation forced the government’s hand. 
Under public and political pressure, the Bank of Bangladesh reversed its monetary 
tightening, and the government ordered state owned financial institutions to pump cash 
into fledgling securities markets. A government probe was launched, and its findings 
were scathing. Not only had the stock market crashed, but investors had been 
“scammed.” Deliberate price manipulations had enriched scores of fraudulent brokers 
and politically connected issuers while exacerbating volatility and decline.  One of the 
probe’s authors, former central banker Khondkar Ibrahim Khaled, stated, “All the 
institutions that have anything to do with the stock market were responsible for the 
debacle” (Jewel 2012; emphasis added). In the days following the investigation, the 
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission resigned in disgrace along with 
several board members who had been directly implicated in illegal market manipulation. 
Dozens of market intermediaries were indicted, and others were expelled from the 
profession. Shortcomings in exchange governance, widespread accounting and auditing 
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irregularities among issuers, and rampant insider trading were all exposed. Yet despite 
these troubling revelations, the government heavily censored its investigative report when 
it became clear that “senior members of both Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's Awami 
League and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), along with businessmen 
members of the parties, were involved in the sell-off at the peak of the 
market…”(Chowdhury 2011). 
 While being more than willing to protect its allies among the corporate and 
political elite, the government was quick to point the finger at its regulatory agents. The 
report depicted the Securities and Exchange Commission as being especially 
incompetent. The country’s press core piled on and claimed that the Commission’s 
decisions “relating to the splitting of share's face value, companies' listing, changing of 
margin loan ratio, pre-IPO placement, direct listing, monitoring and supervision, portfolio 
management and book building method triggered a situation of unrest in the market.” 
(Financial Express 2010). The Commission was further chided for its frequently 
changing and inconsistent policies. The probe pulled no punches: “In most cases the 
securities regulator remained reluctant or took weak measures in containing irregularities 
that occurred during the bullish trend of the market. There was no effective indication in 
regulatory measures so that the market could be an equal field for all or the manipulations 
would be contained for the sake of all stakeholders” (Khaled 2011). Not all of these 
shortcomings should be laid at the feet of Commission officials. The Commission 
continually fell victim to a lack of political support and woefully inadequate funding. Its 
ability to hire expert personnel and maintain adequate staffing was especially hindered. In 
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the years running up to the crisis, the Commission had no chartered accountants and only 
one securities lawyer (The Economist 2012). Critics continue to criticize its lack of 
resources and politicization. Or as one prominent Bangladeshi economist complains, 
“What is questionable is the fact that the SEC is looking for recommendations from the 
same associations and institutions about whom there are allegations of market 
manipulation…most manipulators are leading ruling party members themselves" 
(Chowdhury 2011).  
  As I will argue in the upcoming chapters, the Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s lack of political insulation and its incompetence are inextricably 
linked. For instance, the terms and conditions of employment for Commission staff and 
outside consultants can only be altered with explicit government approval. As a result, 
blame for the Commission’s inability to retain even a single corporate accountant or a 
sufficient number of securities lawyers lies with the government as much as with the 
commissioners. Efforts by the Commission to redirect regulatory resources to stock 
market regulation and away from other activities were also circumscribed by politicians. 
The Commission’s organization, funding levels, and budget allocations are all subject to 
government veto before they can be adopted or changed. Charges that the SEC’s 
rulemaking and enforcement were politicized should also be unsurprising given the 
Commission’s legislative framework. In the BSEC statute of 1993, there is no formal 
statement of the Commission’s political independence or organizational autonomy; the 
government can remove commissioners under the vague pretext that the “continuation of 
[their] service will go against the public interest;” and most notably, the government can 
 6 
 
issue legally binding directions to the Commission regarding rulemaking and 
enforcement. Commission personnel were far from blameless, but their exposed political 
position undoubtedly contributed to their indecisive and ham-handed responses to the 
crisis. In the end, the Stock Market Scam of 2010-11 was not just a regulatory failure, but 
a political failure as well. 
  This raises the question: how would events have unfolded differently had the 
BSEC been more independent? Although commentators can only speculate, there is 
reason to believe that the 2010-2011 crash may have been less severe. With the freedom 
to hire outside advisers and consultants under attractive conditions, the commissioners 
could have supplemented their lack of legal and accounting expertise. Greater 
organizational and budgetary autonomy would have allowed scarce resources to be more 
quickly reallocated to stock market surveillance and the regulation of an increasingly 
opportunistic broker-dealer industry. Most importantly, an explicit guarantee of 
independence, protection from politically motivated dismissal, and full policy making 
discretion could have had two complementary effects. Assuming that any lack of 
discretion or independence is anathema to policy minded experts, greater agency 
independence could have attracted more qualified commissioners.
1
 Second, greater 
independence would have given the Commission wider latitude to confront, with less fear 
of reprisal, the politically connected issuers and financial intermediaries who stood at the 
                                               
1
 These assertions build upon the work of Gailmard and Patty who argue that added discretion and 
independence strengthens incentives for commissioners to invest in expertise and collect information. 
Without the ability to make real decisions, regulators and other bureaucrats have little incentive to become 
informed. For similar reasons, politicized organizations may repel experts interested in ‘making good 
policy,’ while remaining attractive to uninformed cronies and partisans (Gailmard and Patty 2007 & 2013).  
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center of the Scam. In sum, greater political insulation may not have prevented the crisis, 
but it would have likely made it less severe and the response more technically sound, 
consistent, and politically evenhanded.  
  While the events in Bangladesh are unique in terms of their violence and 
destruction, in other ways they are unremarkable. They are a historical echo that once 
again belies any claim that “this time is different” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010). The Great 
Stock Market Scam of 2010-11 is only the latest example of politicians’ lack of credible 
commitment to minority shareholder protection (MSP) and market integrity. 
Governments almost universally claim that they will respect investors’ rights and shield 
them from the powerful interests that populate the corporate and financial landscape. Yet 
across time, culture, legal tradition, and level of development, the confluence of 
regulatory failure, irrational exuberance, and special interest influence have revealed 
these commitments to be fragile at best and outright shams at worst. Even if crises and 
scandal are largely avoided, investor protections may still be eroded bit by bit as 
legislation passed in the name of transparency or fairness is implemented in ways that 
allow for more insidious forms of shareholder expropriation and market manipulation.   
  This is not to say that governments and their regulatory agents always fail and 
shareholders are always exploited. In fact, global trends suggest that investors are 
increasingly confident in their rights, and this confidence is manifested in the growing 
size, liquidity, and efficiency of stock markets. Throughout the world, stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP, value traded as a percentage of GDP, and share 
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turnover have all increased by at least four fold over the last four decades. These 
increases are consistent across upper, middle, and lower income countries (see Figure 1.1 
below). 
      Figure 1.1       
(Global Stock Market Development Trends) 
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  Despite this general trend, there remains remarkable variation both across 
countries and within countries overtime with regards to shareholders’ faith in their rights 
and stock market development more generally. Within North America, Western Europe, 
Japan, and South Korea where property rights are secure and stock markets are uniformly 
more developed, market capitalization to GDP’s between and within country standard 
deviations are still 39 and 36 percent respectively over the 1988-2012 period. Variation in 
market capitalization across the rest of the world is similar with between and within 
country standard deviations of 45 and 30 percent respectively. In sum, even as the policy 
promises of the ‘average’ politician become more investor friendly, the strength of these 
promises remains uneven across countries and over time. The goal of this dissertation is 
to explain this variation in strength. More exactly, it asks: once politicians make 
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commitments to investor protection and equity market development, what political 
conditions will lend their commitments greater or lesser credibility? I will argue that 
politically independent regulatory organizations and consensual political institutions will 
both be credibility enhancing. As a result, variations in the political insulation of 
regulatory actors, the number of policy making veto players, and the increasing 
proportionality of electoral institutions should all be consistently associated with 
increases in stock market development and performance. 
  Before delving into this argument further, questions remain: why would 
politicians commit to investor protection and stock market development in the first place? 
Why would politicians commit to economic institutions that come with certain risks, but 
uncertain benefits? Stock market crashes can endanger incumbents’ hold on power or 
force them to confront their allies within the corporate community. Poor stock market 
performance and a lack of market integrity can undermine the political feasibility of 
multi-pillar pension reforms as well as weaken the political sustainability of systems that 
are already (partially) privatized (Kritzer, Kay, and Sihna 2011). Furthermore, stock 
market development’s macroeconomic benefits are far from immediate, and its 
distributive effects can threaten core constituencies on both the left and right. Despite 
these risks, stock markets exist in nearly every country on earth and politicians’ almost 
always pay at least some lip service toward protecting equity investors. The question is 
why? 
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Politics, Power, and Exchange Development  
 Especially in Anglo-American countries, proponents of equity based finance 
argue that exchanges can be the key to solving the principal agent problems that emerge 
when corporate ownership is separated from control. By definition, minority shareholders 
(i.e. non-controlling) lack the equity stakes necessary to influence management as 
individuals. In addition, their large numbers and diverse financial holdings create 
significant collective action problems with regards to monitoring and sanctioning poorly 
performing board directors or senior managers. Coordination costs are significant; the 
potential benefits of monitoring are small; and freeriding on the efforts of other 
shareholders is always a temptation. So what is to prevent managers and boards from 
shirking their duties or exploiting shareholders who are too disorganized to monitor or 
punish them? If shares are freely transferrable and markets sufficiently liquid, dissatisfied 
shareholders can exercise “exit” by selling their shares. To the degree that this “Wall 
Street Walk” reduces companies’ stock prices, their costs of equity capital increase, and 
their managers are left more vulnerable to takeover. Senior executives--who want to 
maintain their control of the firm and maximize equity based compensation--will respond 
to price drops by changing company policies in ways that please shareholders and 
increase their firms’ stock price. In sum, even when shareholders lack the individual 
economic power to pressure managers and/or have difficultly coordinating with others,  
stock prices can disseminate valuable information on managerial performance and serve 
as a powerful disciplinary force. 
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 Econometric evidence suggests that there is some merit to this story. To the extent 
stock markets directly promote more efficient firm governance and provide entrepreneurs 
with needed financing, they should promote economic growth. In a survey on the cross-
national empirical finance literature, Paşalı (2013) finds that depending upon the study  
  “the effect of stock market liquidity on economic growth is significantly positive  
  and ranges between 0.5 and 1.14 percent in response to a 10 percentage point  
  increase in a stock market proxy. Stock market liquidity is found to be more  
  robustly (both statistically and economically) associated with economic growth  
  than is stock market capitalization”(7).       
   
 Despite this evidence, many commentators suggest that these positive effects 
come with costs that may be even more significant. Rather than engines of economic 
growth, stock markets are often maligned as promoting unproductive speculation, 
damaging short-termism, employment volatility, economic inequality, and crisis. 
 This critique is implicitly adopted by politicians and business elites in continental 
Europe and East Asia who point to the historical success of more bank-based financial 
systems. The bank-led blockholder model is said to have several clear advantages over 
more market based forms of corporate governance and finance. First, concentrated and/or 
controlling shareholders will have both the incentives and the sophistication needed to 
closely monitor managerial performance thereby ameliorating the principal agent-
problems that plague corporate firms. Second, “patient capital” gives managers greater 
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freedom to adopt a longer-term perspective and pursue higher-end production strategies 
that rely on firm and industry specific investments, high-paid skilled labor, and interfirm 
coordination (Hall and Soskice 2001). More patient bank-based financial systems are also 
associated with more egalitarian distributions of income, generous welfare states, and 
reduced employment risk (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Jackson and Vitols 2001; Estevez 
Abe 2001). In developing and/or non-democratic countries, concentrated shareholding 
and bank financing characterize the large and diversified business groups that dominate 
economic production. These groups are often seen as the best way to protect firms from 
the negative effects of political uncertainty, institutional weakness, and scare credit 
(Khanna and Yafeh 2007; Schneider 2009).  
 Controversy over the virtues and vices of stock market versus bank-blockholder 
financial systems will continue because both models expose shareholders and other 
stakeholders to the greed and malfeasance of corporate insiders. While market-based 
systems may leave shareholders and other stakeholders vulnerable to entrenched 
professional managers, bank-based blockholding systems leave them vulnerable to 
expropriation at the hands of controlling owners and/or founding families. Although 
yielding valuable insights regarding the distributive consequences of corporate finance 
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and governance, viewing these issues solely in terms of Anglo-American versus Rhenish 
capitalism or liberal versus coordinated market economies is incomplete. Such a 
framework has little to offer in terms of explaining why stock markets have diffused 
across nearly every corner of the globe, or why they have thrived in some developing 
nations while stagnating in others. A more historical approach suggests that commitments 
to stock market development are often deeply embedded within explicitly political 
projects such as colonial expansion, post-colonial independence, coalition building, and 
state-led economic development.  
 State Sources of Developmental Commitment 
  Like the bond markets that emerged as the result of state borrowing, equity 
markets first emerged in Europe as the result of state-led mercantilist colonial expansion.  
The Dutch and British East India companies are only the most famous of a larger number 
of colonial enterprises that spurred secondary securities markets in Amsterdam and 
London. Colonial administrators also promoted exchanges in Egypt, South Africa, India, 
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Korea, Indonesia, China, and Sri 
Lanka. These markets were explicitly designed to serve the financial needs of merchant, 
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banking, mining, railroad, and plantation elites as they extracted wealth on behalf of 
European metropoles. 
 Ironically, post-colonial economic nationalism was another key driver exchange 
establishment and growth. Although some colonial era exchanges were abolished or 
withered away in the wake of communist revolution or widespread nationalization, others 
remained tools of newly independent state elites. Or as Kathryn Lavelle argues, many 
governments “moved to establish a national stock exchange regardless of its institutional 
compatibility with broader developmental goals…the exchanges were promoted as 
symbols of nationhood and were connected to the state’s economic prestige in the same 
way…battleships symbolized military might”(55). Although projects of national vanity in 
some nations, they were valuable tools of economic indigenization in others. Exchanges 
in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria were either established or 
underwent significant growth due to state restrictions on foreign ownership and 
mandatory listings of transnational corporations (Lavelle 53-56). 
 The urgency of mass privatization in the former Soviet Union, neo-liberal reforms 
in Western Europe, and the abandonment of state dominated industrialization in the 
global south also spurred stock market establishment and growth. The desire for 
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efficiency in newly liberalized corporate sectors was obviously a key consideration, but 
privatization programs were also designed to send explicitly political signals to investors 
and the public. Or as Perotti and Oijen (1999) argue, “a sustained privatization program 
represents a major political test which gradually resolves uncertainty over political 
commitment to a market-oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property 
rights…In particular, successful privatization… broadens the appeal and confidence in 
equity investment” (1-2). Particularly in countries where both investors and governments 
have little experience with stock markets, privatization is a clear opportunity for 
politicians, regulators, and exchange officials to demonstrate their commitments to 
investor protection and market integrity. The political benefits may not end there. Biais 
and Perrotti (2002) argue that privatization and stock market development may be 
pursued for explicitly partisan ends. They argue,  
  strategic privatization can build political support for right-wing parties … even   
  when median-class voters are likely to support the redistributive policies of the  
  left, once they  are allocated a significant amount of shares in the privatized firm,  
  their preferences can shift towards right-wing, market-oriented policies. This is  
  not the result of gratitude: rather, their shareholdings make them averse to elect  
  politicians whose redistributive policies would reduce the value of their   
  investment (240-41). 
In short, economic growth and good corporate governance are sometimes only secondary 
concerns; politicians may commit to equity market development as a means to win 
elections and prevent redistribution.  
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 Similarly “Machiavellian” motivations may be at work in the single-party regimes 
of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Although true privatization has proceeded 
slowly, they have all established stock markets either independently (China, Vietnam) or 
as joint ventures with foreign exchanges (Cambodia, Laos). Their aims are similar: 
diffuse non-controlling equity stakes of state-owned enterprises among the general 
population and introduce greater efficiency and transparency into their corporate sectors.  
Since their hold on power depends upon their ability to deliver superior economic 
performance, their embrace of equity markets is as much as product of political 
calculation as it is a desire for modernization. 
 Although the exigencies of post-colonial and post-Soviet transition have faded, 
stock market development and commitments to investor protection remain key 
components of state strategies for economic independence and development. Particularly 
in East Asia where memories of the 1994 financial crisis are still raw, countries have 
sought to develop domestic equity markets and shareholder bases as a way to reduce their 
dependence upon foreign bondholders, volatile international portfolio flows, and short-
term loans from opaque and less than competitive local banking sectors (Cameron 154).  
Overall, countries have come to recognize the benefits of equity over debt because the 
latter “requires regulator payment regardless of the borrower’s economic 
circumstances…an equity contract involves risk sharing—large payouts for shareholders 
when times are good and little to nothing when times are bad…variations in profits and 
dividends are pro-cyclical and tend to stabilize the balance of payments” (Henry and 
Lorentzen 182). In short, states may commit to stock markets development as a way to 
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free domestic firms from the rigid grip of foreign bond holders and the high priced debt 
of local bankers.  
 Even in the highly internationalized and financially advanced economies of the 
United Kingdom and France, political and economic elites often view stock exchanges as 
distinctly national assets that are the key to international competitiveness.  In 2006, the 
UK’s Chancellor Gordon Brown created the High-Level City Group that was tasked with 
improving the City of London’s global reach and reputation. A central focus of the 
Group’s activities was the development of the country’s securities markets and the 
regulations that supported them.  In a press release regarding the Group’s work, Ed Balls, 
then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, stated, “If we get key decisions right, as we are 
doing with regulation of exchanges, and continue to attract the best talent from around 
the world, I believe that we can entrench London as the key financial centre of the 21st 
century” (emphasis added). Similarly nationalist sentiments were expressed by French 
politicians and business leaders in their failed attempt to prevent the NYSE from 
acquiring the Paris Bourse’s parent company Euronext. The French Socialist Party called 
on the government to “immediately take … responsible action by opposing the merger in 
such a way that economic patriotism, be it French or European, does not remain a mere 
slogan” (AFP, December 20, 2006). This attitude was echoed across the political 
spectrum. Axel Miller, CEO of the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, complained after the 
merger that “the finance ministers should have taken care of this matter …The stock 
exchange is a vital instrument for growth and employment, and for the market economy 
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at large. The failure to preserve it reveals the current political void” (Les Echos, 
December 18, 2006).  
 To summarize, stock exchanges and the investor protections that allow them to 
thrive are about far more than solving principal agent problems within the firm or 
promoting economic growth. In the 19
th 
and early 20
th
 centuries, they were used to 
marshal financial resources for colonial expansion and extraction. Following WWII, post-
colonial governments viewed stock markets as valuable tools with which to indigenize 
corporate ownership. More recently, the establishment of exchanges and investor 
protections were utilized to facilitate highly politicized processes of privatization and to 
signal governments’ dedication to economic modernization and reform. 
  Despite increases in cross-border listings, the emergence of global exchange 
companies, and increased international portfolio flows, battles over investor protection, 
exchange governance, and stock market development remain largely domestic. Investors 
continue to exhibit a strong bias in favor of equities issued by local and domestic 
companies. Many stock markets continue to enjoy political support in the name of 
“economic patriotism” (Wójcik 2011; Clift and Woll 2012). In countries with multi-pillar 
retirement systems, regulators often place a hard cap on foreign equity ownership or 
require that a minimum percentage of pension assets be held in domestic stocks (OECD 
2015).  
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Dissertation Goals and Dependent Variables 
 Although commitments to stock market development are nearly universal, some 
exchanges receive more political and regulatory support than others. Furthermore, not all 
home biased investors are rewarded for their national loyalty with strong and consistently 
enforced shareholder protections and market integrity. As a result, the actual role that 
stock exchanges play in corporate finance ranges from purely symbolic to indispensable.  
The goal of this dissertation is to explain this variation. Like previous approaches, I will 
emphasize the role of political institutions in solidifying politicians’ commitments to 
investor protection and market integrity. Unlike past research, I will not subsume public 
and private regulators under the broader concept of regulation. They will be treated as 
important actors in their own right capable of making unique contributions to stock 
market development.  
 Different political and regulatory institutions will make politicians’ commitments 
to MSP and market integrity more or less credible. When retail investors and minority 
shareholders believe politicians’ commitments, they will invest more and equity markets 
will become more developed. But what exactly constitutes development? I settle upon 
four different measures all of which speak to some different aspect of the concept. My 
most encompassing measure of equity market development is the stock market 
capitalization of domestically listed companies as a percentage of GDP. Also known as 
equity share, it is an indirect and imperfect measure. However, past literature consistently 
identifies equity share as a reliable reflection of investor confidence in the overall 
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functioning of financial markets and in the legal and regulatory system’s capacity to 
protect their rights. It is also a rough indicator of the intensity of the general populace’s 
participation in stock markets. My second measure is annual percentage price growth in 
national benchmark stock indices as compiled by Standard and Poor. These composite 
indices of investment grade equities are the broadest available measure of country level 
stock market performance, and they are the standard by which investors judge the 
performance of their own portfolios. Price growth in benchmark indices can be viewed as 
a market-wide average of changes in investor sentiment regarding the value of individual 
companies’ equity securities. Unlike equity share that is of greatest interest to academic 
audiences, the performance of benchmark indices are widely reported in the media. 
 Closely related to index price growth is index price volatility. More specifically, I 
utilize the relative standard deviation of national composite index prices. While volatility 
is not bad in and of itself, the large spikes in volatility that often accompany financial 
crisis or bear markets may reflect a lack of liquidity, poor information, ineffective price 
discovery, and/or speculative herd behavior. Particularly during crisis, containing equity 
market volatility is often the top priority of securities market regulators and finance 
ministers. A failure to do so can scare away the risk averse, undermine investor 
confidence, and lead to overly aggressive policy responses that can repress stock market 
development for decades.  
 My final indicator of equity market development is the degree to which corporate 
elites have a realistic grasp of the formal level of minority shareholder protections within 
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their regulatory jurisdiction. Although not a measure of stock market development per se, 
accuracy in senior executive perceptions of MSP strength may indicate that investor 
protections are consistently enforced and have substantive meaning to market actors. If 
the ‘average’ executive has a poor understanding of the strength of investor protection, it 
is likely that these rules have little impact on how corporate insiders treat non-controlling 
shareholders. Overall, the accuracy of executive opinions regarding MSP should be a 
good indicator of the degree to which pro-shareholder norms have diffused across 
business elites. 
 To sum up, I will argue that political and regulatory institutions are the basis of 
politicians’ policy credibility and of stock market development more generally. While 
institutions’ impact on equity market size is important, their influence goes well beyond 
it. If politicians commitments to MSP and market integrity are credible, stock markets 
will not only be larger, they may be better performing and less susceptible to damaging 
bouts of volatility. In addition, if regulators consistently and impartially implement MSP, 
they will be transformed from an abstract set of rules that corporate insiders can safely 
ignore into something that inspires considerable conflict among investors, politicians, and 
business elites.  
Argument Summarized 
 As the previous section made clear, politicians may have explicitly political 
reasons to protect investors and promote stock market development. But as the scenes 
from Bangladesh so dramatically highlight, they often have difficulty following through 
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on their regulatory promises. Equity markets and shareholder-centered corporate 
governance have important distributive consequences that can awaken powerful anti-
investor constituencies. More specifically, controlling shareholders, senior executives, 
and incumbent firms may all lose when minority shareholder protections (MSP) and 
market integrity are strong and consistently implemented. I argue that since these groups 
can more easily engage in collective action, are politically sophisticated, and possess 
greater expertise as compared to politicians and minority shareholders, their anti-
MSP/integrity lobbying efforts will be particularly effective in undermining politicians’ 
regulatory commitments. The existence of potentially powerful anti-MSP constituencies 
across the political spectrum also means that neither the political left nor right will be 
inherently better at resisting anti-investor mobilization. 
 Crisis and corporate scandal may temporarily undermine the lobbying power of 
corporate insiders (i.e. controlling/block shareholders and senior executives), facilitate 
the collective action of small investors, and create powerful electoral incentives for 
politicians to renew their pro-investor policy commitments. However, these post-crisis 
commitments may last only as long as issues of financial regulation and corporate 
governance remain politically salient. As the memory of crisis or scandal fades and 
minority shareholders demobilize, politicians will lose interest in corporate governance 
issues at the precise time when important questions of policy implementation move onto 
the regulatory agenda. As a result, political commitments to MSP and market integrity 
may not only be non-credible due to corporate insiders’ lobbying activities, but these 
commitments’ cyclical nature may also make them time inconsistent. 
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 Despite all these political forces aligned against commitments to stock market 
development, I argue that political and regulatory institutions may go some way toward 
making politicians’ pro-investor policy promises more credible. For the reasons 
highlighted by Lijphart (1999) and Tsebelis (2002), consensual political institutions (e.g. 
more veto players and proportional elections) should reduce the frequency and scale of 
regulatory policy change. More numerous veto players may also dilute the lobbying 
efforts of corporate insiders and make anti-investor policy collusion more costly 
(Gehlbach and Malesky 2010; Andrews and Montinola 2004). Proportional elections can 
have additional benefits in terms of facilitating the adoption of controversial pro-
shareholder regulatory reforms. More specifically, they should more consistently give 
shareholders and retail investors political representation, facilitate side payments to the 
losers of financial reforms, and create a more favorable bargaining environment by 
removing the specter of “winner-take-all” elections.  
 In countries where consensual political institutions are absent, politicians’ 
commitments to MSP and market integrity will be particularly non-credible. A lack of 
veto players and majoritarian elections can undermine the stability of regulatory policies 
and lead to policy incoherence as new regulatory priorities are adopted each time a new 
incumbent takes office. The wide representational swings associated with majoritarian 
elections make the electoral and policy bargaining environments more zero-sum. It is in 
these non-consensual political contexts where the delegation of financial policy discretion 
to politically independent regulatory agents will assume its greatest importance in the 
eyes of minority shareholders. Knowing that political institutions will do little to 
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constrain politicians’ policy whims or strengthen their commitments, small investors will 
be more closely attuned to the level of political independence enjoyed by regulatory 
organizations both public and private.  
 Delegation to politically insulated regulatory agents should have a number of 
advantages for credibility seeking politicians. These advantages will most clearly emerge 
when a lack of veto players and majoritarian electoral competition make politicians’ 
regulatory policy commitments particularly weak. Regulatory agencies are specifically 
designed to maintain policy specialization and continuously monitor industry conditions 
regardless of political saliency. This specialization is essential in regulatory debates 
where expertise and information are decisive power resources. Their isolation from 
electoral accountability and protection from politically motivated dismissal should extend 
their time horizons beyond the next election, limit those forms of regulatory capture that 
operate through politicians, decouple regulatory policy change from incumbent turnover, 
create incentives for the acquisition of expertise, and make policy implementation more 
impartial. Like consensual political institutions, delegation to independent regulators can 
also diminish the waves of deregulation and re-regulation that emerge due to booms and 
busts in asset values.  
 I am not saying that regulatory agencies are purely publically interested angels 
who produce perfectly neutral policies. Regulators will bring their own policy 
preferences, career concerns, and ideological leanings into the organizations they serve. 
Furthermore, they will never be completely immune from political interference or 
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industry capture. Formal independence should not be viewed as a magical elixir that 
confers absolute technical detachment or political evenhandedness. Independence is not 
all or nothing. Instead, various statutory features of independence (e.g. term-lengths, 
budget autonomy, dismissal language, appointment/dismissal procedures) serve only to 
raise the costs faced by politicians seeking to influence regulators. To the extent industry 
capture requires the active participation of regulators' political principals, formal 
independence will mitigate but not eliminate industry pressure as prosecuted by 
industry’s political allies. Like all bureaucratic organizations, independent regulators 
have their flaws and biases. But as I will demonstrate, they are superior to the alternative: 
stock market regulation conducted by finance ministries and/or more politicized 
executive bureaucracies. 
 Similar to independent public regulators, private self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs) such as stock exchanges or associations of broker-dealers should also be better 
positioned than politicians to conduct the day to day tasks of securities market and 
corporate governance regulation. In comparison to public regulators, they are even closer 
to market participants and enjoy tacit knowledge of industry practices. They are also 
likely to be more flexible in the face of rapid innovation and possess greater legitimacy in 
the eyes of industry actors. By definition, self-regulatory organizations are captured by 
the financial industry because they are a part of the financial industry. As a result, there is 
an ever-present danger that their regulatory activities will be anti-competitive, overly 
permissive, or opportunistic vis-à-vis the interests of financial service consumers.  
However, a situation in which exchange governance is directly conducted by political 
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officials would likely be even worse for investors. Despite the risks of private self-
regulation, there is little to be gained by directly injecting politicians’ credibility 
problems into the day-to-day operation of securities market infrastructures.  
 Although political consensualism and delegation to public and private regulators 
should enhance politicians’ credibility during normal times, how do these institutions 
perform in times of high uncertainty? I will argue that these institutions will continue to 
have beneficial effects even in times of systemic crisis. A larger number veto players 
increases the chances that at least one player will represent the interests of equity 
investors as policy responses are crafted. Regulatory independence should better ensure 
that corporate insiders and their political allies do not exploit the confusion of crisis 
conditions to expropriate minority shareholders, manipulate markets, or shift a 
disproportionate share of losses onto retail investors. However, these benefits of 
credibility are not without costs. As veto players become more numerous, regulators 
more independent, and exchange governance less politicized, coordination costs will 
increase and bargaining over mutually acceptable policy solutions and market 
interventions will be more intensive and protracted. This delay and added negotiation 
may exacerbate market volatility in the short term even as the credibility effects of veto 
players and regulatory independence prevent catastrophic drops in stock prices. Although 
the benefits of consensualism and independence outweigh the costs even in times of 
crisis, periods of market turmoil nevertheless highlight these institutions shortcomings.  
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Plan of Dissertation 
 In order to test these claims, I constructed two novel datasets that will be utilized 
in the upcoming chapters. The first is used to produce a yearly latent measure of formal 
public regulatory independence for over 100 countries dating back to 1975. The second 
dataset features information on the following features of exchange and securities industry 
governance: state ownership of stock exchanges; the presence of regulators, politicians, 
and their appointees on stock exchange boards; the existence of statutory frameworks that 
encourage industry self-regulation; and the existence of officially recognized self-
regulatory organizations. This information is then used to develop a yearly index measure 
of depoliticized exchange governance and self-regulation. By “depoliticized” I do not 
mean that securities industry governance is somehow outside of political debate, interest 
group struggle, or public oversight. More modestly, fully “depoliticized” exchange 
governance and self-regulation is defined as a situation in which the operation and 
management of exchange infrastructures is free from the direct participation of public 
officials and therefore fully private. Furthermore, securities legislation formally delegates 
important regulatory power to industry controlled self-regulatory organizations. I label 
this latent “depoliticized self-regulation” index DSRO. As with public regulators, DSRO 
covers over 100 countries and dates back to 1975. These two measures, in conjunction 
with preexisting measures of political institutions and macroeconomic controls, are 
included in a series of cross-sectional time series regressions. The goal of these empirical 
models will be to determine regulatory independence and DSRO’s association with stock 
market size, performance, and volatility 
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 The remainder of this dissertation will proceed as follows. The second chapter 
will review the well-developed literature on delegation, regulatory capitalism, and 
financial development. It will also emphasize the endemic nature of commitment 
problems in financial policymaking and regulation. Furthermore, the chapter will explain 
why both political institutions and delegation to regulatory agencies or SROs can help to 
solidify politicians’ policy commitments to investor protection and securities market 
integrity. Possible objections to my theoretical framework will be addressed, and the 
theoretical propositions that will be evaluated in following chapters will be specified. 
 The third chapter will present a series of empirical models designed to evaluate 
whether consensual political institutions and public regulatory independence does in fact 
enhance politicians’ credibility with regard to investor protection and market integrity. 
Under the assumption that greater credibility will lead to greater stock market 
development, I estimate the strength of association between veto players, electoral 
institutions, and public regulator independence on the one hand, and stock market size 
and performance on the other. The third chapter also evaluates the conditions under 
which regulatory agency independence will be more or less important. Since consensual 
political institutions appear to lessen politicians’ credibility problems, I investigate 
whether the effects of regulatory independence on stock market development and 
performance diminish as political institutions grow more consensual. In line with 
expectations, I find a substitutive relationship between credibility enhancing regulatory 
institutions and credibility enhancing political institutions. This suggests that one will be 
more essential to stock market development if the other is lacking. Stated differently, if 
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political institutions create an environment in which politicians are already credible 
guardians of MSP, shielding regulators from their influence will have fewer added 
benefits in terms of stock market development.   
 Given that the balance of interest group mobilization is so influential in terms of 
politicians’ regulatory commitments, Chapter 3 also investigates whether credibility 
enhancing political and regulatory institutions are more important when anti-MSP 
interests are particularly powerful. Although a direct measure of interest group 
mobilization would be ideal, the lack of such a measure forced me to rely on an 
alternative proxy for asymmetries in lobbying power. In line with the work of Rajan and 
Zingales (2003), I assume that underdeveloped credit markets are highly effective 
barriers to entry. When credit is scarce, anti-MSP incumbent firms will be larger, fewer in 
number, richer due to large economic rents, and better connected with politicians. Credit 
market underdevelopment should also lessen ordinary citizens’ knowledge of and 
political stake in the formal financial system. For both of these reasons, the supply of 
credit as a percentage of GDP can be a crude though still meaningful proxy of corporate 
insiders’ lobbying advantages. If these lobbying advantages are particularly formidable, 
the special interest dilution effects of consensual political institutions and independent 
regulators should be all the more important for maintaining political commitments to 
MSP and market integrity. Although sensitive to alternative specifications, I do find that 
consensual institutions and regulatory independence have a stronger association with 
market capitalization to GDP when the supply of credit is smaller relative to GDP.  
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 The forth chapter digs deeper into the question of anti-MSP mobilization. It does 
so by surveying the opinions of those who have the most to lose from the full and 
stringent implementation of MSP—senior executives. If political consensualism and 
formal regulatory independence are substantively associated with executives’ opinions of 
minority shareholder protection, it would be direct evidence that these institutions 
meaningfully shape regulatory practice. While consensual political institutions appear to 
have little to no effects, regulatory independence does emerge as a key driver of 
executive opinion regarding investor protections even after controlling for formal levels 
of MSP. More exactly, independent regulators’ more consistent and impartial 
implementation of MSP appears to increase executives’ realism with regards to the 
formal strength of investor protections in their country. This finding is helpful in 
identifying where independent regulators will inspire the most opposition from corporate 
insiders. The link between independence and elite opinion is strongest where executive 
opinions of MSP strength are more optimistic than expert legal assessments; where 
property rights are strong but there are historical traditions of concentrated corporate 
ownership; and where stock markets are not the most developed in terms of size or 
liquidity. It is within these countries where the activities of independent agencies may 
come as a rude awakening for corporate insiders unaccustomed to the discipline of equity 
markets or regulation more slanted towards the interests of outside investors. 
 The fifth chapter explores whether delegation to privately governed self-
regulatory organizations produces similar credibility enhancements as delegation to 
public regulatory agencies. It begins by describing my second dataset of non-private 
 31 
 
exchange ownership, exchange governance, and self-regulation. The description reveals 
that in many countries stock exchanges are anything but symbols of free market 
capitalism. They can be state-owned enterprises that are not just closely monitored by 
governments, but are directly operated by them as well. I then evaluate whether 
depoliticized self-regulation (DSRO) is associated with stock market size and 
performance both before and after controlling for public regulatory independence and 
consensual political institutions. Results are mixed and not robust across all 
specifications, but there is evidence that depoliticized self-regulation is positively 
associated with stock market size and to a lesser extent with stock market performance. 
This finding has two important implications. First, it demonstrates that directly injecting 
politicians’ credibility problems into the governance of equity market infrastructures will 
discourage equity market investment. Second, it suggests that the retention of regulatory 
power by the private securities industry will not necessarily lead to anti-competitive 
behavior or the cartelistic elevation of broker-dealer interests over those of retail 
investors. Overall, it appears that both public regulatory independence and depoliticized 
exchange self-regulation ease politicians’ credibility problems and therefore boost stock 
market development. 
 The sixth chapter begins with a discussion of how the nature of politicians’ 
commitment problems may change when ‘normal times’ give way to periods of 
uncertainty and panic. Equity investors ordinarily place a high value upon policy 
stability, but the onset of crisis often generates a seemingly conflicting demand for 
immediate policy responsiveness. The empirical analysis explores this conflict to see if 
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the stability based virtues of political consensualism, regulatory independence, and 
depoliticized self-regulation become institutional vices with the onset of systemic crisis. 
Results indicate that all three sets of institutions continue to have beneficial effects, but 
these benefits involve a tradeoff between minimizing investor losses and reducing market 
price fluctuations. More specifically, numerous veto players, more independent 
regulators, and more depoliticized exchange governance all seem to minimize stock index 
price declines during crisis. This likely reflects these institutions’ associations with better 
corporate governance practices prior to the crisis as well as their ability to reduce 
politicians and corporate-insiders’ anti-investor opportunism during crisis. However, 
these same institutions also seem to exacerbate crisis-period stock index volatility. This 
may be because they prevent politicians from adopting the quickest and most decisive 
responses to market turmoil. The seventh and concluding chapter will summarize 
previous results, explain their implications in terms of past literature, and outline future 
lines of inquiry.  
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Chapter 2 
Theory and Literature Review 
 In both the developed and developing world, the last forty years have witnessed a 
fundamental reordering of the role of the state in economic production and distribution. 
As public ownership and closed economies have given way to privatization and free 
markets, independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have emerged as handmaidens of 
financial liberalization and increasingly powerful moderators between the interests of 
politicians, private firms, and consumers. Once a distinctly American phenomenon, IRAs 
have diffused across countries and economic sectors. While all commentators recognize 
the increasing importance of the regulatory state in economic and social governance, 
others have gone so far as to describe IRAs as the expression of a new form of 
“regulatory capitalism” (Levi-Faur 2005 & 2006; Moran 2010). 
 Previous theoretical and empirical work made substantial progress in explaining 
the domestic and international forces behind IRAs’ diffusion as well as the institutional 
bases of their independence and autonomy. Scholars continue to engage in unresolved 
debates about IRAs’ legitimacy, their neutrality in the face of political pressure and 
interest group lobbying, and their ability to deliver superior outcomes as compared to 
politicians and politicized executive bureaucracies. This chapter will address all of these 
debates, but it will remain agnostic as to the legitimacy of IRAs or whether they are 
captured by firms and industry interest groups. Instead, I will focus upon a more narrow 
set of questions in this and the following empirical chapters: 1) is delegation to polit ically 
independent regulatory organizations, both public and private, an effective commitment 
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mechanism for politicians interested in protecting minority investors and ensuring the 
integrity of equity markets, and 2) will the credibility effects of delegation increase as the 
formal political independence of IRAs and SROs increases as well. Although informed 
by research on monetary policy and the regulation of utilities, the core of the theoretical 
discussion will remain focused upon the particular commitment problems facing 
politicians with regard to equity markets, and how these commitment problems vary 
across political institutions.  
 This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will outline the previous literature on 
delegation and the regulatory state in order to place my argument in broader context. 
Second, I will review the rapidly growing literature on regulatory capitalism with specific 
reference to the political forces and institutions that explain the diffusion of IRAs and 
their independence. The ability of regulatory independence to enhance policy 
commitments as well as the threats posed by various forms of industry capture will also 
be discussed. After these preliminaries, I will describe the sources of various commitment 
problems facing politicians with regard to stock market development and why delegation 
to politically independent public agencies and private SROs can bolster politicians’ 
credibility. Next, I will discuss how political institutions can alter the severity of policy 
commitment problems within equity markets and how this variation in severity makes 
regulatory independence more or less important for equity market development. I will 
discuss possible objections to my key theoretical assertions including how the nature of 
policy commitments may change in times of systemic financial crisis. The final section 
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will summarize my overall argument and lay out a series of theoretical propositions that 
form the bases of the hypotheses tested within the empirical chapters.  
Drivers of Delegation  
 Legislators often lack the knowledge, expertise, and foresight necessary to secure 
their desired policy outcomes. No piece of legislation, no matter how detailed or cleverly 
crafted can account for every possible contingency or every possible set of future 
circumstances. In sectors such as finance that are characterized by high levels of 
complexity and innovation, the connections between broad statutes and specific policy 
outcomes are especially uncertain. Assuming sufficient bureaucratic capacity, this 
uncertainty creates strong incentives for the delegation of policy implementation to 
specialized bureaucratic actors (Huber and McCarty 2004; Bawn 1995). American 
scholars have long highlighted the political consequences that emerge from acts of 
delegation. Their work is often based on two key assumptions. First, they assume that 
legislators would prefer to delegate to ideological allies (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 
Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 2001; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Gailmard and Patty 
2012). Second, when they cannot delegate to ideological allies, they seek ways to limit 
the discretion of their bureaucratic agents so that policy does not stray too far from their 
preferences. The need to limit agent discretion is particularly crucial because the qualities 
that make bureaucrats superior policy implementers (i.e.  information and expertise), are 
the same qualities that give them power over their political principals (Fiorina 1986; 
McCubbins 1986). 
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 The implications of this imbalance for separation of powers systems have been 
exhaustively explored. McCubbins, Noll and Wiengast (1987,1989), Epstein and 
O’Halloran (1996,1999), Kiewiet and McCubbins(1991), and Huber and Shipan (2002) 
all argue that elaborate administrative procedures and restrictive statutes are key 
resources in legislators' struggle to limit executive discretion. If legislative-executive 
conflict is sufficiently severe, legislators may seek to avoid executive branch 
implementation all-together by delegating to independent commissions rather than 
executive branch departments (Volden 2002; Wood and Bohte 2004). According to Moe 
(1989,1990), these same statutory, organizational, and procedural instruments not only 
constrain bureaucrats in the present, they can constrain executive bureaucrats, legislative 
majorities, and interest group coalitions in the future. Even in the absence of separation of 
powers, the struggle to circumscribe bureaucratic discretion remains. Within 
parliamentary systems, clashes between cabinet officials on the one hand and career civil 
servants and ministry bureaucrats on the other are well documented (Plowden 1994; 
Dowding 1995). Like their counterparts in separation of powers systems, parliamentary 
legislators respond to this conflict by writing more specific statutes deliberately designed 
to limit the discretion of bureaucratic actors and coalition partners (Huber and Shipan 
2002)  
 Despite significant progress, canonical principal-agent theory and the literature on 
legislative-executive relations fits awkwardly with the widespread diffusion of 
independent regulatory agencies and central bank independence (CBI). In both cases 
political principals violate the “ally principle” and deliberately delegate policy discretion 
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to bureaucratic agents who do not share their preferences. Previous literature has 
numerous explanations. But one of the most powerful is politicians’ search for credible 
policy commitment. 
 Credible commitment problems are typically described in terms of a simple game 
(see Bendor et. al 2001 for a review). In terms of equity markets, the game follows the 
following logic. Politicians make a commitment in the first stage of the game (e.g. protect 
investors and market integrity). This commitment can take the form of “a promise, 
pledge, vow, covenant, guarantee, or bond to perform in a specific fashion” (Shepsle 
1991). In the second stage, constituents take some sort of action conditional on their 
beliefs about the politician’s commitment (e.g. invest or not invest in equity markets). In 
the third stage, the politician moves again by either maintaining (e.g. protecting investors 
and market integrity) or reneging on their promise (e.g. shirking regulatory duties and 
allowing investor expropriation). The assumption is that everyone would be better off 
(e.g. more developed equity markets and economic growth) if the politician fulfills their 
commitment, but for some reason it is suboptimal for the politician to do so in the short 
term (e.g. political contributions from corporate insiders/financial industry). If 
constituents anticipate this broken promise, they may refuse to invest or invest 
suboptimally in stage two leaving everyone worse off. Similar game theoretic approaches 
have been fruitfully utilized to describe commitment problems in monetary and exchange 
rate policy, foreign direct investment, the governance of utilities and other natural 
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monopolies, and banking regulation.
2
 In all instances, politicians make a commitment 
that they cannot adhere too, economic actors (e.g. investors, firms, workers, consumers) 
recognize the non-credibility of a particular policy commitment, and then rationally 
respond in ways that leaves everyone worse off as compared to what would occur if 
politicians were more credible. 
 When politicians’ commitments lack credibility but they sincerely seek the 
outcomes that would occur if their commitments were seen as credible, delegation to 
independent actors with different preferences becomes increasingly attractive. In terms of 
price stability, this takes the form of delegating monetary policy to politically insulated 
central bankers who hold more ‘conservative’ (i.e. inflation averse) preferences 
(Goodman, 1991; Cukierman et. al 1992; Posen 1995; Maxfield 1997; McNamara, 2002). 
In an increasingly large number of economic sectors including securities markets, the 
search for credibility involves delegation to independent regulatory agencies. Emulation, 
peer pressure by international and regional organizations, and outright coercion have also 
played an important part in the diffusion of IRAs (Gilardi 2005; Jordana and Levi-Faur 
2006; Gandrud 2013; Kleibl 2015). Yet even after controlling for these factors, empirical 
research consistently points to credible commitment as a key driver of IRA diffusion and 
independence. Elgie and McMenamin (2005), Gilardi (2005; 2011), and Jordana and 
Levi-Faur (2005 & 2006) all provide evidence that IRAs are adopted more quickly and 
                                               
2
 See Kyland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983); Backus and Drifill (1985), and Taylor (1985) 
for a discussion of these issues with regard to monetary policy. Related issues emerge with foreign direct 
investors (Vernon 1971), utilities governance (Levy and Spiller 1994); exchange rate stability (Bernhard et. 
al 2002); and banking regulation (Mailath and Mester 1994; Kahn and Santos 2015).   
 39 
 
given greater political autonomy in newly liberalized economic sectors where credibility 
problems are particularly severe (e.g. electricity, telecommunications, transport, banking, 
and financial services/markets).  
 Credibility problems are closely related to issues of overall policy stability. Even 
if both a governing majority and the opposition are credible in the sense that they will 
stick to their particular policy promises, their credibility will remain in question to the 
extent that policy can change with the arrival of each new governing majority. In a worse 
cast scenario, policy not only changes each time an incumbent is replaced, but policy 
becomes incoherent as policy reforms are layered on top of each other. From this 
perspective, delegation to “nonmajoritarian” intuitions such as IRAs is beneficial not just 
because they “tie the hands” of current incumbents, but because they partially detach 
policy change from the electoral cycle (Majone 1996).   
 While policy stability is itself appealing to investors, regulated interests, and 
consumers alike, it is also appealing to legislative incumbents for more explicitly political 
reasons. According to Moe (1990), enacting coalitions may fear that their legislative 
accomplishments will be undone by future policymaking majorities once they leave 
office. If the threat of defeat (i.e. political uncertainty) is sufficiently high, current 
incumbents may attempt to protect their policy legacy from future majorities by 
delegating key aspects of policy implementation to politically independent regulatory 
organizations. Empirical evidence supports these intuitions. Within the American context, 
Wood and Bohte (2004) find that as the proportion of new members in the American 
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Congress increases, as majorities get smaller in size, and as ideological party cohesion 
decreases, new regulatory organizations are more likely to be independent commissions 
with politically insulated leadership. Among European countries, Gilardi (2005) finds 
that as the duration of governments are shorter and variance in governments’ partisan 
composition increases, regulatory agencies enjoy higher levels of formal independence. 
 In addition to limiting political uncertainty in the future, granting independence to 
bureaucratic agents should increase their incentives to invest in expertise (Gailmard and 
Patty 2013). Absent the “carrot” of policy discretion, bureaucratic agents have little 
reason to invest in expertise. Why expend the resources to gain knowledge if that 
knowledge cannot be used to make any meaningful decisions? Protection from politically 
motivated dismissal should magnify these discretionary inducements. Longer terms of 
service should extend the time horizons of regulatory officials thereby strengthening their 
incentives to invest in costly expertise. In sum, political principals grant their agents 
independence because without this independence their agents are more likely to be poorly 
informed and technically incompetent.  
 Gailmard and Patty (2013) provide another reason why politically insulating 
regulatory agents may improve regulatory policy making: independence should increase 
the willingness of regulated interests to reveal sensitive information to public authorities. 
If firms or industry associations believe that political principals will use revealed 
information in ways that are detrimental to their interests, they will conceal or 
misrepresent. However, if meaningful regulatory power is delegated to an independent 
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regulatory agent with preferences distinct from their political principals, industry actors 
may feel more comfortable discussing current industry practices, prices, and innovations 
with regulatory personnel. As evidenced by Gailmard and Patty’s (2013) case study of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, more stringent corporate disclosure and 
stock market governance reform would have remained unrealized without high levels of 
trust among politically independent public regulators, SROs, and industry firms.  
 Similar informational and expertise concerns drive delegation to private 
regulatory actors. In areas such as banking, accounting, and securities trading, private-
standard setting bodies and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have long been key 
pillars of industry governance. The primary justification for these organizations’ power 
lies in their superior expertise and informational advantages. Delegation to SROs allows 
tacit knowledge of industry practices and technical know-how to be directly reflected in 
rulemaking and enforcement (Carson 2011). Furthermore, market participants and firms 
may view a private organization as more legitimate. This added legitimacy can increase 
voluntary compliance and encourage the disclosure of sensitive information. Self-
regulation is not without its critics. Conflicts of interest and anti-competitive behavior are 
a real threat. By definition SROs are ‘captured’ by the industries they regulate. Yet with 
these threats comes the opportunity to make regulatory policy smarter, more legitimate, 
and less burdensome on public authorities. 
 To summarize, there are numerous reasons why delegation to non-allies like IRAs 
or SROs could be in the interest of political principals: it can enhance the credibility of 
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their policy commitments, protect their policy reforms against political uncertainty, 
prevent policy instability, and ensure that the essential tasks of policy implementation are 
conducted by fully informed agents with high levels of expertise.  
Democratic Deficits, Capture, and the Myth of Neutrality   
 Despite the many advantages highlighted above, the regulatory state has been 
criticized since its inception. In the United States, where a mature administrative state 
first emerged, critics view delegation to executive agencies and independent commissions 
as clear violations of popular sovereignty and constitutionally enshrined separation of 
powers. Others dismiss the possibility of politically ‘neutral’ technocratic governance out 
of hand. Similar concerns about the regulatory state’s “democratic deficit” have been 
expressed in Europe and Latin America. Particularly in the developing world, critics 
argue that IRAs are more the product of international pressure than an earnest search for 
better policy. Regardless of how the specific critique is framed, the delegation of key 
policy making power away from the peoples’ representatives and toward unelected 
bureaucrats is depicted as a serious abridgement of democratic accountability. 
 Beyond these broader normative and constitutional critiques, critics have accused 
bureaucratic agents of serving rather than supervising regulated industries. As early as the 
1950’s, prominent political scientist Samuel Huntington (1952) claimed that regulatory 
agencies become captured by industry interests “as a rule.” Bernstein (1955) went so far 
as to argue that pro-industry bias should increase as regulatory bodies become more 
independent. Public choice theorists extended and formalized these criticisms in terms of 
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supply and demand. Rather than serve consumer welfare or the public interest, the 
regulatory process devolves into a series of transactions. Regulators supply incumbent 
firms with barriers to entry in exchange for monetary rewards and political support 
(Stigler 1971; Niskanen 1975).  
 By the end of the 1970s, theories of capture grew more subtle and the search for 
empirical evidence became more rigorous. Scholars began to explicitly measure just how 
often the “revolving door” between industry and regulators turned (Gormley 1979; 
Krasnow et. al 1982; Sckrzycki 2003). Other researchers highlighted how the flow of 
personnel between firms and agencies can lead regulators to identify with industry rather 
than consumers, to overemphasize the costs of regulatory compliance to firms, and to 
conduct excessively lenient rulemaking and enforcement (see Makkai and Braithewaite 
1992). Kwak (2014) comes to the disturbing conclusion that even when regulators 
believe that they are pursuing the public interest, their “conception of the public interest 
has been colonized by industry…through a set of shared but not explicitly stated 
understandings about the world.” In contrast to earlier eras, both critics and defenders of 
the administrative state now doubt the neutrality and public interestedness of regulatory 
agents.  
 Although theories of capture and politicized expertise have made significant 
advancements, rigorous empirical testing of their effects on economic outcomes has 
moved more slowly. A notable exception is Adolph’s (2013) analysis of the career 
motivations of central bankers and how those motivations are related to price stability.  
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Rather than a strictly materialistic account of capture, Adolph argues that central bankers’ 
policy making emerges from a complex mixture of motivations including a technocratic 
desire to “get it right,” ideological policy preferences, socialization, and career concerns. 
He goes on to demonstrate how central bankers’ employment/educational history and 
their future employment are robustly associated with inflation levels. In sum, central 
bankers’ past socialization and future career concerns make them responsive to “shadow 
principals” in the financial sector rather than their formal principals in government. 
 Adolph’s theoretical points are well taken. Interests should not be buried under 
institutions and scholars should pay more attention to the motivations of real-life 
principals and agents. However, it is important to underscore that Adolph’s empirical 
results show that interests and institutions matter for economic performance. When he 
includes his measure of central bankers’ interests (i.e. Central Bank Career Conservatism 
or CBCC) in models of price stability within the developed world, its statistical effects 
are comparable to institutional measures of central bank independence (CBI). 
Furthermore, CBI’s effects are not driven into insignificance, their substantive size is left 
largely unchanged, and point estimates for CBI are more often than not slightly larger 
than CBCC. CBI does drift into insignificance (but maintains theorized sign) within the 
developing world, but even there the effects of CBCC are substantively weak in the 
absence of high CBI. In sum, regulatory institutions themselves can be robustly related to 
economic outcomes even after controlling for the interests of central bankers and 
regulators. In certain contexts, the effects of interests can only be fully realized in the 
presence of particular institutions. To reiterate, Adolph’s findings suggest that both 
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interests and institutions matter in terms of outcomes. His evidence that purportedly 
neutral regulatory agents actually have ideological and/or career driven preferences does 
not erase the continued importance institutions. In fact, many of Adolph’s most revealing 
insights would not have emerged had preexisting institutional measures of CBI not been 
available. 
 Although some commentators will always oppose the regulatory state on 
philosophical grounds, most debates regarding capture and politicized expertise revolve 
around whether institutions such as independent central banks or IRAs deliver superior 
outcomes for consumers and the general public. Stated differently, the political survival 
these “nonmajoritarian” institutions depends upon some form of what Franz Scharpf 
describes as “output legitimacy.” Only if regulators can “effectively promote the common 
welfare of the constituency in question” will their independence remain politically 
defensible (Scharpf 1999; Majone 1996a). The particular “constituency” whose welfare 
ought to be promoted is itself a thorny issue that will vary across sectors and political 
contexts. In other cases no identifiable general interest exists; regulatory policies have 
distributive consequences that create winners and losers with neither group’s interests 
being universal. Yet in order for these normative discussions to be meaningful, scholars 
must have at least some idea of how actual regulatory institutions are related to actual 
economic outcomes.  
 For example, if capture, “as a rule”, grows worse as agencies become more rather 
than less politically independent (Bernstein 1955), the rapid diffusion of independent 
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regulatory agencies should be associated with a clear cross-national deterioration in 
consumer welfare and regulatory quality. However, available empirical evidence tells a 
different story. In regions as diverse as Africa, Latin America, and the EU, the 
independence of telecommunications regulators is associated with lower prices and 
increases in network capacity, per capita numbers of telephone lines, and payphone 
availability (Wallsten 2001; Gutiérrez 2003; Montoya and Trillas 2007; Edwards and 
Waverman 2006). Similarly, the greater independence of banking regulators is associated 
with higher capital ratios and reduced risk of banking crises (Gilardi and Servalli, 2011; 
Jordana and Rosas 2014). When regulators assess each other’s quality, greater regulatory 
independence is associated with more positive peer reviews (Hanretty, Larouche, and 
Reindl 2012). Evidence at the firm level is also encouraging. In a sample of 80 EU 
regulated utility firms from 1994 to 2004, Cambini and Rondi (2010) find that regulatory 
independence is positively related to firm investment. These findings with regards to 
regulatory agencies are echoed in the monetary policy literature. At least within the 
developed world, numerous studies have found an inverse relationship between central 
bank independence and inflation (Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992; Alesina and 
Summers 1999; Crowe and Meade 2008; Adolph 2013). Even more telling is the survival 
and in some instances the recent establishment of SROs in the world’s securities markets. 
These organizations are by definition dominated by industry actors, yet stock market 
crashes and scandals are not confined to countries that delegate more extensive powers to 
private SROs.  
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 None of this is to deny that particularistic interest group demands or political 
pressures can lead IRAs, SROs, or central bankers to abandon their policy commitments. 
However, the utility of regulatory independence should not be judged solely by high 
profile failures. It should also be evaluated based upon its ability to deliver industry 
stability, growth, and consumer welfare over the long-run. Securities market regulation 
and corporate governance is no exception. Stock market crashes, corporate scandals, and 
sleazy behavior by market intermediaries are as real as they are damaging to the 
reputations of regulators. But these failures should not overshadow the more general 
trend. On balance, greater levels of regulatory independence and self-regulation should 
help more than they hurt equity market development.  
Commitment Problems and the Benefits of Independence  
 Maintaining equity market integrity and investor protection is a central policy 
priority for financial regulators. Stock markets can amplify volatility originating in other 
parts of the financial system; be susceptible to bubbles, crashes, and scandals; and have 
distributive consequences for executives, shareholders, employees, and pensioners. 
Equity markets are undoubtedly only a minor part of many countries’ financial 
infrastructures, but global market capitalization continues a steady upward trend. Even 
where stock markets are small relative to the overall economy, they may still remain 
important for strategies of privatization, corporate governance modernization, and overall 
financial development.  
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 Since 1980s, securities market IRAs spread particularly rapidly through Europe, 
Latin America, and Africa. While pressure to comply with international norms 
undoubtedly played an important role in their diffusion (Gandrud 2013; Kleibl 2015), 
questions of credible commitment remain a powerful impetus behind their creation and 
organizational design (Elgie and McMenamin 2005; Gilardi 2005, 2011; Jordana and 
Levi-Faur 2006). Politicians must deliver upon two closely related policy commitments 
in order for stock markets to thrive: minority shareholder protection and market integrity.  
The former protects non-controlling shareholders from the fraud, mismanagement, and 
self-dealing of senior managers and controlling owners.
3
 The latter is often defined as the 
degree to which issuing companies and market intermediaries (e.g. brokers, dealers, 
investment advisers, fund managers etc.) treat retail investors and each other in a fair and 
transparent manner.
4
 The strength of MSP and market integrity not only depends upon 
specific rules and regulations, but also the consistency with which regulators implement 
and enforce them. If minority shareholders or retail investors believe that corporations are 
                                               
3 Common minority shareholder rights include transparency standards with regard to of related-party 
transactions; minority shareholders’ ability to sue and hold directors liable for self-dealing, fraud, and 
negligence; rights of access to evidence and allocation of legal expenses in shareholder litigation; minority 
shareholders’ rights and roles in major corporate decisions and corporate democracy more generally; 
governance requirements that ensure board independence, prevent  undue board control, and reduce 
managerial entrenchment; transparency rules with regards to ownership stakes and executive compensation; 
and the frequency and quality of audits and financial reporting.   
4
 Retail investors are particularly vulnerable to lapses in market integrity. Retail investors are those who 
purchase securities for their own personal account rather than for an organization. Retail investors can be 
ordinary middle to upper-middle class citizens who engage in smaller transactions. These less sophisticated 
investors are the principal losers of brokers and dealers’ market manipulations. When retail investors own 
equity indirectly through various types of managed funds, they also become vulnerable to fund managers as 
well. In addition to rules of business conduct, transparency, and fairness in the trading process, the 
technological development of market infrastructures is also key to integrity. Without rapid dissemination of 
price information and quick and reliable execution of trades, investors are extremely vulnerable to market 
intermediaries’ opportunism. As a result, government’s commitment to the technological development of 
exchanges is part and parcel of their commitment to integrity.  
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systematically operated to their disadvantage or that the trading process is riddled with 
opportunism and deceit, they will shy away from equity ownership and stock markets 
will wither. 
 In sum, stock markets will thrive only to the extent that politicians can credibly 
commit to market integrity and investor protection. However, there are numerous reasons 
why these commitments may lack credibility. First, there can be serious asymmetries in 
political mobilization between the winners and losers of stock market development. The 
particular mix and power of interest groups may vary within and between the developed 
and developing world, but in most contexts interest group pressure will be biased toward 
the neglect of MSP and market integrity. Second, the broader economic effects of more 
investor friendly corporate governance create costs for key constituencies of both the left 
and the right. As a result, neither partisanship nor left-right ideology can serve as a 
reliable indicator of commitment across countries. Third, politicians’ commitments are 
highly dependent upon the political saliency of regulatory issues. Since this political 
saliency is often cyclical across booms and busts in asset values, politicians’ dedication to 
stock market integrity and investor protection may lack consistency over time.  
 Despite the ubiquity of these commitment problems, they are not insurmountable. 
For the reasons outlined in the previous section, delegation to specialized regulatory 
agents, both public and private, should go some way toward ameliorating politicians’ 
credibility problems with regard to MSP and market integrity. By removing at least some 
aspects of rulemaking and enforcement from the legislative arena and politicized 
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ministries, the protection of investors and market integrity should become more stable, 
consistent, and technically sophisticated. This should enhance the confidence of equity 
investors and lead to larger and better performing stock markets. To reiterate, I am not 
arguing that IRAs and SROs are angelic guardians of the public interest who make no 
mistakes or are immune from industry pressure. What I am arguing is that delegation to 
independent regulatory agencies and SROs is superior to the alternative: securities market 
regulation conducted by executive ministries and politically dominated stock exchange 
boards. 
 This connection between independence and equity market development comes 
with two important caveats. First, the advantages of regulatory independence will not be 
constant across political institutions and financial conditions. When normal political 
institutions enhance politicians’ policy credibility, delegation to independent regulators 
should be less important and have smaller effects on equity market outcomes as a result. 
Second, overall levels of financial stability may also affect the relationship between 
political and regulatory institutions on the one hand, and stock market outcomes on the 
other. In times of systemic crisis, regulatory independence and more numerous veto 
players will continue to enhance politicians’ credibility, but these benefits will come with 
added coordination costs among political and regulatory actors.  
Biased Mobilization  
 Commitments to market integrity and MSP are inherently fragile because the 
losers of stock market development have the upper hand in terms of political organization 
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and lobbying capacity. The most obvious losers are economic incumbents who can rely 
on retained earnings and their well-established reputations with creditors for any needed 
financing. Since they do not need external equity capital, they benefit when those who do 
need it cannot access it. Particularly in countries isolated from the global flow of goods or 
capital, weak investor protection and stock market underdevelopment can form 
formidable financial barriers to entry that incumbent firms will mobilize to protect (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003). 
 Incumbent financiers also have reasons to oppose equity market development. 
When stock markets are small and finance is primarily relational, bankers utilize personal 
relationships, blockholding, interlocking directorates, and reputational incentives to select 
borrowers, ensure repayment, and monitor firm management. Since building and 
maintaining these personal and financial networks with firms and other financiers is 
costly, they may constitute lucrative barriers to entry within the financial sector. As a 
result, the impersonal and arm’s length workings of stock markets are a direct threat to 
incumbent bankers’ hard won relational capital and economic rents. Incumbent financiers 
may respond politically to this threat, but more often than not their opposition assumes 
more subtle forms. They may simply refuse to invest in stock market infrastructures 
while drawing upon their considerable market power and social capital to isolate up-start 
broker-dealer firms (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
 Incumbent firms and financiers’ preference for financial repression is unlikely to 
abate until both international competition and cross-border financial flows are 
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substantial.
5
 Yet even in highly internationalized economies, many senior executives and 
controlling block shareholders (i.e. corporate insiders) will still have reason to oppose 
particular minority shareholder protections. Senior executives are management 
professionals with varying levels of ownership over the companies they operate. 
Blockholders are investors, but differ from minority shareholders due to their 
concentrated stake in individual companies and their ability to directly control managers.  
These corporate insiders are hostile to any attempt by public or private actors to interfere 
with their decision making authority. This may not make them opposed to stock market 
development per se, but it does make them deeply skeptical of any minority shareholder 
right or accounting practice that could even potentially erode their private benefits of 
control (Dyck and Zingales 2004). To the extent stock markets provide investors with 
easy to understand information on managerial performance or facilitate active markets for 
corporate control, the economic privileges of corporate insiders are even more 
endangered. If forced to choose between more robust stock markets on the one hand, and 
the privileges of economic incumbency and decision making autonomy on the other, 
managers and blockholders in many countries choose the latter.  
 Not only do segments of the business community have an interest in weak MSP 
and underdeveloped stock markets, they are also more likely to mobilize around that 
interest. Investor protection and market integrity can produce highly concentrated costs 
on economic incumbents, corporate insiders, and unscrupulous market intermediaries. 
                                               
5 See Rajan and Zingales (2003) pp. 21-24 for why openness to both trade and capital flows may be 
necessary to lessen economic incumbents preference for financial repression. 
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This, in combination with their smaller numbers and market power, should facilitate their 
collective action (Olson1965; Bombardini 2008). By virtue of their position atop the 
managerial hierarchy, corporate insiders often subsidize their political action with firm 
resources (Morck et. al 2003; Bebchuck and Neeman 2009). These substantial political 
resources win them greater access to politicians, aids in the communication of policy 
relevant information, and serves as a clear signal of their willingness to fight regulation 
within the political arena (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Gordon and Hafer 2005). 
Corporate insiders can also be deeply embedded within networks of social and political 
elites further facilitating the sharing of information, coordinated action, and trust 
(Windolf 2002; Burris & Staples 2012; Morck and Yeung 2004). Given the highly 
complex nature of financial policy, corporate and industry insiders’ greatest advantages 
may be their technical resources, legal sophistication, and tacit knowledge of industry 
practices and conditions. Not only will this make less knowledgeable legislators and 
media professionals more deferent to their arguments, but corporate and industry insiders 
will be more likely to occupy influential positions within informal working groups, 
expert committees, and consultative forums (Culpepper 2011).  
 In contrast to corporate and industry insiders, the winners of stock market 
development (e.g. minority shareholders and retail investors) may find it far more 
difficult to act collectively. The benefits of pro-investor regulatory policies are often 
indirect or difficult to perceive in the short-term. Furthermore, pro-MSP interests are 
diverse and larger in number raising the costs of their organization. They typically enjoy 
fewer social connections with political economic elites and lack the technical expertise, 
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legal sophistication, and tacit industry knowledge of corporate insiders and market 
intermediaries. This lack of information and expertise should put them at a significant 
disadvantage in terms of informational lobbying and limit their participation in informal 
regulatory networks and working groups (Culpepper 2011; Pagliari and Young 2004).  
 There are two potential pro-MSP constituencies who could be less bound by the 
limitations just described: upstart entrepreneurs who seek to raise capital from public 
markets in the future and institutional shareholders. The former have an interest in MSP 
and market integrity because a lack of either should increase the costs of raising equity 
capital, diminish the value previously issued shares, and further solidify the position of 
market incumbents (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Despite this interest, previous research 
suggests that these entrepreneurs are likely to underinvest in lobbying activity relative to 
the costs generated by weak investor protection (Bebchuck and Newman 2009). Their 
underinvestment will be even more substantial whenever more demanding corporate 
governance and transparency standards raise the costs of regulatory compliance. Upstart 
entrepreneurs are also less likely to be politically mobilized given their large numbers 
and economic diversity. Despite enjoying greater sophistication and monetary resources 
as compared to the average retiree or retail investor, they will still tend to be less 
sophisticated, wealthy, politically experienced, and socially connected relative to elite 
corporate insiders. In short, the existence of a thriving entrepreneurial sector will 
moderate but not eliminate business opposition to MSP and market integrity. 
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 In terms of political mobilization and monitoring managerial performance, the 
most promising ally of retail investors are institutional shareholders. In contrast to most 
small investors, institutional shareholders have the wealth, legal expertise, and tacit 
industry knowledge necessary to weigh in on even the most technical corporate 
governance controversies. Particularly in countries with more diffuse corporate 
ownership such as the UK and the US, institutional shareholders such as Hermes, TIAA-
CREF, and CalPERS have a long track record of pressuring managers to improve 
corporate governance practices (Gillan and Starks 2000). Yet despite sensationalistic 
media accounts of “pension fund socialism” and shareholder activism, there are 
numerous reasons why institutional shareholders more often than not fail to use their 
wealth and expertise on behalf of the investing public. First, institutional shareholders are 
highly diverse. They include mutual funds, public and private pension funds, insurance 
companies, endowments, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth funds. These institutions 
vary wildly in terms of their governance, risk appetite, diversification, time horizons, and 
willingness to confront management. As a result, they rarely speak with one voice 
regarding regulatory issues. 
 Exercising boardroom voice or engaging in political action is also risky. The 
profitability of many institutional investors depends, in part, on the goodwill of senior 
executives. Criticizing company managers may make it more difficult for fund managers 
to grow their assets under management and in turn their fees. Even if institutional 
shareholders are willing to take the risks, their activism may be highly circumscribed by 
regulatory restrictions in company, securities, insurance, pension, and banking laws 
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(Rock 2015). Like entrepreneurs, institutional investors are also likely to underinvest in 
pro-MSP lobbying relative to the aggregate benefits it would create for all non-
controlling shareholders (Bebchuck and Newman 2009). The reason for this follows the 
familiar Olsonian logic. Institutional shareholders bear a disproportionate share of the 
lobbying costs while having to share a disproportionate amount of the benefits with free-
riding retail investors and entrepreneurs. Of course, this assumes that there are significant 
institutional shareholders to begin with. Although they are more numerous in liberal 
market economies such as the U.S. and U.K. and increasingly important in a handful 
coordinated market economies such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, activist 
institutional shareholders remain relatively rare. To sum up, individual retail investors 
may have elite allies, but these allies share only some of their interests and are likely to 
underinvest in political activity. 
 What is true of institutional shareholders is also true of the financial industry as a 
whole. The industry can only thrive to the extent that the market possesses at least a 
minimal level of integrity and investors enjoy some modicum of protection. However, 
this overlap of interests with retail investors and minority shareholders is limited. The 
industry’s chief goal is lowering their regulatory burden and maximizing profits. The 
welfare of financial consumers and/or minority shareholders is at best a secondary 
concern. Given that corporate insiders are often some of their most lucrative customers, 
the industry will avoid open conflict with non-financial business interests over corporate 
governance issues. Particularly in developed countries, the financial lobby is a generous 
political contributor and enjoys social, business, and political connections to party elites 
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across the ideological spectrum (McCarty et. al 2008; Connaughton 2012; Corporate 
Europe Observatory 2014). As a result, when their interests conflict with those of their 
disorganized customers, they are likely to emerge victorious.  
Non-Credible Partisans and the Inattentive Public 
 In terms of politicians’ commitments to MSP and market integrity, the account 
thus far suggests that the normal balance of interest group mobilization should be biased 
against political commitments to MSP and market integrity. But what about voters and 
the political parties who represent them? Could ideological conviction or partisans’ desire 
to funnel benefits to core constituencies be sufficient to deliver credible commitment to 
MSP and market integrity? In most instances, the answer is no. Stock market 
development is a low salience issue that divides the core constituencies of both the left 
and the right. As a result, neither the political left nor the right should be seen as 
inherently more credible with regard to MSP and market integrity. The cross-cutting 
nature of MSP and market-integrity is best conceptualized in terms of labor and capital 
market insiders and outsiders (Barker 2010). 
 According to most partisan theories of corporate governance, shareholder power 
and stock market development is associated with all that the political left has historically 
opposed: income inequality, wealth concentration, and employment risk. In its most well-
known academic formulation, Roe (2001) argues that wage earners and the social 
democratic governments they bring to power are inherently anti-investor inasmuch as 
they prioritize the interests of employees (e.g. high wages, employment security, skill 
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development, and fringe benefits etc.) at the expense of shareholder value maximization. 
Perotti and von Thadden (2006) make a similar argument in terms of risk. They assume 
that because human capital is primarily firm specific and is difficult to diversify, risk 
averse workers will oppose the financial short-termism and volatility of equity financing.  
 What all these accounts implicitly assume is that left wing parties are primarily 
the representatives of labor market insiders who enjoy secure employment, decent wages, 
and fringe benefits (Rueda 2005). Given this assumption, it makes sense that left-wing 
parties lack commitment to MSP so as to better protect their core constituency from the 
corrosive effects of equity based corporate finance. However, the fringe benefits, higher 
wages, and collective bargaining that often accompany being a labor market insider may 
create opposite pressures. Defined contribution retirement plans; the use of company 
stock for employee compensation; union administered pension plans; and high profile 
corporate scandals may push political parties of the center-left to develop more nuanced 
positions towards issues of financial market regulation and corporate governance. Stock 
market growth may further enrich the already wealthy, but it can also make pensioners’ 
retirement incomes more secure. Added corporate transparency can empower unions at 
the collective bargaining table, strengthen works councils, prevent accounting scandals, 
and reveal the controversial behaviors of corporate elites. These benefits also create a 
rhetorical advantage. Parties of the center-left can make direct appeals to the material 
interests of middle class voters and depict themselves as economic modernizers 
determined to bring needed dynamism to a self-satisfied corporate elite (Cioffi and 
Höpner 2006; Cioffi 2010). 
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 Stock market development may have benefits for another potential constituency 
of left parties: labor market outsiders. Since these outsiders lack stable employment, 
fringe benefits, and wage protections, they put a high value on employment growth even 
if this means a reduction in the security of existing jobs (Rueda 2005). According to Pinto 
et. al.(2010), many left parties may promote MSP and financial liberalization more 
generally with these demands for employment growth in mind. They argue that center-
left parties discount the employment risks posed by financial markets and “join forces 
with some investors in promoting policies that are conducive to higher levels of 
investment, thus policies which promote equity capitalization and undermine the political 
clout of concentrated economic groups who oppose the opening of markets both 
internally and externally (Pinto et al. 2010; 379). In sum, parties of the center-left may be 
willing to accept equity markets’ disruptive influence on employment relations as long as 
the aggregate effect of stronger investor rights increases economic and job growth.  
 Like the left, the right may also be divided by insiders and outsiders. Historically, 
conservative parties have been the chief political representatives of corporate insiders 
(e.g. senior executives and blockholders), opponents of the regulatory state, and 
defenders of economic and social hierarchy. However, these positions may be difficult to 
sustain where more “dispersed ownership implies more outside shareholders and more 
lawyers, investment bankers, stock market analysts et al. whose jobs depend on outsider-
friendly…rules” (Callaghan 2007). The center-right needs political contributions from 
wealthy corporate insiders and votes from upscale segments of the middle-class. If the 
latter hold equity assets, conservatives can find themselves in an awkward position when 
 60 
 
their elite corporate constituency blatantly disregards the interests of minority 
shareholders or vested retirees. This tension should be especially severe for more 
traditionalist conservative parties with long historical ties to ‘old-money’ elites and 
familial capitalism.  
 To sum up, there is little reason to believe that left or right wing partisanship 
alone will be sufficient to solidify politicians’ commitments to equity market 
development. Labor market insiders on the left and corporate insiders on the right may 
both pressure their allied political parties to abandon their investor friendly regulatory 
commitments. The spread of shareholding among more well-off workers and the 
electorally pivotal middle-class could potentially counteract this pressure on both the left 
and the right. However, this electorally based counteraction makes a heroic assumption: 
ordinary voters both understand the connection between complex financial policies and 
economic outcomes, and then incorporate this understanding into their voting decisions. 
More often than not, financial and corporate governance policy is a low saliency issue 
that voters care little about. In turn, politicians have little incentive to make it a priority 
let alone enter into open conflict with interest groups representing their core insider 
constituencies. However, there are exceptions to this general tendency: crisis, crash, and 
scandal. 
Regulatory Cycles and Inconsistent Crisis Commitments 
 When banks fail, stock markets crash, or corporate insiders egregiously violate 
the rights of minority shareholders, low saliency financial politics characterized by large 
inequalities in collective action gives way to public outrage and widespread mobilization 
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among interested stakeholders. Sudden and concentrated financial losses to investors 
clarify the distributive consequences of corporate governance and securities regulation 
and turn once esoteric issues of financial policy into highly salient subjects of public and 
partisan debate. This renewed partisan contestation and interest group pluralism reduces 
policy makers’ deference to managers’ expertise and saps the effectiveness of corporate 
insiders’ media and public relations strategies (Pagliari and Young 2004; Culpepper 
2011). Once voices in the political wilderness, pro-MSP policy entrepreneurs and 
developmentally-minded state elites can harness popular anger to their political 
advantage. Politicians, fearful that a wave of populist outrage will dislodge them from 
power, seek to renew their commitments to MSP and market integrity by increasing their 
financial policy expertise and passing pro-investor legislation opposed by corporate and 
industry insiders. These dynamics are clear from the historical record. 18
th 
and early 19th 
century securities regulation in the U.S., United Kingdom, and France all emerged 
following investment bubbles and stock market crashes. The same can be said of the 
federal securities acts of the 1930s (Banner 1997). The Dot.com bust and corporate 
scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, 
Global Crossing, Parmalat, Cirio, FloTex) were equally powerful drivers of reforms in 
corporate governance, transparency, and auditing standards.   
 While the initial adoption of securities legislation in the developing world often 
stems from desires for economic modernization and national prestige, they too respond to 
market crash and scandal with legislative change. In short, crisis and scandal heightens 
the saliency of financial policy issues for ordinary investors and the public thereby 
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raising the political costs of policy inaction. Not only does this increased saliency bring 
about greater interest group pluralism, it also leads politicians to renew their 
commitments to MSP and market integrity by increasing their policy expertise and 
passing pro-investor legislation. 
 Unfortunately, financial history as well as pervious research suggests that these 
post crisis commitments may be deficient on two accounts. First, post-crisis regulatory 
commitments may signify populist overreactions that overcompensate for past failures 
through overly restrictive or expansive rules.
6
 Rather than close the specific regulatory 
gaps implicated in the crisis, politicians may seek to exploit justifiable public outrage to 
enact their own personal regulatory wish-list. Second, even if new commitments are 
appropriate given past failures, they are rarely credible over the long-run (McDonnell 
2013). Once the recovery takes hold, asset values recover, and public anger wanes, 
politicians may neglect the highly technical and politically unrewarding work involved in 
implementing their hard won legislative achievements. The return of low saliency “quiet” 
politics reinforces the expertise and media based power resources of entrenched 
managers, controlling owners, and industry interest groups (Culpepper 2011). Originally 
far reaching statutory reforms become watered down through endless litigation and 
industry friendly rulemaking. The normal inequalities in political mobilization reassert 
themselves, voters stop paying attention, and the erosion of MSP and market integrity 
                                               
6
 It is important to point out that legislative responses to crash are not necessarily beneficial for equity 
market development. The Mississippi Bubble in France and the South Sea Bubble in Britain both led to 
highly restrictive legislation that likely slowed the development of stock markets in both countries. The 
response in France was particularly draconian and harmful for equity market development. As a result, the 
Mississippi Bubble is widely accepted as a turning point in the history of French capitalism.  
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begins again. In sum, crises may push politicians’ to renew their commitments to MSP 
and market integrity, but the post-recovery demobilization of pro-investor political forces 
means these commitments are likely to be time inconsistent.  
 The clearest example of these dynamics is also the most recent. Prior to the 
housing crash and Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, issues such as subprime mortgage 
lending, the regulation of mortgage backed securities and credit default swaps, and the 
resolution plans of large financial institutions were issues of low political saliency.  
Lobbying around these issues was dominated by investment banks, the mortgage 
industry, and activist community groups eager to weaken mortgage lending requirements 
in the name of ‘democratizing’ home ownership. Large political contribut ions continually 
flowed from these interest groups to politicians of both political parties. Politicians 
responded to this political pressure by loosening the regulatory framework that governed 
housing finance and appointing regulatory officials who shared their views. When 
regulatory officials raised alarms about the growth of subprime mortgage lending and the 
exotic derivatives that emerged from it, they were ignored or isolated. In short, low 
political saliency increased politicians’ receptiveness to mortgage industry lobbying and 
weakened their commitment to the integrity of mortgage markets.  
 As housing prices crashed, foreclosures spiked, and failing investment banks 
required tax payer funded bailouts, the public became enraged. Esoteric issues of housing 
finance and investment banking shot onto the front page. In response to this increased 
political saliency, politicians sought to renew their commitment to market integrity 
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though the passage of landmark legislation: the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. The law’s provisions reflected the temporary weakness of the 
financial industry lobby, the public’s call for action, and the strengthened political hand 
of regulatory policy entrepreneurs within the Democratic Party. But despite the clear 
commitment the legislation signified, the strength of Dodd-Frank commitments began to 
erode as soon as asset values recovered, public anger waned, and low saliency issues of 
policy implementation moved to the forefront. Five years after the legislation’s passage, 
40 percent of the law’s 400 proposed regulatory rules have been delayed by industry 
lobbying and litigation. In 2014 alone, the financial industry spent nearly half a billion 
dollars (not counting campaign contributions and legal fees) and hired more than 2,300 
registered lobbyists. Their goal was to tilt the rule-making process in their favor and 
maintain the steady drumbeat for repeal (Schoen and Ward 2015;CNBC). Since its 
passage, provisions regarding executive compensation, minority shareholders’ proxy 
access, resolution authority, contingent capital, and the Volker Rule have either been 
repealed or implemented in ways favorable to financial industry preferences. Appalled by 
this steady watering-down of Dodd Frank, pro-reform legal scholar John Coffee (2012) 
writes,  
 Above all, this episode shows again that, once a crisis passes, Congress can easily 
 be persuaded to repeal legislation that it passed in response to the crisis. This 
 proves not that the original legislation was flawed, but more that Congress can be 
 manipulated, has a limited attention span, and will sometimes accept makeweight 
 arguments…To be sure, in a national crisis, countervailing forces sometimes 
 arise, but they do not remain organized and vigilant indefinitely (1078).  
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 In summation, the previous account points to several factors which should 
undermine politicians’ commitments to equity market integrity and MSP. First, interest 
group mobilization around issues of MSP and market integrity should, in normal times, 
be largely dominated by the losers of stock market development. Second, these losers of 
equity market development (i.e. labor market and corporate insiders) are core 
constituencies of both the political left and right. As a result, partisanship and ideology 
cannot in and of themselves be reliable indicators of financial policy commitment. Third, 
crisis or scandal can temporarily undermine corporate insiders lobbying dominance and 
renew political commitments to MSP and market integrity, but these policy commitments 
often wane as the political saliency of financial policy fades and asset values recover. 
Variation in Commitment Problems across the Globe 
 Despite the ubiquity of these mobilization biases and interest group dynamics, 
their exact character will vary from country to country. Differences in economic 
development and the diffusion of equity ownership across society will alter the mix of 
political actors involved in these policy debates and regulatory struggles. Table 2.1 below 
provides a rough guide to this variation in interest mobilization. ‘a’ rows correspond to 
developed countries with diffuse ownership; ‘b’ rows correspond to developed countries 
with concentrated ownership; and ‘c’ rows correspond to the developing world.    
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                 Table 2.1       
(Summary of Interest Groups and Mobilization Propensity) 
I. Mobilized Interests Undermining Development/MSP/Integrity
a. Senior Executives [Anti-MSP], Market Intermediaries [Anti-Integrity, greater in #]
b. Controlling Owners/Blockholders [Anti-MSP], Incumbent Financiers [Anti-Equity Market],                                              
Market Intermediaries [Anti-Integrity, fewer in #]
c. Incumbent Non-Financial Firms [Anti-Equity Market], Incumbent Financiers [Anti-Equity Market],                                                        
Controlling Owners/Blockholders [Anti-MSP], Market Intermediaries [Anti-Integrity, very few in #]
 II. Mobilized Interests Supporting Development/MSP/Integrity
a. Policy Entreprenuers, Politicians (after crisis), Activist Institutional Investors [Pro-MSP, larger in #],                                                                 
Retail Investors (after crisis, larger in #), Public (after crisis)
b. Policy Entrepreneurs, Politicians (after crisis), Retail Investors (after crisis, fewer in #), Public (after crisis),                                                       
Activist Institutional Investors (Pro-MSP, fewer in #)
c. Policy Entrepreneurs, Politicians (after crisis), Retail Investors (after crisis, very few in  #), Public (after crisis)
III. Weakly Moblized and/or Indeterminate Preferences
a. Politicians (cyclical commitments & receptive to lobbying), Labor (w/o crisis &  insider/outsider split),                   
Passive Institutional Investors (greater in #), Retail Investors (w/o crisis, larger in #), Public (w/o crisis)
b.  Politicians (cylcical commitments & receptive to lobbying), Labor (w/o crisis & insider/outsider split)                                                                                         
Passive Institutional Investors (fewer in #),  Retail Investors (w/o crisis, fewer in #), Public (w/o crisis)
c. Politicians (cyclical commitments & receptive to lobbying), Labor (w/o crisis & insider/outsider split)                                                                                            
Retail Investors (w/o crisis, very few in #), Public (w/o crisis)
 
a. Developed Countries w/Diffuse Ownership
b. Developed Countries w/Concentrated Ownership
c. Developing Countries  
 The existence of stock exchanges in nearly every country of the world suggests 
there are at least a handful of elite economic or political actors (i.e. policy entrepreneurs) 
who support their development. But what the table above makes clear is that the elite 
devotees of equity finance will have inconsistent allies and consistent opponents. In the 
developed world with diffuse ownerships, opposition will come mainly from two groups: 
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professional executives determined to ward off shareholder interference in their decision 
making autonomy and a highly developed financial sector (i.e. market intermediaries) 
concerned with reducing their regulatory burden. In the developed world with 
concentrated ownership, opposition will arise from blockholders determined to protect 
their private benefits of control and traditionalists in the banking sector who favor more 
relational finance. In the developing world, the anti-developmental alliance may be even 
more formidable: blockholding industrial incumbents, incumbent banks who thrive on the 
rents created by financial repression, and state actors who view the financial system as a 
political tool to distribute rents among their political cronies.
7
  
 Pro-market policy entrepreneurs are not without allies in both the developed and 
developing world, but these allies are beset by collective action problems, uneven in their 
policy expertise, and are unlikely to mobilize in the absence of crisis or scandal. In short, 
maintaining political commitments to MSP and market integrity is an uphill battle 
regardless of economic development or the diffusion of equity ownership. However, the 
steepness of this uphill battle will not be equal across political institutions. When political 
institutions reduce the difficulty of committing to stock market development, delegation 
to independent regulatory actors should be less important.  
Commitment and Reform: The Role of Political Institutions   
 Past literature consistently argues that more numerous partisan veto players can 
prevent governments from frequently or arbitrarily altering economic policy. As a result, 
                                               
7 As Calmoris and Haber (2014) suggest, this sort of behavior is also present within the developed world. 
However, greater levels of political competition, transparency, and media scrutiny can make it less severe.  
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politicians’ commitments to investor friendly policies such as respect for private property 
rights, impartial contract enforcement, and fiscal and monetary policy stability should be 
viewed as more credible when veto players are more numerous (North and Weingast 
1989; Haber, North, and Weingast 2008; Henisz 2000;Tsbelis 2002). Empirical evidence 
largely supports these contentions. Increased political constraint (i.e. more veto players) 
is associated with more stable and robust economic growth, better developed banking 
systems and credit markets, and increased levels of private investment by both foreign 
and domestic actors (Henisz 2004; Jensen 2003; Stasavage 2002; Keefer 2008). There is 
little reason to think that these credibility effects do not also extend to regulatory policy 
including MSP and market integrity. While investors may not enjoy their ideal level of 
protection, they know that the rights and protections they do enjoy are less likely to be 
revoked if veto players are more numerous. Furthermore, more numerous veto players 
means investors have a higher chance of being represented by at least one veto player in 
the policy making process. Previous findings suggest that political principals take these 
credibility effects into account when designing their regulatory agents. In analysis of 
regulatory agencies in Western Europe, Gilardi (2008) finds an inverse relationship 
between the number of veto players and levels of regulatory independence. This suggests 
that when credibility seeking politicians are more significantly constrained by other veto 
players, they view their own commitment problems as less severe and therefore grant less 
independence to regulatory agents as a result.
8
  
                                               
8 However, it is important to point out that Jordana and Levi-Faur (2006) find that veto points and agency 
independence are positively related in Latin America. 
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 More numerous veto points may also play a part in diluting corporate insiders and 
incumbent financiers’ anti-investor lobbying. Following a logic outlined by Gehlbach and 
Malesky (2010), veto players must be politically compensated by corporate insiders and 
economic incumbents in order to protect the financial policy status quo. 9 This 
compensation (i.e. political contributions) should become increasingly more expensive 
for corporate elites as veto players become more numerous. As a result, the profitability 
of anti-investor rent-seeking should decrease as veto players increase in number. 
Andrews and Montinola (2004) make a similar argument, but place greater emphasis on 
inter-veto player coordination. To the extent that voters punish veto players for being “in 
the pocket” of special interests or delivering poor economic governance, increases in 
political competition should encourage rival veto players to expose each other’s 
acceptance of political contributions from economic incumbents and corporate insiders. 
In order to avoid this mutual recrimination, veto players must collude. However, as the 
number of veto players increases so too does the cost of policy collusion. As a result, 
corporate insiders will have to increase the value of their contributions as veto players 
become greater in number thereby reducing the profitability of their anti-investor 
lobbying.  
 In addition to the political constraint created by veto players, more proportional 
electoral institutions may also do their part to lessen politicians’ commitment problems. 
                                               
9This is built upon the assumption that political actors value the economic growth and efficiency that comes 
from more ‘optimal’regulatory policies. Evidence in favor of the stock market development and economic 
growth connection is provided by Levine and Zervos (1998), Levine (2005), Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Rousseau and Wachtel  2002), and Beck and Levine (2004) 
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To the extent greater proportionality creates coalition governments and consensual 
lawmaking, it too should reduce the magnitude of policy changes that accompany cycles 
in asset values or alterations in vote shares (Lijphart 1999). Once again, investors may 
not enjoy their ideal level of protection, but the protections they do enjoy will be less 
exposed to the sort of wide policy swings that can follow majoritarian elections. 
Proportionality should also ensure that both the winners and losers of stock market 
development receive a seat at the bargaining table when reforms are discussed. Since 
retail investors and minority shareholders are an electoral minority with weak lobbying 
power, this assurance of political representation should be especially important. I am not 
suggesting that more consensual political institutions (i.e. veto players and 
proportionality) will completely eliminate regulatory cycles or prevent the erosion of 
MSP when saliency is low. Instead it is best to view regulatory cycles as waves that move 
above and below some unknown ‘optimal’ set of financial policies. Consensual political 
institutions will not systematically produce these optimal policies, but they should widen 
the wavelength and decrease the amplitude of regulatory waves as they move through the 
financial system. 
 In addition to their ability to moderate policy change, proportional elections may 
moderate political opposition to departures from the blockholding status quo that 
characterizes most countries. More specifically, the more consensual bargaining 
environment created by proportional representation can encourage the provision of 
“benefits for groups, parties, and organizations that are adversely affected by policy 
change.”(Lindvall 2010). In other words, proportionality should facilitate the distribution 
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of side payments to stock market development losers. Since proportionality also reduces 
the impact of vote share for retaining office, bargaining among political parties and key 
interest groups is more likely to be iterative further extending time horizons and making 
promises of side-payments more credible. These effects of proportionality are not merely 
hypothetical. Side payments have been key to pro-MSP reforms throughout the world.  
 For example, German labor market insiders not only acceded but actively 
promoted pro-MSP reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Their compromise 
inducing side payment came in the form of significantly higher standards of corporate 
transparency. Labor insiders valued this transparency because it increased the capacity of 
unions and works councils to monitor and punish managers who have “too much 
discretion and too great a capacity to promote their interests ahead of the workers and the 
firm” (Gourevitch and Shin 2005; 163). Labor market insiders in the Netherlands agreed 
to pro-MSP reforms because they “obtained side-payments in the form of increasing 
works council influence on board elections” (Schnyder 2008:13). The menu of side 
payments for capital insiders is even more expansive and includes tax breaks, subsidies, 
tariff protection, lucrative government contracts, and/or more forgiving regulatory 
treatment in areas not directly connected to corporate governance.    
 To summarize, political institutions may profoundly shape the severity of 
politicians’ commitment problems with regard to MSP and market integrity. As a result, 
the relationship between regulatory independence and stock market development should 
also vary across political institutions. Where fewer partisan veto players and majoritarian 
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elections increase the frequency and magnitude of regulatory policy change, politicians’ 
policy commitments are especially suspect. As a result, delegation to IRAs and SROs 
should be an especially powerful commitment device in these contexts. When political 
institutions are more consensual (i.e. more veto players and greater proportionality) 
policy change should be less frequent and anti-investor lobbying more costly to corporate 
insiders. Since the winners of development tend to be an electoral minority, more 
consensual institution should also increase the chances that they receive direct political 
representation. Finally, when policy does change, it is more likely to be the result of 
compromise that gains at least some buy in from corporate insiders further increasing the 
chances that it will be faithfully implemented. As a result, politicians’ credibility should 
be less dependent upon delegation and the independence of their regulatory agents when 
political institutions are more consensual.   
Possible Criticisms and Responses 
 While the arguments of the previous section are relatively non-controversial in 
light of previous research, they are not without their critics. These critics bring up three 
main points that deserve to be directly addressed: 1) veto players and electoral 
institutions may increase policy stability, but this stability can be the foundation of anti-
investor political coalitions; 2) the act of delegation is itself a commitment problem 
suggesting that more numerous veto players are a prerequisite of rather than a substitute 
for delegation; and 3) political constraint and regulatory independence are not credibility 
enhancing during periods of systemic financial crisis because crises fundamentally alter 
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the nature of politicians’ commitment problems. I will discuss each of these criticisms in 
turn.  
  In their influential book on the politics of corporate governance, Goureveitch and 
Shinn (2003) argue that workers, managers, and controlling owners share mutual interests 
in maintaining firm size and stability. Despite class tensions, they may cooperate to 
maximize the share of income for themselves at the expense of outside shareholders. 
Workers receive greater employment security, wages, and benefits while owners and 
managers get to enjoy larger private benefits of control. Goureveitch and Shinn point to 
the more numerous veto points and proportional elections of consensual political systems 
as the institutional foundation of this anti-shareholder “corporatist compromise.” Since 
the compromise requires sustained political alliances between workers, managers, and 
blockholders, it is unlikely to survive without the policy stability and incentives to 
cooperate created by more consensual institutions. Although more concerned with 
electoral competition, Pagano and Volpin (2005) develop a formal model that comes to 
similar conclusions. They assume that proportional electoral institutions empower social 
groups with “homogenous preferences” such blockholders and workers. Since both are 
assumed to favor the stability of bank based finance, proportional electoral institutions 
are predicted to undermine equity markets. 
 Although these arguments are convincing, there are several reasons why I come to 
opposite conclusions regarding consensual political institutions. Gourevitch and Shinn’s 
explanation is likely accurate in terms of providing a historical explanation of post-WWII 
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corporate governance politics in Western Europe. However, what was true then may be 
less so now. I follow Barker (2010) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) and insist that recent 
economic changes may have altered the preferences of corporate insiders and weakened 
industry incumbents’ preference for financial repression. More specifically, the 
combination of capital mobility and international trade has led to “an exogenously driven 
increase in product market competition. This implies economic rents decline to much 
lower levels…the erosion of rents makes it increasingly difficult to sustain a social 
compromise with insider labor, as there is no longer a surplus which can be 
shared”(Barker 2010; 54). With reduced private benefits of control, less retained earnings 
available for investment, and promising opportunities for financing and expansion 
abroad, firms may be less likely to “play nice” with domestic insider labor at the expense 
of outside shareholders. Insider labor, now lacking fully committed partners among 
insider capital, may be willing to form corporate governance “transparency coalitions” 
with outsider capital over issues of accounting, disclosure, and management self-dealing 
(Gourevitch and Shin 2003). This is not to say that continental Europe will suddenly 
adopt Anglo-American shareholder driven capitalism. Instead, I am making a more 
modest claim: the effects of consensual political institutions on corporate governance 
politics will change as the interests of actors constrained by those institutions change as 
well. As a result, the same features of consensual institutions that may have once 
supported anti-shareholder alliances in Western Europe (eg. policy stability, greater 
compromise), now serve to encourage stock market development across a world 
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characterized by freer trade, more intense product market competition, and greater capital 
mobility.  
 Another objection concerns my argument that delegation to independent 
regulatory actors will be more credibility enhancing when political veto players are fewer 
in number. In fact, scholars such as Keefer and Stasavage (2000) argue the direct 
opposite. They insist political veto players and delegation are not substitutes, but instead 
are complements. More exactly, they argue that the act of delegation to independent 
regulatory agents is itself a policy that is vulnerable to commitment problems. Only if the 
act of delegation is credible will agents’ exercise of delegated power be credible. Or as 
formulated by Keefer and Stasavage (2000), “The important question that remains, 
therefore, is how delegation of policymaking authority to an independent agency can 
make a difference for policy when the number of veto players required to overturn 
delegation and to change…policy is the same.” This is an important question, but one that 
can be answered in several ways.  
 First, overturning an act of delegation or significantly reducing agency 
independence is costly. These costs involve far more than the political transaction costs 
involved in getting the necessary veto players to agree to a change. More specifically, 
reversing delegation is a highly visible act that is likely to have serious reputational costs. 
This is particularly true in a globalized sector such as finance where IRAs are considered 
an international best practice and sign of good governance. Furthermore, perceptions of 
credibility are not confined to individual economic sectors. If a government reverses 
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course with respect to one independent authority, the credibility of all their acts of 
delegation may come into question. Second, as pointed out by Gailmard and Patty (2013) 
the reduction of independence may weaken bureaucrats’ incentives to invest in expertise. 
This loss of expertise will reduce the effectiveness of bureaucratic policymaking in 
general, not just the specific policy that a current governing majority wishes to change by 
overturning independence. Finally, returning regulatory power to politicians will 
reintroduce issues of political uncertainty and policy instability. None of this is to deny 
that acts of delegation are themselves tests of credibility or that regulatory agencies are 
never abolished or reorganized. However, reversing acts of delegation is costly and these 
costs are usually sufficient to make politicians’ acts of delegation credible.  
 Evidence of this fact is not hard to find. Greasley and Hanretty (2014) look at the 
life span and risk of termination of 723 arm’s length agencies in the United Kingdom 
between 1985 and 2008. Given that the UK’s parliamentary system is considered an 
“elected dictatorship” by many commentators, British politicians’ acts of delegation 
should be particularly suspect according to Keefer and Stasavage. Yet, the authors find 
“that agencies intended to generate credible commitments in regulation are less likely 
than others to be terminated in any given year… [and] Agencies structured as executive 
non-departmental public bodies and non-ministerial departments are also longer lived 
than others.”10 Obviously no act of delegation is irreversible. However, the fact that the 
                                               
10
 “Non-Ministerial Departments are government departments, staffed by civil servants, established by 
legislation but headed by a statutory board, or a Director-General, rather than their own elected minister”  
“A Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) is ‘a body which has a role in the process of national 
government but [which] is not a government department or part of one, and which accordingly operates to a 
greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers’ ”… “Executive NDPBs have their own legal 
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unconstrained politicians of the U.K. are so clearly affected by concerns of credibility is 
telling. As I have repeatedly argued, acts of delegation to independent agencies have real 
credibility effects even when the number of veto players required to reverse that 
delegation is relatively small.  
 A final objection concerns the role of political institutions and regulatory 
independence in times of financial crisis. During periods of high uncertainty and market 
turmoil, the nature of politicians’ credibility problems may change: commitments to rapid 
policy responsiveness and decisive intervention could become more important than 
commitments to policy stability. Numerous quantitative and qualitative studies have 
explored this tension within the context of crisis (MacIntyre 2001; Angkinand and Willett 
2008; Keefer 2001; Ha and Kang 2015). While I recognize the importance of swift and 
decisive crisis responses, credible commitments to investor protection and market 
integrity should become more not less important in times of crisis.  
 As panic and insolvency spreads, opportunistic corporate insiders will do almost 
anything including expropriating investors in order to minimize their personal financial 
losses and prop up failing subsidiaries. In a worst case scenario, governments will face 
intense pressure to ignore investor interests and play favorites as they distribute bailout 
funds, coordinate emergency nationalizations or forced mergers, and grant regulatory 
relief. More simply, politicians could simply look the other way as politically allied 
business elites save themselves by raiding their firms’ assets to the detriment of 
                                                                                                                                            
personality…They carry out some combination of administrative, commercial, executive technical, or 
regulatory functions.” (Greasley and Hanretty 2014;pp. 7-10) 
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shareholders and other stakeholders. To the extent financial crises become fiscal crises 
for governments, unconstrained politicians may be tempted to renege on their debts, seize 
assets, and expropriate minority shareholders in state-controlled enterprises. If regulators 
are politically dependent, they may become willing accomplices to these activities or be 
forced to remain timid at the very time when investors need aggressive action. 
 The likelihood of this nightmare scenario should depend, in part, upon political 
institutions and regulatory independence. If political veto players are more numerous, 
investors will have a better chance of being politically represented when crisis responses 
are developed. To the degree veto players are partisan rivals, blatant acts of favoritism in 
crisis intervention should also inspire greater controversy. Finally, if regulatory actors 
enjoy more rather than less independence, they can more confidently confront 
opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders. As a result, both veto players and regulatory 
independence should continue to have beneficial effects on stock market performance 
even in times of crisis. Despite these continued credibility effects, the insights of previous 
literature should not be ignored. More numerous veto players and more independent 
regulators should raise coordination costs or possibly delay market interventions. These 
costs and delays are likely to exacerbate crisis period stock price volatility. The real 
question is whether these added volatility costs are worth the added benefits of 
credibility. As my empirical analysis will demonstrate, greater stock index volatility is 
well worth the price. The alternative is mass desertion from equity ownership and 
catastrophic stock index price declines. 
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Argument Summarized and Theoretical Propositions for Testing  
 Like many other areas of economic and regulatory policy making, politicians’ 
commitment to MSP and market integrity may lack credibility. Their non-credibility 
stems from the technical complexity and low political saliency of many regulatory issues, 
the superior mobilization capacity of corporate and industry insiders, the presence of anti-
investor interests on both sides of the political spectrum, and the tendency of financial 
regulation to be cyclical rather than time consistent. In line with the literature on central 
banking and the regulation of utilities, the delegation of rulemaking and enforcement 
power to independent regulatory actors, both public and private, may enhance politicians’ 
policy commitments. Along with these credibility effects come added benefits in the form 
of greater policy stability and more informed and knowledgeable regulatory agents. This 
leads to the following theoretical propositions that will be explored in the upcoming 
chapters: 
Proposition 1a: Delegation to politically independent public regulatory agencies should 
make politicians’ commitments to market integrity and investment protection more 
credible, and these credibility effects should enhance stock market development and 
performance.   
Proposition 1b.: Delegation to politically independent SROs should make politicians’ 
commitments to market integrity and investment protection more credible, and these 
credibility effects should enhance stock market development and performance.   
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 The idea that regulatory institutions can ameliorate credibility problems is 
straightforward. However, the severity of these credibility problems will not be constant 
across political contexts. More specifically, where political institutions undermine policy 
credibility or where the financial status quo benefits politically powerful industrial and 
financial incumbents, politicians’ commitments to stock market development will be 
particularly fragile. This leads to three more theoretical propositions: 
Proposition 2a: Where a lack of partisan veto players undermines the credibility of 
political commitments to market integrity and investor protection, delegation to 
independent regulatory actors should be especially credibility enhancing.  
Proposition 2b: Where majoritarian electoral competition undermines the credibility of 
political commitments to market integrity and investor protection, delegation to 
independent regulatory actors should be especially credibility enhancing.  
Proposition 2c: Where financial repression empowers anti-investor economic 
incumbents, delegation to independent regulatory actors should be especially credibility 
enhancing  
 As repeatedly highlighted in the previous pages, investor protection is a key pillar 
of equity market development. If enforcement is inconsistent or rulemaking overly 
lenient, corporate insiders have little incentive to understand let alone respect the 
minority shareholder protections enshrined in statutes and regulations. The consistency of 
enforcement and stringency of rulemaking should be dependent upon the ability of 
regulators to resist political pressure from anti-investor interests and their political allies. 
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Therefore, corporate insiders’ understanding of the strength of minority shareholder 
protections should be function of regulators independence. Or stated more simply, 
Proposition 3: When regulators are able to consistently implement shareholder 
protections free from the most egregious forms of political interference, corporate elites 
should have a greater awareness and understanding of minority shareholder protections.   
 Research on the political economy of financial crises suggests that the benefits of 
policy stability in good times can become damaging policy rigidity when rapid, 
coordinated, and decisive policy responses are needed to calm market volatility. I 
partially accept this critique and expect that more numerous veto players and more 
independent regulators may increase coordination costs and slow crisis responses.  
However, this work fails to fully account for minority shareholders and retail investors’ 
acute vulnerability to corporate insiders, market intermediaries, and predatory state actors 
in times of systemic crisis. This added vulnerability should make the credibility of 
political commitments to investor protection and market integrity more rather than less 
important in crisis periods. This leads to two final theoretical propositions:  
Proposition 4a: More numerous political veto players and more independent regulatory 
actors should reassure investors that their rights will not be consistently abused by 
panicked corporate insiders, market intermediaries, or opportunistic politicians; this 
added reassurance should make investors less likely to abandon equity ownership in 
times of crisis.  
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Proposition 4b: Since more numerous political veto players and more independent 
regulatory actors should raise coordination costs and extend bargaining over policy 
interventions, both may exacerbate stock market volatility during systemic crisis.  
 Exact measures and hypotheses stemming from these propositions will be 
explored in upcoming chapters. More specifically, propositions 1a, 2a, 2b, and 2c will be 
evaluated in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 and 5 will analyze propositions 3 and 1b respectively. 
Finally propositions 4a and 4b will be the focus of Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 
Institutions, Independence, and Stock Market Development 
 With its official socialist ideology, widespread state-ownership, and single-party 
political system, it seems unlikely that China would exemplify many of the political 
dynamics outlined in the previous chapter. Yet upon closer examination, China’s one-of-
a-kind socio-economic system has not created one-of-a-kind stock market politics. Like 
nearly every other country in the world, Chinese officials have repeatedly committed to 
stock market development in the name of improved corporate governance, economic 
performance, and international competitiveness. Like other countries, unscrupulous 
market intermediaries, opportunistic corporate insiders, and political short-sightedness 
consistently undermined this commitment to equity market development. In response to 
local political officials’ lack of regulatory credibility, China’s State Council followed a 
familiar script. They delegated significant rulemaking and enforcement power to 
regulatory organizations that enjoy at least some autonomy from party politics. In sum, 
once it became clear that local party officials and politicized municipal bureaucracies 
were not only ineffective regulators but that their ineffectiveness led to crisis and social 
instability, China’s most powerful leaders chose to delegate and centralize power within a 
specialized regulatory agency.  
 After Communist revolutionaries ordered the closing of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 1949, securities trading in China lied dormant for nearly 40 years. Only after 
Deng Xiaoping initiated shareholder-based reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
the latter half of the 1980s did securities markets reemerge in earnest (Schlicting 2008). 
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Treasury notes and local government bonds formed the bulk of the early trading. As SOE 
reforms gathered momentum, corporate equities made up an increasingly large portion of 
trading volume. In contrast to the indifference and occasional hostility of central 
government officials, local leaders had fewer ideological qualms and a greater financial 
interest in the development of these early securities markets. Municipal bonds fueled 
local government borrowing, and the fees and levies that accompanied SOEs’ IPOs 
proved to be a financial boon for local leaders (Green 2004). Although opposed by party 
conservatives, reformers within the Thirteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
sought to harness rather than repress these early markets. In December of 1990, they 
pushed through the first public commitment to stock market development in the 
Communist regime’s history. In the name of a new form of “socialist market economy,” 
the Party congress officially approved of the: 
 “Gradual enlargement of bond and share issuance, and stern strengthening of its 
 management…the development of financial markets, and giving encouragement 
 to other capital raising methods. In big cities where conditions are right stock 
 markets should be established and perfected, and standardized” (1990) 
 Local leaders in Shanghai and Shenzhen responded to this policy cue and 
officially opened stock exchanges in the two cities. Although nominally SROs, municipal 
governments owned both exchanges and local party officials and bureaucrats dominated 
their governance.
11
 Most early brokerage firms were similarly dominated or at least 
financially connected to local leaders. As an added boon for municipal and provincial 
                                               
11
 Technically, both exchanges were regulated by a non-local institution, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC). However, the actors actually enforcing PBoC’s regulations were PBoC local offices. These local 
offices were operated under the administrative control of local leaders meaning they rarely served as an 
independent watch dog of local officials’ regulatory conduct.  
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officials, 50 percent of the “stamp taxes” levied on exchange transactions remained in 
local government coffers. Unsurprisingly, both primary and secondary equity markets 
became politicized hot beds of corruption and opportunism. Local leaders’ regulation of 
share issuance, exchange trading, market intermediaries, and corporate governance was 
blatantly self-serving. Revenue maximization and influence peddling took clear 
precedence over investor protection and market integrity (Green 2004).  
 Despite clear excesses and the flouting of Central Government regulatory 
directives, national party leaders and the State Council cautiously supported these early 
local experiments in shareholding and exchange trading (CSRC  2008). Deng Xiaoping 
best expressed their circumspect commitments to stock market development in early 
1992. He stated: 
 “Securities, stock markets, are they good or evil? Are they dangerous or safe? Are 
 they unique to capitalism or also applicable to socialism? Let’s try and see. Let’s 
 try for one or two years; if it goes well, we can relax controls; if it goes badly, we 
 can correct or close it. Even if we have to close it, we may do it quickly, or 
 slowly, or partly. What are we afraid of? If we maintain this attitude, then we will 
 not make big mistakes.” 
 This tentative commitment received its greatest test less than a year later. On 
August 10
th
, 1992, an initial public offering went horribly wrong in Shenzhen. Municipal 
officials artificially restricted the number of IPO subscription forms and exploited the 
slipshod regulatory framework in order to enrich themselves and the brokerage firms they 
controlled. Retail investors rioted and touched off the most serious social disturbance in 
China since Tiananmen Square (CSRC 2008). Recognizing that stock markets had 
become large enough to threaten social stability and cognizant of continued ideological 
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resistance to their existence, the reformist Central Committee acted in accordance with 
the theory outlined in the previous chapter. They renewed their commitment to investor 
protection and market integrity, and then sought to enhance the credibility of this 
commitment through delegation.  
 The Central Committee created two new regulatory bodies: the State Council 
Securities Committee (SCSC) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (SCSC). The 
former was effectively a committee of the State Council made up of top level party 
officials, economics and finance ministers, and chief bureaucrats. SCSC drafted relevant 
laws, rules, and regulations for securities market, developed long-term policy goals, and 
served as a coordinating forum among various regulators and ministries. The CSRC was 
subordinate to the SCSC and was responsible for developing rules and regulations as well 
as supervising market intermediaries, exchanges, IPOs, and the listing/delisting of 
companies. In December of 1992, the Central Government issued the Circular on Further 
Strengthening of the Macro-management Over the Securities Market. The Circular and 
implementing rules and regulations were the first clear expressions of the Central 
Government’s desire to assume control over securities regulation as well as protect the 
interests of retail investors (CSRC 2008).  
 This renewed policy commitment had the desired effects. The creation of the 
SCSC and CSRC and the issuance of the Circular led to significant increases in total 
market capitalization, retail investment accounts, trading volume, and listed companies 
(CSRC 2008). But despite this initial success, the Central Government’s commitments 
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remained incomplete. Local politicians, municipal securities regulators, and stock 
exchange officials remained powerful and oftentimes ignored CSRC implementation 
efforts. The SCSC itself was hamstrung by political infighting and proved to be an 
unreliable ally in the CSRC’s struggles with local officials and provincial offices of the 
People’s Bank of China (PBoC). In sum, the Central Government’s regulatory initiatives 
continued to lack credibility since they could not ensure that their policy directives would 
be faithfully implemented at the local level. Regulatory uncertainty reigned. Investors 
simply did not know when the CSRC would prevail over the protests of local officials 
and when it would not (Green 2004). 
 Once again it was instability that led to further reform. The Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997 highlighted the dramatic political and economic consequences that can result 
from weak financial and corporate governance regulation (Haggard 2000). Eager to avoid 
the mistakes of their regional neighbors, China adopted a proactive and multipronged 
approach. First, they abolished the SCSC, revoked the PBoC’s authority over securities 
firms, and consolidated all securities market regulation within the CSRC. This 
consolidation allowed the CSRC to wrest control of securities exchanges from local 
governments, shutdown unauthorized securities markets, and initiate a crackdown on 
fraudulent practices within the politically connected brokerage and fund management 
industries (Green 2004). Second, after languishing in committee for nearly 6 years, the 
National People’s Congress passed the Securities Law of 1998. For the first time in their 
history, Chinese securities markets would be governed by a nearly all-encompassing 
national statute (CSRC 2008). Investors could now look to one set of statutes and 
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implementing regulations to understand their rights rather than a patchwork of local laws, 
stock exchange ordinances, SCSC measures, and State Council Directives. The content of 
the statute itself was unremarkable. It “…had little to offer in terms of institutional 
change. It contained few new rules…it created no regulatory organs… and it extended 
few new powers to, or constraints upon, the organs already in existence” (Green 2004; 
172). The law was more important in terms of the signal it sent to investors, local 
politicians, and the international community: all the organs of the Central Government 
were committed to stock market development and integrity, and the CSRC was the only 
legitimate agent of the Central Government working toward that purpose.  
 Since its initial passage in 1998, the Securities Law has been amended repeatedly 
and extensively. Each time, the investor protections and supports for market integrity 
have been formally strengthened rather than weakened (CSRC 2008; IMF “China” 2012). 
This steady legal refinement has been accompanied by the expansion of the CSRC’s 
enforcement power. Most notably, the CSRC now has powerful provincial enforcement 
offices and assumes a dominating role in exchange governance and regulation. Both 
trends have come at the direct expense of local politicians and bureaucrats, unscrupulous 
or financially troubled market intermediaries, and opportunistic corporate insiders. The 
emergence of the CSRC as a competent regulator with national jurisdiction is perhaps the 
most remarkable. There is no doubt that the CSRC operates under the supervision and 
direction of the State Council and lacks many of the hallmarks of political independence. 
A Standing Committee of the National People Congress continues to approve its budget. 
Its leaders enjoy neither fixed terms nor protection from arbitrary dismissal. That said, 
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the Commission has defended its status as a non-governmental organization, and it 
continues to successfully resist most instances of interference by municipal politicians, 
provincial officials, the PBoC, and politically connected SOEs and brokerage firms 
(Green 2004). This very modest though still meaningful level of political independence is 
recognized by the international community. A 2012 joint IMF-International Organization 
of Securities Commissions Report states: 
  “the CSRC itself exercises its day-to-day functions independent of external 
 political influence… [and] free from political or commercial interests… The 
 CSRC staff observes  high professional standards including avoiding conflicts of 
 interests and preserving the confidentiality of information obtained in the course 
 of their duties… The powers and authorities of the CSRC are sufficient, taking 
 into account the nature of China’s capital markets…” (emphasis added) 
 The Central Government’s commitment to equity market integrity and the 
credibility effects of the CSRC’s partial independence are obvious in various measures of 
stock market development. Once mere experiments, listed companies now play an 
important role in the Chinese economy. After numbering only 14 in1991, there are now 
over 2,500 listed companies on Chinese exchanges today. As of 2012, China’s market 
capitalization and value traded as a percentage of GDP are 44% and 70% respectively. 
This places them in the 59
th
 and 92
nd
 percentiles in the world (World Development  
Indicators). When viewed in terms of growth rather than levels, the performance of 
China’s equity markets is even more impressive. Between 1998 and 2012, market 
capitalization and value traded increased by 100% and 84% respectively. As of 2006, 
over 11.8 million retail investment accounts held domestic equities and this number 
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continues to grow even in the aftermath of recent market turmoil (CSRC 2008; Fahey and 
Chemi 2015).  
 Despite these positive trends, serious weaknesses remain within China’s 
regulatory architecture, exchanges, corporate governance, and securities industry.
12
 
Corruption, local officials’ continued resistance to the CSRC’s regulatory initiatives, a 
lack of institutional investors, underutilization of SROs, and the continued vulnerability 
of retail investors continues to threaten Chinese markets. Perhaps most troubling, the 
persistent lack of investor education has led many of China’s retail investors to view the 
stock market as a casino rather than a tool of long-run wealth management (Fahey and 
Chemi 2015).
 
Despite these weaknesses, the Chinese case reveals the credibility 
enhancing effects of delegation to regulatory agencies. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
these effects can emerge in hostile political environments characterized by a lack of 
electoral competition and a minimal number of policy making veto players.  
 Although unique in many ways, China exemplifies many of the theoretical claims 
explored in the previous chapter. To reiterate, politicians often have difficulty credibly 
committing to the defense of market integrity and the promotion of minority shareholder 
protections (MSP). This lack of credibility can reduce investors’ confidence and 
undermine stock market development and performance. Independent regulatory 
organizations can help to ameliorate politicians’ commitment problems particularly 
where political institutions (i.e. few veto players or majoritarian elections) make those 
                                               
12 For the CSRC’s opinion regarding their country’s weaknesses, see Chapter 3 of “China’s Capital Markets 
Development Report” of 2008 
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problems more severe. In the sections below, I will evaluate these claims. More 
specifically, this chapter will explicitly test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Ia: There is a positive association between regulatory independence and 
market capitalization to GDP 
Hypothesis Ib: There is a positive association between regulatory independence and 
benchmark index price growth.  
Hypothesis IIa: There is a positive association between consensual political institutions 
(veto players and electoral proportionality) and stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Hypothesis IIb: There is a positive association between consensual political institutions 
(veto players and electoral proportionality) and benchmark index price growth. 
 Furthermore, I will evaluate whether consensual political institutions and 
regulatory independence are complementary or substitutive in terms of their credibility 
enhancing effects. As was highlighted by the Chinese experience, the delegation of 
regulatory power to the CSRC was likely more impactful because local political elites 
were initially unconstrained and local bureaucracies were highly politicized. This lack of 
constraint and the politicization of local bureaucracies led to unstable, opportunistic, and 
sometimes arbitrary rulemaking and enforcement. These claims regarding the 
substitutability of political and regulatory institutions lead to the following hypotheses:  
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Hypothesis IIIa: The positive association between independence and market 
capitalization will increase in magnitude as veto players become fewer in number and 
elections more majoritarian. 
Hypothesis IIIb: The positive association between independence and price growth in 
benchmark indices will increase in magnitude as veto players become fewer in number 
and elections more majoritarian.  
  In addition to investigating any substitutability between political and regulatory 
institutions, I will explore whether both sets of institutions take on greater importance if 
asymmetries in political mobilization are especially biased against minority investors. 
Unfortunately, a direct measure of mobilization asymmetries is unavailable both cross-
sectionally and temporally. What is needed is a proxy that can account for the superior 
political resources of corporate insiders vis-à-vis retail investors and the general public. 
To this end, I follow Rajan and Zingales (2003) and assume that credit market 
underdevelopment is a highly effective financial barrier to entry that swells both the 
economic and political power of incumbent industrial and financial firms. When credit is 
scarce, incumbent firms will be larger, fewer in number, and enjoy substantial economic 
rents that they can use for political contributions and lobbying. Reduced firm turnover 
will also allow these typically anti-MSP corporate insiders to develop longer lasting 
relationships with politicians and bureaucrats. In short, credit market underdevelopment 
creates and empowers the sorts of business elites who have the most to lose (i.e. their 
monopoly rents) from equity market development and investor protection.  
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 As a result, where credit is the scarcest, corporate insiders will be the most 
politically advantaged and politicians will be the most insincere in their commitments to 
MSP and market integrity. However, as Chapter 2 highlighted, consensual political 
institutions and regulatory independence both have the capacity to dilute special interest 
influence and/or increase the chances that retail investors and minority shareholders will 
be politically represented. This leads to a final set of hypotheses. 
Hypothesis IV: The magnitude of the association between consensual political institutions 
and market capitalization will increase as the supply of credit becomes scarcer. 
Hypothesis V: The magnitude of the association between regulatory independence and 
market capitalization will increase as the supply of credit becomes scarcer. 
 The remainder of the chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will present my 
measures of stock market development and performance. Second, I will present my novel 
measure of regulatory independence, veto point and electoral proportionality measures, 
and macroeconomic controls. Third, I will outline my modeling approach and test the 
hypotheses above. The fourth and final section will discuss the results and their 
implications. 
Measures of Capital Market Development and Performance  
 The ideal dependent variable for my purposes would be an annual measure of 
minority shareholder protections (MSP) and securities market integrity for all countries 
with public securities markets. While such measures exist, they exist for only a handful of 
years and a subset of mostly middle and upper income countries (La Porta et. al 
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(1997,1998); Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). Furthermore, they are extremely slow-moving. 
A direct measure of ownership concentration would be a next best measure. Higher levels 
of concentration suggest that blockholders rather than minority shareholders dominate 
corporate governance. This would serve as a clear indication that the latter group has 
fewer rights. These measures also exist, but they have only been available since the late 
1990s, cover only a subset of upper-middle and upper-income countries, and are rarely 
available in annual panel form.  
 In line with previous literature, I utilize stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP as an indirect de facto measure of MSP and outsider oriented 
corporate governance. Also known as equity share, market capitalization is calculated by 
multiplying share prices with the number of shares outstanding for all domestically 
incorporated firms that are listed on a country's stock exchanges. Investment companies, 
mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles are excluded. Market capitalization 
is obviously an indirect and imperfect measure. That said, it is reasonable to assume that 
if country A has a significantly higher market capitalization to GDP than country B 
(controlling for macroeconomic variables), investors in country A have greater 
confidence in their rights as minority shareholders. Stated differently, only where 
corporate insiders are willing (or coerced through government regulation) to govern their 
companies in ways that promote the financial interests of minority shareholders will 
minority shareholders actually invest.  
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 Despite having significant advantages in terms of cross-national availability 
(N>100) and annual observations dating back to at least 1988, the measure is not without 
shortcomings. First, some of the capitalization of national equity markets may be 
controlled by blockholders who gained their shares prior to a company going public. As a 
result, some market capitalization merely reflects continued insider control rather than 
outsider friendly governance. Second, equity share can exhibit cyclical behavior that 
outpaces cycles in economic growth. This was especially the case in the developed world 
during the late 1990s dot.com boom. Financially open developing nations may not only 
experience their own domestic cycles, but they are rarely left unaffected by financial 
cycles in the global economic core (Barker 2010). These issues should not be dismissed 
out of hand. However, the use of appropriate econometric techniques such as fixed 
effects “within” estimators, year dummies, and lagged dependent variables should go a 
considerable way in terms of mitigating their potential impact on final inferences. Even 
more importantly, equity share is less flawed than its most feasible alternatives.  
 The most common alternative measure of stock market development is value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. Although more revealing in terms of liquidity, it often 
reflects factors other than minority shareholders’ overall confidence in their rights. These 
factors include financial transaction costs, the state of market infrastructure technology, 
and the competitiveness of the investment services sector. As compared to equity share, 
value traded is also even more sensitive to financial and macroeconomic cycles. Finally, 
there is considerable controversy regarding how to properly measure value traded. The 
inclusion or exclusion of “off-trading floor” transactions of listed securities continues to 
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spark disagreement (Rajan and Zingales 2003). Given the even greater short-comings of 
the value traded measure, equity share’s more straightforward cross-national 
comparability and historical coverage make it the best measure for my purposes.
13
  
 My measure of stock market capitalization to GDP was taken from the World 
Bank’s Financial Development and Structure Dataset drawn from Standard & Poor's 
Global Stock Markets Factbook. Missing observations and variations in how S&P 
accounted for inflation restricts my dependent variable data to the period between 1988 to 
2012. After the introduction of controls, most model estimations include around 110 
countries with an average of 18 yearly observations per country. Before including equity 
share in empirical models, it was natural log transformed for several reasons. First, 
market capitalization had an extreme positive skew and its variance tended to increase 
with its level. Second, there were indications that market capitalization may not be 
stationary. The transformation had the desired effects. It reduced equity share’s skew, 
stabilized its variance, lessened the influence of outliers, and produced more conclusive 
evidence of stationarity. Augmented Dickey-Fuller panel unit root tests of both the 
transformed and untransformed equity share measures can be found below in Table 3.1. 
 
                             
 
 
 
                                               
13
 Equity share has a pairwise correlation with value traded of 0.73. 
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     Table 3.1      
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller Panel Unit Root Tests)  
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 369 0 Inverse Chi-sqrd 330 0
Inverse Normal -4.3 0 Inverse Normal -2.08 0
Inverse Logit -3.3 0 Inverse Logit -2.94 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 6.9 0 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 5 0
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 260 0.04 Inverse Chi-sqrd 425 0
Inverse Normal -1.3 0.1 Inverse Normal -4.08 0
Inverse Logit -1.5 0.07 Inverse Logit -6.19 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 1.8 0.03 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 9.64 0
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 135 1 Inverse Chi-sqrd 309.5 0
Inverse Normal 4.2 1 Inverse Normal -1.18 0.12
Inverse Logit 4.2 1 Inverse Logit -2.3 0.01
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd -3.9 1 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 4.38 0
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 169 0.99 Inverse Chi-sqrd 296 0.002
Inverse Normal 2.3 0.99 Inverse Normal -1 0.16
Inverse Logit 2.2 0.99 Inverse Logit -1.67 0.05
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd -2.3 0.99 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 3.86 0.001
First Lag
2nd Lag 2nd Lag
Market Capitalization %GDP ln(Market Capitalization %GDP)
3rd Lag 3rd Lag
No Lag No Lag
First Lag
µT=20, #of Panels=110 µT=20, #of Panels=110
 
 Because market capitalization has an obvious upward trend and the panels exhibit 
considerable cross-sectional dependence, both the transformed and untransformed series 
were demeaned and test regressions included a time trend. The results above suggest that 
transformation eliminated that non-stationarity revealed at the second and third lags.  
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 In addition to measuring stock market size relative to the rest of the economy, I 
will also use a measure of overall market performance. Performance will be measured in 
terms of annual percentage growth in the prices of national stock market indices. 
Although not a measure of development per se, it is safe to assume that countries with 
stronger MSP and market integrity will produce stronger demand for equities and this 
demand should produce larger price growth after controlling for macroeconomic 
conditions. Individual country market indices are taken from the larger S&P/IFCI and 
S&P/Frontier BMI indices. In developed and middle income country indices, all included 
equities must be publically listed, considered “investable,” have market values of at least 
$100 million(US), and annual dollar value traded of at least $50 million(US) (S&P 2016). 
For the 34 smallest markets covered by the S&P Frontier BMI, included equities must be 
the “most active securities in their respective stock markets” subject to multitier 
capitalization and liquidity requirements (see S&P Frontier BMI for details on index 
construction). Given that I am looking at price growth (i.e. first differences in index price 
levels), stationarity will most likely not be an issue. However, I conduct augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Unit Root tests to rule out integration with greater certainty (see Table 3.2 
below). Within the 80 country sub-sample, an obvious trend is not apparent, but the series 
are demeaned to account for cross-sectional dependence.  
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                    Table 3.2       
(Augmented Dickey-Fuller Panel Unit Root Test) 
Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 1258.9 0
Inverse Normal -27.46 0
Inverse Logit -37.95 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 59.98 0
Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 553 0
Inverse Normal -15 0
Inverse Logit -16.6 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 21.25 0
Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 288.5 0
Inverse Normal -7.048 0
Inverse Logit -7.16 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 7.3 0
Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 276.97 0
Inverse Normal -5.32 0
Inverse Logit -6.23 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 7.16 0
No Lag
1st Lag
%Price∆S&P Benchmark Country Indicies
µT=16, #of Panels=84
2nd Lag
3rd Lag
Augmented Dickey-Fuller
 
As expected, there is no evidence that the series is non-stationary and the variable is left 
untransformed due to only moderate skew. 
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Independent Variables 
 In order to measure consensual political institutions, I need measures for both 
institutional veto points and electoral proportionality. I primarily utilize Witold Henisz’s 
Political Constraints III index while also using Beck et. al’s (1999) checks variable as a 
robustness check. Political constraint takes on values between 0 and 1 with higher values 
indicating that it would be more difficult for a change in the preferences of any one actor 
to lead to a change in government policy. The measure itself indicates the number of 
constitutional veto points in the political system, whether these points are controlled by 
different parties, and then makes a final adjustment for overall levels of party 
fractionalization within veto points. Checks is very similar, but places less emphasis on 
overall levels of party fractionalization. In presidential systems, it counts veto players 
according to whether different parties control the legislative and executive branches. In 
parliamentary systems, checks simply counts the number of parties in the governing 
coalition and then makes further upward adjustments if electoral competition is 
unrestricted and ballots are open rather than closed lists. Since my theoretical framework 
emphasizes the ability of consensual political institutions to incorporate a wider diversity 
of social preferences, Political Constraint III is the featured independent variable; it more 
systematically incorporates party fractionalization in the legislature and more closely 
adheres to a formal spatial model of heterogeneous preferences as compared to Checks.  
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 For my measure of electoral proportionality, I utilize Pagano and Volpin (2005) 
approach and combine three variables from Beck et. al. Database of Political Institutions: 
PR, Plurality, Housesys. PR equals one if any government officials are elected using 
proportional representation. Plurality equals one if any officials are elected under 
majoritarian rules. Housesys equals one if the majority of house seats are assigned by a 
non-proportional rule. Housesys equals .5 if there is a bicameral legislature and a 
majority of house seats are assigned by a non-proportional rule in one house, but not the 
other. These three variables are then combined according to the following formula so that 
the higher scores indicate greater electoral proportionality: PR-Pluralty-Housesys+2 = 
Electoral Proportionality.  
 In addition to the featured political variables above and my original measure of 
regulatory independence, I will include a series of alternative political and institutional 
controls. Main models will feature two additional variables derived from Beck and 
Keefer’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI): a measure of partisanship and electoral 
competitiveness. In light of Pinto et. al’s (2010) findings regarding the connection 
between left-partisanship and stock market growth, I include the DPI dummy variable of 
left-wing partisanship. It takes on a value of one if the chief executive in a presidential 
system or the largest governing party in a parliamentary system is left wing. Electoral 
competitiveness is also included because of past literatures’ emphasis on the importance 
of partisan competition for financial development. I combine the Legislative and 
Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (liec and eiec) rescaled onto a [0,12] 
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interval. 12 indicates a maximum level of electoral competition.
14
 Both competitiveness 
indices were used in light of Gehlbach and Keefer (2011) as well as Jensen et. al’s (2013) 
findings. The former emphasizes the importance of institutionalized ruling parties in 
ensuring the credible commitment of autocrats to property rights and the latter 
emphasizes the importance of autocratic legislatures in facilitating the passage of pro-
investor corporate governance legislation. Taking both sets of findings at face value 
means that executive and legislative party competition that is less than free and fair may 
still have important effects on corporate governance regulation and the overall investment 
environment. As a result, the intermediate categories of eiec and liec may contain 
valuable information in terms of stock market development.
15
  
 In line with most cross-national large-N research, I include natural log of GDP per 
capita and annual percentage growth in GDP to account for economic development and 
growth.
16
 In light of Rajan and Zingales’(2003) emphasis on how both trade and capital 
                                               
14 The index of executive competitiveness takes on the following values: 1,2--no executive or executive is 
unelected; 3—elected executive but there is only 1 candidate; 4—single party multiple candidates; 5—
Multiple legal political parties but only 1 candidate received  votes in executive elections; 6—Multiple 
candidates and legal parties but winning candidate received more than 75% of the vote; 7—winning  
executive candidate received less than 75% of the vote. The legislative index is same as the executive 
index, but coded for legislatures. The two indices were added together and then anchored at 0 so that the 
maximum score is 12.   
15 This also means that the use of Polity II and its components may be less than ideal. Both the combined 
democracy score and the executive constraint subcomponent are highly correlated with political constraint 
and checks(ρ=.74 and .73). While the use of Polity’s competitiveness of participation subcomponent is the 
most promising, it lumps regimes with institutionalized ruling parties under the same “repressed” category 
as countries without such parties. Such a categorization goes directly against the insights of Gehlbach and 
Keefer (2011) and Jensen et. al (2013). In contrast, my combined competiveness measure makes more fine 
grained distinctions among countries with varying levels of ruling party institutionalization as well as 
legislative party competition in both its autocratic and democratic forms 
16 Natural log of 1 plus inflation excluding a  handful of extreme negative values was also included in 
preliminary analyses, but will not be found in models of stock market size. In most models, inflation failed 
to approach even the most generous levels of significance (p>.10), did not maintain a consistent sign, and 
only rarely affected the coefficients of other variables. Furthermore, it was highly correlated with both GDP 
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account openness may alter the preferences of economic incumbents, I include Chinn and 
Ito’s (2006) de jure index of capital account openness and the natural log of export plus 
imports as a percentage of GDP. The latter was log transformed in order to reduce right 
skew and ease interpretation. In order to control for any crowding out effects from 
government spending, I include general government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) for robustness. The measure takes into account all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods, services, and the labor public employees. It also 
takes into account most forms of military spending excluding expenditures that are a part 
of government capital formation (World Development Indicators). In order to control for 
global trends and cycles in stock prices, I included (differenced) price level measures of 
Morgan Stanley Capital International’s All World Securities Index (USD hundreds). The 
index captures 2,483 large and midcap companies across 23 developed and 23 emerging 
markets and includes approximately 85% of the globe’s investment grade equities.17 
From the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Global Financial 
Development Database, I use a yearly banking crisis dummy variable to control for the 
                                                                                                                                            
per capita and capital account openness (ρ≈-.45).  Due to missing values, it served only to reduce the 
number of observations. 
17
 The price index was differenced because Dickey-Fuller unit root tests suggest that it is non-stationary. 
Retests suggest that the series is difference stationary. The MSCI price index is a superior way to control 
for the global trend of increasing stock values because it is a direct measure of the trend that tracks year by 
year increases and decreases in stock values. This should be far more meaningful than the inclusion of 
linear, quadratic, or cubic time trends. These trends make more restrictive assumptions regarding 
underlying data generating process and have come under criticism for leading to erroneous causal 
inferences (Box-Steffensmeier et al.2014). Furthermore, the inclusion of a time trend or year dummies 
absorbed a large amount of the variance of interest. Year dummies will be included in interaction models as 
a robustness check. 
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effects of banking system instability. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrices of all 
variables can be found in the Appendix III(c). 
 
Formal Regulatory Independence   
 In order to construct my original measure of formal regulatory independence, I 
assume that simply taking into account a regulator’s separation from government 
ministries is insufficient to capture the full impact of agency independence on politicians’ 
credibility. Unfortunately, there is no preexisting global dataset of securities market 
regulators’ formal independence from politicians.18 Elgie and McMenamin (2005) as well 
as Yesilkagit and Thiel (2008) have both created fine grained datasets that include 
financial regulators, but each is limited to only one country. Gilardi’s (2002) dataset of 
formal regulatory agency independence is one of the most all-encompassing given its 21 
indicators and cross-sectoral coverage. However, the data remains confined to the 
European continent and is limited historically. 
 De jure measures of central bank independence do a better job in terms of their 
global coverage and sometimes incorporate well over twenty years of data, but these too 
are often limited to OECD members or a handful of developing nations (Parkin and Bade 
1977; Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini 1991; Alesina and Summers 1993). In terms of 
detail, cross-national range, and historical coverage, Cukeriman’s (1992) dataset remains 
                                               
18 The GlobalRegs project at the Institut Barcelona d´Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) is currently constructing 
a global dataset of regulatory agency formal independence that covers nearly all social and economic 
sectors. However, this dataset is not yet publically available.  
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one of the best. It features over 16 de jure measures of central bank political 
independence, includes 21 OECD countries along with 49 developing countries, and 
covers the period from 1950 to 1989. Unfortunately, central banks are also capital market 
regulators in only a handful of countries and most measures of stock market development 
begin in the late 1980s. Therefore, Cukeriman’s extensive dataset can only be used as a 
guide, rather than a source of data.  
 Given the limitations of these past datasets, I constructed a new dataset of 
securities market regulatory organizations in over 120 countries from 1975 until 2012.
19
 
The dataset is one of a kind in terms of both historical depth and cross-national coverage. 
Drawing from financial legislation, agency statutes, executive orders and decrees, and a 
wealth of secondary sources, the dataset features 25 indicators of political independence 
making it the most detailed measure of agencies’ formal political independence 
available.
20
 Indicator selection was guided by a close review of Cukierman (1992) and 
Gilardi (2002). However, I made a deliberate effort to be more parsimonious in terms of 
the number of categories per indicator. Typically, independence indicators are ordinal 
with the lowest scores corresponding to political dependence upon ministries of finance 
and/or executive cabinets; middling scores indicating independence from the executive, 
but not legislatures; and the highest scores reserved for instances in which the regulator is 
                                               
19 Countries that lacked a public securities markets or where data was unavailable were excluded from the 
sample. 
20
 In most cases, English translations of agency statutes and financial legislations were available. Most 
often, these were provided by the agencies themselves, financial ministries, official gazettes, stock 
exchanges, and/or international organizations. For languages other than Spanish or English, statutes were 
machine translated and then double checked with dictionaries. On occasion, machine and/or dictionary 
translations were then sent to fluent speakers for verification.  
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independent of both executive and legislative actors. In other instances, higher scores 
reflect requirements that multiple veto players must agree before a particular action can 
be taken vis-à-vis a regulatory agency or its personnel (e.g. legislative confirmation of 
executive nominees to an agency board).  
 My de jure independence indicators include but are not limited to appointment 
and dismissal procedures for regulators’ supervisory boards, executive boards, and/or 
CEOs/general managers; restrictions on appointment renewal; term lengths and the 
staggering of board terms; the presence of political officials and other regulators as ex-
officio members of agency boards; agencies’ budgetary and organizational autonomy; the 
ability of political officials to issue binding instructions to agency personnel; and the 
rights of political actors to veto agency rules or issue their own regulations independent 
of agency participation. Overall, functional, institutional, financial, and organizational 
independence were all represented by indicators. Of these “secondary-level” features of 
independence, personnel and functional independence were particularly emphasized. 
Countries where the ministry of finance or executive cabinet is in charge of regulation 
almost always received the lowest scores possible for each item indicator.
21
  
 I assume a “family resemblance” approach to the concept of independence. As a 
result, my coding scheme does not attempt to express necessary and sufficient conditions 
                                               
21 In most instances, regulatory organizations which remained within the Ministry of Finance were not 
treated as regulatory agencies. Instead they are treated as administrative sub-divisions of the Finance 
Ministry and receive minimum scores. However, I do not treat institutional independence from government 
ministries as a necessary condition. When a regulatory organization remained within a government 
ministry, but its personnel enjoyed finite term limits, protections from dismissal, and/or explicit statutory 
guarantees of operational autonomy in certain areas, that ministerial subdivision received non-minimum 
scores on personnel and functional indicators.  
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for independence (Goertz 2006). Instead, I treat independence as a latent quality that a 
regulator can possess to a greater or lesser degree. However, my measure does not 
arbitrarily assume that all indicators are equally important for independence. Rather than 
rely upon theoretical assertion to weigh some indicators more than others, I follow 
Hanretty and Koop (2012) and look to a group of measurement models associated with 
Item Response Theory (IRT).  
 Item-response models are analogous to factor analysis with item-discrimination 
parameters resembling factor loadings. However, factor analysis models do a poor job 
with ordinal data since they assume that indicators have a multivariate normal 
distribution. Since my coding scheme relies entirely upon ordinal and categorical 
indicators, they lacked this distribution and factor analysis was ruled out. To be more 
specific, my statutory ‘tests’ of formal independence contained both dichotomous 
(yes/no) and polytomous (>2 ordered categories) response items. Given this mixed 
indicator format, a graded response model was superior to most alternatives in the IRT 
family. First, graded response models can accept both polytomous items with differing 
numbers of response options and dichotomous items. This made it preferable to a 
standard latent trait model, rating scale models, Rasch models, or a Mokken scaling 
procedures. Second, unlike a partial credit model, it does not assume that the difference 
between response options is identical for different items. 
 Utilizing the R package mirt (Chalmers 2016), I fit an unconditional maximum 
likelihood factor analysis model for graded responses using the Expectation-
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Maximization approach outlined by Bock and Aitkin (1981). My specific graded 
response model was unidimensional and estimated two parameters. The choice of a 
unidimensional model was primarily theoretical. Indicators were deliberately designed 
with only one dimension in mind: latent levels of formal independence from politicians.  
Exploratory two and three dimensional models distributed items across dimensions in 
ways that were neither theoretically nor empirically informative. In contrast, all items 
‘loaded’ well on a single dimension of latent regulatory independence.22  
 As pointed out by Kolen and Tong (2007 & 2010), the choice of IRT estimator is 
not without consequences. The choice can have significant influence on the ultimate 
distribution of latent scores as well as discrimination and extremity parameters. In cases 
with fewer test items and small sample sizes, these differences can be large. For graded 
response models, possible estimation approaches include marginal maximum likelihood 
(MML) estimators, test characteristic functions (TCFs), and fully Bayesian estimators. 
While the use of TCFs has fallen out of favor, current debates among applied researchers 
revolve around the choice between MML and fully Bayesian approaches. MML 
approaches are lauded for their efficiency and consistency as tests and sample sizes grow 
in size. They are considered the “gold standard” among most testing practitioners 
(Templin 2011). However, they can perform poorly when dimensions and parameters 
become more numerous; produce large standard errors at the extremes of the latent 
                                               
22 The graded response models were reestimated with the STATA package IRT grm. Discrimination 
parameters and latent scores were very close with pairwise correlations of ρ≈.97. Standard errors were also 
very similar. Unlike MIRT, IRT grm allowed me to cluster standard errors by country. Clustering by 
country did increase the size of standard errors for both discrimination parameters and latent scores. 
However, the size of this increase was marginal and ranged from 3 to 20 percent depending upon the 
parameter and item in question.   
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continuum; and generate nonsensical parameters or fail to converge when response 
vectors are rare or non-existent.  
 Although less frequently utilized, Bayesian approaches are said to have several 
advantages over MML. The most important advantage is the ability to incorporate 
estimates of uncertainty within parameter estimations. More specifically, standard errors 
of item parameters can be taken into account when estimating latent trait parameters. In 
my case, this would allow confidence intervals (typically quantiles of the marginal 
posterior densities) of independence scores to ‘propagate’ into inferences about 
independence’s association with stock market outcomes. Along with this practical 
advantage, previous research suggests that Bayesian methods may also prevent 
“parameter drift” and more accurately estimate parameters for extreme response patterns, 
small samples, and short tests (Lord 1986; Swaminathan and Gifford 1982). When 
modelling issues include large amounts of missing data, multiple raters, multi-level 
structures, multiple dimensionality, or testlet structures, Bayesian models are also 
preferable (Patz & Junker 1999; Fox & Glas 2001; Béguin & Glas 2001; Bradlow, 
Wainer, & Wang 1999; Kuo and Sheng 2016). However, Bayesian estimation is not 
without shortcomings. Shortcomings include extreme computational intensity for 
multidimensional models in large datasets, high sensitivity to the selection of the prior, 
and significant bias toward the selected prior’s mean particularly when the number of test 
items is small. As a result of these weaknesses, Templin (2011) describes the choice 
between approaches in terms of the reduced overall error of Bayesian methods with the 
more (asymptotically) unbiased estimates of MML. 
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 While my choice of measurement model is far from trivial, there are reasons to 
believe that the differences between a MML and a Bayesian approach may be less 
pronounced in practice. Kim (2001) directly compared the estimates from MML and 
Gibbs sampling for Rasch models. He found no significant difference between the item 
parameter estimates except for the longer computational time of the Bayesian approach. 
Wollack et. al. (2002) made a similar comparison for nominal response models and 
discovered that the two methods are similarly accurate in samples of 300 and 500 persons 
with test lengths greater than 10 items. Finally, studies of graded response models 
suggest that MML and Bayesian approaches produce comparable estimates of item and 
person parameters “in most cases” with the latter emerging as superior only when sample 
and test sizes are small or models grow more complex (Kieftenbeld and Natesan 2012) 
 Since my measurement model is unidimensional, has a large sample (4000+ 
country-years), and my ‘test’ of independence is long (25 indicators), my choice of a 
MML rather than a Bayesian approach will involve little sacrifice in terms of parameter 
recovery. Obviously, this will not allow me to directly propagate measurement error in 
my regression models. That said, issues of measurement error should be minimal, 
because I deliberately selected indicators that would minimize measurement error. If a 
potential indicator would require subjective judgements or extratextual interpretation, it 
was not included in the final measure. To reiterate, my measurements involved 
accounting for the existence or non-existence of particular statutory language. It is 
difficult to mistake a four year term with a six year term or to misread language that says 
‘all agency rules are subject to the approval of the finance minister.’ This is not to say 
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that I completely eliminated measurement error, but the simplicity of my chosen 
indicators should make it minimal. This lack of widespread measurement error weakens 
but does not eliminate the most convincing justification for a Bayesian approach. 
 Table 3.3 provides support for my estimation choices. Following the procedure 
outlined by Bock and Aitkin (1988), each items’ discrimination parameter was 
transformed into the more well-known factor loadings metric. With transformed loadings 
of 0.7 or higher, all selected items appear to substantively tap latent independence. 
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     Table 3.3      
(Regulatory Independence Indicators and Factor Loadings) 
 
 Of the two item parameters estimated by my graded response models, the 
discrimination parameter was most important in terms of maintaining concept-measure 
consistency. The discrimination parameter is analogous to a factor loading (see above) 
and indicates the degree to which a particular indicator can differentiate between 
regulatory organizations with greater or lesser independence. When a final latent score of 
independence is estimated for each country year, the items that constitute that latent score 
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are weighted so that more discriminatory item indicators have a larger impact on the final 
latent measure. Overall, discrimination parameters are positive and ranged from 1.7 to 
5.8. Of the 25 indicators, having government ministers or non-securities regulators as ex-
officio board members; the ability of governments to give binding directions to agency 
personnel; agency head, supervisory board, and executive board/manager term lengths; 
and agency head/executive board appointment and dismissal procedures are all the most 
discriminatory. Appointment and dismissal procedures for supervisory board/general 
manager are the next most discriminatory. Organizational, reporting, and financial based 
indictors are the least discriminatory though the size of their discrimination parameters 
suggests that they all make greater than negligible contributions to final latent measures. 
A detailed list of independence indicators along with their discrimination parameters can 
be found in Appendix III(b). Overall, these results fall in line with theoretical 
expectations as well as past central bank autonomy indices that emphasize personnel 
based indicators of independence.  
 For ease of interpretation, latent independence scores were max-min normalized 
onto a [0,1] scale with 0 indicating regulation conducted completely by political actors 
and 1 indicating the maximum level of formal independence found in the sample.
23
 
Overall, regulatory independence is rarely changing and strongly trended. While being 
very stable throughout the post-war era, the number of changes began to accelerate in 
                                               
23 The normalization was calculated in the following way: (Independence - 
Independence(minimum))/(Independence (maximum) - Independence(minimum)). In order to ensure that middle 
category inflation does not throw off inferences. All analyses in this chapter were reestimated with raw 
scores of Independence and Independence z-standardized (Independence- Independence(sample 
µ))/std.dev(Independence in sample). Qualitative findings were left unchanged and p-values were nearly 
identical.   
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1990 and peaked in 1998 when nearly 17 countries experienced changes to their 
regulators’ level of formal independence. Since then, each year has witnessed between 5 
to 12 changes in formal regulator independence. 84% of all changes were in the direction 
of greater independence meaning independence granted is rarely taken away.
24
 Excluding 
years when independence remained unaltered, mean and median changes in formal 
independence are 0.35 and 0.23 respectively. After 1988, the overall, between, and within 
standard deviations of formal independence are 0.36,0.22, and 0.27 respectively. During 
the same period, the global average level of independence increased from a mere 0.18 in 
1988 to around 0.73 in 2012.  
 There is also considerable regional variation. After 1988, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
East Asia (excluding Australia and New Zealand), and the Middle East/North Africa have 
the least independent regulators with average independence scores of around 0.40. The 
next best region is South Asia with a regional average score of 0.50. Latin 
America/Caribbean, Western Europe, and the Former Soviet Republics of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia are somewhat better with regional average scores ranging from 0.59 to 
0.61. Unsurprisingly, British settler colonies (i.e. U.S, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand) lead the world with average scores of 0.77. The United States’ Securities 
Exchange Commission has an independence score of 0.92.   
                                               
24 This is not to say that regulators were never reorganized or that regulatory power was never rearranged. 
However, even when new regulators were created, they often had comparable though not identical levels of 
formal independence. 
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 Pairwise correlations of 0.31, 0.28, 0.35, and 0.41 suggest that regulatory 
independence has a modest positive association with economic development (GDP per 
Capita), rule of law (Freedom House), political constraint, and electoral competition 
respectively. In contrast, pairwise correlations with electoral proportionality, government 
consumption, and partisanship all hover around 0. Pairwise correlations between 
independence and stock market capitalization (% of GDP), index price growth and 
volatility, and value traded (%GDP) are equally as weak. Despite having virtually no 
correlation with trade (%GDP), independence has moderately positive pairwise 
correlations of 0.34 and 0.48 with capital account openness and KOF’s Index of 
Globalization respectively (Chinn-Ito 2006; Dreher 2006).  
 Most important for my purposes, formal regulator independence and formal 
investor protection are only weakly correlated at ρ=0.13 in 2012.25 Similar pairwise 
correlations were found in 2006, 2008, and 2010 (.10 < ρ<0.17). This positive association 
is not universal and is driven largely by Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In the rest of 
the world the correlation between independence and MSP is either weakly negative or 
negligible (see Figure 3.1 below). This divergence between independence and MSP 
suggests that the political factors that encourage more politically independent regulatory 
designs (i.e. political uncertainty, divided government, bureaucratic capacity, recent 
liberalization) do not necessarily lead to increases in investor protection as well. In 
countries such as Croatia, Bolivia, Jordan, and Kuwait, politicians have sought to 
                                               
25 My measure of formal MSP is the World Bank’s strength of investor protection index. The index is a part 
of the Doing Business Project and is only available from 2005-2012. 
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enhance their credibility by giving securities market regulators higher levels of formal 
independence. However, these same politicians have stopped far short of bringing their 
investor protection regimes up to Anglo-American standards. The opposite situation has 
emerged in countries such as the UK, Colombia, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In these 
countries, formal MSP is very strong, but politicians have deliberately left regulatory 
organizations open to direct political influence. The U.S.’ global leadership in terms of 
the size and liquidity of its stock markets makes more sense in light of the diagrams 
below. The U.S. is exceptional in that its regulatory regime combines both high levels of 
independence and very strong MSP. Other global leaders in terms of domestic company 
market capitalization (i.e. UK, Canada, Japan, North West Europe) have levels of formal 
MSP that range from mediocre to more stringent than the U.S., but all of their regulators 
lag behind the U.S.’ Securities Exchange Commission in terms of formal independence.  
Figure 3.1                                                                                        
(Independence Investor Protection Scatterplot) 
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 The lack of a strong correlation between formal independence and formal MSP is 
very helpful from the standpoint of establishing a statistical association between 
regulatory organization and stock market development. Had formal independence and 
formal MSP been strongly correlated, it would be unclear whether it is the regulator or 
the regulation that is explaining variance in equity market outcomes. Since they lack a 
tight correlation, I can be surer that my latent independence measure is not 
unintentionally serving as a proxy for MSP. 
Methods 
 Since the following sections will analyze cross-sectional time series, 
contemporaneous correlation, panel heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation are all 
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serious concerns. Debate continues among scholars regarding the best way to produce 
efficient, unbiased, and consistent estimates in these situations (Green et. al. 2001; De 
Boef and Keele 2008; Beck and Katz 2011). However, three features of the data are 
likely to make to make particular modeling approaches more trustworthy than others: 1) 
unit effects have more than a minor correlation with the right-hand side variables (ρ>.43); 
2) the dataset is large and cross-sectionally dominated—(N >100) and (µT≈18); and 3) 
first order serial correlation is easily detectable. In light of these facts and simulations 
conducted by Kristensen and Wawro (2003) and Clark and Linzer (2012), country fixed 
effect estimations with Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by country should 
be superior to OLS estimations with Panel Corrected Standard Errors or random effects 
Generalized Least Squares models.
26
  
 In addition to “cluster robust” standard errors, serial correlation was also directly 
addressed through the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (LDV). This approach is 
not without shortcomings. A large literature beginning with Nickell (1981) discusses 
possible biases introduced when a LDV is combined with fixed effects. Given that the 
coefficient on the LDVs are roughly 0.65 and the average panel length is between 18 and 
19, the coefficient of the LDV is likely to be downwardly biased by between 0.07 to 0.11 
(Nickel 1981;1422). Since my independence measure is positively related to the LDV, it 
should have a slight upward bias since it is effectively ‘stealing’ variance from the LDV. 
Although these biases are not negligible, it is unlikely that they will lead me to make 
                                               
26
Hausman tests clearly indicated the superiority of fixed over random effects. In line with the 
recommendation of King and Roberts (2015), Huber/White robust standard errors were compared with 
classical standard errors. They were nearly identical providing evidence against misspecification.  
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incorrect inferences regarding the qualitative relationship between independence and 
stock market development. That said, all hypotheses will be reevaluated with Arellano–
Bover(1995)/Blundell–Bond(1998) dynamic panel-data estimators.27 This Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator uses lagged differences as instruments for the 
initial level equation and lagged levels as instruments for the difference equation. While 
this approach may avoid biases of a dynamic LSDV, GMM’s will be treated as a 
robustness check due to their inefficiency and poor root-mean-squared-error properties.  
Overall, the strong theoretical basis for the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
outweighs the complications involved in including them with fixed effects.
28
 My models 
will take the following form:  
Yit = γYit-1+ αi + β1*Pit + β2*Xit + εit 
The dependent variable Yit represents stock market capitalization/GDP for country i in 
year t and Yit-1 is the same dependent variable lagged by one year. The vector Pit contains 
my measures of consensual political institutions, competing political controls, and my 
                                               
27 The Arellano–Bover(1995)/Blundell–Bond(1998) GMM estimators were implemented with STATA’s 
xtdpdsys package. 
28 The theoretical arguments in favor of the inclusion of lagged DV are outlined by Bebchuck and Roe’s A 
Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance (1999). They write “First, the 
corporate structures of an economy depend on the structures with which the economy started. Initial 
ownership structures have such an effect because they affect the identity of the structure that would be 
efficient for any given company and because they can give some parties both incentives and power to 
impede changes in them. Second, corporate rules, which affect ownership structures, will themselves 
depend on the corporate structures with which the economy started. Initial ownership structures can affect 
both the identity of the rules that would be efficient and the interest group politics that can determine which 
rules would actually be chosen”(127). More generally, as stock markets get larger they offer more 
opportunities for diversification which encourages even more investment. This further investment makes 
them all the more attractive sources of capital for companies leading to more public listings.   
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measure of regulatory independence. Xit contains macroeconomic controls. β1, β2,
 
 and γ 
are estimated coefficients. αi are country dummies and εit is the remaining error  
Results: Institutions and Independence  
 The first set of analyses tests Hypotheses I(a) and II(a). Table 3.4 reports the 
estimation results. Model 1 is naïve in that it excludes all other political variables as well 
as the dummy for banking crises. Models 2-6 include the banking crisis dummy and 
additional political controls introduced one at a time. Overall, results suggest a strong 
positive association between consensual political institutions (i.e. constraint and 
proportionality) and regulatory independence on the one hand, and stock market size on 
the other. All three associations were significant at conventional levels of significance 
(p<.05) even after controlling for macroeconomic controls, electoral competition, 
partisanship, and government spending. Moves from minimum levels of political 
constraint and regulatory independence to maximum levels would produce 
contemporaneous increases in stock market size of around 18 or 13 percent respectively. 
The former is equivalent to just under half and the latter to a little over half of the within 
country standard deviation in market capitalization. A move from completely 
majoritarian elections to completely proportional elections would be associated with an 
even larger 30 percent contemporaneous increase in market capitalization to GDP. A 
direct comparison of all the political variables’ standardized coefficients (i.e. 1 standard 
deviation increases) can be found in Figure 3.2: 
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    Table 3.4    
 (Independence and Market Capitalization) 
DV: ln(Market  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
       
        
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.03)` 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
0.14** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
        
Political   0.19***     0.17** 
Constraints  (0.07)     (0.07) 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  0.10*** 
(0.03) 
   0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Left     -0.007    
Partisanship    (0.02)    
Electoral     -0.005  -0.008 
Competition     (0.008)  (0.01) 
Government 
Consumption  
     -0.01** 
(0.006) 
-0.01** 
(0.005) 
GDP growth  0.01*** 0.08*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
ln(GDPper  0.01 0.05 0.005 0.04 0.04 0.047 0.02 
Capita) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
Banking Crisis   -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.17*** 
  (0.034) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆All World 
Stock Index 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.02) 
Constant -0.443 -0.877** -0.83** -0.75** -0.72** -0.52 -0.70* 
 (0.295) (0.363) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.4) 
        
Observations 2,027 1,926 1,750 1,937 1,927 1,909 1,724 
Adjusted R
2 
0.68 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.72 
Overall R2 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.817 
Number of 
countries 
110 109 103 110 109 110 103 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 Each coefficient in Figure 3.2 corresponds to Models 1-6 of Table 3.4. The plots 
reveal that the two strongest political drivers of stock market size are electoral institutions 
and the negative effects of government spending. Contrary to their anti-investor image, 
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left-governments do not appear to have significant negative effects on stock markets. The 
introduction of dummies for center-left, center, center-right, and right wing governments 
produced similarly non-significant results (not shown). Although negatively signed, 
electoral competiveness fails to have a significant effect. 
Figure 3.2 
Regulatory Independence
Political Constraint
Checks
Electoral Proportionality
Electoral Competitiveness
Government Consumption
Left Government 
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Standardized Coefficients (Market Cap(ln))95% CI
 
According to the figure above, standard deviation increases in independence, constraint, 
and proportionality are associated with contemporaneous increases in stock market size 
of roughly 6.0%, 4.75%, and 11.5 % respectively. Given the coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variables, the long-run increases in stock market size due to standard deviation 
increases in these three variables would be around 17%, 13%, 33% respectively. Results 
also support the contention that trade and capital account openness should promote stock 
market development. Unsurprisingly, economic growth has positive effects and banking 
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crises negative effects on market capitalization. Finally, the highly significant coefficient 
for changes in the MSCI All World Stock Index suggests that the effects produced by my 
political, regulatory, and macroeconomic variables exist even after controlling for global 
trends in stock market performance.  
 In order to see if the effects of regulatory independence are the same across 
different numbers of veto players and different levels of electoral proportionality, I 
estimated a series of interactions. Table 3.5 below presents the interactions between 
regulator independence and both of my veto player measures. As expected Hypothesis 
III(a) receives support. There is a substitutive effect between veto players and regulatory 
independence with the latter being particularly important when veto players are fewer in 
number. Looking at the main effects suggest that the size of regulatory independence’s 
coefficient almost doubles when political constraint is at its lowest levels (Model 1). This 
“maximum” main effect creates a nearly 30 percent contemporaneous increase in market 
capitalization even after electoral competition and the powerful effects of electoral 
institutions are controlled for (Model 3). Unlike the individual effects in Table 3.4, the 
interaction effects in Table 3.5 are not only robust to year fixed effects, they grow 
stronger with their inclusion (Models 2 and 4). 
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     Table 3.5      
  (Independence-Veto Interaction: Market Capitalization)   
DV: ln(Market  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
      
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.63*** 
(0.03) 
0.66*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.20** 
(0.082) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.25*** 
(0.086) 
0.195* 
(0.10) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
Political Constraints 0.40*** 
(0.114) 
0.46*** 
(0.12) 
0.46*** 
(0.13) 
0.53*** 
(0.12) 
  
Checks      0.012 0.02 
     (0.015) (0.015) 
Independence X 
Political Constraint 
-0.35** 
(0.16) 
-0.39** 
(0.17) 
-0.47** 
(0.18) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
  
Independence X 
Checks 
    -0.023 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Electoral  
Competition 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  0.09*** 
(0.025) 
0.09*** 
(0.027) 
 0.09*** 
(0.02) 
General government 
consumption  
  -0.01** 
(0.005) 
-0.01** 
(0.005) 
 -0.01** 
(0.005) 
GDP growth  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.03 
 (0.038) (0.06) (0.035) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
Banking crisis  -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆All World Index 0.29***  0.29***  0.29*** 0.29*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.92** -0.19 -0.75* 0.11 -0.88** -0.75* 
 (0.36) (0.63) (0.39) (0.69) (0.36) (0.39) 
       
Observations 1,926 1,926 1,724 1,724 1,913 1,712 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.72 
Overall R2 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.81 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Number of countries 109 109 103 103 109 103 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
 125 
 
 
Figure 3.3 below presents the predicted marginal effects of regulatory independence 
across both veto player measures with all other variables held at their means.        
      Figure 3.3                                                  
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 While the interaction effects are estimated with greater precision when the 
political constraint measure is utilized, both veto player measures tell a similar story.  
Only when politicians are less constrained (and therefore less credible) than the ‘average’ 
politician in the sample, does regulatory independence have a meaningful impact on 
market capitalization. Assuming 95% confidence intervals, the effects of regulatory 
independence on stock market size become statically indistinguishable from zero when 
political constraint and checks significantly exceed their post 1988 median levels (.34 and 
3 respectively). Stated differently when political institutions produce greater than median 
levels of constraint (and credibility), delegation to an IRA will have little to no impact on 
market capitalization.  
 Also in line with Hypothesis III(a), regulatory independence and electoral 
proportionality appear to be substitutive rather complementary. As demonstrated by the 
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interaction coefficients in Table 3.6, this substitutive relationship is supported by p-
values no larger than .10.  
     Table 3.6      
(Independence-Proportionality Interaction: Market Capitalization) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
      
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
Regulatory  0.20*** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.14** 0.20*** 
Independence (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Electoral  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13***  
Proportionality (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Proportional       0.30*** 
Dummy      (0.09) 
Independence X 
Proportionality 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
 
Independence X 
Proportional Dum. 
     -0.16** 
(0.07) 
Political Constraint   0.15* 0.17** 0.22** 0.18** 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Electoral     -0.008 -0.01 -0.007 
Competition    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
General government 
consumption 
   -0.01** 
(0.005) 
-0.01** 
(0.005) 
-0.0** 
(0.005) 
GDP Growth 0.007** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.008** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.006 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
Capital Account  0.26*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 
Openness (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank Crisis -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
∆All World Index 0.29***  0.29*** 0.29***  0.29*** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Constant -0.88** -0.07 -0.99*** -0.77* 0.20 -0.71* 
 (0.37) (0.70) (0.38) (0.39) (0.69) (0.40) 
       
Observations 1,750 1,750 1,749 1,724 1,724 1,724 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.71 
Overall R2 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.82 
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Number of countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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The predicted marginal effects of independence found in Figure 3.4 describes this 
relationship in more detail.            
         Figure 3.4         
   (Independence-Proportionality Marginal Effects) 
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Holding all other variables at their means, regulatory independence fails to have a 
statistically significant positive impact on market capitalization wherever electoral 
institutions are more proportional than they are majoritarian (i.e. >2). When institutions 
are completely majoritarian, a maximum increase in independence is associated with 
contemporaneous stock market size increases of between 14 to 20 percent. Looked at 
differently, when financial regulation is retained within the executive bureaucracy, a 
move from completely majoritarian elections to completely proportional elections leads 
to a nearly 30 percent increase in stock market capitalization. Table 3.6 suggests that 
these interaction effects are robust to the inclusion of additional political controls, year 
fixed effects, and a dummy recoding of the proportionality measure so that all countries 
without purely majoritarian institutions are coded 1 (Models 2,5,6). 
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 Overall, results largely support the theoretical claims made in Chapter 2 as well as 
Hypotheses I(a), II(a), and III(a). There is a positive association between consensual 
political institutions and stock market development. When the positive effects of political 
constraint are compared to those of electoral proportionality, the latter appears to be more 
influential. Regulatory independence also appears to have a modest positive effect on 
stock market size. However, the effects of regulatory independence grow more 
substantive when the threats of policy instability and time inconsistency are the greatest. 
Stated differently, regulatory independence has its largest impact on politicians’ 
credibility when political institutions are the least consensual(i.e. elections are first past 
the post and veto players are fewer in number).  
Results: Stock Market Performance  
 In contrast to stock market size, the relationship between my political and macro-
economic covariates with index price growth does not appear to be dynamic. While 
preliminary analyses suggest lagged index price growth was related to index price growth 
at p-values around conventional significance (0.05<p<0.14), this relationship disappeared 
with the introduction of a control for inflation. So as to avoid the complications of a 
lagged dependent variable, I include a control for inflation along with cluster robust 
standard errors. Below I estimate iterations of the following model that is identical to the 
models estimated above except with a different regressand and no lagged dependent 
variable. 
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Y(annual index price growth)it =  αi + β1*P(political/regulatory variables)it + β2*X(macroeconomic 
controls)it + εit 
 In contrast to stock market size, results are more mixed with regards to 
Hypothesis II(b). Electoral proportionality continues to have a positive effect, but 
political constraint either undermines or at least fails to contribute to index price growth.  
Although Hypothesis I(b) is supported, results still contrast with the results found in 
Table 3.4. Regulatory independence maintains a positive and significant relationship with 
index price growth, but its positive effects come to rival those of electoral proportionality 
in terms of magnitude. This is clearly demonstrated by Table 3.7 and Figure 3.5 that 
features standardized coefficients from Models 1-6.  
Figure 3.5  
Regulatory Independence
Political Constraint
Checks
Electoral Proportionality
Left Government
Electoral Competition
-20 -10 0 10 20
Standardized Coefficients (Index%Growth)95% CI
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                                        Table 3.7     
 (Independence and S&P Index Annual % Price ∆) 
DV: %∆S&P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indices       
       
Regulatory 
Independence 
19.7** 
(8.17) 
18.9*** 
(6.99) 
15.5** 
(7.51) 
18.4*** 
(6.88) 
18.0** 
(7.10) 
17.2** 
(7.95) 
Political   -16.7     
Constraints  (13.0)     
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  5.84* 
(3.44) 
   
       
Left     -0.82   
Government    (2.78)   
Electoral 
Competitiveness 
    -1.14 
(2.14) 
 
       
General government 
consumption 
     -3.91 
(4.32) 
       
GDP Growth 1.28*** 0.61 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.20 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.38) (0.55) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -5.15* -1.88 -1.18 -1.66 -1.28 -1.32 
 (2.75) (3.1) (3.284) (3.07) (3.16) (3.54) 
ln(Trade) 16.3 22.7** 25.2** 24.1** 23.9** 23.0** 
 (9.8) (10.0) (10.8) (10.1) (10.1) (11.5) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
2.25 
(11.0) 
-7.31 
(11.0) 
-3.91 
(12.3) 
-7.46 
(11.1) 
-7.71 
(11.1) 
-11.9 
(12.1) 
ln(Inflation) 2.19 2.09 2.62 1.76 1.88 -0.43 
 (5.90) (5.71) (6.83) (5.65) (5.70) (3.22) 
Bank Crisis  -23.5*** -24.1*** -24.0*** -24.0*** -21.4*** 
  (4.83) (5.07) (4.88) (4.89) (4.52) 
∆All World Index 35.9*** 35.4*** 36.1*** 35.5*** 35.5*** 35.9*** 
 (2.55) (2.46) (2.77) (2.46) (2.45) (2.50) 
Constant -37.7 -74.6* -107.6** -87.6** -77.5* -12.1 
 (31.9) (38.3) (46.3) (38.3) (44.1) (70.2) 
       
Observations 1,244 1,167 1,117 1,175 1,167 1,164 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 
Overall R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.11 
Number of countries 80 79 74 80 79 80 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 As before, Model 1 (above) is a naïve model with no control for banking crises 
and no additional political variables. Subsequent models include both the crisis dummy 
and additional political controls added one at a time. Results indicate minimum to 
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maximum increases in both regulatory independence and electoral proportionality are 
associated with additional 15 to 20 percent increases in annual index price growth. This is 
20 to 35 percent larger than the mean price growth across the sample and roughly 
equivalent to around half of the within country standard deviation (42%). Overall, results 
suggest that regulatory independence and some consensual political institutions (i.e. 
proportionality) enhance stock market performance. In contrast to market capitalization, 
political constraint appears to make negligible and possibly even negative contributions 
to index price growth.  
 Like Hypothesis II(b), support for Hypothesis III(b) is mixed across different 
features of institutional consensualism. Like stock market size, results suggest that there 
is a statistically significant negative interaction effect between regulatory independence 
and veto players in terms of promoting stock index price growth (Table 3.8). This 
interaction effect is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects as well as electoral 
competition and government spending. In contrast to stock market size, the interaction 
effect is more statically robust for checks rather than for Political Constraint III (see 
Table 3.8 below). 
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                Table 3.8      
(Independence-Veto Interaction: S&P Index Annual % Price ∆) 
DV: %∆S&P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indices       
       
Regulatory 
Independence 
43.8*** 
(14.0) 
45.4*** 
(15.4) 
39.8* 
(22.4) 
35.9 
(22.3) 
69.1** 
(27.20) 
68.0** 
(27.1) 
       
Political Constraint 24.6 37.4* 22.3 28.9   
 (22.1) (19.2) (30.4) (26.6)   
Checks     7.99* 8.1** 
     (4.05) (4.01) 
       
Independence X 
Political Constraint 
-60.8** 
(29.6) 
-59.7** 
(27.4) 
-57.5 
(43.2) 
-44.6 
(38.0) 
  
Regulatory 
Independence X 
Checks 
    -12.3** 
(5.93) 
-11.5* 
(6.0) 
Electoral  
Competition 
  -0.32 
(3.3) 
-0.69 
(2.7) 
  
       
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  5.57** 
(2.7) 
0.48 
(3.2) 
  
       
General Government 
Consumption 
  -4.02 
(4.72) 
-4.8 
(4.75) 
  
GDP Grow 0.59 1.4** 0.14 1.04* 0.58 1.39** 
 (0.38) (0.58) (0.57) (0.55) (0.37) (0.59) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -2.39 -37.4** -1.08 -43.3** -3.05 -38.5** 
 (3.06) (15.8) (3.95) (17.9) (3.17) (15.9) 
ln(Trade) 22.8** -12.4 23.4* -18.2 24.4** -12.2 
 (10.1) (17.5) (12.1) (21.4) (10.3) (17.4) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
-6.42 
(11.0) 
-13.3 
(11.9) 
-8.66 
(13.2) 
-15.8 
(13.3) 
-3.9 
(11.5) 
-10.4 
(12.5) 
ln(Inflation) 2.05 3.86 0.86 2.21 2.05 4.03 
 (5.746) (5.21) (4.44) (3.87) (5.68) (5.22) 
Bank Crisis -23.3*** -18.1*** -21.2*** -16.1*** -23.5*** -18.0*** 
 (4.77) (3.91) (4.62) (3.98) (4.71) (3.78) 
∆All World  35.4***  36.6***  35.5***  
Stock Index (2.47)  (2.9)  (2.5)  
Constant -87.75** 323.6* -31.82 496.3* -112.4** 313.2* 
 (38.33) (173.9) (62.92) (283.9) (46.90) (166.9) 
       
Observations 1,167 1,167 1,106 1,106 1,163 1,163 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.23 0.30 
Overall R2 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.08 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of countries 79 79 74 74 79 79 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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 As suggested by the predicted marginal effects in Figure 3.6, the positive effects 
of regulatory independence are statistically distinguishable from zero for a larger range of 
veto player values than as compared to the market capitalization veto-interaction models. 
Political constraint would have to reach its 75
th
 percentile and checks its 90
th
 percentile 
before the positive impact of regulatory independence would be indistinguishable from 0.  
Although maximum levels of formal regulatory independence could never be achieved in 
absolute autocracy given the nature of some of my independence indicators, the main 
effects in Table 3.8 are nonetheless dramatically large in magnitude. In line with the 
Chinese experience, this suggests that regulatory agencies can have very large positive 
effects on stock market performance in even the most inhospitable of political contexts.  
More exactly, when constraint and checks are at their minimum, a maximum increase in 
independence would lead to additional 40 to 70 percent increases in annual percentage 
price growth in benchmark indices. At mean levels of constraint and checks, the same 
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maximum increase in independence could lead to 25 to 50 percent additional increases in 
(annual %) index price growth.  
 In contrast to veto players, the interaction effect between regulatory independence 
and proportionality does not resemble that found for stock market size. Instead, results 
suggest a complementary relationship in which independence has larger positive effects 
on index price growth when electoral institutions are proportional (Table 3.9 below). 
However, the statistical strength of the positive interaction effect is weak with p-values 
ranging from .09(Model 4) to .218 (Model 1). Marginal significance is only achieved 
when year fixed effects are included (Models 2,4,6). Figure 3.7 below presents the 
marginal effects of independence across proportionality. It suggests that the positive 
effects of independence on S&P price growth are only distinguishable from 0 when 
electoral institutions are more proportional than they are majoritarian (i.e. >1.5).  
Figure 3.7 
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                      Table 3.9                     
 (Independence-Proportionality Interaction: S&P Annual % Price ∆) 
DV: %∆S&P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indices       
       
Regulatory 
Independence 
4.28 
(10.5) 
-0.78 
(13.5) 
1.73 
(10.0) 
-1.39 
(13.5) 
-4.26 
(16.1) 
-11.7 
(21.6) 
Electoral  
Proportionality 
0.84 
(5.67) 
-7.47 
(6.81) 
-0.16 
(5.62) 
-7.66 
(6.77) 
-2.63 
(6.67) 
-11.8 
(8.84) 
       
Independence X 
Proportionality  
6.02 
(4.84) 
10.2* 
(6.09) 
7.65 
(4.88) 
10.6* 
(6.12) 
9.96 
(6.96) 
14.9* 
(8.82) 
       
Political    -19.8 -5.88 -18.8 -3.51 
Constraint   (13.2) (10.7) (11.9) (10.4) 
Electoral      -0.51 -1.0 
Competition     (3.31) (2.57) 
General government 
consumption 
    -4.12 
(4.70) 
-5.01 
(4.73) 
GDP Growth 0.57 1.40** 0.55 1.39** 0.14 1.07* 
 (0.39) (0.65) (0.39) (0.65) (0.57) (0.55) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -1.25 -40.4** -1.72 -40.17** -0.90 -45.8** 
 (3.24) (15.8) (3.26) (15.90) (3.97) (18.3) 
ln(Trade) 24.2** -15.7 22.3** -15.9 20.9* -22.8 
 (10.6) (18.2) (10.4) (18.1) (11.6) (21.4) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
-3.81 
(12.4) 
-10.7 
(12.1) 
-3.59 
(12.2) 
-10.6 
(12.1) 
-8.76 
(13.3) 
-15.2 
(13.3) 
ln(Inflation) 2.62 4.51 2.89 4.62 0.77 2.0 
 (6.83) (6.11) (6.83) (6.10) (4.4) (3.8) 
Bank Crisis -24.0*** -18.8*** -23.6*** -18.7*** -21.0*** -16.2*** 
 (5.06) (4.08) (5.01) (4.10) (4.64) (4.02) 
∆All World Stock 36.08***  35.9***  36.5***  
Index (2.78)  (2.76)  (2.8)  
Constant -94.01* 393.2** -73.03 394.2** 13.4 581.2* 
 (48.31) (186.3) (49.13) (185.8) (67.0) (297.3) 
       
Observations 1,117 1,117 1,117 1,117 1,106 1,106 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.30 0.23 0.30 0.24 0.32 
Overall R2 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.06 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
Replacing the proportionality measure with the dummy for all non-purely majoritarian 
institutions measure does little to increase coefficients or reduce standard errors (not 
shown).  Given the instability and marginal significance of the coefficients, it is difficult 
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to definitively state that there is a complementary relationship between independence and 
proportionality on the one hand, and stock market performance on the other. What is 
more certain is that they are not substitutable as they were with regard to stock market 
size.  
 Overall, the empirical analyses thus far have produced a series of fairly robust 
conclusions. Hypotheses I(a) and I(b) are strongly supported. Regulatory independence is 
positively associated with both stock market size and performance. In line with 
Hypotheses III(a) and part of Hypothesis III(b) these associations are strongest when veto 
players are fewer in number. Hypothesis II(a) also receives robust support: consensual 
political institutions(veto points and proportionality) are positively associated with stock 
market size. The remaining hypotheses receive more mixed support. While veto points 
are positively related to stock market size, they fail to have a statistically meaningful 
relationship with index price growth. In contrast, proportionality continues to be 
positively and significantly related to index price growth. Although the relationship 
between independence and proportionality is substitutive with regards to market 
capitalization, there is tentative evidence that this interaction becomes complementary or 
insignificant with regards to index price growth.  
Institutions, Independence, and Biased Mobilization 
 To reiterate, when financial barriers to entry are high, corporate insiders will 
enjoy larger rents and be fewer in number. Both factors should aid their collective action 
and deepen their opposition to MSP and market integrity. Financial underdevelopment 
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will also reduce the financial sophistication of the general public and minimize 
opposition to corporate insiders on corporate governance issues. In short, when financial 
sectors are immature, political mobilization will be particularly biased against minority 
shareholders. To the extent that consensual political institutions and independent 
regulators can dilute the effects of this anti-MSP bias, their association with stock market 
development should be even stronger when anti-MSP interests are especially dominant. 
Since I lack a direct measure this anti-MSP mobilization bias, I will use credit supplied 
by the domestic financial sector (%GDP) as a proxy.
29
 More specifically, I will evaluate 
whether the magnitude of the associations between regulatory independence and 
consensual political institutions on the one hand, and market capitalization on the other 
increase as credit becomes scarcer (Hypotheses IV and V). 
 Hypothesis testing will once again utilize dynamic fixed effect models with Huber/White 
standard errors clustered by country. Model estimations will assume the following form:  
 Yit = γYit-1+ αi + β1*Pit + β2*Xit +β3(Pit x Total Credit Supply) + εit 
The dependent variable Yit represents stock market capitalization/GDP for country i in 
year t and Yit-1 is the same dependent variable lagged by one year. The vector Pit contains 
                                               
29 Domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a percentage of GDP is taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators and the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion Database. Alternative 
measures of credit supply and/or financial development include total credit supplied to the private sector as 
a percentage of GDP, bank deposits as a percentage of GDP, domestic credit provided to the private sector 
by banks as a percentage of GDP, and a de jure measure of financial liberalization (Abiad et. al 2008). With 
the exception of the formal liberalization measure, all of the financial development indicators are very 
closely related with pairwise correlations ranging from .81 to .94. Therefore, results and qualitative 
inferences were not dependent upon the specific measure of credit supply chosen. 
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my measures of consensual political institutions and my measure of regulatory 
independence. Xit contains macroeconomic controls, β1, β2, β3 and γ are estimated 
coefficients with β3 being the coefficient for the interaction term. αi are country dummies 
and εit is the remaining error  
 In terms of veto players, there is tentative evidence of an interactive relationship 
between political constraint and credit market depth. Interaction coefficients for domestic 
credit market show consistent negative signs and relatively stable coefficients. However, 
coefficients were inconsistently significant at even the most generous levels with p-
values ranging from .075 to .194 (Models 1-4; Table 3.10 below). Unsurprisingly, static 
specifications performed significantly better in terms of the magnitude and significance 
of the interaction term (Models 5 and 6). In general, the addition of political controls both 
alone (not shown) or all together inflated standard errors (Models 3 and 4). The addition 
of year fixed effects to Models 2 and 6 did not substantively alter coefficients or standard 
errors.  
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                                    Table 3.10      
    (Veto Player-Credit Interaction: Market Capitalization)   
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
      
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
  
Political  0.36** 0.41*** 0.29* 0.30* 0.97*** 0.94*** 
Constraint (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.30) (0.32) 
Domestic Credit by 
Financial Sector 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Constraint X 
Domestic Credit 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
  0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.31** 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Electoral  
Competition 
   -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
General Government 
Consumption 
   -0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
       
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.70*** 
(0.15) 
0.53*** 
(0.14) 
GDP Growth 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.015** 0.016** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.03 -0.032 -0.016 -0.007 0.42*** 0.48*** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.15) 
ln(Trade) 0.32*** 0.20** 0.35*** 0.33*** 1.03*** 0.80*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.17) 
Bank Crisis -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.30*** -0.24*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.067) 
∆All World  0.28***  0.28*** 0.28*** 0.21***  
Stock Index (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Constant -0.84** 0.26 -0.81** -0.46 -5.65*** -5.31*** 
 (0.36) (0.70) (0.39) (0.41) (0.81) (1.61) 
       
Observations 1,924 1,924 1,719 1,694 1,783 1,783 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.48 0.53 
Overall R2 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.17 0.20 
Year FE NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Number of countries 108 108 102 102 104 104 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
The substitution of checks for political constraint also produced negative interaction 
coefficients, but standard errors were sometimes well over two times the size of 
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coefficients (not shown). 
 
Figure 3.8 
-.
2
0
.2
.4
.6
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
C
o
n
s
tr
a
in
t 
o
n
 M
a
rk
e
t 
C
a
p
-5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 105 115 125 135 145 155
Domestic credit by financial sector (% of GDP)
Effects of Constraint Across Credit Supply 95% CIs
Model 1 Table 3.10 Controls at Means
 
 
 With these caveats in mind, Figure 3.8 is nonetheless informative and suggests 
that political constraint does have its largest positive effects on stock market size when 
credit is scarcer. To be specific, constraint’s positive effects remain statistically 
distinguishable from 0 until total domestic credit reaches roughly its 75
th
 percentile for 
the sample. Beyond this point, additional veto players contribute little to further market 
development. In short, the special interest dilution effects of veto players only emerge as 
meaningful in credit scarce environments.  
 In contrast to veto players, the results for electoral proportionality show greater 
statistical strength. They more definitively suggest that the positive effects of 
proportionality on stock market size will decrease as credit supply increases and 
incumbent insiders enjoy a less dominant economic position (see Table 3.11). While 
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proportionality has uniformly positive effects on stock market development across all 
levels of credit supply, the positive effect becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0 
as total credit supply exceeds its 80
th
 percentile or 100 percent of GDP (See Figure 3.9).                
Figure 3.9 
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 The interaction effect is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects (Model 2,4,6) 
and the full battery political and regulatory controls ( Models 5 and 6). This is remarkable 
given that the effects of proportionality remain even after controlling for the greater 
number of veto players that often results from proportional elections. These effects are 
also substantively strong. 
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    Table 3.11      
(Proportionality-Credit Interaction: Market Capitalization) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization %GDP)       
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
Electoral  
Proportionality 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Domestic Credit by  
Private Sector 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
       
 Proportionality  
X Domestic Credit 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001** 
(0.0003) 
Regulatory 
 Independence 
  0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Political    0.15* 0.20** 0.16** 0.21** 
Constraint   (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Electoral      -0.006 -0.008 
Competition     (0.012) (0.012) 
General Government 
Consumption 
    -0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Capital Account  
Openness 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.259*** 
(0.06) 
0.228*** 
(0.06) 
GDP Growth 0.007** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.007** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -0.01 -0.06 -0.015 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) 
ln(Trade) 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.321*** 0.234** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.073) (0.093) (0.071) (0.092) 
BankCrisis -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
∆All World Index 0.28***  0.28***  0.285***  
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
Constant -0.79** 0.21 -0.80** 0.02 -0.46 0.42 
 (0.37) (0.79) (0.39) (0.82) (0.42) (0.82) 
       
Observations 1,744 1,744 1,719 1,719 1,694 1,694 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.74 
Overall R2 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 At the median level of credit supplied by the financial sector (51%), going from 
completely majoritarian elections to elections in which just some officials are elected 
proportionally (i.e. 1 unit increase) is associated with stock markets that are 10 percent 
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larger. A more dramatic complete minimum to maximum increase in proportionality 
would lead stock markets that are roughly 30 percent larger holding all controls at their 
means. In short, corporate insiders and incumbents will be especially powerful in credit 
scarce environments, but there is robust evidence that proportional representation goes at 
least some way toward limiting their lobbying dominance.  
 Thus far Hypothesis IV has received some support: the positive effects of 
consensual political institutions on stock market size appear to decline as credit markets 
become more developed. Results with regard to regulatory independence tell a similar 
story. Taking Model 3 of Table 3.12 as a guide, regulatory independence’s marginal 
effects on stock market size are distinguishable from zero until total credit supply reaches 
the 80
th
 percentile of the sample (see Figure 3.10).  
Figure 3.10 
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 When credit supply is at its median (51%), going from minimum to maximum levels of 
independence is associated with a roughly 18% contemporaneous increase in stock 
market in size. 
    Table 3.12    
 (Independence-Credit Interaction: Market Capitalization) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
      
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
Regulatory  0.27*** 0.20** 0.27*** 0.21** 0.26** 0.19* 
Independence (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Domestic Credit by 
Financial Sector  
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
 Independence X  
Domestic Credit 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Political    0.19*** 0.23*** 0.16** 0.21** 
Constraint   (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Electoral      0.10*** 0.10*** 
Proportionality     (0.03) (0.03) 
Electoral      -0.01 -0.01 
Competition     (0.01) (0.01) 
General government 
consumption 
    -0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Capital Account  
Openness 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
GDP Growth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.00275) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.02 -0.001 0.02 -0.014 -0.006 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) 
ln(Trade) 0.318*** 0.239*** 0.324*** 0.236*** 0.341*** 0.244*** 
 (0.068) (0.084) (0.067) (0.083) (0.071) (0.09) 
Bank Crisis -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.19*** -0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
∆All World Index 0.29***  0.28***  0.28***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
Constant -0.73* -0.06 -0.86** -0.07 -0.57 0.39 
 (0.37) (0.72) (0.38) (0.72) (0.41) (0.81) 
       
Observations 1,901 1,901 1,890 1,890 1,694 1,694 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.74 
Overall R2 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.82 0.83 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Number of countries 109 109 108 108 102 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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At that same median level, within and overall standard deviation increases in 
independence are associated with 5.5 and 7 percent contemporaneous increases in market 
size respectively. In other words, the overall impact of regulatory independence on stock 
market size is modest across most levels of credit market depth. That said, the interaction 
is statistically robust to year fixed effects (Models 2,4,6) as well as the full battery of 
political controls (Models 5 and 6). The interaction terms themselves are estimated with 
reasonable levels of precision with p values maxing out at 0.08.  
Robustness 
 In order to ensure that the positive relationship between independence and market 
capitalization is not driven entirely by the latter’s log-transformation, the models in Table 
3.4 were reestimated with the non-transformed version of market capitalization. The 
substantive magnitude of the relationship did decline with contemporaneous and long-run 
(multiplier) effects of a maximum increase in independence being 6.8% and 15% 
respectively. However, the coefficient for independence was stable as additional political 
controls were added and it always maintained significance with p-values of less than 0.05 
(Table 3.13A; Appendix III(a)). In contrast, all other political variables with the 
exception of government consumption failed to reach even the most forgiving levels of 
significance with the untransformed size measure (p>.10). Various independence 
interactions as well as GMM reestimations also failed to produce significant results with 
the untransformed version of market capitalization (not shown).  
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 All dynamic models of (log transformed) stock market size were reestimated with 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Blundell-Bond dynamic panel estimators. In 
terms of the individual effects found in Table 3.4, results were encouraging (see Table 
3.14A; Appendix III(a)). The use of the GMM estimator strengthened the estimated 
association between regulatory independence and stock market size with coefficients’ 
increasing in size by between 35 to 45 percent. Political constraint’s coefficients saw 
similar if slightly larger increases in the GMM estimations as well. When the alternative 
veto player measure checks was estimated with the GMM, its coefficient remained small 
(<.01) but became positive moving it closer to theoretical expectations (not shown). The 
coefficients for government consumption grew slightly in size, but their standard errors 
noticeable increased. Electoral proportionality’s coefficients were cut in two, lost 
significance, but remained positively signed.   
 In terms of the interaction effect between regulatory independence and veto 
players, the GMM results produced similar results qualitatively (Table 3.15A; Appendix 
III(a)). Although the size of the main effects increased in magnitude, the interaction 
coefficients for political constraint were estimated with far greater error and often lost 
significance as a result. The checks coefficients also decreased in size. That said, all 
interaction effects regardless of veto player measure maintained their negative signs in 
line with the theoretical claims of Chapter 2. The interaction between regulatory 
independence and electoral proportionality was weakened in terms of statistical 
significance due to larger standard errors. However, the coefficients of the main effects 
for regulatory independence and all the proportionality interaction terms noticeably 
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increased in size (Table 3.16A; Appendix III(a)). This was especially true when the 
electoral institution variable was recoded as a proportional dummy. In fact, the 
interaction with the proportional dummy maintained significance at p<.10 and increased 
significantly in size as compared to the dynamic least squares dummy variable estimation 
in Table 3.6.   
 Unsurprisingly, static reestimations of the results in Tables 3.4 to 3.6 produced 
much larger coefficients for regulatory independence, political constraint, electoral 
proportionality, and their interactions (not shown). I most instances, they roughly doubled 
in size and maintained conventional levels of significance. In terms of the individual 
effects of regulatory independence and consensual political institutions on price growth 
in national stock market indices (Table 3.7), the introduction of year fixed effects 
produced qualitatively similar results. The coefficients for consensual political 
institutions did marginally decrease in size, but the association between regulatory 
independence and index price growth increased in magnitude with the introduction of 
year dummies (not shown). 
 An additional set of robustness tests were performed to guarantee that it is 
actually the independence of regulators rather than their mere existence that is driving the 
results. I reran models from Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 but with a “regulatory 
framework in existence dummy.” I coded the dummy according to the scheme found in 
Johannes Kleibl’s “Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation” (2014). A 
country-year was coded 1 if   
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 “1.it has established a statutory regulatory body for the supervision of the 
 securities markets; 2. this regulatory body is separate from the ministerial 
 government administration; 3. and this body supervises under a general 
 securities regulatory framework, which covers at a minimum the supervision of 
 stock exchanges and the main securities market participants such as brokers and 
 dealers” (1-2 Kleibl Web Appendix). 
In line with expectations, results were weakened and AIC/BIC levels increased. While 
the individual effects of the regulatory framework dummy were sometimes significant at 
conventional levels, the magnitudes of their coefficients were a little over half the size of 
the independence measure (Table 3.17A; Appendix III(a)). Similarly, they produced 
significant interaction effects with political constraint, but once again dummy main 
effects were roughly 33 percent smaller than the full measure and interaction coefficients 
were between 25 and 30 percent smaller (Table 3.18A; Appendix III). The regulatory 
framework dummy performed even more poorly in terms of reproducing the index price 
growth results from Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 (see Table 3.19A: Appendix III(a)). 
Individually and in interaction with political constraint, the regulator dummy fails to 
reach even the most forgiving levels of conventional significance (p>.10). However, it 
largely confirms the finding of a positive interaction effect between regulatory 
independence and electoral proportionality. Although the regulator dummy variable 
produces slightly smaller interaction coefficients, the interactions found in Models 5 and 
6 of Table 3.19A are significant at even lower p-values (<.01). The combined results of 
Table 3.19A provide strong evidence that the positive price growth effects of having an 
independent regulator will be larger when electoral institutions are more proportional.   
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 The interactions between consensual political institutions and regulatory 
independence on the one hand, and credit market depth on the other are very sensitive to 
alternative specifications. The use of a GMM estimator for models featured in Tables 
3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 uniformly produces smaller and conventionally insignificant 
coefficients for interaction terms. However, all interaction terms maintain their negative 
signs (not shown). Static estimations of the dynamic credit market interaction models 
almost always increase the size of main and interaction effect coefficients both absolutely 
and relative to standard errors (not shown). The only exception is electoral 
proportionality. Static specifications do increase the size of main and interaction effects, 
but standard errors increase even more yielding largely insignificant coefficients ( 0.138 
<p<0. 244). When the regulatory framework dummy replaces the independence measure 
in the credit market interactions from Tables 3.10,3.11, and 3.12 , its main effects are 
typically 35 to 50 percent smaller than the independence measure’s main effects. The 
interaction terms are also marginally smaller, but are all significant at p <.05 (not shown). 
That said, the replacement of regulatory independence with the regulatory framework 
dummy always produces higher Akaike and Bayesian Information Criterions across all 
credit market interaction models. 
 While both trade and capital account openness are included as standard controls, 
it could be said that these two variables insufficiently account for the international 
character of equity trading. More specifically, the analyses above fail to take into account 
inflows and outflows of foreign portfolio equity investments. This is a potentially serious 
omission given the increasing importance and dynamism of international portfolio flows.  
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In order to address this issue, I first see if my regulatory independence measure or any 
other political institutions are associated with net portfolio equity inflows. Results are 
clear, regulatory independence, political constraint, electoral proportionality, and 
partisanship all fail to have statistically significant effects on inflows. In fact, standard 
errors for my independence measure are twice the size of its positive coefficient (Table 
3.20A).  
 Even though independence does not appear to attract foreign portfolio equity 
investment, it is important to rule out the possibility that it is foreign equity flows that are 
driving increases in stock market size and performance rather than the institutional 
variables outlined by my theory. Therefore, the relationship between independence and 
stock market size as well as the various interactions analyzed above were all reevaluated 
with a control for net portfolio equity inflows. As expected, net portfolio flows are 
positively and significantly (p<.01) related to market capitalization. However, the size of 
their effects is very small. More importantly, all substantive findings relating to 
regulatory independence, political institutions, and their interactions are unaffected by the 
inclusion of portfolio flows (Table 3.21A; Appendix III(a)).   
 Although maintaining positive coefficients, net portfolio inflows also appear to be 
unrelated to growth in benchmark stock indices. Unsurprisingly, the statistical association 
between regulatory and political institutions on the one hand and benchmark index 
growth on the other are left unchanged after controlling for foreign equity flows (Table 
3.22A; Appendix III(a)). In sum, controlling for net portfolio equity inflows does not 
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alter the magnitude or significance of previous findings regarding domestic institutions 
and domestic stock market size and performance.   
Conclusion 
 The main argument of this chapter was that consensual political institutions and 
independent regulatory agencies should increase stock market development. Results 
suggest that that this is largely the case. Proportional representation, more numerous and 
fractionalized veto players, and more independent regulators have a robust positive 
association with the size of stock markets. Of the three, increasing electoral 
proportionality is the most strongly related to stock market size. This result confirms my 
theoretical claims and casts doubt on the continued relevance of previous research that 
sees proportional representation as vital to solidifying anti-investor political alliances. 
Instead, it appears that movement towards more proportional representation may limit 
policy instability and facilitate compromise policies that push corporate ownership away 
from the block holding status quo.  
 Results regarding veto players and regulatory independence are also clear. Greater 
political constraint and regulatory independence are both positively and significantly 
related to stock market size. This provides further evidence of investors’ preference for 
policy stability and consistency. Stated differently, political constraint and regulatory 
independence increase the credibility of commitments to MSP and market integrity 
leading to greater equity investment.  
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 My theoretical expectations regarding substitutive relationships between political 
and regulatory institutions are also supported. More specially, the positive effects of 
independence on equity market size are particularly large when majoritarian (i.e. first past 
the post elections) and centralized (fewer veto players) political institutions undermine 
policy stability and consistency. Contrary to past research, greater electoral competition 
appears to have little meaningful effect on stock market development after controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions.    
 Regulatory independence and proportional representation, but not more numerous 
veto players, also appear to increase overall stock market performance as measured by 
annual percentage growth in benchmark index prices. Like stock market size, the positive 
effects of independence on performance do appear to be dependent upon the overall 
institutional context. Greater independence has a particularly large impact on price 
growth when veto players are fewer in number. This mirrors the results for stock market 
size and provides further evidence that regulatory independence and veto players may be 
substitutable in terms of policy stability and consistency. However, the results with 
regard to the interaction between independence and electoral proportionality do not 
mirror those found with regard to stock market size. The association between 
independence and price growth appears to grow stronger when electoral institutions are 
proportional, but this relationship is inconsistent in terms of statistical significance.  
 I also find that the positive effects of consensual political institutions and 
regulatory independence are greatest when credit markets are less rather than more 
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developed. This is especially true for electoral proportionality and regulatory 
independence. If credit is scarce, those who control incumbent firms will be especially 
powerful and have more to lose from stronger MSP. Minority shareholders and their 
allies among the public may also be less sophisticated and have a smaller stake in 
regulatory debates. In short, financial barriers to entry should worsen asymmetries 
between corporate insiders and retail investors making politicians’ commitments to MSP 
and market integrity all the more fragile. However, results suggest that this weakness can 
be reduced by institutional reforms that make political institutions more consensual or 
regulatory organizations more independent. Particularly among developing and middle 
income countries, political consensualism and regulatory independence may be the key to 
diluting anti-MSP special interest influence and providing investor interests with a seat at 
the bargaining table.     
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Chapter 4 
 Political Independence and the Roots of Regulatory Realism 
 
 The previous chapter established that regulators’ independence from politicians is 
positively associated with stock market size and index price growth. This result provides 
support for contention that where minority shareholders (i.e. non-controlling) and retail 
investors (i.e. small) feel exposed to the greed, incompetence, and malfeasance of 
corporate managers and controlling shareholders, they will avoid or reduce their equity 
investments. In light of investor protections’ importance in terms of investor confidence 
and market outcomes, both academics and practitioners have developed numerous formal 
measures and indices of minority shareholder protection (MSP). Well known examples 
include LaPorta et. al (1997,1998, 2000), Djankov et. al (2005), and Gourevitch and 
Shinn (2005). While invaluable, these measures implicitly adopt the perspective of those 
who ‘win’ from stronger MSP.30 But what about the perspective of those who could 
potentially lose? Given that corporate and industry insiders are such key players in the 
corporate governance lobbying game, gaining a better understanding of how they view 
investor protections should also be a priority for researchers. Perceptions of MSP shape 
corporate insiders’ decisions to take their companies public, raise additional capital on 
public markets, and/or expend scarce resources lobbying against MSP. 
                                               
30 For example, one of the most widely cited MSP measures features an “Anti-Director Index” (La Porta et. 
al (1997,1998, 2000).   
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 One of my key theoretical building blocks is that regulatory independence denies 
corporate and industry insiders one of the most powerful tools with which they can shape 
corporate governance and securities regulation: politicians. By at least partially isolating 
regulatory agencies from political influence, formal independence should give regulators 
greater latitude to implement and enforce MSP in ways that deviate from corporate and 
industry insiders’ ideal preferences. As a result, regulatory independence should have a 
noticeable impact on corporate insiders’ perceptions of investor protection. 
 Fortunately, as part of their annual Global Competitiveness Reports, the World 
Economic Forum’s (WEF) Annual Executive Survey directly addresses issues of 
corporate governance. More specifically, the WEF asks senior executives to rate on a 
scale of one to seven the degree to which the interests of minority shareholders are 
protected in their country. To reiterate, this approach is distinct in that it asks the 
potential losers of MSP to rate the strength of investor rights rather than potential winners 
or more disinterested experts. When these surveys of executive opinion are compared 
with legal experts’ assessments of MSP, there are noticeable differences. The goal of this 
chapter is to explore these differences in order to get a better grasp of how corporate 
insiders come to oppose or tolerate minority investor protections.  
 I argue that the key to understanding the differences between executives and legal 
experts’ views of MSP lies is the political independence of those who do the actual 
protecting (i.e. regulatory organizations). I assume that MSP is largely a valence issue 
among business elites. Even though specific investor protections can create costs for 
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senior managers and blockholders, few will express overt hostility to investor protection 
if asked by researchers or members of the media. They may view minority investor 
protections in the same way that they view property rights: something that all modern and 
well governed economies must have. As a result, they may join minority shareholders 
and express a general support for investor protection. However, much of this executive 
support may be predicated upon MSPs remaining abstract rather than realized. In other 
words, corporate elites’ tolerance of investor protections will be strongest when investor 
protections are implemented in ways that do not directly interfere with their economic 
interests. This will be most likely when financial regulators enjoy less rather than more 
political independence. Since corporate insiders enjoy considerable advantages in 
political mobilization vis-à-vis minority shareholders, politicized regulators will face 
strong pressure to enforce MSPs in ways that go largely unopposed by corporate insiders. 
Stated differently, as politicians’ influence over regulatory agencies grows, regulators’ 
rulemaking and enforcement will become increasingly consumed with preempting 
industry criticism and forestalling political interference. In contrast, greater political 
independence should reduce this strategic behavior and allow securities market agencies 
to more stringently and consistently implement MSP in spite of corporate insiders’ 
influence over politicians. This added stringency and consistency should raise executives’ 
awareness of investor protections and highlight the ways in which specific protections do 
or do not impinge upon their interests. As a result, regulatory independence should make 
corporate insiders’ evaluations of MSP strength less abstract, better informed, and 
therefore closer to those legal experts and academics.  
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 In summation, to the degree that independent regulators’ more effective policy 
implementation brings executives and blockholders face to face with the realities of 
investor protection, it may reduce their valence based approval of MSP in the abstract. As 
independent regulators force corporate insiders to confront the costs of more stringently 
and consistently enforced corporate governance regulation, executives’ assessment of 
MSP may be less optimistic and more likely to fall in line with the views of the legal 
experts. 
This leads me to my first two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis I: As regulatory independence increases, average executive evaluations of the 
strength of minority shareholder protection will decrease. 
Hypothesis II: As regulatory independence increases, the difference between expert 
assessments and executive opinion should decrease.  
 However, direct regulatory intervention by public actors is not the only way that 
corporate insiders gain awareness of shareholder rights. Large and liquid stock markets 
can embolden shareholders by lowering the costs of exit from firm ownership (i.e. 
selling) and by providing easy to understand and up-to-date information on corporate 
insiders’ managerial performance. More developed stock markets also increase the 
credibility of hostile takeover threats and encourage equity based executive compensation 
schemes that can align the preferences of senior executives with those of short-term 
investors. Countries with large stock markets also tend to have a more active financial 
press, more numerous and assertive institutional investors, and a larger cadre of 
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professionals (e.g. lawyers, accountants, auditing firms, fund managers, investment 
analysts and advisers ) whose livelihood is built around the understanding and in some 
cases the promotion of investor rights. Since the most developed equity markets are often 
found upper-middle and upper-income countries, corporate elites in these richer countries 
should generally be more sophisticated in how they view their regulatory environments. 
For some or all these reasons, executives in countries with highly developed equity 
markets are likely to have a firmer grasp of the rules and norms of corporate governance 
regardless of whether they believe investor protections are too strong or not strong 
enough. Stated differently, it is not their confrontations with independent regulators that 
most strongly shape these executives’ understanding of investor protection. Instead, they 
gain awareness of the formal level of investor protection through their repeated 
interactions with institutional shareholders, their exposure to the financial press, and their 
everyday conversations their lawyers, accountants, auditors, and corporate peers. This 
leads to my third hypothesis.     
Hypothesis III: The effects of regulatory independence on the difference between expert 
and executive assessments should be smaller in countries with more highly developed 
stock markets. 
 Results indicate that regulatory independence is associated with lower executive 
assessments of investor protection, but this association is not equally strong in all 
contexts. Findings suggest it is primarily associated with countries where executives 
express higher levels of confidence in MSP than do ‘neutral’ experts in the same country. 
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Stated differently, regulatory independence seems to reduce executive overconfidence in 
their countries’ level of investor protection. In addition, the negative effects of regulatory 
independence are larger in countries where stock markets are less liquid and smaller in 
size. In short, where stock markets are highly developed or executive assessments of 
MSP are more pessimistic than the experts, regulatory independence has small to 
negligible effects. These results hold across a variety of estimators and survive the 
inclusion of a numerous political economic controls. 
MSP Assessments   
 In order to test these hypotheses, I need accurate measures of both expert 
assessments and executive opinion of minority shareholder rights. For my expert 
measure, I draw upon the World Bank Doing Business Project’s Strength of Minority 
Investor Protection Index. According to the Doing Business Project’s website, the index 
is constructed from a “questionnaire administered to corporate and securities lawyers and 
are based on securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules 
of evidence.” The index itself is actually a composite of several others and is constructed 
in the following way: 
 The indicator measures the protection of minority investors from conflicts of 
 interest through one set of indices (combined in the extent of conflict of interest 
 regulation index) and shareholders’ rights in corporate governance through 
 another (combined in the extent of shareholder governance index).The extent of 
 conflict of interest regulation  index focuses on one of the most serious breaches 
 of good corporate governance around the world: the related-party transaction. The 
 index measures the protection of shareholders against directors’ misuse of 
 corporate assets for personal gain by  distinguishing 3 dimensions of regulation 
 that address conflicts of interest: transparency of related-party transactions 
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 (captured by the extent of disclosure index),  shareholders’ ability to sue and hold 
 directors liable for self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and access to 
 evidence and allocation of legal expenses in  shareholder litigation (ease of 
 shareholder suits index).  The extent of shareholder governance index measures 
 shareholders’ rights in corporate governance by distinguishing 3 dimensions of 
 good governance: shareholders’ rights and role in major corporate decisions 
 (captured by the extent of shareholder rights index), governance safeguards 
 protecting shareholders from undue board control and entrenchment (extent of 
 ownership and control index) and corporate transparency on ownership stakes, 
 compensation, audits and financial prospects (extent of corporate transparency 
 index)  (Doing Business Project). 
 The resulting composite Strength of Investor Protection Index takes on values 
between 0 to 10 with 0 indicating the complete absence of investor protection and 10 
indicating maximum investor protection. 
 My measure of executive opinion is taken from The World Economic Forum’s 
Executive Opinion Survey that began a systematic survey of corporate governance issues 
in 2005. Although there is variation year to year, the survey typically collects the 
opinions of well over 12,000 senior managers with the average number of respondents 
per country being over 90. A majority of survey respondents are randomly selected, but 
the World Economic Forum insists that their country partners include some repeat 
respondents in order to aid in comparability overtime. Once the data is cleaned of outliers 
and missing responses, individual answers are aggregated at the country level and 
weighted by economic sector. Each yearly country average is actually a weighted average 
of the most recent year’s survey results combined with a discounted average of the 
previous year.
31
 This step is performed in order to make country averages less sensitive to 
                                               
31Care must be taken to match yearly control variables with the correct yearly average. For example, the 
dependent variables for 2012 are a combination of assessments collected in the first quarter of 2012 and the 
first quarter of 2013 with greater weight placed on 2013 assessments.  These observations are then matched 
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the specific point in time in which survey responses were collected and to increase 
sample size. Given my dependence upon these WEF surveys, empirical analyses will 
utilize annual data from 2006 to 2012 and include just over 100 countries. 
 The question formats are identical for all indicators and loosely resemble Likert 
scales. They consist of a 1 to 7 scale with 1 corresponding to “you agree completely with 
the answer on the left-hand side; 3 corresponding to “your opinion is indifferent between 
the two answers;” and 7 corresponding to “you agree completely with the answer on the 
right-hand side.” The most important indicator for my purposes is the “protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests” with 7 corresponding to the strongest protection (see 
Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 pp. 83-92 for more detail of survey 
methodology and score construction). Obviously this is a far more crude measure than the 
index created by the Doing Business Project, but this is precisely the point. The latter 
expert measure is specifically designed to be an objective assessment of the legal 
environment. In contrast, the simplicity of the executive survey question leaves room for 
more affective components of policy evaluations. Rather than a purely disinterested 
assessment of what executives consider to be the “objective” level of MSP, the Likert-
styled WEF measure provides executives’ with ample opportunity to draw upon any 
feelings of contentment or frustration that their personal experiences with MSP engender. 
 Overall, the Pearson product-moment pairwise correlation between the two MSP 
evaluations is positive and weakly moderate at ρ≈.35 (see Appendix IV(b)). Both 
                                                                                                                                            
to controls from 2012. This approach had to be taken in order to ensure that independent variables in 2012 
were not explaining variation 2011-2012 assessments. Instead, independent variables in 2012 explain 
variation in the combined weighted average of 2012 and 2013 assessments.  
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measures of MSP were max-min normalized onto a [0,1] interval to ease interpretation 
and cross-measure comparison.
32
 In order to measure the divergence between executive 
and expert assessments, the normalized WEF executive assessments were subtracted 
from the Doing Business Project’s normalized shareholder index score. I label this 
difference “formal bias” (formal bias = expert assessment - average executive opinion) 
and it describes the differences in how experts and executives place their country on two 
MSP scales relative to other countries. Formal bias ranges from [-0.59, 0.59] with a mean 
of zero and an overall standard deviation of 0.22. When formal bias takes on negative 
values, this means that the expert assessments of MSP where less optimistic than 
executive opinion relative to other countries. When it takes on positive values, it suggests 
that expert assessments are more sanguine with regard to MSP than executives. A formal 
bias of zero means both executives and experts placed their countries’ regulatory regimes 
in identical positions relative to other countries on their respective MSP scales. 
According to my framework, formal bias should become more negative (i.e. executives 
more optimistic as compared to experts) as executives’ face less confrontational 
implementation of MSP by less than fully independent regulators (see Figure 4.1).  
Correlations provide some support for my theoretical intuitions: regulatory independence 
has a weak negative pairwise correlation with executive opinion (ρ≈ -0.26) and an even 
weaker positive correlation with expert assessments of MSP (ρ≈0.13) 
                                               
32
 There may be concern that this transformation could distort information or lead to middle category 
inflation. In order to rule out this possibility, I z-standardized both MSP measures and then subtracted the 
z-standardized expert assessments from the z-standardized average executive opinions. I then reevaluated 
the latter two hypotheses. The direction and p-values of coefficients were left virtually unchanged. 
Unsurprisingly, predicted margins for models evaluating Hypotheses I and II did see some minor shifts, but 
qualitative conclusions were left unchanged. Predicted margins of the interaction effect featured in 
Hypothesis III were almost identical.  
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 Figure 4.1 
 
 
   
                                                                              
 
 
 
  
A look at Figure 4.2 below provides some hints as to where executives will be the most 
likely to express greater confidence in MSP relative to the experts. Executives in Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent Germany 
and Austria all seem to express greater confidence in investor protection as compared to 
legal experts’ formal evaluations. These countries are all known for wealth, good 
governance, and having some of the strongest property rights in the world.  
 
 
 
 
Executive >  Expert Executive <  Expert 
Regulatory Independence 
0 Bias 
Formal bias = Expert Assessment - Average Executive Opinion 
Negative Bias: Switzerland, Sweden, Qatar, 
Germany, Jordan, Greece, Tunisia, Austria, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, Iceland 
Positive Bias: Bangladesh, Mongolia, 
Columbia, Kyrgyzstan, Bulgaria, Slovenia, 
Italy, Trinidad, Israel, USA 
e.g. Croatia, South Africa, New 
Zealand, Mexico,  Kuwait, Ecuador 
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 Figure 4.2  
Expert and Executive Assessments Compared (2012)  
dashed lines indicates 0 Formal bias 
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Despite these positive qualities, these countries have long histories of bank rather than 
market based systems of finance where insider relationships and highly concentrated 
corporate ownership and control (i.e. blockholding) are dominant. Given their otherwise 
well governed economies and productive corporate sectors, executives in these countries 
may assume that the interests of investors (like all property owners) are sufficiently 
protected even when their regimes of MSP fall short by Anglo-American standards. A 
similar dynamic may be taking place in Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, 
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Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. These countries are wealthy and possess strong property 
rights relative to both their region and the rest of the world. As with Scandinavia, these 
Middle Eastern business elites see their relatively well governed corporate sectors and 
then assume that investors’ interests are respected. This is despite the fact that formal 
MSP is weak to mediocre, pro-shareholder norms are not widely internalized, and 
corporate ownership is highly concentrated among the state and families allied to the 
ruling regime. It is within these rich property rights respecting countries with historical 
traditions of concentrated corporate ownership where politically independent financial 
regulators may have the most sobering impact on executive opinions of investor 
protection.  
 What about those countries with positive formal bias in which experts express 
greater confidence in MSP as compared to executives? These countries can be divided 
into two groups: 1) rich common law countries such as the U.S., New Zealand, and 
Canada who have longer traditions of diffuse corporate ownership, and 2) poor or corrupt 
countries with weaker court systems and incomplete property rights. Within the first 
group, pro-shareholder norms are more widely accepted across the business elite and 
common law legal systems facilitate shareholder self-help. As a result, executive 
opinions in these countries will be better informed regarding MSP and shareholders will 
exercise greater economic power. This means executives are likely to be more aware of 
where investor protections fall short of formal standards or they may downgrade their 
assessments in an affective response to what they believe is excessive shareholder power.  
Both could conceivably produce positive formal biases (expert>executive).   
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 The second group forms the majority of the countries of the world. It is within 
these countries where the gap between de jure investor protection and the de facto 
economic reality will be most pronounced. Experts may rate these countries’ formal MSP 
highly, but corruption or weak judiciaries may undermine MSP’s consistent and impartial 
enforcement.
33
 In short, investor protections may be unrealized statutes that exist only on 
paper causing executive assessments to be more pessimistic relative to legal experts’ 
formal evaluations. For both groups 1 and 2, regulatory independence may have little to 
no effects. For group 1, shareholders’ may have economic and legal power that that is 
less dependent upon public regulators. As a result, the latter may have a less meaningful 
role in shaping executives assessments of MSP. For group 2, if formal MSP has little 
connection to the economic reality as judged by executives, there is little reason to 
believe that regulators’ formal independence will have much meaning either. As a result, 
the delegation of regulatory power to ‘independent’ regulators will do less to ensure that 
investor protections are implemented in an impartial manner. Therefore, formal 
independence should have less effect on executive assessments. This discussion suggests 
a fourth and final hypothesis. 
Hypothesis IV: regulatory independence will have the largest effects in countries where 
executives express greater confidence in MSP as compared to experts (i.e. rich, property 
rights respecting, historical traditions of weak MSP). 
                                               
33
 Particularly in Eastern Europe, many countries’ formal regimes of MSP consist of best practices 
transplanted by organizations such as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development after the fall 
of communism. When comparing executive assessments to international best practices, it should not be 
surprising that the former are relatively more pessimistic.   
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Variables 
 In addition to my original measure of regulatory independence, main models will 
feature the same variables as previous chapters including the three derived from Beck and 
Keefer’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI): electoral competitiveness, electoral 
proportionality, and a measure of partisanship.  The partisanship measure is a dummy 
variable of center-right government that takes on a value of one if the chief executive in a 
presidential system or the largest governing party in a parliamentary system is centrist or 
right-wing. In order to account for the legal environment, I also include a dummy 
variable control for common law legal family and Freedom House’s Rule of Law 
measure. The latter ranges from [0,16] with 16 corresponding to maximum levels of  
judicial independence, procedural fairness in criminal and civil trials, and equal rights 
under the law. In order to evaluate the importance of veto players, I once again utilize 
Witold Henisz’s Political Constraints III index. The World Banks’ Worldwide 
Governance Indicators’ Regulatory Quality measure will be included in supplemental 
models to control for the overall regulatory environment.  The Regulatory Quality  
indicator takes on values between [-2.21, 2.25] and is a broad measures of the “incidence 
of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as 
well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as 
foreign trade and business development” (Kaufmann and Mastruzzi 2009). Higher scores 
indicate a more “market-friendly” and less burdensome regulatory environment. 
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 Featured macroeconomic controls include GDP per Capita in current US. Dollars 
(ln), GDP annual percentage growth, Chinn-Ito’s index of capital account openness 
(normalized), trade (sum of exports and imports of goods and services) as a percentage of 
GDP (ln), and value of stock traded as a percentage of GDP (ln) as a measure of stock 
market liquidity and development.
34
 In supplementary models, a dummy variable for 
banking crises, stock index price volatility, and inflation (ln) are also included. All 
macroeconomic variables, with the exception of the Chin-Ito index, come from the World 
Banks’ World Development Indicators or their Database on Financial Development and 
Structure. 
Methods 
 The short nature of the panel (2005-2012) and the slow moving nature of both my 
independent and dependent variables create important modelling challenges. “Within” 
fixed effects estimators are increasingly seen as the standard for cross-national panel data 
and an effective way to limit concerns regarding time invariant omitted variable bias. 
Despite its appeal, this solution would involve throwing away cross-national variation 
and depending primarily upon within country variation for hypothesis testing. Given the 
                                               
34 The inclusion of value traded raises concerns with reverse causality. It will not be included as a control in 
models where the dependent variable is the level measure of executive confidence in MSP, but will be 
included in models evaluating the gap between expert and executive assessments. Although this may 
introduce some endogeniety bias, the exclusion of value traded does not substantively alter the results in 
Table 4.1.  The analysis of the interaction effect between independence and value traded is not meant to 
definitively establish the direction of causality. Instead it is included in order to find out if the effects of 
regulatory independence are the same in countries that have greater or lesser degrees of stock market 
development.   
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limited amount of within country variation in my key variables, this is unlikely to yield 
informative results. 
 The most straightforward alternative is to estimate multi-level models, but this 
would involve making the dubious assumption that idiosyncratic error terms are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  Haussmann specification tests suggest that 
this correlation does indeed significantly alter results between fixed and random effects 
models (Baltagi 2008). As a result, I face the following dilemma: fully utilize cross-
national variation but suffer the biases caused by correlations between errors and 
independent variables, or correct this bias with country fixed effects and throw away 
potentially revealing cross-national variation. I choose the former path with full 
awareness of its costs. Main models utilize random effects estimations supplemented by 
pooled Prais-Winsten models with panel corrected standard errors.  
  The slow moving nature of the key dependent and independent variable raises 
another issue, serial correlation. With this in mind, random effects estimations will be 
estimated with Huber-White standard errors clustered by country (Stock and Watson 
2008).
35
 But to further assure that inferences are not biased by autocorrelation, alternative 
Cochrane-Orcutt and Prais-Winsten (with common AR(1) disturbances) estimators will 
also be utilized.
36
 Despite the many caveats just discussed, main models will utilize a 
                                               
35 Following King and Roberts (2014), I directly compared the conventional and robust standard errors for 
my models. They appear nearly identical. At no point did they alter my substantive findings. 
36 Another common solution to serial correlation is the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. I avoid this 
approach for 2 reasons: 1) coefficients for LDVs were .88 or higher absorbing much of the effects of the 
independent variables, and 2) the briefness of the panel (T ≤ 8) means the combination of random effects 
and an LDV would result in considerable short panel bias.   
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random effects estimator with Huber/White “cluster-robust” standard errors. The 
“random effects” are drawn from the Normal distribution.37 As a result, most models will 
take the following form: 
Yit = α+ βXit + ui + vit 
Yit represents either normalized executive assessments of MSP in country i. in year t, or 
the formal bias measure in country i. year t. Xit represents regulatory independence and 
the full battery of political economic controls in country i year t. ui represents the random 
individual specific effects. By assumption, between-country errors are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the predictors. vit represents the remaining error. β is a vector of 
coefficients for my explanatory variables and controls. A third set of models will feature 
an interaction term between regulatory independence and value traded as a percentage of 
GDP. These models will be nearly identical to the model above with the exception of the 
interaction effect:  
Yit = α+ β1Xit +β2(Independenceit x ValueTradedit) +  ui + vit 
Analysis 
 Results largely support Hypothesis I. Regulatory independence has a negative 
association with executive assessments of investor protection. In contrast, stronger formal 
MSP (as measured by World Bank expert surveys) has a positive association (see below). 
                                               
37
 I realize the normality of the random effects coefficient is often questionable in many empirical 
applications. However, according to simulations by Beck and Katz (2007), Maas and Hox (2004), and 
McCulloch and Neuhaus (2011a) estimates of beta and random effects variances are typically unbiased by 
non-Normal random effects in linear models with continuous dependent variables. Bias arise only in 
“extreme” circumstances (McCulloch and Neuhaus 2011b) 
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The effects of independence and expert MSP are almost identical in size. A maximum 
zero to one increase in either variable is associated with a half overall standard deviation 
(≈0.20) and at least a full within standard deviation (≈0.07) change in executive 
assessments. This suggests that a simultaneous and equally sized increase in formal MSP 
and formal regulator independence could have largely offsetting effects in terms of 
executive opinion. Of the two variables, regulatory independence was far more robust to 
the inclusion of a dummy for common law legal origin while the expert MSP measure 
shrank in terms of both magnitude and significance. (see Table 4.1 below). This is 
unsurprising given the non-negligible positive correlation between the two variables 
(ρ≈.34) and the work of La Porta et. al. (1998) who suggest that legal tradition 
fundamentally shapes the strength of MSP. 
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     Table 4.1    
 (Executive Opinion of Investor Protection) 
(DV: Executive 
Opinions) 
(1)  
Random 
Effects 
(2)         
Random 
Effects 
(3)          
Random 
Effects 
(4)  
Random 
Effects 
(5)            
Cochrane
– Orcutt 
(6)         
Cochrane
– Orcutt 
       
       
Regulatory  -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.05* -0.11*** 
Independence (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Formal MSP          
Expert  
Assessment 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.056) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Electoral  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02* -0.004* -0.01** 
Competition  (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
Rule of Law  0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.006** 0.008** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Common Law   0.12*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Political   -0.06 -0.08*  -0.03 
Constraint   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) 
Electoral    0.001 0.01  0.01 
Proportionality   (0.006) (0.008)  (0.01) 
Center-Right    0.03 0.02  0.01 
Government   (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.03*** 0.02* 0.02* 0.04** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Capital Account  0.11** 0.10** 0.12*** 0.11* 0.05* 0.10** 
Openness (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.026) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) -0.05 -0.05* -0.06** -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
ln(Inflation)    0.001  0.0002 
    (0.01)  (0.005) 
Bank Crisis    -0.11***  -0.10*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01) 
Stock Index     -0.002**  -0.001** 
Volatility    (0.0006)  (0.0004) 
Constant 0.35** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.40* 0.034 0.18 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.23) (0.10) (0.15) 
Observations 860 848 796 455 848 455 
Overall R2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.48 0.43 0.31 
Within R2 0.32 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.01 0.48    
Number of 
countries 
121 119 114 73 119 73 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 Like independence and expert MSP, rule of law and electoral competition have 
opposite effects on executive assessments. This mirrors the findings of Li and  Resnick 
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(2003) who suggest that distinctions must be made between the property rights enhancing 
aspects of democracy (e.g. rule of law) versus those aspects that could frighten business 
interests (open electoral competition that could empower anti-business interests). Political 
constraint, electoral proportionality, and government partisanship all lacked meaningful 
relationships to executive opinion. Economic growth and economic development both 
improved executive evaluations while instability in stock markets and the banking sector 
had opposite effects. Effects for my two measures of globalization (capital account 
openness and trade) were mixed though consistently significant at conventional levels. 
Overall, Hypothesis I is supported. Regulators’ formal insulation from politics does 
appear to depress executive assessments of investor protection even after controlling for 
the formal level of MSP as measured by experts. 
Formal Bias  
 The previous section demonstrated that countries with more independent 
regulators have lower average executive assessments of investor protection. But given 
that executives are not neutral players in struggles over corporate governance and may 
benefit from less stringent investor protections, how should this lower level of confidence 
be understood? Is it simply the losers of regulatory independence expressing their 
frustration or does it represent a genuine reappraisal of MSP in light of its more 
consistent and impartial implementation? By analyzing executive opinions alongside 
those of the experts and isolating the role of regulatory institutions in explaining gaps 
between the two (i.e. formal bias), we should have a better idea of the answer. Results in 
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Table 4.2 suggest that regulatory independence is in fact a strongly associated with 
differences between experts formal assessments and executive opinion. 
 Although the magnitude of the association shrinks by almost half with the 
inclusion of year dummies or the use of a Cochrane Orcutt AR(1) transformation, 
regulatory independence is statistically significant at conventional levels in all models. 
This positive coefficient is in line with Hypothesis II: as regulatory independence 
increases, formal bias becomes more positive (or less negative) suggesting a decrease in 
executive confidence relative to the experts. In the random effects models, a maximum 
zero to one change in regulatory independence should produce positive changes that 
range from a third to a half of the overall standard deviation of formal bias. Prais-
Winsten models suggest effects would be equal to roughly half of an overall standard 
deviation in formal bias (0.12).  
 To reiterate, the positive coefficient on regulatory independence variable should 
not be interpreted as an increase in the absolute size of the gap between expert 
assessments and executive opinion. 
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                  Table 4.2       
              (Formal bias) 
  (DV: Formal bias) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random Effects 
GLS 
Random Effects 
GLS 
Cochrane- 
Orcutt(AR1) 
Prais-Winsten 
w/PCSE  
     
Regulatory Independence 0.127*** 0.082** 0.076** 0.116** 
 (0.043) (0.04) (0.038) (0.046) 
Electoral Competition 0.008** 0.003 0.007** 0.008*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rule of Law -0.008 0.006 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Common Law 0.07 0.006 0.047 0.0397 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.04) (0.029) 
Center-Right Partisanship -0.021 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.041** -0.07*** 0.0124 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.02) (0.012) (0.011) 
GDP growth (annual %) -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Account Openness -0.11* -0.05 -0.07* -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.08** 0.06 0.03 -0.002 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
ln(Stocks Traded) -0.04*** -0.0005 -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.68*** 0.14 -0.22 -0.03 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.14) (0.14) 
     
Observations 733 733 733 733 
Within R2 0.21 0.37 0.18 -- 
Overall R2 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.10 
Year FE NO YES NO NO 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (Models 1-2) (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Figure 4.3 
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  Instead, it can be described as a move away from negative levels of formal bias 
(expert < executive) or a reduction in executives’ valence based overconfidence in MSP 
relative to experts’ formal evaluations. Figure 4.3 above features a linear prediction of 
bias across regulatory independence and should clarify the meaning of the positive 
coefficients. The dashed reference line on the y axis designates the point at which experts 
and executives’ ratings of MSP are identical relative to the other countries of the world. 
Since all controls are held at their mean, the predictions above represent the effects of 
regulatory independence on the average country in an average year. When predictions are 
generated with actual values, results are nearly identical.  
 Despite differences in slope, all models suggest that regulatory organizations with 
below average formal independence (<.71) should be associated with executive 
assessments of MSP that are more optimistic than the experts (i.e. negative formal bias). 
 177 
 
Beyond mean levels independence, differences are not distinguishable from zero at 95% 
level of confidence. When financial regulation is conducted within the executive 
bureaucracy (independence =0), formal bias becomes the most negative and reflects the 
highest levels of executive overconfidence and/or optimism relative to the experts. 
Overall, Figure 4.3 provides clear support for Hypothesis IV, linear predictions at both 
means and actual values are confined primarily to negative levels of formal bias. In other 
words, the effects of formal regulatory independence seem most closely associated with 
countries where executive opinions of MSP are more positive relative to experts’ formal 
assessments. 
 Of the political control variables, only electoral competition produced consistent 
results in terms of both sign and significance. Interestingly, electoral competition has 
very similar effects to regulatory independence. As electoral competition increases, 
executives’ opinions become less optimistic relative to the experts and the formal bias 
variable approaches zero. In short, electoral competition and executives’ MSP realism 
appear to go hand in hand. Of the macroeconomic controls, only economic growth, 
capital account openness, and stock market liquidity maintain consistent signs. All three 
are negative and their linear predictions suggest that brisk economic growth, greater 
capital account openness, and increased stock market development can all increase 
executive opinions of MSP beyond those of the experts. Although further research would 
be required, the higher MSP ratings (relative to experts) created by economic growth may 
be a reflection of a more general optimism experienced by executives during periods of 
high economic growth. Similarly, the greater optimism in MSP that results from higher 
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levels of capital account openness may be due to the added financial activity that emerges 
in the wake of financial liberalization. It could also reflect executives’ mistaken 
assumption that liberalization is accompanied by stronger investor rights.
38
  
 A similar logic may explain the highly significant and largely negative effect of 
stock market liquidity on formal bias. Executives may see greater stock market activity 
and then infer that this must be due, at least in part, to formal investor protection. They 
may also be conflating formal investor protections with the added economic power that 
flows to shareholders as a result of market liquidity. As stock markets become more 
developed, minority shareholders gain added leverage over corporate insiders. Markets 
for corporate control become more active; information about managerial performance is 
more readily available; and shareholders can more easily divest themselves of poorly 
performing companies. Furthermore, as trading activity becomes a larger part of the 
economy, executives are more often exposed to pro-investor norms and may even 
internalize these norms through equity based compensation. Any or all of these factors 
may lead executives to over-estimate minority shareholder protection relative to the 
experts.   
 Overall, regulatory independence, electoral competition, economic growth, capital 
account openness and stock market development have a statistically significant 
association with formal bias. Higher levels of the first two reduce executives’ confidence 
in MSP relative to the experts while higher levels of growth, capital account openness, 
                                               
38 Fortunately, Chinn and Ito’s measure of capital account openness has a pairwise correlation of over 0.63 
with Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel’s index of banking sector and credit market liberalization. 
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and stock market development may do the opposite. Given the profound  role that stock 
markets can have on business culture and therefore executive’s preferences and behavior, 
the question arises as to whether the sobering effects of regulatory independence remain 
the same as economies transition to more shareholder friendly forms of corporate 
governance. As the findings in Table 4.3 below indicate, the answer is clearly no. 
 The marginal effects of regulatory independence diminish as stock trading activity 
becomes a larger portion of the economy. This result is robust to the inclusion of year 
fixed effects and alternative Cochrane-Orcutt and Prais-Winsten estimations. As Figure 
4.4 demonstrates, increases in regulatory independence diminish formal bias in most 
countries. But once value traded exceeds the 75 percentile of the sample (3.5), the 
sobering effects of regulatory independence become indistinguishable from 0. There are 
number of reasons why independence should be less important at these higher levels of 
market development. 
 First, there are simply more listed companies, equity investors, and financial 
professionals spreading pro-shareholder norms across the economy. Long before they are 
confronted by regulators, executives will have had frequent interactions with the financial 
press, securities lawyers, independent auditors, and securities analysts. Shareholder-
centered corporate governance is also more likely to be included within executives’ 
business education. Most directly, highly liquid markets can facilitate market based 
punishments for executive under performance (e.g. slumping stock prices and reduced 
stock based compensation) and make takeover threats more credible. Both give 
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executives a direct material interest in understanding investor protection. Overall, where 
markets are highly developed, the chief conduits of pro-shareholder norms are executive 
socialization and education rather than the enforcement actions of public regulators. 
      Table 4.3     
 (Regulatory Independence-Market Depth Interaction on Formal bias)   
DV: Formal Bias (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
GLS 
Cochrane-
Orcutt 
Prais-
Winsten 
w/PCSE  
     
Regulatory  0.30*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 
Independence (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
ln(StockTraded) 0.007 0.03** 0.002 0.015 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Independence X 
ln(StockTraded) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Electoral  0.008** 0.002 0.007** 0.009*** 
Competition (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rule of Law -0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Common Law 0.081* 0.01 0.06 0.05* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
Center Right  -0.02 -0.01 -0.005 -0.001 
Government (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.04** -0.07*** 0.012 -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001) 
Capital Account  -0.11* -0.05 -0.07** -0.034 
Openness (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.08* 0.05 0.02 -0.005 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.79*** 0.06 -0.32** -0.13 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15) 
     
Observations 733 733 733 733 
Overall R2 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.11 
Within R2 0.21 0.38 0.19 -- 
Year FE NO YES NO NO 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
  
 .  
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         Figure 4.4       
                 (Independence-Market Depth Interaction on Bias) 
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 In contrast, executives in countries with smaller equity markets will be far less 
likely to gain an understanding of investor protection through non-administrative 
channels. There are several reasons why this should be the case. First, fewer executives 
will manage publically listed companies so fewer executives will have incentives to 
prioritize investor relations. More broadly, executive socialization and education will be 
less steeped in the norms of outsider oriented corporate governance. The financial press 
will be less developed, fewer executive peers will manage listed companies, and there 
will be a smaller density of financial professionals working on behalf of minority 
shareholders. When executives are made aware of investor protection, this awareness will 
be more likely to result from interactions with public authorities. Since these interactions 
are profoundly shaped by regulators’ political independence, independence will more 
powerfully shape executive perceptions in these less developed contexts.  
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 To summarize, higher levels of regulatory independence reduce executive 
assessments of investor protection. When executive and expert assessments are placed on 
relative [0,1] scales, findings reveal that this reduction also corresponds to smaller gaps 
between executive opinions and expert assessments. In support of Hypotheses IV and III 
respectively, the effects of regulatory independence seem largely confined to countries 
where executives express greater confidence relative to the experts and in countries 
where stock markets are not the most highly developed in terms of liquidity and size. The 
section below will investigate the robustness of these results. 
Robustness and Sensitivity 
 In terms of the relationship between regulatory independence and formal (expert) 
MSP on the one hand and executive assessments on the other, neither is robust to the 
inclusion of country fixed effects. Only the expert measure is robust to the inclusion of 
year fixed effects (not shown). However, when the same relationship is evaluated with a 
pooled Prais-Winsten estimator and panel corrected standard errors, results resemble 
those in Table 4.1: both expert MSP and regulatory independence are statistically 
significant, oppositely signed, and have associations with executive assessments of 
roughly equal magnitude (see Table 4.4A). Regardless of estimator type, the inclusion of 
controls for financial instability does not diminish the strength of regulatory 
independence’s coefficient. 
 The relationship between regulatory independence and formal bias found in Table 
4.2 is also fairly robust. A statistically meaningful association survives the inclusion of a 
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further set of controls including overall regulatory quality, political constraint, and 
financial instability (Table 4.5A). Findings weaken but typically remain significant with 
the inclusion of country and year fixed effects both together and separately (Table 4.6A). 
However, the independence coefficient drifts into insignificance when a Prais-Winsten 
estimator is combined with country fixed effects (Model 3, Table 4.6A). Additional 
specifications also demonstrate that the reduced differences between expert and executive 
assessments are in fact driven by the independence of regulators and not their mere 
existence. When the regulatory independence measure is replaced with a ‘regulator in 
existence’ dummy variable, coefficients are cut in half with standard errors being at least 
as large as coefficients. This non-significance holds across all estimators (not shown). 
 Robustness tests also provide further support for the assertion that the effects of 
regulatory independence on formal bias are smaller as stock markets become better 
developed. The interaction effect is largely unaffected by the inclusion of country fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, or both (Table 4.7A). Once again, combining a Prais-Winsten 
estimator with country fixed effects significantly weakens the results (Models 3 and 6, 
Table 4.7). The interaction survives the addition of controls for political constraint and 
financial instability (Table 4.8A), but substantially weakens when the independence 
measure is replaced by the “regulator in existence” dummy (Table 4.9A). If the size of 
stock markets is substituted for liquidity, results remain largely unchanged across all 
model types (not shown). 
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Conclusion 
 The strength of minority shareholder protection is widely believed to be an 
essential contributor to financial development. As a result, scholars continue to focus 
upon developing accurate measures of how various rules and regulations protect non-
controlling shareholders from the fraud, incompetence, and self-dealing of corporate 
insiders. While most measures attempt to develop an objective account of MSP strength, 
other measures, like the survey evidence provided by the World Economic Forum, allow 
for more subjective evaluations. Unsurprisingly, the differences between the more formal 
legal expert based approaches and those that utilize the opinions of the potential losers of 
MSP (i.e. corporate insiders) are substantial in many countries. Findings indicate that 
regulatory independence is a key driver of the size and nature of these differences.  
 In countries where regulators are freed of the most blatant forms of political 
interference, average executive assessments of MSP are actually lower than countries 
with more politicized regulators. While it is possible that regulatory independence 
systematically weakens investor protection, this is likely not the case. Not only would 
such a conclusion be contrary to the expectations of nearly all past literature on 
regulatory politics, it would also ignore the potential costs that executives must pay when 
MSP is strengthened. What seems more likely is that the added policy consistency that 
accompanies independence may raise executives’ awareness of formal MSP including 
how current levels of MSP fall short or impinge upon their interests. Rather than a 
genuine sign of weaker investor protection, the inverse relationship between 
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independence and executive confidence in MSP likely reflects a higher level of 
knowledge and realism among business elites. Furthermore, these results provide clear 
guidance as to where independent regulatory organizations may generate the most 
opposition from corporate insiders: countries where senior executives are more confident 
relative to the experts in the current regime of investor protection and are relatively 
isolated from the financial pressures that come from having larger and more liquid equity 
markets. In these contexts, the consistent and impartial implementation of formal MSP 
may come as a rude awakening for corporate insiders unaccustomed to the discipline of 
financial markets or the more stringent enforcement of corporate governance regulation.   
 However, there are contexts where formal regulatory independence may be a less 
powerful shaper of executive opinion. In countries where shareholders are economically 
powerful and reassured by common law, regulatory independence may be less essential 
to shareholder protection and therefore more weakly associated with executives’ 
assessments of that protection. In other instances, politicians and judges may largely 
ignore investors’ formal rights leading executive opinions to lag far behind expert 
assessments (expert>executive). If formal MSPs are ignored, regulators’ formal 
protections from political interference will likely be ignored as well. This will cause the 
latter to have little to no effect on executive opinion since formally independent but 
informally politicized regulators will act in largely the same way as politicians.    
 These findings have two key implications. First, independent regulators play an 
important part in spreading financial knowledge and pro-shareholder norms among 
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business elites. Their consistent implementation of MSP may help to shift executive 
assessments of investor protection away from being naïve, abstract, and valence based 
toward something more concrete, meaningful, and possibly pessimistic. Second, these 
findings highlight the importance of preventing capture that operates indirectly through 
politicians via processes of appointment, appropriation, and oversight. Had findings 
indicated that formal political independence is unrelated to executive opinions of MSP, it 
would suggest that the indirect pressure corporate insiders exercise through the political 
process plays a only a minor role in shaping regulatory practice. This chapter’s results 
suggest the opposite. Political independence matters and may be essential to transforming 
formal investor protections from empty words upon which everyone can agree into 
something that inspires considerable conflict among powerful economic elites.   
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Chapter 5 
Depoliticized Exchange Governance and Self-Regulation 
 
 In what was widely seen a landmark case in the history of Canadian federalism, 
the country’s Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Federal government’s 
proposed establishment of a national securities regulator (Reference Re Securities Act 
2011). As a result of the Court’s decision, Canada remains the only country in the world 
that regulates its stock markets and securities industry on a fully provincial basis. While 
provincial securities commissions go to great lengths to coordinate their actions, the only 
truly national authority over the Canadian securities industry is a private self-regulatory 
organization: the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC). 
Although Canada is not alone in having a regulatory regime that relies extensively on 
SROs (e.g. U.S., Korea, Japan, and Colombia), it is unique in that its Federal constitution 
makes such a reliance virtually unavoidable.  
 Like Canada, industry self-regulation has fundamentally shaped China’s financial 
development. But unlike Canada, the Chinese experience dramatically highlights how 
effective self-regulation requires a political foundation that China continues to lack. More 
specifically, self-regulation means more than exchanges or market participants setting 
and enforcing their own rules. The governance of exchanges must also be free from direct 
political interference in order for meaningful industry self-regulation to emerge. In the 
introductory paragraphs below, I will briefly review the Canadian and Chinese 
experiences. By comparing clear instances of self-regulatory persistence and success with 
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self-regulatory failure and continued inadequacy, the reasoning that guided the 
construction of my depoliticized self-regulation measure should become more intuitive.   
 The history of securities regulation and self-regulation in Canada roughly 
resembles that of its neighbor to the south.
39
 Organized securities trading first emerged in 
Canada during the 1850s and 1860s. Within informal clubs and associations, traders in 
Toronto and Quebec concentrated their exchange activities on government bonds and 
early railroad stocks. By the mid-1870s, informal associations of brokers gave way to 
officially recognized exchanges in both Montreal and Toronto. Both exchanges were 
privately governed and exercised significant self-regulatory power including making and 
enforcing detailed trading, settlement, and dispute resolution rules. Railroad and mining 
booms led to the rapid growth of both self-regulatory markets’ trading volume and 
membership. The sale “Victory Bonds” during WWI accelerated this trend as ordinary 
Canadians became familiar with financial securities. Like the United States, the 1920s 
were a boom time for Canadian markets. But along with high prices and popular 
participation came exploitation. Inexperienced retail investors frequently fell victim to 
aggressive and sometimes fraudulent brokerage sales practices, price manipulation by 
corporate insiders and market intermediaries, and poor corporate governance (Armstrong 
1997). Since segments of the brokers-dealer industry benefited financially from many of 
                                               
39
 The discussion below will focus mainly upon events in Ontario. Ontario is home to the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, the largest equity market in Canada from the mid-1930s onward. The Montreal Stock Exchange 
was the largest by capitalization prior to the 1930s, but economic restructuring, provincial politics, and 
even a terrorist attack gradually pushed trading volume and business incorporations out of Quebec.   
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these dubious practices, member controlled stock exchange boards did little to crack 
down on these corrosive practices.  
 Following the lead of prairie populists to their south, Western provinces and later 
Ontario and Quebec passed “Blue Sky Laws” and set up securities fraud enforcement 
tribunals in order to punish industry wrongdoing. Although these laws and tribunals 
reigned in the most egregious acts of fraud in the share issuance process, opportunism 
during exchange trading and within the still self-regulating brokerage industry continued. 
High profile swindles in mining stocks exposed the shortcomings of the Blue-Sky laws 
and tribunals, and led the province of Ontario to pass the first modern securities 
legislation in Canadian history. The Security Frauds Prevention Act of 1928 brought 
market intermediaries under the purview of public registration, established business 
conduct rules, and introduced criminal penalties for violations of the Act (Armstrong 
1997 & 2001). A new regulatory body, the Securities Fraud Prevention Board was also 
created to enforce the statute. Following a stock market crash roughly a year later, an 
additional and even more stringent Fraud Prevention Act was enacted and the Fraud 
Prevention Board was reorganized into the Ontario Securities Commission. Although the 
new law and Commission expanded public authority over securities issuance and the 
brokerage industry, successful lobbying by exchange officials insulated the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSE) from direct Commission supervision. Despite the many weakness 
revealed by the 1929 crash, Canadian politicians did not believe that private exchange 
governance or self-regulatory power were the culprits behind market volatility. Instead, 
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they pointed to weaknesses in corporate reporting, aggressive sales practices, and 
individual broker-dealer firms. 
 Only after WWII was the Toronto Stock Exchange finally brought under the 
supervisory authority of the Securities Commission (Armstrong 2001). Yet it is important 
to point out that this official recognition represented the formalization and deepening of 
self-regulation rather than its curtailment. Most provincial lawmakers remained confident 
in the benefits of private rulemaking and enforcement and saw opportunism within the 
brokerage industry as a reason to empower rather than weaken private self-regulators. 
This willingness to delegate accelerated even further during the latter half of the 20
th
 
century. The Investment Dealers Association (IDA), originally a trade association 
founded in 1916, gained SRO status under the Commodities Futures Act in 1984 and then 
under the Securities Act in 1995. The fund management industry followed suit with the 
Mutual Fund Dealers Association gaining SRO status in 2000. When the Toronto Stock 
Exchange spun off its self-regulatory functions into a stand-alone organization in 2001, 
the entity (Market Regulation Services Inc.) was immediately recognized as an SRO by 
the Ontario Commission. Canadian politicians and regulators’ faith in self-regulation 
reached its pinnacle in 2008 when they allowed the merger of the IDA and Market 
Regulation Services Inc. into the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada 
(IIROC). To this day, the IIROC is one of the most powerful SROs in the world and is 
the only regulatory organization with national jurisdiction in Canada. Its regulatory duties 
are extensive and include screening investment advisors for good character and sufficient 
training; ensuring that brokerage firms meet minimum capital requirements and are in 
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good financial health; reviewing business conduct compliance so that all customers are 
treated fairly; conducting front-line market surveillance of trading activity; investigating 
marketplace and dealer misconduct; adjudicating disputes between market intermediaries; 
and initiating disciplinary proceedings that can results in fines, suspensions, permanent 
bans, and referrals to criminal prosecution. 
 Canada’s history raises the following question: is Canadian politicians’ 
confidence in private-sector self- regulation misplaced? Is their continued reliance on 
self-regulation more a product of industry lobbying rather than a reflection of successful 
practice? View most broadly, the answer to both questions appears to be no. Canadian 
official’s uniquely intense reliance on privately governed SROs has not led to a 
widespread deterioration in investor protections or major delays in the development of 
Canadian equity markets. As of 2012, Canada’s market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP, value traded as percentage of GDP , and number of publically listed companies per 
capita are at the 91
st
,  89
th
, and 97
th
 percentile globally (World Development Indicators). 
According to the World Bank’s composite index of investor protection, Canada sits atop 
the rankings at the 98
th
 percentile. When the World Economic Form asked Canadian 
executives to rank the strength of investor protection and the quality of exchange 
regulation in their country, their average scores were at the 93
rd
 and 89
th
 percentile of the 
2011-2012 global sample (Schwab 2013). In sum, Canadian federalism may have 
induced a high degree of dependence upon private-sector self-regulation, but this 
dependence appears to have aided rather than hindered the development of Canada’s 
equity markets.  
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 As touched upon in Chapter 3, the experience in China could not be more 
different. Prior to the passage of its first full-fledged securities statute in 1999, early 
securities exchanges and brokerage firms performed self-regulation by default. The first 
securities markets were operated by local banks and branches of the PBoC with the latter 
exercising limited regulatory power over OTC equity and bond markets. These early 
experiments were largely a failure. Fees were high, manipulation widespread, securities 
registration uneven, corruption endemic, and securities companies poorly managed. Due 
to these issues, the State Council shut down this interbank OTC equity and bond market 
at the end of the 1980s. Municipal governments then took their turn as market builders. In 
1990 and 1991, municipal officials in both Shenzhen and Shanghai opened formal stock 
exchanges and designated both as SROs. Reformers within the Communist party saw the 
establishment of these new exchanges as an opportunity to push their country’s nascent 
securities industry in a Western direction (Green 2004). Unfortunately, the efforts of 
these more pro-Western modernizers were unsuccessful, and their influence quickly 
waned as local politicians and bureaucrats seized control over securities trading and SOE 
reform. Rather than market integrity and investor protection, short-term financial gain 
and the protection of local industry took precedence within locally administered 
regulatory regimes.  
  The weaknesses of local regulation were obvious. A broker-dealer SRO, the 
Securities Association of China (SAC), was established in 1991 as a non-governmental 
organization. However, the association was unable to development meaningful self-
regulatory power and proved to be a poor advocate for the industry. Rather than a SEC 
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styled national regulator, Securities Management Commissions (SMC), Securities 
Administration Offices (SAO), and provincial branches of the PBoC assumed key 
rulemaking powers. All three organizations were dominated by provincial and municipal 
politicians, bureaucrats, and party leaders. The exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen did 
exercise the powers traditionally associated with western-styled exchange SROs. They 
authorized the listing and delisting of shares, set exchange membership rules, developed 
disclosure requirements for companies, set trading and settlement rules, investigated 
members’ rule violations, and determined disciplinary actions. However, their 
governance was largely public and resembled that of the SMCs and SAOs. Executives, 
officers, and key committees were made up of local politicians, provincial bureaucrats, 
and their appointees and allies. As a result, many of the exchanges’ self-regulatory 
powers went either unexercised or were exercised so as to protect politically connected 
intermediaries and issuers (Green 2004). In short, local officials in the exchange SROs, 
SMCs, and SAOs consistently abandoned their commitments to investor protection and 
market integrity in the name of revenue maximization, personal enrichment, and political 
careerism. 
 As previously discussed, the Central Government engaged in a prolonged and 
largely successful struggle to wrest control of securities regulation from local leaders. 
However, the means by which they waged this struggle has further undermined 
meaningful self-regulation in the Chinese securities industry. More specifically, in order 
to protect the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from corrosive local influence, the 
exchanges’ regulatory powers were curtailed and their self-governance undermined.  
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Although formally recognized as SROs according to the 1999 Securities Law, their 
regulatory role is now that of a frontline supervisor and limited rule maker over trading 
activity, member conduct, and listing requirements. More dramatically, the CSRC gained 
appointment power over both exchanges’ presidents, vice-presidents, and general 
managers. The CSRC even holds a de facto veto over appointments and dismissals of 
directors and middle-managers in key exchange departments (Green 2004). 
 Although a joint IMF-IOSCO evaluation states that “the regulatory arrangements 
in China place appropriate and significant reliance on SROs to perform regulatory 
functions...” many experts highlight the limitations and weaknesses of this reliance (IMF 
China 2012). In its 2008 Capital Markets Development plan, even the CSRC admits that 
“Self-regulatory organizations such as the SAC and exchanges have not been fully 
functioning, and lack the ability to work independently from regulatory agencies (CSRC 
2008; 279).  The SAC has come under particular criticism. While formally possessing 
considerable self-regulatory power, experts assert that SAC     
 representatives have been actively involved in neither rule-making nor in 
 significant lobbying on behalf of industry...Instead the CSRC has closely 
 deliminted the SAC’s role, power, and rulemaking capabilities. The association 
 has operated under the administrative control of the CSRC… all SAC senior staff 
 are government officials, appointed by their CSRC and their work is mainly 
 focused on organizing educational programs (Green 2004; 201). 
Despite these obvious weaknesses, the SAC is beginning to fulfill some of the roles 
envisioned by its founders and the statutes of the National People’s Congress. As the 
second decade of the 2000s commenced, the SAC expanded its long standing educational 
efforts; conducted a higher volume of “professional assessments” of securities firms; 
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intensified the issuance of guidelines, best practices, and codes of conduct; and launched 
its own remote trading system (SAC 2016). While these are signs of progress, the SAC’s 
inability to issue legally binding rules and its lack of disciplinary power demonstrates that 
it remains more of a (weak) industry lobby and professional association rather than a 
SRO. It continues to fall far short of the examples set by the IIROC in Canada or the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Association in the U.S. 
 As the previous account suggests, the delegation of regulatory power to stock 
exchanges or associations of broker-dealers is not enough for meaningful self-regulation 
to emerge. Like public regulators, stock exchanges and industry associations must have 
sufficient discretion and independence from political officials in order to assume actual 
self-regulatory power. Without this independence, they can become mere extensions of 
executive bureaucracies and/or public regulatory agencies. The result is the loss of many 
of the expertise, legitimacy, and credibility based advantages highlighted by self-
regulation’s proponents. In short, self-regulation is about more than stock exchanges or 
broker-dealers exercising power over their own affairs. It requires the exercise of private 
power by private actors under public oversight that remains free from direct forms of 
political interference. These themes will be explored further in the remainder of this 
chapter and will be directly incorporated into my novel measure of depoliticized self-
regulation and exchange governance. This measure will then be used to explore whether 
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depoliticized self-regulation actually produces the positive stock market development and 
performance effects predicted by both my theory and self-regulation’s proponents.40   
SROs across the World 
 As highlighted by the country vignettes above, the activities of public regulatory 
agencies are often complementary to and sometimes dependent upon extensive private 
sector self-regulation. Stock exchanges, associations of broker dealers, and industry wide 
self-regulatory organizations can be key actors in defending retail investors from the 
opportunism of market intermediaries (e.g. brokers, financial advisers) and ensuring 
corporate transparency. They perform a variety of regulatory tasks including the 
establishment and enforcement of market trading, conduct of business, and fair dealing 
rules; conducting real-time and post-trade surveillance; licensing trading and clearing 
members; setting capital adequacy and position risk standards; performing clearing and 
settlement; and providing arbitration facilities for dispute resolution (WFE 2005).
 41
 In 
addition, many exchanges play a leading role in protecting minority shareholders by 
embedding corporate governance, financial performance, and accounting, auditing, and 
                                               
40
 By proponents I have in mind the financial community, individual SROs, and international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund, International Organization of Securities Commissions, European 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the International Council of Securities Associations. 
According to IOSCO’s 2008 Objectives and Principals of Securities Regulation, regulatory regimes should 
“make appropriate use of SROs that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas 
of competence and to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.” The exercise of this 
oversight responsibility should be “subject to the oversight of the regulator” (IOSCO 2008). 
41
 Central securities depositories (CSD) are also considered Self-Regulatory Organizations in some national 
jurisdictions. These organizations regulate and record 1) the net trading obligations of the broker 
participants; 2) exchange of cash and securities on the contractual settlement date; and 3) safekeeping of 
securities and other financial assets. CSDs also act as a central counterparty to trading participants so that if 
either party to a transaction fails to fulfill their obligations, the CSD will make the wronged party whole. 
Although researchers have recently pointed to CSDs as a source of systemic risk, they will not be the main 
focus of this chapter.  
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periodic disclosure standards in their listing requirements. In many instances these 
standards are more demanding than the minimum standards set by legislative statute or 
public regulatory rules. Even short of these formal powers, stock exchange officials can 
be major players in spreading pro-shareholder norms through their participation in 
informal working groups and their development of non-binding corporate governance 
codes. Associations of broker-dealers can play similar roles with regard to market 
integrity through their promotion of codes of best practices among their members. While 
they typically lack the powers of public regulators and prosecutors, many exchanges and 
associations retain the ability to conduct investigations and disciplinary hearings, oversee 
legally binding arbitration, publically censure market intermediaries and listed firms, and 
impose monetary fines. Their most potent enforcement powers include the ability to  refer 
market actors to administrative proceedings or criminal prosecution; delist companies 
from trading; expel or suspend stock exchange and/or industry association members; and 
revoke industry licenses.  
 Given the essential role they often play in rulemaking and enforcement, SROs are 
understudied phenomena among political scientists. Although volumes of research has 
addressed the international “private politics” of accounting harmonization and corporate 
social responsibility, securities industry self-regulation has received less sustained and 
frequent treatment (Simmons 2001; Baron 2001; Mattli and Büthe 2011). When they are 
the subject of study, they are typically the object of political struggle and regulatory 
controversy. Work on their regulatory role and whether that role has positive or negative 
benefits on stock market development is even rarer. This is a puzzling omission for a 
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number of reasons. First, securities exchanges are the venue within which inherently 
politicized processes such as privatization and the reform of state-owned enterprises takes 
place. Second, inasmuch as SROs exercise delegated regulatory authority, they are 
private guardians of public interests. Major breakdowns in exchange governance and/or 
self-regulation can create damaging market volatility; exacerbate financial crisis or 
directly cause market crashes; heighten opportunities for corporate malfeasance; and 
retard financial development by undermining market integrity. The neglect of SROs is 
puzzling for a third and even more obvious reason. In many instances, stock exchanges 
are directly owned by the state or are indirectly controlled by state-owned financial 
institutions. The presence of politicians, regulators, and their appointees on exchange 
boards is common in the developing world. In sum, stock exchanges are not just objects 
of political and regulatory debate; they are political and regulatory actors in their own 
right.  
 Unfortunately, only a handful of cross-national studies have systematically 
explored the prevalence of SROs and their regulatory role within securities markets 
(Carson 2011; IOSCO surveys).
42
 While legal and financial scholars have engaged in 
                                               
42 The International Council of Securities Associations (ICSA) defines an SRO as “a private, 
nongovernmental organization that should be dedicated to the public interest objectives of enhancing 
market integrity, investor protection, and market efficiency.” More specifically, the ICSA (2006b)  insists 
that SROs should “ (a) share a common set of public policy objectives including the enhancement of 
market integrity, market efficiency, and investor protection; (b) are actively supervised by the government 
regulator(s); (c) have statutory regulatory authority, authority that is delegated by government regulator(s), 
or both; (d) establish rules and regulations for firms and individuals that are subject to their regulatory 
authority; (e) monitor compliance with those rules and regulations and, in the case of SROs that regulate 
trading markets, conduct surveillance of markets; (f) have the authority to discipline members that violate 
applicable rules and regulations; (g) include industry representatives on their boards or otherwise ensure 
that industry members have a meaningful role in governance; and (h) maintain structures, policies, and 
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more in-depth analyses, their work is rarely comparative and explicitly political questions 
make only intermittent appearances within the literature. A lack of data may at least 
partially explain this omission of exchange governance and SROs from the financial 
politics research agenda. Even the peak level international organization that represents 
stock exchanges experiences difficulties collecting information. In the preface to their 
2004 study on exchanges’ rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement responsibilities, the 
World Federation of Stock Exchanges states that only  
 
 80% of the WFE members responded to the questionnaire, although not all 
 exchanges responded to all of the questions asked… The costs of regulation are a 
 significant portion of exchange operating expenses, although the answers to  
 questions about costs in this survey were somewhat disappointing in terms of 
 genuine comparability for the group.  Some exchanges did not respond to these 
 questions, and some answers seemed somewhat arbitrary, and perhaps even 
 erroneous… A majority of exchanges wished their answers to remain 
 confidential… Perhaps an inability by exchanges to fully understand or control 
 what is happening to the exchange markets and to their regulation explains some 
 of the difficulties exchanges had in answering the questions…Another possible 
 impediment to clearer responses is that as exchanges become commercial 
 enterprises in a global capital  market, they are all competitors on some level. That 
 also makes giving quantitative information a sensitive matter(3-4). 
 Studying financial statues and regulation can only go so far in overcoming this 
dearth of information regarding exchanges’ regulatory roles. Statutes often list the areas 
over which exchanges can and/or must make rules and conduct enforcement activities. 
How detailed or wide ranging these rules are in practice is far harder to discern as is the 
effort that exchanges actually expend in enforcing them. Oftentimes, public regulators 
will have overlapping and/or duplicative regulatory responsibilities with exchanges and 
                                                                                                                                            
procedures to ensure that conflicts of interest between their commercial and regulatory activities are 
appropriately managed.” (quoted in Carson 2015) 
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SROs leaving it unclear which actor exercises the preponderance of authority. Further 
complicating matters are statutes that give public regulators the ability to delegate their 
regulatory power to industry SROs. How much delegation actually takes place and 
whether the delegation is broad or specific remains ambiguous. As the 2004 WFE report 
quoted above suggests, these issues are in constant flux and are a real source of confusion 
among regulators, politicians, exchange officials, and securities firms. If even industry 
insiders often lack a detailed understanding of the true distribution of regulatory authority 
within the securities industry, outside analysts should not be blamed for their less than 
complete grasp of the same issues.    
 To date, there is no panel data regarding state ownership within the stock 
exchange sector or the presence of politicians, political appointees, regulators, and central 
bankers within exchanges’ decision making bodies. Relatedly, there is no dataset that 
measures the degree to which different countries’ financial legislation encourages or 
discourages the formation of SROs or whether officially designated SROs actually 
emerge when a legislative framework exists. Before the more complex task of discerning 
the exact division of authority between public and private regulators can be tackled, a 
more basic empirical baseline must be established. The goal of this chapter is to establish 
just such a baseline. This chapter will begin with a descriptive overview of 1) non-private 
ownership of securities exchanges; 2) the formal politicization of their governance; 3) the 
presence of financial statutes that facilitate the exercise of regulatory power by the 
private sector; and 4) the de facto presence of SROs across the globe. As in previous 
chapters, I will utilize a graded response model in order to place national regulatory 
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regimes along a latent continuum of depoliticized private industry self-regulation 
(DSRO). Once I have a measure of DSRO, I will estimate a series of empirical models in 
order to discern the strength of the association between industry self-regulation and 
measures of stock market development and performance.  
 Overall findings are mixed. In terms of overall stock market development, there is 
evidence that depoliticized self-regulation is positively associated with market size and 
index price growth, but this relationship is not robust to all potential controls. 
Furthermore, it seems that the association between depoliticized self-regulation and stock 
market development is dependent upon at least some semblance electoral competition 
particularly among legislators. Finally, there is evidence that both public regulatory 
independence and depoliticized self-regulation make unique contributions to stock 
market size and price growth. 
SRO Models 
 Variation in levels of self-regulation is best viewed as part of a continuum ranging 
from outright government domination of both the operation and regulation of financial 
markets to elaborate systems of self-regulation that utilize extensive private rulemaking 
and enforcement. Different countries have different mixes of public regulation and 
private self-regulation with public regulatory agencies and SROs sometimes playing 
complementary and at other times playing substitutive roles within capital market 
governance (IOSCO 2000; CFA Institute 2007; Carson 2011; World Federation of 
Exchanges 2004; CFA Institute 2013). At one end of the self-regulatory continuum is a 
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government dominated model in which all forms of private sector self-regulation are 
virtually absent and the governance of the securities industry is maximally politicized. 
Government ministers, political appointees, or politicized regulatory agencies are charged 
with supervising trading activities; determining exchange rules concerning listing, 
trading, membership, and business conduct; and/or enforcing penalties when traders or 
issuers violate rules. The most extreme version of the government dominated model 
features exchanges that are statutory public institutions or SOEs with politicians, political 
appointees, and/or other public officials serving as executive management and/or 
supervisory board members. These government dominated exchanges may be nominally 
self-regulatory in the sense that the exchange board of directors both operates and 
regulates the exchange. However, in line with most practitioners and international 
organizations such as the ICSA, I do not consider them SROs since they lack the status of 
private nongovernmental organizations. The government dominated model is found most 
often within authoritarian regimes particularly those located in the Middle East and North 
Africa. However, the presence of political appointees on exchange boards was and 
continues to be present in countries across the world (see Appendix V(b) for a complete 
list).  
 In other instances, the government plays a leading rather than a dominating role in 
securities market regulation. Particularly common in Western Europe, the government-
led model is built upon the assumption that assigning public regulatory functions to a 
private body is inappropriate particularly when the private body is a commercial 
company that must compete against others for trading volume. This model seeks to 
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minimize layers of regulation and compliance costs by centralizing rulemaking and 
enforcement responsibility within one public body. Within the government-led model, 
exchanges’ self-regulatory functions are highly circumscribed, but still include market 
surveillance and basic rulemaking with regard to trading procedures, exchange 
membership, and basic listing requirements. Exchanges’ roles in enforcement are also 
minimal in this model and are typically limited to reporting wrong doing to public 
authorities and/or temporarily suspending trading participants or securities firms while 
more formal public enforcement activities run their course. Issues such as market 
manipulation and insider trading remain the sole purview of public regulators. The 
government-led model also tends to be less politicized than the government dominated 
model since political officials play a much smaller role in exchange governance and 
operation. 
 The limited SRO exchange model is similar to the government led model in that 
public regulatory agencies remain the most powerful rule makers and enforcers, but they 
are more dependent upon exchanges to perform “front-line” supervisory and monitoring 
duties. Exchange rulemaking extends beyond mere operational rules and becomes more 
detailed and demanding particularly with regard to listing, trading, and membership rules. 
Enforcement powers are also augmented under this model, but they remain limited to 
listed companies and trading participants conduct vis-à-vis each other and the exchange. 
This model may also feature dispute resolution procedures for any disagreements that 
emerge on the trading floor. 
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 At the more extreme end of the self-regulatory spectrum lies the strong exchange 
SRO and independent member SRO models. In the former model, government regulators 
are highly dependent upon exchanges to perform “extensive” regulatory functions that 
extend well beyond market surveillance and trading rules. Not only will exchanges 
regulate the behavior of trading participants and members while they are on the exchange 
floor, but strong exchange SROs will also make rules regarding broker-dealers’ internal 
business, compliance, book keeping, and risk management practices; intermediaries’ 
dealings with customers off the exchange; and clearing and settlement. The strongest 
exchange SROs may play dominant roles in the licensing and examination of market 
intermediaries as well as rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement regarding insider 
trading and market manipulation. Strong exchange SROs listing requirements tend to 
move beyond basic issues of financial health and accounting transparency. They can 
include extensive corporate governance requirements with regards to minority 
shareholders, board independence, mergers, block acquisitions of shares, and auditing 
procedures. Some exchanges (e.g. Johannesburg Securities Exchange) are the sole 
authority with regards to prospectus and securities distribution requirements in initial 
public offerings. Enforcement powers are also much stronger and include the ability to 
launch formal investigations with statutorily backed powers to demand testimony, 
documentation, and/or trading data. Disciplinary procedures may take on a quasi-judicial 
flavor that can not only lead to fines, suspension, and expulsion, but also referral to 
criminal prosecutors. Some SROs are so powerful that they enjoy the same immunities 
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from lawsuit that are enjoyed by public regulators and government personnel (e.g. U.S, 
Bahamas, Singapore).  
 The independent member SRO model is very similar to the strong exchange 
model, except the SRO is not a market operator. These non-exchange member SROs are 
typically non-profit, member owned, and have emerged in countries as disparate as the 
United States, Canada, Turkey, Oman, Japan, and Korea. Like exchange SROs, these 
organizations settle disputes between trading members; set membership requirements 
concerning professional training, experience, and financial solvency; punish members for 
violating trading or business conduct rules; and institutionalize off-exchange over-the-
counter trading. In more recent decades, independent SROs have extended their authority 
beyond trading activities into areas such as financial advising, investment fund 
management, and ethical standards for all financial professionals and intermediaries. 
Given the increasingly prominent role of non-exchange trading across electronic 
communication networks and the demutualization of exchanges into for-profit 
corporations, some non-exchange member SROs (e.g. US prior to 2013, Canada, 
Philippines) assume nearly all of the regulatory duties once exercised by exchange 
operators.
43
 
 These models should all be considered ideal types with some countries utilizing 
features from more than one model at the same time or shifting between models 
overtime. Furthermore, some countries have created statutory frameworks for SROs 
                                               
43
 Credit for the SRO types just described belongs largely to Carson (2011) 
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without any SROs actually emerging. Even within models there is variation in the degree 
to which self-regulation is a substitute or complement to public regulatory effort. There is 
also diversity as to  whether self-regulatory power is exercised independently of public 
oversight or under the strict scrutiny of public officials. In light of this complexity, the 
measures outlined below are obviously rudimentary. However, they do provide an 
essential first cut at the evidence regarding the role of industry self-regulation across the 
world’s stock markets.    
Public Ownership of Stock Exchanges 
 Despite their symbolic association with free market capitalism, non-private 
ownership of stock exchanges is widespread throughout the world. During the 1988-2012 
period, roughly 45% of 130 sample countries hosted a stock exchange with some sort of 
non-private ownership.
44
 While the vast majority of the world’s largest and most liquid 
exchanges undoubtedly remained in private hands throughout the period, the number of 
non-purely privately owned exchanges is high and reflects the very active role of the state 
in supporting the diffusion of equity markets across the globe.   
 In order to get a more detailed grasp of global trends in ownership, I created an 
indicator for the world’s major exchanges that measures all three types of non-private 
ownership: 1) direct government ownership; 2) ownership by central banks; and 3) 
ownership by banks or other financial institutions which are themselves controlled by 
state shareholders. Within these three categories, 0 indicates pure private ownership, 1 
                                               
44  During the 1988-2012 period, just under 35% of all country-year observations indicated non-purely-
private exchange ownership.   
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indicates minority non-private ownership, and 2 indicates majority non-private 
ownership. Exchanges that are statutory public institution were automatically given a 2 
under the direct government ownership category. These three categories were then 
summed and truncated at 2 with all scores above 2 being recoded to 2.
45
 The resulting 
public ownership measure, PubOwnTotal, takes on a value of 0 for pure private 
ownership, 1 for minority non-private ownership of any sort, and 2 for majority non-
private ownership of any type OR minority ownership by more than one type of non-
private body.
46
 With this coding, PubOwnTotal’s sample mean is 0.61 and its median is 
0.  
   Several trends become clear from an initial look at the data. First, the number of 
exchanges with non-private ownership has increased as less well developed countries 
have founded exchanges. More formally, there is a negative spearman rank order 
correlation between the measure of non-private ownership and the age of exchanges (ρ≈-
.41). Non-privately owned exchanges are overwhelmingly concentrated in Africa, the 
Middle East, South East Asia, and the former Soviet countries of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia. The most common type of non-private ownership during the 1988 to 2012 
period is direct ownership by government (25% of country year observations) followed 
                                               
45 I initially attempted to utilize an IRT scaling procedure to uncover a latent dimension of non-private 
ownership. However, no measurement model emerged in which the three indicators loaded onto a single 
dimension. Other than the indicator direct government ownership, all others had trivially small 
discrimination parameters.   
46 Since the goal of this analysis is to investigate the impact of exchange politicization, 2 other coding 
schemes were adopted for robustness. Both attempted to weigh the ownership types according to their level 
of politicization. Due to international best practice converging around the norm of central bank 
independence, the central bank category was not given any extra weight.  PubOwnTotal2 multiplied the 
direct government ownership category by 2 before adding the other two categories. PubOwnTotal3 
multiplied the direct government ownership category by 2,  the ownership by government owned financial 
institutions category by 1.5, and left the central bank category  unmodified before the 3 were summed. 
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by indirect ownership via financial institutions controlled by the government (13%), and 
Central Banks (6%). Finally, within country variation in non-private ownership is small 
as compared to the overall variation during the 1988-2012 sample period (within/overall 
std.dev =0.34/0.9). There are only 31 instances in which the overall level of non-private 
ownership increased or decreased. When changes are measured so that alterations in the 
mix of non-private ownership are counted rather than just the overall level, the number of 
changes increases to 48 over the sample period. 
 Below are Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between the ordinal 
ownership measure and different political and macroeconomic variables. 
     Table 5.1       
(Exchange Ownership and Macroeconomic Correlations) 
Trade (%of GDP) .14**
Capital Account Openness -.30**
ln(GDPperCapita) -.23**
Services Value Added (%ofGDP) -.36**
Industry Value Added (%ofGDP) .19**
Agriculture Value Added (%ofGDP) .21**
p<.05*; p<.01**  
Non-private stock ownership exchange ownership has a clear negative rank order 
correlation of a weakly moderate size with economic development. More specifically, 
countries with more tightly regulated capital accounts, less than fully liberalized financial 
sectors, and whose economies are dominated by “old” economic sectors (i.e. industry and 
agriculture) are also more likely to have non-privately owned exchanges. Non-private 
ownership also appears to be more common in non-democratic contexts with spearman 
rank order correlations being -0.40 and -0.32 for electoral competition and political 
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constraint respectively. Not surprisingly, non-private exchange ownership is negatively 
associated with securities market and banking development and has a negative correlation 
with measures of financial sector liberalization and regulatory quality (see below). 
      Table 5.2       
(Exchange Ownership and Financial Development Correlations) 
.
 
Market Capitalization (%GDP) -.24**
Value of Stock Traded (%ofGDP) -.13**
Stock Price Volatility .30**
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector -.16**
Privatization of Bank Sector -0.35**
Stock Market Liberalization (First ADR or Country Fund) -.09*
Overall Financial Liberalization -.31**
p<.05*; p<.01**  
Politicized Exchange Governance 
 When exchanges are owned by non-private actors, these actors also tend to 
exercise influence over exchange management by virtue of their status as block and/or 
controlling shareholders. However, the ability of non-private shareholders to appoint 
board directors is not the only way government officials and regulatory actors can 
directly participate in exchange decision making. More specifically, financial legislation 
in many countries reserve seats on exchange boards of directors for government 
ministers, regulators, and their direct delegates. Other statutes require that exchange 
managers or boards of directors be appointed or approved by political officials or 
regulators. In some contexts, governments appoint “commissioners” to exchange bodies 
that are directly responsible to political officials rather than regulators. These 
commissioners often have the right to participate in board deliberations as well as veto or 
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suspend board decisions. In short, there are a variety of methods that public officials can 
utilize to directly influence exchange governance and operation.
 47
 In order to get a more 
accurate grasp of these methods, I analyzed financial legislation, regulatory orders, and 
exchange annual reports to develop five indicators of exchange politicization.  
 The first indicator (exOfficioGov) measures whether politicians or their direct 
delegates sit on exchange boards. The indicator is scored on a 0,1,2 scale with 0 
indicating multiple government officials/delegates, 1 indicating a single government 
official/delegate, and 2 indicating the absence of any government officials/delegates 
within organs of exchange decision making. The second indicator (exOfficioReg) is 
identical to exOfficioGov except the presence of securities regulators or central bankers 
is measured on the 0-2 scale. The third indicator measures the presence of board 
members appointed by state-owned financial institutions and takes on the same 0-2 scale 
as the exOfficio indicators. The last two indicators measure both the ability of 
government or regulators to appoint board members (who are not their 
delegates/representatives) and their ability to approve the appointments of exchange 
shareholders or members. The two indicators, GovAptApv and RegAptApv, are coded so 
that 0 indicates the presence multiple appointments, 1 a single appointment, 2 approval 
power over shareholder/member appointments, and 3 no appointment or approval power. 
 An initial glance at the data suggest that like non-private exchange ownership, 
politicized exchange governance is concentrated in the Middle East, North Africa, South 
                                               
47
 I include Central Bankers under the category of regulators  
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East Asia, and former Soviet countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Across 131 
countries during the 1988-2012 period, 78 countries had some form of non-private 
participation in exchange governance. Overall, there is relative stability in exchange 
governance politicization. During the 1988-2012 period, there were just over 90 changes 
to the mix of government and regulatory officials and appointees within exchange 
governance. As new exchanges were founded in countries of the former Soviet Union 
during the 1990s, the global level of exchange politicization briefly increased. However, 
this brief increase was reversed as the role of government owned commercial banks and 
financial SOEs declined within many Eastern European and Central Asian exchanges 
(see Appendix V(b) for review of non-private ownership and politicized exchange 
governance). 
 In order to measure overall levels of politicization, I once again utilized a 
marginal maximum likelihood (MML) two-parameter graded response model to extract a 
latent dimension of exchange governance (de)politicization from my five indicators. As 
previously discussed in Chapter 3, the choice of MML estimation rather than a Bayesian 
approach is not without consequences. As compared to my independence measure that 
had a large number of statutory test items, my politicization measure has only five 
indicators. This fewer number of indicators does make a Bayesian approach more 
appealing in terms of the accuracy of latent scores (Kieftenbeld and Natesan 2012). 
However, according to simulations conducted by Lautenschlager et al. (2006) and 
Kieftenbeld and Natesan ( 2012), MML graded response models still perform reasonably 
well in terms of parameter recovery (as compared to Bayesian models) as long as sample 
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sizes exceed 300 and the number of indicators in no fewer than five. Since my final 
measure of depoliticized exchange governance and/or self-regulation meets or exceeds 
both of these rules of thumb, I will continue with a MML approach in the name of 
consistency.  
 In line with the coding outlined above, higher latent scores indicate a smaller role 
for public officials and appointees in exchange governance. For obvious reasons, I expect 
the presence of government officials on exchange boards to be the most politicizing and 
discriminatory. I expect the presence of regulators or central bankers on exchange boards 
to be the second most discriminatory in terms of politicization. I have this expectation 
because they are appointed to their posts by politicians, are often charged with supporting 
government policies, and enjoy only imperfect protection from political interference.
48
 
For comparable reasons, I expect the government appointees indicator to have a similar 
level of discriminatory power. Finally, I expect the regulatory appointee and government 
owned financial institution indicators to be the least discriminatory in terms of latent 
politicization because both groups are an added layer of delegation removed from 
political officials. Of the two, I expect the appointees of regulators to be the least 
politicizing since they are often appointed as “public interest” or “independent” directors 
rather than as delegates or representatives of government actors. In contrast, appointees 
                                               
48 The severity of this “imperfection” should correspond to the varying levels of formal political 
independence enjoyed by regulatory organizations and central bankers. Less independent regulatory 
officials will likely politicize exchange governance to a greater degree than more independent regulatory 
officials.   
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of government owned financial institutions are directly responsible to actors who 
themselves have legally binding fiduciary duties to government shareholders. 
 Overall, the modified factor loadings (i.e. discrimination parameters) largely fall 
in line with expectations. Indicators measuring the presence of politicians and regulators 
on boards of directors were the most discriminatory while indicators measuring actors 
who were an added layer of delegation removed from politicians were the least 
discriminatory. However, the regulator appointment/approval indicator (RegAptApv) 
performed poorly. Not only did it possess a discrimination parameter and modified factor 
loading that was of negligible size according to convention, but its discrimination 
parameter was also negative. As a result, the RegAptApv indicator was dropped and the 
graded response model was reestimated. The reestimated model produced very similar 
results.   
       Table 5.3        
(Exchange Governance Factor Loadings) 
With Regulator Appointment and Approval 
Government Board Members/Delegates  0.99
Regulator Board Members/Delegates  0.717
Government Owned Bank Appointees  0.326
Government Appointees    0.574
Regulator Appointment/Approval   -0.235
   Modified Factor Loadings
 
Without Regulator Appointment and Approval 
Government Board Members/Delegates  
Regulator Board Members/Delegates  
Government Owned Bank Appointees  
Government Appointees    
0.982
0.732
0.365
0.587
   Modified Factor Loadings
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 In order to ease interpretation in future analyses, I max-min normalized exchange 
governance depoliticization latent trait scores onto a [0,1] interval so that 0 corresponds 
to the maximum level of politicization within the sample and 1 corresponds to complete 
freedom from direct public governance. Overall, the average exchange’s decision making 
body was relatively free from political influence (µ=0.8) and the level of variation within 
countries was minimal (within/overall std.dev = 0.11/0.28).  Exchange governance 
depoliticization has gradually increased overtime from an average of 0.74 in 1988 to 0.85 
in 2012. 
 In comparison to exchange ownership, the positive correlations between 
governance depoliticization on the one hand and overall economic development and 
democracy on the other are somewhat weaker. Veto players and electoral competition 
have Pearson correlations with exchange governance of 0.38 and 0.21 respectively. In 
terms of financial sector outcomes, the depoliticization of exchange governance is only 
very weakly correlated with stock market development and measures of financial 
liberalization.    
     Table 5.4       
(Exchange Governance Correlations) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.04*
Capital Account Openness .16**
Trade (%ofGDP) -.08**
Services Value Added (%of GDP) .14**
Industry Value Added (%of GDP) -.10**
Agriculature Value Added (%of GDP) -.07**
p<.05*, p<.01**  
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Self-Regulatory Statutes and Organizations 
 In contrast to exchange ownership and governance, measuring the importance of 
self-regulation is less straight forward. Nearly every stock exchange in existence has at 
least some basic self-regulatory powers and nearly every securities market regulatory 
framework gives stock exchanges the right to make and enforce rules. However, what is 
more important for my purposes is the degree to which politicians explicitly promote or 
sanction self-regulation within financial statutes. This conceptual issue is analogous to 
issues raised by public regulatory independence. Most regulatory agencies are 
organizationally separate from ministries of finance. However, when measuring their 
formal protections from political interference, many experts view references to agency 
“independence” or “autonomy” within financial statutes as a clear indication that 
lawmakers intend for an agency to act independently. I view statutory references to “self-
regulation” in a similar way. Explicit references to “self-regulation” within financial 
legislation serves as a clear indicator of government actors’ willingness to delegate 
regulatory authority to non-public actors. Obviously, an ideal measure would track the 
specific areas of rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement that were delegated, but this 
ideal would be difficult to achieve for the reasons outlined earlier. In lieu of this ideal, I 
construct an indicator that encompasses both the degree to which statutes facilitate and/or 
mandate self-regulation and the actual presence of self-regulatory organizations within a 
particular country’s securities industry. With this in mind, I developed the following scale 
of self-regulatory intensity: 
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0--A full securities market regulatory framework exists, but there is no mention of self-
regulation anywhere within the framework.  
1—A fully private stock exchange operates in an environment in which there is no 
securities market regulatory framework and is therefore self-regulatory by default.  
OR  
1--A securities market framework exists and there is a brief mention or passing reference 
to self-regulation within financial statutes. Stock exchanges may be recognized as self-
regulatory, but a full self-regulatory statutory framework is absent from financial 
legislation. 
2--A full SRO statute exists, but no exchange or broker dealer association has officially 
been designated as an SRO under the statute by public authorities. An SRO statute is 
considered “full” when it 1) outlines the process by which an exchange or broker-dealer 
association receives recognition as an SRO; 2) it describes SROs’ obligations vis-à-vis 
the public, the government, regulators, and its members; 3) it outlines SROs rulemaking 
and enforcement powers; 4) Explicitly describes how the government and/or securities 
market regulator conducts oversight of officially designated SROs 
OR: 
2--A statutory framework exists for securities markets and there is no explicit mention of 
“self-regulation” within the statutory framework, but a non-government dominated 
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exchange is explicitly delegated extensive regulatory powers over market participants 
and/or listed companies.
49
   
3--Exchanges and/or broker dealer associations are explicitly designated as Self-
Regulatory Organizations by statute or regulatory order.  
OR 
3--A statute mandates the creation of a broker dealer association that exercises self-
regulatory power, the association comes into existence, and it is recognized as fulfilling 
its mandate.
50
  
 Overall, just over 55 countries have non-zero scores on the SRO indicator. Only 
25 countries have or did have exchanges that are/were officially designated as SROs 
according to statute or regulatory order during the 1988-2012 period. 18 additional 
countries have or had officially designated non-exchange member based SROs. The 
remaining 12 countries’ regulatory regimes have either a) private exchanges operating 
without a formal securities market regulatory framework (scored 1), b) non-government 
                                               
49 For example, from 2001 until 2009, the Australian Exchange was not only charged with enforcing 
compliance with its own business rules, but it was also charged with enforcing public licensing 
requirements. In addition it was tasked with enforcing as all of the statutes within the “Securities” chapter 
of the Corporations Act of 2001. Bursa Malaysia, Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the Singapore 
Exchange also received a score of 2 during particular country years due to their extensive exercise of 
delegated regulatory power in the absence of an official SRO designation.  
50 This is the case in Turkey, Oman, Sudan, and Iran. In Turkey, the Borsa Istanbul is not considered an 
SRO and operates within a regulatory regime dominated by a public regulator. However, securities statutes 
mandate the creation of the Turkish Capital Market Intermediaries Association and the association 
exercises extensive self-regulatory powers over its members. Both the Muscat Securities Exchange and the 
Khartoum Securities exchanges are government dominated but both countries securities laws mandate the 
creation of broker dealer associations charged with developing and enforcing membership rules as well as 
enforcing members’ compliance with securities laws and ethical codes. A similar government mandated 
broker-dealer association exists in Iran.   
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exchanges exercising extensive delegated regulatory power without SRO designation 
(scored 2), c)  full SRO statutes but no exchanges or industry associations falling under 
their purview (scored 2), or d) possess statutes that merely mentions self-regulation 
(scored 1).  A full description of all countries with non-zero scores can be found in the 
Appendix V.   
 While nearly all exchanges exercise some self-regulatory power, officially 
sanctioned self-regulation is rare with the average SRO score during the 1988-2012 
period being 0.9. The median country received a score of 1.  The average exhibits little 
change with only a slight uptick beginning in the mid-1990s (see Figure 5.1). Overall and 
within country variation across the sample is also muted with overall and within standard 
deviations of 1.25 and 0.65 respectively.   
Figure 5.1 
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 Geographically, self-regulation (i.e. non-0 scores) is largely concentrated in North 
America (Canada, US), Asia (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) 
and to an increasing extent Latin America and the Caribbean (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, 
Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominican Republic, Barbados, Bahamas, and formerly 
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Argentina). Self-regulatory arrangements within securities markets are the rarest in 
Western Europe. A review of Spearman’s rank order correlations between the SRO 
variable on the one hand and electoral competition and veto players on the other yields no 
meaningful correlations. Self-regulation does appear to have a modest positive 
correlation with measures of stock market development and liberalization 
          Table 5.5       
(Self-Regulation and Financial Development Correlations) 
Market Capitalization (% of GDP) .16**
Value Traded (% of GDP) .15**
Stock Price Volatility 0
Domestic Credit Provided by Financial Sector  (% of GDP) -.02
Privatization of Bank Sector .15**
Stock Market Liberalization (First ADR or Country Fund) .12**
Overall Financial Liberalization -0.03
p<.05*, p<.01**  
Global leadership in terms of securities markets also appears to have little relationship 
with self-regulatory intensity. The world’s ten largest exchanges by market capitalization 
are located in nine regulatory jurisdictions. Of these nine jurisdictions, four rely 
extensively on self-regulatory arrangements (United States, Canada, Japan, and Brazil) 
while four do not (Germany, Australia, Hong Kong, United Kingdom).   
Combined Indicator: DSRO 
 To reiterate the argument of Chapter 2, politicians often have difficulty credibly 
committing to investor protection and market integrity. In order to overcome this 
commitment problem, they often delegate regulatory power to public agencies. The 
findings of previous chapters suggest that this delegation is effective in terms of 
credibility and these credibility effects increase with political independence. The same 
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should hold true for stock exchanges and broker dealer associations. Delegation to stock 
exchanges and other industry actors should only be credibility enhancing to the degree 
that they are actually private actors (i.e. not government dominated) and are free from 
politicized governance. Therefore, an accurate measure of self-regulation should take into 
account both the intensity with which self-regulatory practices are explicitly promoted by 
the state via statute and the role of politicians and other public regulators in operating 
market infrastructures. Only by measuring both traits can researchers understand the 
degree to which the securities markets of the world are privately self-regulated.  This 
section will combine the four indicators of politicized exchange governance with my 
ordinal measure of self-regulation to create a composite measure of private and 
depoliticized self-regulation or DSRO. 
 The DSRO measure is composed of the following indicators: 1) government board 
members/delegates on exchange boards, 2) regulator board members/delegates on 
exchange boards, 3) appointees of state owned financial institutions on exchange boards, 
4) government appointments to or approval power over exchange boards, and 5) the 
ordinal SRO intensity indicator.
51
 As before, I estimate a graded response model in order 
to measure regulatory jurisdictions’ latent levels of depoliticized self-regulation. I then 
min-max normalized country-year latent scores onto a 0-1 scale in order to produce an 
                                               
51
 The ownership measures were excluded from the graded response models because they lack 
independence from the Government Appointee and Government Owned Bank Appointee indicators. The 
inclusion of indicators with axiomatic dependence could bias estimates of discrimination parameters and 
factor scores.  
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easily interpretable composite measure of private and apolitical self-regulation (DSRO).
52
 
Once again, a score of 0 corresponds to highest level of political domination in the 
sample. 1 corresponds to the highest level of depoliticized private self-regulation (DSRO) 
and would characterize a country with no political or regulatory appointments on the 
stock exchange board, a full SRO statute, and an SRO recognized under that statute. 
Countries with no SRO statute but fully depoliticized exchange boards (e.g. most of 
contemporary Western Europe) have scores of 0.80 or greater.  Modified factor loadings 
and descriptive statistics can be seen below.  
 
       Table 5.6       
(DSRO Factor Loadings) 
Government Board Members/Delgates 0.99
Regulator Board Members/Delegates 0.7
Government Owned Bank Appointees 0.33
Government Appointees/Approval 0.6
0.47
Modified Factor Loadings
SRO Intensity  
 
 As with its two component indicators, DSRO is slowly moving with only 120 
changes across the world during the 1988-2012 period. Most changes occurred from the 
                                               
52
 The normalization was calculated in the following way: (DSRO - DSRO(minimum))/(DSRO (maximum) - 
DSRO(minimum)). In order to ensure that middle category inflation does not throw off inferences. All analyses 
in this chapter were reestimated with raw scores of DSRO and DSRO z-standardized (DSRO- DSRO(sample 
µ))/std.dev(DSRO in sample). Qualitative findings were left unchanged and p-values were very similar.   
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mid-1990s until the early 2000s (Figure 5.2b). Overall, DSRO is gradually increasing 
over the sample period (Figure 5.2a). 
      Figure 5.2       
(DSRO Global Trends) 
         (a)                                                             (b) 
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 Pairwise correlations suggest a moderately strong association between 
depoliticized self-regulation on the one hand and democracy on the other. DSROs 
pairwise correlations with political constraint and electoral competition are 0.25 and 0.44 
respectively.    
Depoliticized Self-Regulation and Stock Market Development and Performance 
 Now that I have a measure of depoliticized self-regulation (DSRO) across the 
world’s securities markets, I can answer a similar question to the one posed in Chapter 3: 
To what extent is state sanctioned depoliticized self-regulation associated with stock 
market development in general and market performance more specifically? If delegation 
of regulatory power to independent public regulators mitigates politicians’ credibility 
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problems vis-à-vis minority shareholders and retail investors, delegation to depoliticized 
private regulatory organizations could be similarly credibility enhancing. As in previous 
chapters, overall stock market development will be measured in terms of the natural 
logarithm of stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. National market 
performance is measured as annual percentage price changes in stock markets covered by 
the S&P/IFCI and S&P/Frontier BMI country indices. The remainder of this chapter will 
investigate the following closely related hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Ia: There is a positive association between depoliticized self-regulation and 
stock market development measured in terms of market capitalization as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Hypothesis Ib: There is a positive association between the extent of depoliticized self-
regulation and stock market performance measured as price growth in national market 
indices.   
Hypothesis II: The previously demonstrated positive association between public 
regulatory independence and stock market size will remain even after controlling for self-
regulatory practices. 
 In addition to these hypotheses, I will investigate whether any positive association 
between self-regulation and stock market development is larger when political 
institutions undermine politicians’ credibility. More specifically, I will test the following: 
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Hypothesis III: the association between DSRO and market capitalization will grow 
stronger as veto players become fewer in number and elections more majoritarian.  
In light of the Chinese experience, I will investigate whether the positive effects of self-
regulation can only emerge in contexts where leaders are held accountable through 
electoral competition.  
Hypothesis IV: The positive effects of self-regulation on market capitalization will only 
emerge when elections are minimally competitive.  
As before, I will utilize fixed effects estimators with Huber/White standard errors 
clustered by country. Models will include a lagged dependent variable and will be 
variations on the following equation: 
Yit = γYit-1+ αi + β1*Pit + β2*Xit + εit 
The dependent variable Yit represents stock market capitalization/GDP for country i in 
year t and Yit-1 is the same dependent variable lagged by one year. The vector Pit contains 
my measures of consensual political institutions, competing political controls, and my 
measures of depoliticized self-regulation and public regulatory independence. Xit 
contains macroeconomic controls. β1, β2,
 
 and γ are vectors of estimated coefficients. αi 
are country dummies and εit is the remaining error. Given the coefficients for lagged 
market capitalization are roughly 0.63 and the average panel lengths are between 16 and 
17, the lagged dependent variable will be downwardly biased by approximately 0.10.  
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Once again, in order to ensure that my inferences are not faulty, Blundel-Bond, Prais-
Winsten, and Cochrane-Orcutt models will be estimated for robustness. Estimations of 
stock index price growth will be identical to the market capitalization models above but 
without a lag of the dependent variable.  
Analysis 
 An initial series of models begins with DSRO alone and then adds additional 
macro-economic controls (see Table 5.12A). Results lend some support to Hypothesis I, 
but DSRO’s coefficient declines in both strength and significance as macroeconomic 
controls are added. When estimated alone with only a lagged DV, a change from 
minimum to maximum levels of depoliticized self-regulation is associated with a 
statistically significant 27 percent contemporaneous increase in stock market size and an 
even larger long-run multiplier of around 80 percent. However, when controls move 
beyond economic development and growth, DSRO loses significance at conventional 
levels and suggest that a maximum increase would result in only 17 to 21 percent 
contemporaneous increases in stock market size. The importance of DSRO for capital 
market development becomes clearer with the addition of political controls (see Table 
5.13A). Although a control for electoral competition does little in terms of increasing the 
magnitude of DSROs coefficient relative to its standard errors, the addition of political 
constraint and checks pushes DSRO into more forgiving levels of significance (p≈0.10). 
More dramatically, when electoral proportionality is controlled for, DSRO is once again 
associated with a nearly 27 percent increase in stock market size. This is equivalent to 
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roughly half of the overall and over 70 percent of the within standard deviation in market 
capitalization to GDP. In sum, there does appear to be a statically significant positive 
relationship between depoliticized self-regulation and stock market size, but the 
significance of this relationship is dependent upon the inclusion of veto player and 
electoral proportionality controls. 
 In the dynamic LSDV models below, I introduce a control for public regulatory 
independence and DSRO’s effects are sensitive to its inclusion (see Table 5.7). In 
contrast, regulatory independence’s coefficients are largely unaffected by DSRO. When 
both variables are included in the same models along with veto player and 
macroeconomic controls, it is regulatory independence that emerges as statistically 
significant while DSRO’s p-values inflate to over 0.21. 
 Overall, DSRO performs better with the addition of an electoral proportionality 
control. When proportionality is included, DSRO returns to conventional levels of 
significance (p<.05) and its coefficient becomes roughly two times larger than the 
coefficient for public regulatory independence (Models 4 and 6). In light of these 
findings, Hypothesis I(a) and Hypothesis II are generally supported. Public regulatory 
independence continues to be significantly related to stock market size even after 
controlling for self-regulation, but the latter is associated with increases in stock market 
size that are 20 to 30 percent larger.
53
 
 
                                               
53 Similar to the findings regarding regulatory independence in Chapter 3, neither DSRO or independence 
were robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects. 
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     TABLE 5.7      
 (DSRO: Market Capitalization) 
DV: ln(MarketCap) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.63*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
Depoliticized Self- 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.19** 0.11 0.21** 
Regulation (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
Electoral 
Competition 
 -0.007 
(0.01) 
    
       
Political Constraint   0.19**   0.16* 
   (0.07)   (0.08) 
Electoral     0.10***  0.10*** 
Proportionality    (0.03)  (0.03) 
General Government      -0.01**  
Consumption     (0.006)  
GDP Growth 0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.30*** 0.36*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Capital Account 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 
Openness (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank Crisis -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
ln(Inflation) 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.001    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
∆All World  0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
Stock Index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.96** -0.91** -1.09*** -0.90** -0.58 -1.02** 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39) 
       
Observations 1,730 1,722 1,722 1,689 1,829 1,688 
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.70 
Overall R2 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.80 
Number of countries 107 106 106 102 109 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
  
 Given the sensitivity of these results to the addition or subtraction of particular 
control variables and the threat of Nickel bias in the presence of a lagged dependent 
 228 
 
variable, I reestimated the models with two different GMM estimators (Table 5.8), a 
Prais-Winsten fixed effects estimator (Models 1-3, Table 5.14A), and a Cochrane Orcutt 
random effects estimator (Models 4-6, Table 5.14A). The two GMM estimators are 
closely related: Models 1-3 utilize the estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
while models 4-6 are nearly identical to the first three models but with added level 
equation instruments in the form of lagged differences of market capitalization (Arellano 
and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). Tests for serial correlation in the errors at 
orders higher than one came back negative suggesting that moment conditions of both 
sets of models are valid with only a one year lag of the dependent variable. 
 Models 1-3 tell a very similar story to Table 5.7. Although the size of the DSRO 
coefficients is sometimes larger, only regulatory independence is significant at 
conventional levels. Coefficients for regulator independence suggest a minimum to 
maximum increase would result in a 20 to 25 percent contemporaneous increase in stock 
market size (Models 1-3). As before, the size of regulatory independence’s coefficient 
decreases but remains marginally significant with the introduction of a control for 
electoral proportionality (Model 2). When lagged differences of the dependent variable 
were included as instruments, regulatory independence fares poorly in terms of both 
coefficient size and conventional significance (Models 4-6). Independence’s coefficients 
roughly resemble those in Table 5.7, but the addition of a control for electoral 
proportionality cuts their magnitude by over half (Model 5). In contrast to Arellano-Bond 
estimations (Models 1-3;Table 5.8), Blundell-Bond estimations produced  DSRO  
coefficients that were very large in magnitude and significant beyond conventional levels. 
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Maximum increases in self-regulation are associated with contemporaneous increases in 
market size of between 39 to 58 percent (Models 4-6;Table 5.8). As before, the largest 
increases in DSRO effects and decreases in regulatory independence effects emerged 
when a control for electoral proportionality was included. 
                  Table 5.8       
 (DSRO: Market Capitalization(GMM)) 
DV:ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization per 
Capita) 
Arellano
-Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell
-Bond 
Blundell
-Bond 
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.46*** 
(0.06) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.06) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
0.64*** 
(0.05) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
Depoliticized Self- 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.38** 0.58*** 0.40** 
Regulation (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.19) 
Regulatory  0.24** 0.21* 0.25** 0.13 0.05 0.13 
Independence (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
       
Electoral  0.01   0.01   
Competition (0.01)   (0.01)   
       
Electoral   0.05   0.04  
Proportionality  (0.04)   (0.04)  
Political Constraint   0.31***   0.29*** 
   (0.12)   (0.11) 
GDP Growth 0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.03 0.004 0.04 0.004 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.75*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Capital Account 0.34*** 0.23** 0.34*** 0.20* 0.14 0.20* 
Openness (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Bank Crisis -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.15*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
∆All World Stock 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 
Index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -2.26*** -2.13*** -2.48*** -0.95* -0.93* -1.06** 
 (0.75) (0.73) (0.77) (0.51) (0.49) (0.51) 
       
Observations 1,725 1,574 1,723 1,846 1,689 1,845 
Number of countries 107 99 107 108 102 108 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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 Overall, results are mixed depending upon which GMM estimator is utilized. 
Models 1-3 give strong support to Hypothesis II (i.e. positive association between 
independence and market size after controlling for DSRO) but only weak support for 
Hypothesis I(a) (i.e. positive association between DSRO and market size). In contrast, 
Models 4-6 give very strong support for Hypothesis I(a) and weaker support for 
Hypothesis II.  In a final attempt to settle whether DSRO and regulatory independence are 
both significantly related to larger stock markets, I estimated a series of Prais-Winsten 
fixed effects and Cochrane-Orcutt random effects models with common AR(1) 
disturbance terms (Table 5.14A). As before, both DSRO and public regulatory 
independence appear to be positively associated with stock market size with the former 
association being larger in magnitude. That said, the coefficients of both variables were 
inconsistent in terms of conventional significance within the fixed effect Prais-Winsten 
models (Models 1-3). In the Cochrane-Orcutt estimations, both variables were significant 
at conventional levels and also had stable positive coefficients.  
 Despite sensitivities to estimation approaches and controls, the whole of the 
evidence supports Hypothesis 1(a) and Hypothesis II. Both depoliticized self-regulation 
and regulatory independence are positively related to stock market size even when both 
are included in the same estimation. While the effects of DSRO are typically larger, 
regulatory independence is generally more robust to alternative specifications and control 
variables.  
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 Across several different estimators, coefficients appeared highly sensitive to the 
inclusion of electoral proportionality. The statistical significance and magnitude of 
depoliticized self-regulation is particularly affected by its inclusion. There are two 
possibilities as to why this is the case. First, the inclusion of the proportionality measure 
involves the exclusion of all countries without meaningful electoral institutions and it 
may be this exclusion of autocracies that is behind the sensitivity. Second, like public 
independence, DSRO could be genuinely sensitive to the different levels of 
proportionality in electoral institutions. In order to directly probe this sensitivity, I 
estimated a series of models in which I interact DSRO with my combined executive-
legislative electoral competition index (Table 5.9) and my measure of electoral 
proportionality (Table 5.10).  
 The results below provide support for Hypothesis IV and suggest that the positive 
effects of depoliticized self-regulation are highly dependent upon the existence of 
meaningful electoral competition. Excluding model 3 which includes the control for 
proportionality, the positive interaction effects are all significant at p-values between 
0.014 and 0.097. The positive and significant interaction effects are robust to all 
macroeconomic control variables, both veto player measures, year fixed effects, static 
reestimation (not shown), and both GMM estimators (Table 5.15A). 
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     Table 5.9        
(DSRO-Electoral Competition Interaction: Market Cap) 
DV:ln(Market (1) (2) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
      
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.63*** 
(0.03) 
0.63*** 
(0.03) 
0.63*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
Depoliticized Self- -0.07 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 -0.19 
Regulation (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17) 
Electoral  -0.02* -0.02* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03 -0.037*** 
Competitiveness (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
       
Self-Regulation X. 
Electoral Competition 
0.031** 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.016) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
       
Regulatory    0.12** 0.07 0.09* 0.11* 
Independence   (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Political Constraint   0.25*** 0.28*** 0.18** 0.25*** 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Electoral      0.100***  
Proportionality     (0.027)  
General Government      -0.014** 
Consumption      (0.006) 
GDP Growth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Capital Account 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 
Openness (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank Crisis  -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
∆All World Stock 0.29***  0.29***  0.29*** 0.29*** 
Index (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.34 -0.04 -0.66 -0.09 -0.75 -0.41 
 (0.33) (0.66) (0.40) (0.67) (0.45) (0.39) 
       
Observations 1,948 1,859 1,845 1,845 1,688 1,818 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.68 
Overall R2 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.80 0.83 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Number of countries 108 108 108 108 102 108 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
  
 233 
 
Figure 5.3 provides a graphical representation of DSRO’s increasing marginal effects as 
electoral competition increases.  
Figure 5.3 
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Model 1 Table 5.9 Controls at Means  
 Using Model 1 as a guide and holding all variables at their means, the positive 
effects of self-regulation are only statistically distinguishable from 0 at electoral 
competition levels of 9 and above. This suggests that in order for DSRO to have 
significant positive effects, multiple political parties must be legally allowed to compete 
in both executive and legislative elections. However, DSRO’s positive effects would still 
exist even if 1 political party garnered larger than 75 percent of the vote in both executive 
and legislative elections. As countries move toward a situation in which no party exceeds 
a 75 percent vote share (i.e. 12), the marginal effect of a maximum increase in 
depoliticized self-regulation increases to around 30 percent.   
 Disregarding confidence intervals, Figure 1 indicates that DSRO’s effects will 
only be positive in countries where any elections are held even if those elections only 
feature one candidate or have only one party with multiple candidates. In order to see if it 
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was executive or legislative competition that was driving the relationship, I reran the 
analyses of Table 5.9 with the executive and legislative electoral competition 
subcomponents. The executive-SRO interaction failed to reach even more forgiving 
levels of significance with p values ranging between 0.145 and 0.330. In contrast, p-
values for the legislative competition subcomponent were routinely significant at 
conventional levels with p-values ranging between 0.004 and 0.07. In short, the 
depoliticization of self-regulation is most meaningful for market development when there 
is some semblance, no matter how limited, of legislative electoral competition. This lends 
further support for Gehlbach and Keefer (2011) as well as Jensen et. al’s (2013) 
respective findings regarding the importance of ruling party institutionalization and 
authoritarian legislatures for financial development. 
 Given the importance of electoral institutions mere existence, I estimated a series 
of regressions to see if the type of electoral competition mattered. Like regulatory 
independence, I expect delegation to depoliticized self-regulatory organizations to be the 
most credibility enhancing when electoral institutions are majoritarian rather than 
proportional (i.e. Hypotheses III). Results provide some support for this assertion. The 
positive effects of DSRO on stock market size are larger in countries with majoritarian 
rather than proportional elections. Table 5.10 below suggests that this relationship is 
weakened by public regulatory independence (Model 3) and strengthened by year fixed 
effects (Models 2 and 5). Overall, p-values for the interaction term range from 0.03 to 
0.14.  
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        Table 5.10      
 (DSRO-Proportionality Interaction: Market Cap) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
      
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.63*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.63*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
Depoliticized 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
Self-Regulation (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Electoral  0.17*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
Proportionality (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Self-regulation X -0.09* -0.10** -0.07 -0.09* -0.10** -0.07 
Proportionality (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
GDP Growth 0.007** 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Regulatory    0.10**   0.07 
Independence   (0.05)   (0.04) 
Political C    0.18** 0.22** 0.17** 
onstraint    (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
General Government      -0.01** 
Consumption      (0.005) 
       
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.35*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Capital Account  0.26*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
Openness (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank Crisis -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 
 (0.036) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
∆All World Stock 0.28***  0.28*** 0.28***  0.29*** 
Index (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Constant -1.06*** -0.32 -0.95** -1.18*** -0.36 -0.93** 
 (0.36) (0.69) (0.37) (0.37) (0.68) (0.39) 
       
Observations 1,702 1,702 1,689 1,701 1,701 1,664 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 
Overall R2 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.81 
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Number of countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
Based upon Model 1, Figure 5.4 below presents the marginal effects of DSRO across 
levels of proportionality with all control variables held at their means. While DSRO has 
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positive marginal effects across all electoral institutions, those effects are only 
distinguishable from 0 in countries where electoral institutions are more majoritarian than 
they are proportional. 
Figure 5.4 
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Using main effects as a guide, maximum increases in depoliticized self-regulation would 
result in market size increases of between 22 and 34 percent when elections are purely 
majoritarian. The main effects are also notable in another way. They highlight the power 
of proportional representation in easing investors’ concerns with market integrity. Even if 
stock market governance were completely dominated by politicians, regulators, and their 
appointees, a maximum 0 to 3 increase in proportionality would result in at least a 45 
percent increase in stock market size even after controlling for public regulatory 
independence, political constraint, and government consumption’s share of the economy. 
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 Despite the apparent strength of evidence in favor of Hypothesis III, they should 
be treated with caution.
54
 The interaction effects in Table 5.10 disappear in both static 
and GMM reestimations. In static estimations the interaction effect maintains a negative 
sign, but falls short of significance with p-values ranging from 0.124 to 0.252. The 
interaction effects in GMM models are even weaker; coefficients are positive and have 
standard errors that are often three times their size. Furthermore, I probed the interaction 
between veto-players and DSRO. Regardless of chosen estimator, veto-players measure, 
included controls, or static versus dynamic modeling, there is no evidence suggesting that 
the effects of DSRO change across veto players. P-values were large (>0.24),unstable, 
and inconsistent in sign (not shown). Overall, Hypothesis III receives only tentative 
support with regard to electoral institutions and no support with regards to veto players. 
 The results of the previous section suggested that self-regulation had large 
positive effects on stock market size even after controlling for the effects of political 
institutions. The results of Table 5.16A suggest a similar relationship to stock index price 
growth. Across all political controls, DSRO is positive and significant lending some 
support to Hypothesis I(b). Varying only slightly from model to model, a maximum 0 to 
1 increase in self-regulation is associated with roughly 30 percent additional annual price 
growth (Table 5.16A). That is over twice the size of the between country standard 
deviation and around 65 percent of the within and overall standard deviations. Only when 
                                               
54 When the electoral proportionality variable is transformed into a dummy variable that takes on a value of 
1 for all countries that are not overwhelmingly majoritarian (e.g. .1= all scores greater than .05), interaction 
effects were negatively signed and had p-values ranging from 0.038 to 0.20. 
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all political institutional controls are added together does DSRO drift into insignificance 
(p=0.2).  
 However, the addition of regulatory independence reduces DSROs coefficient by 
around 25 percent (see Table 5.11 below). When both independence and DSRO are 
included, maximum increases in both variables are associated with roughly 18 and 24 
percent added price growth respectively. When both regulatory measures are estimated 
with all political control variables, only regulatory independence is robust at levels 
approaching conventional significance (Model 6, p=.09).  
 Support for Hypothesis 1(b) is weakened when year fixed effects are introduced. 
Only regulatory independence remains significant at conventional levels and its 
coefficients remain relatively unchanged. In contrast, year fixed effects reduces DSRO 
coefficients by 50 to 75 percent and p-values increase to well above 0.4 (not shown). In 
short, two way fixed effect models suggest that it is regulatory independence rather than 
self-regulation that is the larger and more consistent driver of annual stock index price 
increases.
55
 
 
 
 
                                               
55 I also investigate if there were any interaction effects between DSRO and political institutions with 
regard to index price growth.  No interactive relationships were detected. Interaction coefficients were 
small, standard errors large, and signs inconsistent.  
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       Table 5.11        
(DSRO and %∆S&P Index) 
DV:%∆S&P Price  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Index       
Depoliticized  22.88** 22.8** 22.7** 24.5** 23.0** 12.4 
Self-Regulation (10.30) (10.2) (10.2) (10.6) (10.8) (13.0) 
Regulatory  19.11*** 18.4** 19.42*** 19.10*** 16.54** 16.94* 
Independence (7.09) (7.28) (7.11) (7.17) (7.74) (10.1) 
Electoral   -1.35    -0.61 
Competition  (2.12)    (3.42) 
Political    -16.2   -15.5 
Constraint   (13.6)   (12.1) 
Checks    0.16   
    (1.05)   
Electoral      5.11 5.13** 
Competition     (3.1) (2.5) 
General Government      -4.35 
Consumption      (4.96) 
GDP Growth 0.64* 0.67* 0.66* 0.65* 0.63 0.18 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.60) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -2.94 -2.58 -3.19 -2.76 -2.27 -1.23 
 (3.21) (3.28) (3.21) (3.22) (3.36) (4.31) 
ln(Trade) 22.0** 21.9** 20.8** 22.2** 23.8** 21.8* 
 (10.3) (10.3) (10.2) (10.4) (10.8) (12.4) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
-8.2 
(11.4) 
-8.7 
(11.5) 
-8.23 
(11.4) 
-8.38 
(11.5) 
-5.53 
(12.8) 
-10.4 
(13.8) 
       
Bank Crisis -24.0*** 
(4.92) 
-24.0*** 
(4.94) 
-23.6*** 
(4.88) 
-24.1*** 
(4.96) 
-24.1*** 
(5.09) 
-21.3*** 
(4.72) 
       
ln(Inflation) 1.73 1.86 2.05 1.88 2.82 0.74 
 (5.75) (5.82) (5.82) (5.78) (6.93) (4.36) 
∆All World  35.7*** 35.7*** 35.6*** 35.6*** 36.4*** 37.0*** 
Stock Index (2.51) (2.49) (2.49) (2.50) (2.81) (2.90) 
Constant -84.5** -71.6 -71.6* -88.5** -108.3** -7.12 
 (40.0) (45.8) (40.1) (42.1) (47.1) (66.0) 
       
Observations 1,138 1,130 1,130 1,127 1,081 1,070 
Adjustment R2 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 
Overall R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.12 
Number of countries 79 78 78 78 73 73 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Additional Robustness Tests 
 In order to ensure that the positive relationship between DSRO and stock market 
size is not dependent upon the latter’s transformation, I reestimated the models from 
Tables 5.7 but with the original untransformed version of market capitalization. Even 
after controlling for public agency independence and additional political controls 
introduced one at a time, results were similar in terms of both the conventional 
significance and the substantive magnitude of the coefficients (Table 5.17A).   
 Like public agency independence, I also explored whether depoliticized exchange 
governance encourages foreign equity portfolio flows and whether the inclusion of 
portfolio equity flows alters previous findings with regards to market size and 
performance. Although coefficients are positive, there is little evidence to suggest that 
less politicized self-regulatory arrangements encourage portfolio equity flows after 
macroeconomic and other political factors are controlled for. In all models found in Table 
5.18A, standard errors are larger than the coefficients for DSRO.  
 Controlling for portfolio equity flows modestly strengthened the association 
between DSRO on the one hand and market capitalization on the other in dynamic fixed 
effects models (Table 5.19A; Models 1-4). This strengthening was expressed in terms of 
smaller standard errors and slightly larger coefficients as compared to the findings in 
Table 5.12A and Table 5.13A. The decline in standard errors and enlargement of 
coefficients was especially pronounced when a control for public agency independence 
was included. Blundell-Bond GMM estimations with portfolio controls produced 
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comparable results for DSRO when no political variables were included. However, when 
political constraint was introduced, the coefficient for DSRO declined slightly from 0.34 
to 0.29 and lost significance at conventional levels (p=.12). The coefficients of the 
interaction effects between DSRO, electoral competition, and electoral proportionality 
were the most sensitive to controls for portfolio flows. When the analyses in Tables 5.9 
and 5.10 were reestimated with portfolio flows, both lost significance and produced p-
values between 0.17 and 0.55 (not shown). Despite the sensitivity of market 
capitalization models, the S&P Index Price growth results found in Table 5.5 saw 
virtually no change when portfolio flows were introduced (not shown).  
Conclusion 
 Although typically associated with both the promise and the peril of free market 
capitalism, stock markets in many countries are politicized tools of government elites. 
Some exist as state owned enterprises and even when they do not, their governance may 
still be dominated by politicians, regulators, or their appointees. Since politicians often 
delegate significant regulatory to duties to stock market operators, exchange boards’ 
varying levels of politicization can have profound effects on regulatory outcomes and 
investor confidence. While nearly every stock exchange wields some regulatory power, 
there is wide variation in the degree to which exchanges and industry associations are 
complements or even substitutes to public regulatory arrangements. In some instances, 
they are able to raise industry standards well beyond those that could be achieved through 
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the legislative process. In other instances, SROs assume regulatory roles that rival public 
agencies. 
 This chapter sought to take a first step in understanding if the relationship 
between private (i.e. apolitical) self-regulation and stock market development and 
performance. Results paint a positive picture of self-regulation that is free from the most 
direct forms of political control. I find that depoliticized self-regulation has a substantive 
and significant positive association with stock market size. However, this positive 
relationship’s statistical significance is dependent upon political controls and its 
substantive significance appears to be dependent upon meaningful electoral competition. 
Like independent regulatory agencies, there is also tentative evidence that higher levels 
of depoliticized self-regulation are more strongly associated with stock market size when 
electoral institutions are majoritarian. Overall, the effects of depoliticized self-regulation 
on market capitalizations appear to be larger in comparison to regulatory independence. 
 Although slightly weaker in terms of magnitude, public regulatory independence 
continues to be positively related to stock market size even after controlling for levels of 
self-regulation. However, self-regulation does seem to make regulatory independence 
more sensitive to alternative specifications, estimators, and the inclusion of controls for 
foreign portfolio equity flows. The opposite is true with regards to stock market 
performance. The coefficients for DSRO continue to be larger than those for regulatory 
independence, but the latter is estimated with far less error and is robust to a wider 
variety of political controls and year fixed effects. Furthermore, the relationship between 
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both public and private regulators’ political autonomy and stock index price growth is 
almost completely unaffected by flows of foreign equity. Overall, it seems that both the 
depoliticization of securities industry self-regulation and the increasing political 
independence of public regulators make their own unique contributions to stock market 
development and performance. While not perfect or costless solutions to politicians’ 
commitment problems, credibility seeking politicians should look to both private self-
regulation and independent regulators as potentially valuable contributors to their 
nation’s financial development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 244 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Institutional Credibility in Times of Crisis 
 
 The Chinese securities industry is dominated by the state. Local governments own 
many brokerage firms and listed companies are overwhelming state owned. Each of 
China’s exchanges is operated by a president and general manager who are both 
appointed and removable at will by China’s Securities Market Regulatory Commission. 
Despite the Communist Party’s strong preference for social stability and the 
government’s tight hold on the economy, they were unable to prevent Chinese stock 
markets from descending into chaos during the latter half of 2015. Between June and 
July, China’s blue chip stock index crashed by a third. Additional though less spectacular 
drops followed in August of 2015 and January of 2016. Yet in contrast to Bangladesh’s 
2010 Stock Market Scam, the official response was aggressive and immediate. Under 
orders from the Central Government, regulators and stock exchanges implemented 
trading halts on individual stocks and the markets as whole; temporary bans on short-
selling; margin requirements adjustments; a moratorium on IPOs; limits on blockholders 
selling activity; and emergency financing for distressed brokerage companies. In the 
hopes of boosting prices and adding liquidity, the Chinese government directly purchased 
securities and pressured state-run brokerage firms and pension funds to do the same. By 
November of 2015, state linked shareholders controlled nearly 6 percent of the free-
floating Chinese stock market. The effectiveness of these actions in terms of boosting 
prices and curbing volatility was uneven. In some cases, such as establishing price limit 
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circuit breakers, Chinese authorities were forced to back track after it became clear that 
their actions exacerbated rather than reduced volatility. Yet even with these missteps, 
government interventions had restored calm by the Spring of 2016. Although unique in 
some important respects, many of the Communist regime’s actions were not all that out 
of the ordinary. Or as economists Jeffry Frankel argues:  
 According to the conventional wisdom, the authorities consistently intervened not 
 only to try to boost the market after the collapse, but also during its year-long run-
 up, when the Shanghai Stock Exchange composite index more than doubled. The 
 finger-wagging implication is that Chinese policymakers, particularly the stock-
 market regulator, have only themselves to blame for the bubble. There is 
 undoubtedly some truth to this story…But what many commentators fail to note is 
 that China’s regulatory authorities took action to try to dampen prices over the 
 last six months of the run-up. They tightened margin requirements in January, and 
 again in April, when they also facilitated short-selling by expanding the number 
 of eligible stocks. The event that ultimately seems to have pricked the bubble was 
 the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s June 12th announcement of plans 
 to limit the amount that brokerages could lend for stock trading. This is precisely 
 the kind of counter-cyclical macroprudential policy that economists often 
 recommend. But, whereas advanced economies rarely implement this advice, 
 China and many other developing countries do…(56) 
Frankel’s account suggests that Chinese politicians’ lack of constraint may have both 
undermined and strengthened their policy responses to the bubble and the crash that 
followed. More specifically, the State Council’s influence over the CSRC and as well as 
their bubble inducing financial policies clearly reflected a lack of policy consistency. 
However, the fact that unconstrained Chinese authorities were able to implement 
politically unpopular counter-cyclical policies as well as make decisive market 
interventions in the heat of the crisis suggests that their lack of constraint strengthened 
                                               
56 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/07/chinese-market-interventions-yuan-stock-markets 
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policy decisiveness when swift action was needed. This raises the following question: do 
institutions that enhance credibility during normal times reduce credibility in times of 
crisis when decisive, coordinated, but politically unpopular policies may be the most 
warranted?   
 The goal of this chapter is to answer this question and better understand how 
political institutions and regulatory organizations shape the severity of financial crises 
from the standpoint of equity investors. I take it for granted that governments and 
regulators will make mistakes and engage in trial and error. Choosing among various 
crisis response policies is not an exact science. As a result, what is often most important 
is that politicians and regulators act quickly and definitively. The results of previous 
chapters established that more numerous veto players, electoral proportionality, 
politically independent regulatory agencies, and privately governed self-regulatory 
organizations strengthen politicians’ commitments to investor protection and market 
integrity over the long run. This chapter finds that these same institutional qualities 
continue to provide credibility benefits during times of crisis. However, they also create 
costs in terms of added volatility. In sum, it is during times of crisis that the Janus faced 
nature of political consensualism and regulatory autonomy is most clearly revealed to 
politicians, regulators, and investors alike.  
 This insight is not new. MacIntyre (2001) and Angkinand (2005) both suggest that 
excessive numbers of veto players can lead to damaging policy rigidity during crisis. If 
politicians must engage in costly and time consuming negotiation with other veto players, 
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crisis responses can be delayed or indecisive. Although not directly addressed in their 
work, their arguments can be extended to regulatory agencies and industry self-
regulation. Public and private regulators’ independence from political officials may allow 
them to develop policy preferences that differ substantially from those of politicians. 
These differing preferences and de facto veto power over some aspects of regulatory 
action may extend bargaining and/or undermine inter-organizational cooperation during 
crisis. When the time comes to develop coordinated responses to market instability as 
well as allocate the economic and political costs of crisis, consensual political institutions 
and regulatory autonomy may become institutional vices from the standpoint of swiftly 
calming market volatility.  
 Yet as MacIntyre (2001) and Angkinand (2005) also point out, a complete lack of 
veto players can also undermine crisis response. Without partisan veto players, what 
prevents governments from reversing or watering down their chosen crisis response 
policies? What is to stop the government from opportunistically nationalizing firms or 
pursuing forced mergers that benefit politically connected business elites? In addition to 
these acts of commission, a lack of partisan contestation may allow politicians to look the 
other way as allied corporate insiders save themselves by raiding their firms at the 
expense of shareholders and other stakeholders. In light of these threats to investors, 
consensual political institutions and regulatory independence remain credibility 
enhancing even as they contribute to market volatility. Proportional electoral institutions 
may extend debates among coalition partners, but they should also increase the chances 
that investor interests are politically represented as crisis responses are being crafted. 
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More numerous veto players may slow the speed of response, but they should also give 
non-controlling owners a larger number of potential partisan allies with which to block 
policy responses that go against their interests. Independent regulators and apolitical 
SROs likely heighten coordination costs, but they also restrain politicians from using 
crises to opportunistically manipulate corporate governance and securities regulation to 
their own benefit or to the benefit of allied corporate and financial industry insiders.  
 In sum, consensual institutions and politically autonomous regulators (both public 
and private) will have both costs and benefits in times of crisis. As will be demonstrated 
in the empirical analysis below, the costs come primarily in the form of the added stock 
market volatility. As partisan veto players and regulatory organizations jockey for 
influence, shift blame, negotiate compromise policy responses, and coordinate their 
actions, investor uncertainty will increase leading to greater variation in crisis period 
stock index prices. However, the benefits of these same institutions are even more 
impressive: they prevent catastrophic crisis period stock price declines.  
  Since veto players, proportional representation, partisan contestation, and public 
and private regulatory independence can reduce government opportunism and increase 
investors’ political representation, minority shareholders will be less likely to view 
financial crises as grave events that demand the complete liquidation of their 
shareholdings. In addition, to the extent consensual institutions and regulatory 
independence prevented the deterioration of MSP and market integrity in the past, the 
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corporate governance problems revealed by crisis should be less severe.
57
 In 
environments where politicians lack constraint and regulators are politicized, financial 
crises may be viewed in more apocalyptic terms; investors will do anything to liquidate 
their shareholdings for cash regardless of the discount demanded by buyers. Furthermore, 
past accumulations of corporate governance weakness are also likely to be more severe in 
these less consensual and politicized regulatory environments.  This leads to my first 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis I: As political consensualism, partisan contestation, and regulatory 
independence (both public and private) increases, systemic financial crises should 
produce smaller price declines in national stock market indices.  
 While fewer veto points, less electoral competition, and politicized regulators may 
undermine politicians’ credibility with regard to protecting investor interests, these same 
institutional features may make it far easier for authorities to respond to financial crises in 
a quick and coordinated matter. This greater coordination, swiftness, and ability to 
directly intervene in stock exchange governance should dampen (though not eliminate) 
stock market volatility even if prices continue to decline. Stated differently: 
Hypothesis II: As political consensualism, electoral competition, and regulatory 
independence (both public and private) decrease, financial crises should produce less 
volatility in the prices of national stock market indices.     
                                               
57
 For more on how crisis conditions facilitate shareholder expropriation as well as reveal past weaknesses 
in corporate governance see Johnson et al 2000; Young et al 2008; Mitton 2002; Kirkpatrick 2009 
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Variables  
 Empirical models will utilize many of the same explanatory and control variables 
as found in previous chapters with a few important exceptions. Macroeconomic and 
financial controls will include GDP per Capita, GDP growth, trade as a percentage of 
GDP (natural log), capital account openness, inflation (natural log), domestic bank credit 
provided to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, and changes in the MSCI All 
World Securities Index. These variables should sufficiently account for the various 
economic drivers (both foreign and domestic) of index price growth and volatility. In 
order to compare countries that differ widely in terms of the technological sophistication 
of their stock trading infrastructures and the depth of their brokerage industries, I will 
also control for the stock market turnover ratio: ln(value traded/market capitalization). 
The turnover ratio measures how often shares change hands and is widely used in the 
financial literature to gauge liquidity, transaction costs, and the overall efficiency of the 
stock market.
58
 In line with previous findings, I expect the turnover ratio to be positively 
related to volatility (Amiram et. al. 2015). Once again, I utilize Henisz’s Political 
Constraint III index as a measure of veto players; Pagano and Volpin’s measure of 
electoral proportionality; a combined [0,12] measure of legislative and executive 
electoral competitiveness taken from Keefer’s DPI; my measure of regulatory 
independence; and my measure depoliticized self-regulation. I also include two additional 
political controls for robustness: change in general government final consumption 
                                               
58 Turnover ratio had an extreme positive skew with numerous extreme outliers. For this reason and ease of 
interpretation, the ratio was natural log transformed. Utilizing an untransformed version of the variable did 
not substantively alter any results.  
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expenditure (%GDP) and a dummy variable for center-right government. Both are 
included under the assumption that investors may be sensitive to increases in the size and 
ideological orientation of government. Finally, I include a dummy variable for banking 
crises taken from the World Bank Database on Banking Crises.
59
 
 My measures of annual percentage index price growth and volatility are based 
upon the country level subcomponents of the S&P/IFCI and S&P/Frontier BMI 
composite stock market indices. Volatility is measured as a relative standard deviation 
(i.e. coefficient of variation) and is typically expressed as a percentage. It is calculated as 
the standard deviation of index prices for country i in year t divided by the annual mean 
index price for country i in year t. The division by the annual mean is what allows 
volatility levels to be compared across countries. Overall, this volatility measure is 
available for 82 countries with an average of 16.7 observations per country. However, 
after a full battery of controls is included, most models include between 69 to 76 
countries with average panel sizes ranging from 12 to 15 years.  
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Panel Unit Root Tests of volatility reject the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain unit root at p<.05 for all lags except the 2
nd
. Since the 
rejection of the null hypothesis was only borderline significant at the second lag (p≈.09), 
                                               
59 The World Banks defines banking crises according to the criteria identified by Laevan and Valencia 
(2008): “a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial 
institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-performing 
loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted. In some cases, 
the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general realization that 
systemically important financial institutions are in distress… As a cross-check on the timing of each crisis, 
we examine whether the crisis year coincides with deposit runs, the introduction of a deposit freeze or 
blanket guarantee, or extensive liquidity support or bank interventions.” 
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I estimated Phillips-Perron panel unit root tests for robustness. The Phillips-Perron tests 
were even clearer: at all lags the null hypothesis that all volatility panels contained unit 
roots could be rejected at p<.01 (see Table 6.1). 
     Table 6.1      
 (Index Volatility Panel Unit Root Tests) 
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 287.39 0 Inverse Chi-sqrd 287.39 0
Inverse Normal -5.28 0 Inverse Normal -5.28 0
Inverse Logit -6.04 0 Inverse Logit -6.04 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 7 0 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 7 0
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 431.8 0 Inverse Chi-sqrd 297.9 0
Inverse Normal -9.6 0 Inverse Normal -5.95 0
Inverse Logit -11.8 0 Inverse Logit -6.6 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 15.1 0 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 7.6 0
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 177.7 0.09 Inverse Chi-sqrd 305.4 0
Inverse Normal -1.4 0.08 Inverse Normal -5.8 0
Inverse Logit -1.5 0.07 Inverse Logit -6.7 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 1.4 0.09 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 8 0
Test-Statistic p-value Test-Statistic p-value
Inverse Chi-sqrd 189 0.02 Inverse Chi-sqrd 312.4 0
Inverse Normal -1.41 0.07 Inverse Normal -5.6 0
Inverse Logit -1.9 0.03 Inverse Logit -6.7 0
Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 2.25 0.01 Modified Inverse Chi-Sqrd 8.3 0
Relative Std. Dev. of S&P Benchmark Country Index Prices
No Lag
First Lag
Relative Std. Dev. of S&P Benchmark Country Index Prices
3rd Lag
µT=16.7, #of Panels=82 µT=16.7, #of Panels=82
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron
No Lag
First Lag
2nd Lag2nd Lag
3rd Lag
 
 Index volatility levels range widely between 2.4 and 141 percent. It has a mean of 
24, a median of 21, an overall standard deviation of around 14, and a within standard 
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deviation of 10.
60
 The mean volatility level is 22 percent during non-crisis years and 33 
during crisis years. This difference in means is highly significant (p<.001). Annual 
percentage index price growth ranges from -84 to 912 percent with a mean of 12.5 
percent, median of 10 percent, and overall/within standard deviations of around 45 
percent.
 
 During non-crisis and crisis years average annual index price growth is 15.5 
percent and -7 percent respectively. Once again, this difference in means is highly 
significant (p<0.001). The difference in median levels across crisis and non-crisis periods 
is even larger at around 27 percent. 
Methods 
 The models below will include several different types of estimators. Models of 
index price growth will be static fixed effect models with Huber-White standard errors 
clustered by country. As discussed in previous chapters, a static model was selected 
because the coefficients for lagged index price growth only approached the most liberal 
levels of conventional significance (p>0.10). Given that there are well over 50 reasonably 
balanced country clusters, the use of “cluster-robust” standard errors should produce 
unbiased and consistent estimates even in the presence of within panel serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity (Stock and Watson 2008). Year fixed effects and country fixed 
effect Prais-Winsten estimators will be introduced as a robustness check. My models of 
market volatility will be more varied. Although static models will be estimated as a 
robustness check, most models will utilize country fixed effect estimators with a one-year 
                                               
60 The variable is slightly skewed. All models were reestimated with volatility natural log transformed for 
normality,  and qualitative inferences were left unaffected.  
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lagged dependent variable and cluster robust standard errors. As with the price growth 
models, year fixed effects and fixed effect Prais-Winsten estimators will be used as a 
robustness check. While this dynamic approach is likely appropriate given the data 
generating process, it comes with a set of challenges.  
 Given that the average number of observations per panel is only around 14, any 
substantive correlation between unobserved panel-level effects and the lagged dependent 
variable could make Nickel Bias particularly severe (i.e. lagged dependent variable 
downwardly biased). In order to ensure that this bias is not undermining the integrity of 
inferences, I will also utilize generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators in the 
volatility models. More specifically, I estimate one-step system GMM models as 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
61
 Their 
estimator uses both lagged differences and lagged levels as moment conditions making 
the estimator more robust to the presence of large autoregressive parameters and more 
consistent when the ratio of panel-level effect variance to idiosyncratic error variance is 
very large. However, in order for me to unambiguously satisfy the identifying moment 
conditions and eliminate all serial correlation in the first-differenced errors beyond the 
first order, I must include three lags of the dependent variable. Overall, utilizing the 
GMM estimator involves a nearly 15% reduction in country-year observations as 
compared to the fixed effect models (873< 1024).   
                                               
61
 This estimator was implemented by the xtdpdsys command in Stata 12. 
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 In order to understand how political and regulatory institutions are related to price 
growth and volatility during crisis, key independent variables will be interacted with the 
systemic banking crisis dummy variable. As a result, interaction coefficients will reveal 
how the effects of banking crises change as political institutions become more or less 
consensual and regulatory institutions more or less autonomous from political actors.  
When index price growth is the dependent variable, I will estimate the following 
equation: 
yit = αi +βX*Bit +ζCit+ ɛit 
When the dependent variable is stock index price volatility (i.e. relative standard 
deviation), I will estimate the following equation along with GMM models for 
robustness:  
yit = αi+βX*Bit +ζCit+γyit-1+ ɛit 
 
 The dependent variable yit represents either annual percentage price growth or the  
relative standard deviation of stock market index prices in country i year t. The vector Xit 
is a vector of explanatory political and regulatory variables interacted with the banking 
crisis dummy Bit. Cit is a vector of macroeconomic and financial market controls. αi 
represents country specific intercepts while β, ζ and γ are vectors of estimated 
coefficients.  ɛit is a residual country year disturbance that remains after unobservable 
individual specific effects are absorbed by country dummies αi.      
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Institutions, Crisis, and Index Price Declines 
 Results largely confirm my theoretical expectations: consensual political 
institutions and electoral competition minimize the price declines caused by systemic 
banking crises. Stated differently, increased political constraint and electoral competition 
both result in less negative percentage index price changes. Both results are robust at 
conventional levels of significance (p<.05) to year fixed effects, controls for public and 
private regulatory institutions, and other political controls (e.g. government spending 
growth and partisanship).  Main effects and Figure 6.1(a) suggest that as political 
constraint approaches minimum levels, banking crises will be associated with massive 
price declines of around 90 percent. 
         Figure 6.1      
 (Marginal Effects of Crisis across Veto Players and Competition: %∆S&P Indices) 
      (a)                                                                          (b) 
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This 90 percent decline is roughly 5 times larger than the median index decline during 
financial crisis. Increases in political constraint to levels equivalent to the United States 
under divided government (≈.40) would be associated with crisis period index price 
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declines of roughly half that size (35 to 45 percent) holding all other controls at their 
means. By the time political constraint reaches its 90
th
 percentile (.55), banking crises 
lead to declines that are indistinguishable from 0.
62
  
 Figure 6.1(b) and Models 4,5, and 6 of Table 6.2 suggest that movement toward 
meaningful electoral competition also leads to significantly smaller declines in index 
prices due to banking crisis. This positive interaction effect emerges even after 
controlling for veto players and regulatory institutions. The introduction of a control for 
the proportionality of electoral institutions slightly increases the size of the interaction 
effects but reduces statistical significance (p-values range from 0.07 to 0.15, not shown). 
The extremely large confidence intervals exhibited in Figure 6.1b at the lower end of the 
electoral competition scale makes it hard to come to any definitive conclusions regarding 
the price effects of banking crises within autocracies. Obviously, declines greater than 
100 percent are impossible.  But what Figure 6.1(b) does suggest is that as electoral 
competition approaches minimum levels, banking crises have the potential to trigger truly 
catastrophic drops in stock market indices. In stark contrast, countries with full electoral 
competition and average levels of constraint would see sizable though less severe index 
price declines of around 25 percent.
63
   
  
                                               
62
 When checks is substituted for constraint, interaction coefficients remain positive but are insignificant 
(.307<p<.347). When checks is logged transformed, it provides stronger confirmation of the relationship 
found above. The interaction coefficient is positive and becomes marginally significant (.09<p<.12). 
However, logged checks proves much more sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effects 
63 For frame of reference, the Dow Jones Industrial average declined by 22% on Black Tuesday in 1929. 
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     Table 6.2        
(Veto Players and Competition in Crisis: %∆S&P Price Index) 
DV: %∆S&P Price 
Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Political  -36.3** -46.2*** -24.7**  -13.9 1.9 
Constraint (14.6) (13.3) (10.7)  (13.1) (10.6) 
Electoral     -0.94 -1.61 -1.6 
Competition    (2.23) (1.91) (1.74) 
       
Bank Crisis -85.4*** -93.2*** -69.1*** -132*** -136*** -81.17** 
 (13.61) (13.55) (8.41) (45.14) (45.25) (35.43) 
Constraint 144*** 159*** 117***    
X Bank Crisis (29.85) (30.23) (18.8)    
Competition X    9.18** 9.49** 5.39* 
Bank Crisis    (3.76) (3.77) (2.98) 
       
Regulatory   19.1** 15.7*  17.7** 15.9* 
Independence  (9.3) (9.15)  (8.37) (8.27) 
Depoliticized   15.7 2.57  21.7** 6.02 
Self-Regulation  (9.7) (9.89)  (9.82) (9.99) 
Electoral   7.8*** 3.37    
Proportionality  (2.8) (3.77)    
ln(GDPperCapita) -1.19 -3.94 -36.2** -1.747 -5.52 -36.4** 
 (3.66) (3.41) (16.24) (3.67) (3.73) (17.8) 
GDP Growth 0.72 0.68 1.43* 0.62 0.66 1.41* 
 (0.494) (0.542) (0.855) (0.43) (0.44) (0.72) 
Capital Account  0.37 1.36 -6.11 -2.66 -5.88 -13.1 
Openness (10.9) (12.9) (13.1) (11.2) (11.7) (12.5) 
ln(Trade) 23.3** 23.2** -7.70 24.3** 19.4* -10.8 
 (9.58) (10.9) (17.7) (9.86) (10.4) (18.7) 
ln(Inflation) 0.79 2.05 4.07 1.41 1.68 3.73 
 (4.88) (5.85) (5.46) (5.42) (5.51) (5.11) 
Private Credit  0.005 0.034 -0.035 0.008 0.041 -0.039 
by Banks (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ln(Turnover Ratio) 2.27 1.29 -1.17 2.8 2.48 -0.44 
 (3.25) (3.49) (4.51) (3.25) (3.29) (4.44) 
∆All World Index 35.3*** 36.48**
* 
 35.48**
* 
35.82***  
 (2.56) (2.87)  (2.61) (2.61)  
Constant -75.5** -83.5** 318.0 -78.2* -38.3 345.1 
 (33.77) (40.15) (191.9) (40.54) (38.86) (212.6) 
       
Observations 1,158 1,065 1,065 1,158 1,114 1,114 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.30 
Overall R2 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.09 
Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of countries 79 73 73 79 78 78 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10) 
 
 259 
 
 The interaction of electoral proportionality and banking crises tells a similar if 
less dramatic story as compared to political constraint and electoral competition. 
Regardless of whether political and regulatory controls are included, interaction 
coefficients of proportionality and banking crises are positive and suggest that a 
maximum increase in proportionality reduces predicted crisis price declines from 35 to 20 
percent. However, no firm conclusions can be drawn. Regardless of controls, p-values are 
0.30 or greater for interaction terms (not shown).  
 Overall, the results are clear with regard to veto players and electoral competition: 
more political constraint and full partisan contestation seem to temper sell-offs during 
systemic crisis. In other words, when leaders are constrained and/or more electorally 
accountable, crisis period price declines will be more manageable. When leaders are 
unconstrained by other veto players or electoral competition, price declines can be 
catastrophic. However, political leaders are not the only actors who play influential roles 
in crisis response. Effective actions by regulators may also stem price declines.  
 As expected, increases in regulatory independence and depoliticized self-
regulation (DSRO) seem to reduce price declines during banking crises (Table 6.3). After 
controlling for veto players, electoral institutions, and self-regulation, banking crises are 
associated with index price drops of between 42 and 62 percent when public securities 
regulators are maximally politicized (Figure 6.2a; Models 1-3, Table 6.3).
64
 In contrast, 
when regulatory agencies enjoy the highest levels of formal independence (and other 
variables are at their means) price declines are indistinguishable from 0. This result is 
                                               
64 Models 1-6 of Table 6.3 do not feature a control for electoral competition. Its introduction left interaction 
coefficients, standard errors, and p-value virtually unchanged.  
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robust to year fixed effects (Model 3) and relatively insensitive to a plethora of other 
political economic controls (not shown). Overall, evidence suggests that regulatory 
independence likely restrains crisis period index price declines. 
  Self-regulatory institutions perform similarly in terms of crisis period index price 
movement (Figure 6.2b; Models 4-6, Table 6.3). More specifically, as politicians and 
regulators are increasingly absent from exchange governance, price declines are less 
dramatic. 
              Figure 6.2       
(Marginal Effects of Independence in Crisis: %∆S&P Indices) 
(a)                                                                 (b) 
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Despite the very large confidence intervals at lower levels of DSRO, point estimates 
suggest that when stock exchange governance is completely dominated by politicians, 
regulators, and their appointees, banking crises can lead to potentially massive index 
price declines. More specifically, after controlling for political institutions and public 
regulatory independence (i.e. Model 5), estimated marginal effects of banking crisis 
bottom out at negative 60 percent when stock market governance is maximally 
politicized. In contrast, when exchange governance is completely depoliticized and 
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recognized SROs are in existence, crisis period price declines are indistinguishable from 
0 (holding all other variables at their means).  
      Table 6.3        
(Independence and DSRO in Crisis: %∆S&P Index Price) 
DV:%∆S&P Index 
Price 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Regulatory  12.3 9.51 9.03  18.3** 13.3 
Independence (7.53) (8.52) (8.64)  (8.61) (8.15) 
Depoliticized  18.5** 4.46 24.9** 17.8* 1.07 
Self-Regulation  (8.96) (9.38) (9.72) (9.8) (10.18) 
Bank Crisis -62.0*** -62.0*** -42.9*** -52.2** -52.6** -58.2** 
 (18.4) (19.9) (13.4) (23.2) (23.3) (22.1) 
 Independence 55.7** 55.3* 37.0*    
X Bank Crisis (26.0) (28.0) (19.1)    
       
DSRO X    35.1 35.3 51.0** 
Bank Crisis    (26.6) (26.8) (25.5) 
Political   -19.2 -3.71  -18.92 -2.86 
Constraint  (13.6) (11.3)  (13.6) (11.5) 
Electoral   4.98 0.92  4.16 -0.58 
Proportionality  (3.05) (3.74)  (3.27) (3.91) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -4.29 -5.32 -38.2** -3.57 -4.24 -41.1** 
 (3.57) (3.59) (17.0) (3.76) (3.87) (18.4) 
GDP Growth 0.72 0.74 1.47* 0.65 0.63 1.45* 
 (0.49) (0.52) (0.83) (0.42) (0.45) (0.8) 
Capital Account -5.42 -3.73 -10.7 -7.763 -6.53 -13.7 
Openness (11.3) (12.4) (12.66) (11.0) (12.8) (12.7) 
ln(Trade) 22.2** 21.2* -11.1 24.0** 20.5* -13.7 
 (10.6) (11.2) (18.4) (10.5) (11.1) (19.7) 
ln(Inflation) 1.49 2.77 4.58 1.61 3.1 4.79 
 (5.04) (6.23) (5.71) (5.47) (6.73) (5.89) 
Private Credit  0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.04 
by Banks (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ln(Turnover Ratio) 3.01 2.18 -0.82 2.64 2.37 -0.58 
 (3.2) (3.5) (4.58) (3.22) (3.45) (4.5) 
∆All World Index 35.6*** 36.6***  35.6*** 36.3***  
 (2.6) (3.0)  (2.5) (2.8)  
Constant -66.4** -65.4* 346.4* -86.5** -75.2* 384.6* 
 (32.7) (38.1) (201.3) (35.2) (40.2) (220.6) 
       
Observations 1,153 1,065 1,065 1,132 1,065 1,065 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.30 
Overall R2 0.17 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.08 
Year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of countries 80 73 73 79 73 73 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by county (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10) 
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The DSRO interaction results are somewhat weak by conventional standards with p-
values ranging from 0.049 to 0.19 (Models 4-6). That said, the results are suggestive. 
Like politically dependent public regulators and less consensual political institutions, the 
politicization of stock market governance appears to magnify stock index declines during 
times of systemic financial distress.   
 Thus far, the effects in terms of index price declines are catastrophic for autocratic 
countries or those with politicized securities market regulation. In democratic countries 
with average to high levels of political constraint and regulatory independence, declines 
are much less severe. However, this success in terms of preventing price declines is not 
mirrored in terms of minimizing price volatility. As the results below suggest, the same 
political and regulatory weaknesses that rob political leaders of policy credibility may 
give those same leaders the tools necessary to contain price volatility in the heat of crisis. 
 
Institutions, Crisis and Index Volatility  
 The findings of Table 6.4 suggest that higher levels of political constraint amplify 
the volatility effects of banking crises. Interaction coefficients are positive, stable, and 
significant at conventional levels across both dynamic estimators and as additional 
controls are added to the models. Using the Model 3 estimates with all controls at their 
means, predicted marginal effects of banking crises are indistinguishable from zero at 
constraint levels level below the post-1988 median (Figure 6.3). In other words, only in 
countries where power is more centralized than in the UK’s Westminster system (< ≈3.4) 
will banking crises not contribute to annual index volatility in ways that are statistically 
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discernable from 0. Where leaders are more constrained than those in a fully democratic 
Westminster system, volatility effects of crisis will be statistically significant and 
increasing with the number and fractionalization of veto players.  
Figure 6.3 
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  Coefficients suggest that the maximum levels of political constraint found in the 
sample (.77) would add just over 6 percent to price volatility during the year of a 
systemic banking crisis holding all other variables at their means. This is just under half 
the overall standard deviation and 60 percent of the within standard deviation in price 
volatility. While this may sound small, it is important to remember that this is the 
volatility produced after the volatility created by macroeconomic factors (i.e. declines in 
economic growth) and share turnover is taken into account.  
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               Table 6.4      
 (Veto Players in Crisis: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Volatility    Blundell-
Bond  
Blundell-
Bond  
Blundell-
Bond  
       
Stock Price  0.57*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.59*** 
Volatilityt-1 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) 
Stock Price     -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.27*** 
Volatilityt-2    (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Stock Price     0.025 0.07 0.11*** 
Volatilityt-3    (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Political  0.39 1.68 2.25 0.33 4.73* 3.97 
Constraint (3.66) (2.7) (2.73) (5.03) (2.86) (3.51) 
Bank Crisis -4.69* -2.97 -2.01 -5.32** -2.18 -1.43 
 (2.39) (1.81) (1.92) (2.33) (2.71) (3.19) 
Constraint X  15.4*** 13.2*** 11.4** 19.7*** 16.2** 13.6** 
Bank Crisis (4.6) (4.28) (4.4) (4.78) (6.41) (6.38) 
Regulatory   2.53 4.24**  1.85 3.3 
Independence  (2.06) (1.76)  (3.75) (3.62) 
Depoliticized   1.3 3.2  -4.54 -5.1 
Self-Regulation  (2.65) (2.74)  (5.75) (5.18) 
Electoral    -0.20   0.20 
Competition   (0.20)             (0.46) 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  -1.63 
(1.25) 
  -0.37 
(1.61) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.56*** -3.61*** -3.58*** -5.39*** -3.87*** -3.55*** 
 (0.98) (0.89) (0.93) (1.43) (1.04) (1.13) 
GDP Growth -0.77*** -0.69*** -0.70*** -0.81*** -0.78*** -0.82*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Capital Account  3.84** 3.88** 2.76 -1.23 -0.054 0.703 
Openness (1.64) (1.89) (1.95) (2.46) (3.04) (2.91) 
ln(Trade) 2.56 1.24 1.22 1.55 -1.27 0.12 
 (2.13) (2.19) (2.25) (3.06) (2.51) (2.44) 
ln(Inflation) 1.24** 1.38*** 1.19* 1.03** 1.14** 1.29** 
 (0.47) (0.50) (0.62) (0.41) (0.57) (0.62) 
Domestic Credit  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05*** 0.03** 0.02 
by Banks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
ln(Turnover) 1.97** 2.3*** 2.24*** 1.36 2.48*** 2.54*** 
 (0.79) (0.70) (0.72) (1.12) (0.865) (0.889) 
∆All World Stock 1.02*** 0.88** 0.81* 0.83*** 0.71** 0.69* 
Index (0.35) (0.42) (0.43) (0.32) (0.34) (0.37) 
Constant 20.3** 23.0** 26.8** 47.4*** 43.0*** 32.1** 
 (9.98) (10.6) (12.0) (11.2) (12.3) (12.8) 
       
Observations 1,054 1,027 968 937 916 867 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.51 0.51 -- -- -- 
Overall R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- 
Number of countries 77 77 72 75 75 70 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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 The introduction of year fixed effects to Models 1-3 does slightly reduce the 
magnitude of interaction coefficients, but they remain significant at conventional levels 
(not shown). A fixed effects Prais-Winsten estimator also produces very similar results 
(not shown). Although interactions continue to have positive signs, static reestimations of 
Models 1-3 produce interaction coefficients that are roughly 50 percent smaller than 
those in Table 6.3 and assume p-values greater than 0.5 (not shown). Among all 
estimation approaches, it is the Blundell-Bond estimations that produce the largest 
interaction effects (Models 4-6).  
 Electoral competition produces a similar positive interaction effect with banking 
crisis (see Table 6.5). At lower levels of electoral competition, confidence intervals are 
very large and estimated marginal volatility effects of banking crises are 
indistinguishable from zero. However, as competition increases to levels where neither 
executive nor legislative parties are hegemonic, banking crises once again exacerbate 
volatility. However, this effect is small and maxes out at positive 4.5 percent when 
holding the other variables at their means (Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4 
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Table 6.5  
(Electoral Competition in Crisis: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Volatility    Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond  
       
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-1 
0.57*** 
(0.046) 
 
0.51*** 
(0.027) 
0.49*** 
(0.03) 
0.69*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.04) 
0.59*** 
(0.04) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-2 
   -0.25*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.031) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-3 
   0.02 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
       
Electoral Competition 0.144 0.16 -0.42** 0.33 0.403 -0.07 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.342) (0.323) (0.44) 
Bank Crisis -10.6** -10.4* -11.1* -10.33** -8.90* -10.2 
 (4.89) (5.38) (6.23) (4.09) (4.55) (6.52) 
Electoral Competition  1.09** 1.14** 1.2** 1.18*** 1.21*** 1.26** 
X Bank Crisis  (0.43) (0.46) (0.51) (0.34) (0.41) (0.52) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
 2.60 
(2.0) 
3.98** 
(1.7) 
 2.38 
(3.49) 
3.13 
(3.53) 
       
Depoliticized   1.74 3.52  -3.89 -4.41 
Self-Regulation  (2.65) (2.67)  (5.41) (5.14) 
Political   3.94 4.68*   7.25*** 
Constraint  (2.83) (2.79)   (2.75) 
Electoral    -1.67   -0.403 
Proportionality   (1.33)   (1.59) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.85*** -3.92*** -3.64*** -5.84*** -4.31*** -3.53*** 
 (1.01) (0.92) (0.92) (1.46) (1.11) (1.14) 
GDP Growth -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.71*** -0.79*** -0.78*** -0.83*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
3.60** 
(1.58) 
3.64* 
(1.85) 
2.57 
(1.96) 
-1.73 
(2.4) 
-0.714 
(2.87) 
0.52 
(2.96) 
ln(Trade) 2.51 1.07 1.41 0.857 -2.22 0.161 
 (2.2) (2.22) (2.32) (3.5) (2.67) (2.56) 
ln(Inflation) 1.33** 1.48*** 1.25* 1.12*** 1.32** 1.38** 
 (0.51) (0.53) (0.65) (0.42) (0.55) (0.63) 
Domestic Credit by 0.01 0.019 0.01 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.01 
Banks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.018) (0.01) (0.015) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.04** 2.36*** 2.24*** 1.52 2.68*** 2.69*** 
 (0.81) (0.73) (0.74) (1.13) (0.862) (0.89) 
∆All World Stock 1.06*** 0.92** 0.85* 0.86*** 0.76** 0.75** 
Index (0.35) (0.42) (0.43) (0.31) (0.34) (0.37) 
Constant 21.5** 24.6** 28.3** 49.8*** 46.4*** 33.0*** 
 (9.66) (10.4) (12.1) (11.9) (12.2) (12.5) 
       
Observations 1,054 1,103 968 937 916 867 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.51 -- -- -- 
Overall R2 0.66 0.63 0.57 -- -- -- 
Number of countries 78 78 72 75 75 70 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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 As Table 6.5 indicates, the interaction coefficient is remarkably stable in terms of 
both magnitude and significance across both types of dynamic estimations.  Static 
reestimation, year fixed effects, and country fixed effect Prais-Winsten models also 
produce very comparable results (not shown). Interaction effects are also robust to 
additional controls for government partisanship and growth in government spending.   
Regardless of estimator, a clear conclusion emerges: despite their lack of accountability 
to voters, countries with weak to non-existent electoral competition are associated with 
more minimal levels of volatility during systemic financial crises. It is only when 
winning party vote shares dip below 75 percent in executive and legislative elections do 
banking crises add to volatility in ways that are statically distinguishable from zero.  
 Unlike veto players and electoral competition, the policy consensualism of 
proportional elections does not seem to amplify the effects of banking crises. In fact, 
there is some very tentative evidence that it may reduce the volatility effects of crisis as 
indicated by negative interaction coefficients.  In terms of estimation error, the 
interaction’s statistical and substantive strength is not strong. In Table 6.6 below, 
interaction coefficient p-values range from 0.07 to 0.13. If year fixed effects are 
introduced, coefficients grow smaller and standard errors increase even more. Although 
interaction terms remain negatively signed, static estimations as well as fixed effect 
Prais-Winsten estimators also produce null results at conventional levels.  
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         Table 6.6      
 (Proportionality in Crisis: Index Volatility) 
 
DV: Stock Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Volatility     Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond 
       
Stock Price  
Volatility t-1 
0.56*** 
(0.04) 
0.49** 
(0.03) 
0.49*** 
(0.03) 
0.72*** 
(0.07) 
0.61*** 
(0.04) 
0.60*** 
(0.04) 
Stock Price  
Volatility t-2 
   -0.31*** 
(0.03) 
-0.285*** 
(0.03) 
-0.28*** 
(0.03) 
Stock Price  
Volatility t-3 
   0.06 
(0.06) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Electoral  -2.789 -1.84 -1.95* -2.84 -0.239 -0.28 
Proportionality (1.70) (1.17) (1.17) (2.79) (1.38) (1.47) 
Bank Crisis 4.24*** 5.06*** 4.91*** 6.95*** 7.18*** 6.74*** 
 (1.13) (1.2) (1.21) (1.89) (2.20) (2.20) 
Proportionality X -0.81 -0.97* -0.97* -1.65* -1.42 -1.24 
Bank Crisis  (0.51) (0.53) (0.52) (0.93) (0.89) (0.89) 
Regulatory   4.64*** 4.29**  3.51 2.94 
Independence  (1.63) (1.66)  (3.10) (3.19) 
Depoliticized   3.80 3.61  -2.97 -4.02 
Self-Regulation  (2.73) (2.79)  (5.04) (5.12) 
Political    4.4   6.27** 
Constraint   (2.86)   (3.04) 
Electoral    -0.21   0.20 
Competition   (0.23)   (0.43) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.68*** -3.95*** -3.79*** -4.54*** -3.47*** -3.52*** 
 (0.97) (0.94) (0.95) (1.234) (0.96) (1.11) 
GDP Growth -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.69*** -0.85*** -0.84*** -0.83*** 
 (0.122) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.131) (0.13) 
Capital Account 2.69* 2.25 2.29 -2.11 -0.544 0.34 
Openness (1.55) (1.78) (1.92) (2.45) (2.58) (2.75) 
ln(Trade) 2.26 0.75 1.04 1.26 -1.43 -0.55 
 (2.08) (2.20) (2.29) (3.38) (2.66) (2.7) 
ln(Inflation) 1.09* 1.26* 1.18* 1.17** 1.41** 1.32** 
 (0.59) (0.65) (0.65) (0.51) (0.62) (0.65) 
Domestic Credit  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.02 0.02 
by Banks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 1.86** 2.27*** 2.23*** 1.47 2.62*** 2.55*** 
 (0.82) (0.71) (0.71) (1.20) (0.87) (0.88) 
∆All World Stock 
Index 
0.95*** 
(0.35) 
0.79* 
(0.42) 
0.78* 
(0.43) 
0.73** 
(0.36) 
0.62 
(0.39) 
0.65 
(0.40) 
Constant 29.4** 30.2** 29.2** 47.6*** 40.2*** 33.3** 
 (11.1) (11.9) (12.1) (15.8) (13.1) (13.8) 
Observations 992 968 968 887 867 867 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.50 0.53 -- -- -- 
Overall R2 0.56 0.54 0.54 -- -- -- 
Number of countries  72 72 72 70 70 70 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Even if the largest interaction coefficient above is taken at face value, the difference in 
predicted crisis volatilities between a purely majoritarian and a purely proportional 
country is only around 5 percent. Although suggestive, results are too weak to draw any 
definitive conclusions regarding electoral proportionality’s impact on crisis period 
volatility.   
 Unlike proportionality and in line with my initial hypotheses, there is a robust 
interactive relationship between regulatory independence and crisis volatility (Table 6.7). 
This result is consistently significant across both types of dynamic estimator with 
interaction effects being somewhat larger in GMM estimations. 
Figure 6.5 
-5
0
5
1
0
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
B
a
n
k
in
g
 C
ri
s
is
 o
n
 V
o
la
ti
lit
y
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1
Regulatory Independence
Effects of Banking Crisis Across Independence (95%CI)
Model 2 Table 6.7 Controls at Means
 
Judging from Figure 6.5 above, independence above the 30
th
 percentile of the sample 
exacerbates banking crisis index price volatility. In contrast, regulation by politicians and 
politicized regulators is associated with the almost complete suppression of crisis 
volatility (see negative main effects in Table 6.7).  
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         Table 6.7        
(Independence in Crisis: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock Index 
Price Volatility 
(1) 
  
(2)  
 
(3)  
 
(4) 
Blundell-
Bond 
(5) 
Blundell-
Bond 
(6) 
Blundell
-Bond 
       
Stock Price 
Volatilityt-1 
0.51*** 
(0.02) 
0.51*** 
(0.03) 
0.48*** 
(0.03) 
0.57*** 
(0.04) 
0.57*** 
(0.04) 
0.59*** 
(0.04) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-2 
   -0.24*** 
(0.045) 
-0.23*** 
(0.045) 
-0.28*** 
(0.031) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-3 
   0.084 
(0.054) 
0.078 
(0.051) 
0.111*** 
(0.04) 
Regulatory  1.6 1.95 3.25** 0.032 1.5 2.59 
Independence (2) (1.93) (1.62) (3.31) (3.23) (3.2) 
Bank Crisis  -1.49 -1.31 -0.83 -0.54 -0.84 0.120 
 (1.51) (1.58) (1.75) (1.8) (1.77) (2.05) 
Independence x 6.3*** 6.1** 5.7** 8.30*** 8.44*** 6.53*** 
Bank Crisis (2.22) (2.32) (2.51) (2.63) (2.66) (2.47) 
Depoliticized   1.85 3.46  -2.56 -4.47 
Self-Regulation  (2.74) (2.87)  (5.52) (5.08) 
Political    4.7*   6.86** 
Constraint   (2.77)   (2.91) 
Electoral    -2.23*   -0.723 
Proportionality   (1.28)   (1.56) 
Electoral    -0.221   0.166 
Competition   (0.205)   (0.427) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.83*** -3.98*** -3.86*** -4.2*** -4.11*** -3.64*** 
 (0.99) (1.0) (0.986) (0.99) (0.95) (1.11) 
GDP Growth -0.69*** -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -
0.825*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Capital Account 3.15* 3.17* 2.22 -1.50 -1.23 0.28 
Openness (1.76) (1.80) (1.94) (3.03) (2.99) (2.86) 
ln(Trade) 1.18 1.21 1.45 -1.64 -1.76 0.08 
 (2.16) (2.18) (2.27) (2.51) (2.49) (2.54) 
ln(Inflation) 1.50*** 1.46*** 1.22* 1.37*** 1.32** 1.35** 
 (0.53) (0.54) (0.65) (0.53) (0.56) (0.64) 
Domestic Credit 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.031** 0.03** 0.02 
by Banks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.53*** 2.44*** 2.32*** 2.97*** 2.95*** 2.8*** 
 (0.73) (0.72) (0.73) (0.9) (0.87) (0.90) 
∆All World Stock  0.90** 0.90** 0.87* 0.82** 0.81** 0.78** 
Index (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.33) (0.34) (0.38) 
Constant 27.1** 27.0** 29.2** 46.2*** 46.7*** 32.3** 
 (10.8) (10.7) (12.4) (11.3) (11.2) (13.2) 
Observations 1,048 1,035 968 931 924 867 
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.506 0.504 -- -- -- 
Overall R2 0.637 0.631 0.534 -- -- -- 
Number of countries 78 78 72 76 76 70 
Huber/White standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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 The interaction effect above is also remarkably robust. Coefficients remain stable 
with the inclusion of year fixed effects and additional controls for government 
partisanship and growth in government spending. Fixed effects Prais-Winsten models 
inflate standard errors, but interaction coefficients resemble those in Models 1 thru 3. 
Finally, static reestimations are not only highly significant by conventional standards 
(p<.01), but interaction coefficients almost double in size (≈10, not shown). Regardless of 
estimation approach, results are clear: politicized regulators contain the volatility effects 
of banking crisis while independent regulators exacerbate it. 
 Like public regulators, self-regulators’ political autonomy is also related to 
increases in the volatility effects of banking crises (Table 6.8). Holding public regulatory 
independence and macroeconomic conditions at their means, maximum levels of DSRO 
may add an additional 5 percent to index prices’ relative standard deviations (see Figure 
6.6). In contrast, the presence of politicians and regulators on stock exchange supervisory 
boards is associated with negligible crisis period increases in index price volatility.  
Figure 6.6 
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          Table 6.8       
 (DSRO in Crisis: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock  Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Volatility    Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond 
Blundell-
Bond 
       
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-1 
0.55*** 
(0.02) 
0.50*** 
(0.03) 
0.48*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.06) 
0.57*** 
(0.03) 
0.59*** 
(0.04) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-2 
   -0.26*** 
(0.05) 
-0.24*** 
(0.05) 
-0.28*** 
(0.03) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-3 
   0.03 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Depoliticized  1.27 0.81 2.46 -18.1 -3.65 -4.63 
Self-Regulation (2.2) (2.62) (2.64) (13.7) (5.89) (5.38) 
Bank Crisis -11.01 -4.03 -2.72 -10.4 2.49 5.31 
 (6.94) (3.7) (3.23) (8.09) (3.84) (3.52) 
Self-Regulation x 17.0** 8.90* 7.46* 17.6* 3.01 -1.02 
Bank Crisis (8.41) (4.6) (4.04) (9.85) (4.57) (4.26) 
Regulatory   2.69 3.92**  2.68 3.7 
Independence  (1.76) (1.52)  (3.4) (3.31) 
Political    4.52   6.71** 
Constraint   (2.74)   (3.07) 
Electoral    -1.94*   -0.67 
Proportionality   (1.08)   (1.57) 
Electoral    -0.15   0.23 
Competitiveness   (0.22)   (0.43) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.84*** -3.8*** -3.73*** -4.74*** -3.99*** -3.63*** 
 (0.94) (0.93) (0.93) (1.22) (0.98) (1.12) 
GDP Growth -0.71*** -0.69*** -0.68*** -0.86*** -0.82*** -0.82*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
Capital Account  2.61 3.02* 2.15 -1.48 -0.77 0.732 
Openness (1.57) (1.76) (1.93) (2.69) (3.03) (2.93) 
ln(Trade) 2.47 1.11 1.34 -0.532 -2.29 -0.367 
 (2.25) (2.27) (2.38) (3.01) (2.67) (2.72) 
ln(Inflation) 1.40*** 1.52*** 1.24* 1.08** 1.34** 1.31** 
 (0.47) (0.52) (0.64) (0.50) (0.58) (0.65) 
Domestic Credit  0.01 0.01 0.011 0.05*** 0.033** 0.019 
by Banks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) (0.01) (0.017) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.14*** 2.47*** 2.34*** 1.83* 2.90*** 2.76*** 
 (0.707) (0.685) (0.7) (1.09) (0.87) (0.91) 
∆All World Stock 0.99*** 0.87** 0.83* 0.65* 0.73** 0.69* 
Index (0.35) (0.412) (0.43) (0.35) (0.36) (0.39) 
Constant 23.15** 26.12** 27.67** 63.81*** 47.64*** 32.29** 
 (9.14) (10.39) (11.72) (15.95) (11.50) (14.07) 
       
Observations 1,043 1,035 968 930 924 867 
Adjusted R2 0.522 0.507 0.505 -- -- -- 
Overall R2 0.643 0.632 0.55 -- -- -- 
Number of countries 78 78 72 76 76 70 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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 This positive interaction effect is robust to year fixed effects, and static 
reestimations lead to interaction coefficients that are double the size of those found in 
Models 1-3 above. Fixed effect Prais-Winsten estimations also produce qualitatively 
similar results (not shown). In contrast to previous models, the interaction effect is highly 
sensitive to additional controls beyond those found in Model 1. More specifically, the 
addition of controls for public regulatory independence or growth in government 
spending noticeably decreases the magnitude of interaction effects and push coefficients 
to insignificance. Despite this sensitivity, it is important to point out that static 
estimations can withstand the inclusion of regulatory independence and government 
spending growth both individually and together. Interaction coefficients in those static 
models are around 20 and p-values range from 0.07 to 0.08 (not shown). On balance, 
results still suggest that more politicized regimes of exchange governance are volatility 
suppressing during periods of crisis.  
 The results of this chapter indicate that the politicization of both public and 
private regulators has ambiguous effects during crisis. In countries with politically 
dependent regulatory agencies and politicized exchange governance, banking crises are 
associated with larger index price declines than in countries where regulators and 
exchanges are independent. At the same time, the political dependence of regulators and 
exchanges seems to reduce crisis period volatility. In order to ensure that it is actually the 
politicization of regulators that produces these effects rather than the idiosyncrasies of my 
measurement models, I created a simple additive variable called, apolitical organization. 
The variable has 4 “ex-officio” subcomponents: 1) politicians on securities agency 
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boards; 2) non-securities regulators on securities agency boards; 3) politicians on stock 
exchange boards; and 4) public regulators of any kind on stock exchange boards.
65
 Each 
subcomponent is scored on a 0 to 2 scale with 0 indicating multiple ex-officio members, 
1 indicating a single ex-officio member, and 2 indicating no ex-officio members. For 
example, if country X’s securities regulator has a central banker and two government 
ministers sitting on its board of directors, it would get a score of 0 on subcomponent 1 
and a score of  1 on subcomponent 2. If one member of country X’s regulator agency 
then gets to sit on the board of directors of country X’s stock exchange and all other 
board members were neither politicians nor regulators, subcomponent 3 would be scored 
a 2 and subcomponent 4 a 1. As a result, country Xs total apolitical organization score 
would be a 4 out of a possible 8. A score of 0 indicates minimum apolitical regulatory 
organization (or maximum politicization) and corresponds to the following: multiple non-
securities regulators and multiple politicians sitting on the securities agency board, and 
multiple regulators of any type along with multiple politicians sitting on the board of the 
stock exchange. A score of 8 indicates a maximum level apolitical organization and 
corresponds to the following: the securities market regulator supervisory board is free 
from politicians AND non-securities market regulators, while the stock exchange board 
of directors is free from politicians and regulators of any type.   
 In line with the findings thus far, I expect apolitical organization to dampen the 
index price declines while amplifying the index price volatility caused by financial crisis.  
                                               
65 I consider central bankers to be regulators.  The direct representatives or delegates of regulators or 
politicians are treated as identical to regulators and politicians.  
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Tables 6.9A and 6.10A in Appendix VI confirm this expectation. As public and private 
regulatory organizations become free from outside regulators and politicians, price 
declines are less severe (Table 6.9A). More specifically, at maximum levels of apolitical 
regulatory organization (i.e. 8 out of 8), banking crises are associated with marginal 
decreases in index price growth of around 12 percent (see Figure 6.7).  
Figure 6.7 
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 This is just slightly less than the median crisis period decline of 15 percent. When 
regulatory regimes are maximally politicized, banking crises have very large marginal 
effects on index price growth: banking crises are associated with roughly 75 percent 
declines in stock index prices holding political constraint and all other variables at their 
means. The addition of year fixed effects does lead to more than trivial declines in 
interaction coefficients, but results maintain significance at conventional levels (not 
shown). The introduction of a control for growth in government spending leads to 
similarly sized interaction coefficient declines as year fixed effects, but interaction effect 
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p-values remain between 0.049 and 0.09 (not shown). Fixed effects Prais-Winsten 
estimations produce interaction effects that are nearly identical to those found in Models 
1-3 of Table 6.9A. 
 In line with expectations, the beneficial effects of apolitical regulatory 
organization do not extent to volatility (Table 6.10A; Appendix VI). According to the 
predicted marginal effects in Figure 6.8, banking crises significantly contribute to 
volatility once apolitical organization exceeds its post-1988 mean level (i.e. 5.7). When 
outside regulators and politicians are widely distributed across both public and private 
regulatory organizations (apolitical < 4), banking crises may even decease stock index 
price volatility during crisis. Figure 6.8 demonstrates the full range of these changing 
marginal effects of banking crisis on volatility. Political constraint and macroeconomic 
controls are all held at their means:  
Figure 6.8 
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 This positive interaction effect on volatility is robust across a traditional fixed 
effects dynamic model (Model 1-3, Table 6.10A), a fixed effect Prais-Winsten model 
(not shown), and an alternative GMM estimator (Model 4-6, Table 6.10A). 
Unsurprisingly, the interaction effect is highly significant and twice as large when a static 
estimation is used. Despite slight declines in the magnitude of interaction coefficients, 
Models 1-3 remain stable after the addition of year fixed effects and additional political 
controls for government partisanship and growth in government spending.  
 Overall, results are clear. Banking crises have negligible to negative marginal 
effects on index volatility when regulatory organizations are highly politicized. However, 
these same politicized organizations are associated with potentially massive index price 
declines during crisis. When public and private regulatory organizations are free from 
politicians and non-securities regulators, these associations change direction. Highly 
apolitical regulatory organizations seem to muffle banking crisis price declines, while 
amplifying crisis period volatility.   
Portfolio Equity Flows in Times of Crisis 
 Given the key role that portfolio capital flows play in both revealing and driving 
international financial contagion, I evaluate how political and regulatory institutions 
shape crisis period equity flows and how net equity flows affect the relationship between 
these institutions and stock index price changes. An initial series of both bivariate and 
multivariate regressions suggest that there is no systematic relationship between systemic 
banking crisis and annual net portfolio equity flows. In most estimations, the standard 
 278 
 
errors of the banking crisis coefficients are at least as large as the crisis dummies’ 
coefficient (not shown). Even more interesting is the fact that the coefficient on the 
banking crisis dummy is positive suggesting that systemic banking crises do not lead to 
an outflow of portfolio equity. Unlike depositors, it appears that international portfolio 
investors are less shaken by crises in the banking system. These null-results extend to 
interactions between banking crisis and political and regulatory institutions on the one 
hand, and net portfolio flows on the other. Stated differently, neither consensual political 
institutions nor public and private regulator independence appears to moderate portfolio 
equity flows during crisis periods (not shown). Despite the null results that emerge when 
net portfolio equity flows are the outcome variable, including portfolio flows as a right-
hand side control did attenuate some of the relationships uncovered in previous sections 
of this chapter.   
 Previous findings regarding the ability of political constraint and electoral 
competition to ameliorate crisis period index declines (see Table 6.1) are left qualitatively 
unchanged with the inclusion of a control for portfolio equity flows. P-values of 
interaction coefficients remain less than 0.10 and the magnitude of the positive 
interaction coefficients remain remarkably similar (see Table 6.11A). The same cannot be 
said for regulatory independence and depoliticized self-regulation. Although interaction 
coefficients remain positive and are typically larger than their standard errors, the results 
for both independence and DSRO lose statistical significance. Both coefficients are cut by 
at least half and p-values are frequently greater than 0.30 when portfolio flows are 
included. That said, the main effects of both regulatory variables remain significant, and 
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predicted margins still suggest that both independence and DSRO ameliorate crisis period 
stock declines. Holding all other variables at their means, point estimates suggest that 
stock indices decline by roughly 40 percent when either regulatory measure is at its 
minimum. In contrast, when either variable is at its maximum, annual crisis-period index 
declines are between 15 to 18 percent. Once again, it remains important to highlight that 
both interactions fail to approach conventional levels of significance when portfolio 
flows are controlled for (Table 6.12A).  
 Controlling for equity flows also weakens some of the stock price volatility 
results. In terms of political institutions, the results are very similar. Electoral competition 
and political constraint interactions are nearly identical in terms of both the significance 
and the magnitude of their positive coefficients (Table 6.13A). These similarities occur 
across both dynamic fixed effect and Blundell-Bond GMM estimators. In fact, the 
strength of the interaction effect for electoral competition increases slightly as compared 
to the findings of Table 6.4. This suggests that even after controlling for portfolio flows, 
veto players and electoral competition do in fact exacerbate crisis period volatility. My 
previous findings regarding proportionality’s ability to ameliorate crisis-period volatility 
receive even less support when a control for proportionality is included (Model 5-6, 
Table 6.13A). Although the sign of the coefficient is still negative, the inclusion of a 
portfolio control reduces the magnitude of the coefficient and increases the standard 
errors.   
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 The impact of portfolio flows on the regulatory institution interactions is mixed. 
After controlling for flows, independence continues to have a statistically significant 
positive interaction (p<.05) effect with banking crisis (Models 1-2, Table 6.14A). The 
size of interaction coefficients does decrease in comparison to the models without 
portfolio controls, but the substantive conclusion is the same: regulatory independence 
exacerbates crisis period volatility. In contrast, the DSRO-crisis interaction is weakened 
significantly by the inclusion of the portfolio flow control. P-values of the interaction 
coefficient that hover around 0.10 without the control (see Table 6.7), inflate dramatically 
to well over 0.3 (Model 3-4,Table 6.14A). Furthermore, the sign of the DSRO-crisis 
coefficient lacks consistency across the dynamic fixed effects and GMM estimations.   
 Even in light of the inconsistencies outlined above, my alternative apolitical 
regulatory organization measure continues to perform as expected even after a control 
for portfolio equity flows is introduced. In terms of crisis period index price declines, the 
interaction term declines in size by around 40%, but still remains positive and significant 
with p-values ranging between 0.04 and 0.13 (not shown). This once again suggests that 
apolitical regulatory organization enhances politicians’ credibility and therefore lessens 
crisis period stock index declines. The differences between portfolio controlled and non-
controlled estimations are even less significant with regards to price volatility. In both 
fixed effect and Blundell-Bond estimations, interaction coefficients remain positive, 
significant (p<.04), and stable in magnitude (not shown). In sum, when regulatory 
agencies and stock exchange governing boards are free of political officials, crisis period 
stock index declines will be less severe and index volatility will be more severe. This 
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relationship holds even after controlling for the actions of foreign portfolio equity 
investors.  
Conclusion 
 Investors, corporate insiders, and the public demand two things from their 
political leaders in times of crisis: 1) that their economic interests are protected, and 2) 
that uncertainty is reduced and market volatility calmed. Achieving the second goal 
demands quick and decisive action. Accommodating the first goal often requires 
extended negotiation and the crafting of complex policy compromises that are faithfully 
implemented. The achievement of both goals is the ideal, but political and regulatory 
institutions may facilitate the achievement of one at the expense of the other. This chapter 
provides evidence of this tradeoff. 
 When veto players are few, electoral competition minimal, and regulatory 
organizations politicized, the volatility effects of systemic banking crises are reduced. 
Political leaders can choose a crisis response without difficult and sustained negotiations 
with other veto players or fear of future electoral punishment. Controversial and costly 
interventions such as bailouts, government stock purchases, and forced mergers can be 
more swiftly and widely pursued. Regulators and/or stock exchange officials, lacking 
formal independence, simply implement the orders of their political principals. Even if 
crisis resolution policies are less than ideal from a technical standpoint, the quick and 
decisive implementation of admittedly sub-optimal policies may still curb volatility.  
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 However, the reductions in market volatility just described may come at the 
expense of credibility with regard to MSP and market integrity. Stated differently, the 
same institutional configurations that reduce volatility may also contribute to larger and 
possibly catastrophic declines in stock prices. More specifically, findings suggest that 
when veto players are fewer, elections less than competitive, and regulators and 
exchanges politicized, banking crises lead to more negative price changes in stock market 
indices. These more substantial crisis period price declines may reflect a number of 
factors.  
 First, crises often reveal past accumulations of financial and corporate governance 
weakness. Investors reassess their portfolios in light of this startling new information and 
seek to liquidate their equity holdings in companies that are more poorly governed than 
they had originally thought. Second, investors’ lack of political representation may make 
them fear that their interests will be sacrificed when government responses are being 
crafted. Knowing that there are fewer veto players to defend them and their ability to 
punish incumbents in the future is limited, investors may seek to liquidate their equity 
holdings. This process will be accelerated if investors fear that less than independent 
regulators (public or private) will do little to protect them.  
 This raises the possibility that the reductions in volatility associated with 
unconstrained politicians and politicized regulators may be caused by equity investors’ 
wholesale abandonment of equity markets rather than the calming effects of policy 
decisiveness. With fewer investors making speculative trades on policy uncertainty or 
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responding to policy interventions once they are finally announced, markets are less 
volatile. However, this reduced volatility only emerges because equity markets are 
deserted. If this is the case, the abatement in volatility achieved by unconstrained 
politicians and politicized regulators are a pyric victory. Given my current research 
design, there is no way discern whether it is policy decisiveness, investor abandonment, 
or both that causes volatility reductions.  
 In summation,  to the extent political institutions are more consensual and 
elections more competitive, the interests of investors are more likely to be taken into 
account when crisis responses are devised. Furthermore, regulator independence and 
apolitical exchange governance should ensure more impartial and consistent 
implementation of crisis policies. These credibility effects should reduce crisis period 
stock index price declines even as they open the door to greater volatility. In the end, 
results suggest that political and regulatory institutions can deliver control and credibility, 
but they cannot simultaneously maximize both.  
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     Chapter 7        
Conclusion 
 How do political and regulatory institutions affect economic outcomes? This 
question stands at the center of a large institutional literature in economics and political 
science. Policy making veto players, electoral competition, proportional representation, 
and delegation to politically independent organizations have all been identified as 
essential to understanding a diverse array of economic and financial outcomes. However, 
the connection between institutions and stock market development has received little 
attention. This lack of emphasis is understandable. Stock markets play essential roles in 
corporate finance and governance in only a handful of primarily Anglo-American 
countries. In the rest of the world, bank lending and retained earnings remain the 
dominant motor of business expansion. However, this situation is changing and scholars 
have work to do in terms of understanding the sources and implications of this change.  
 Despite being criticized as financial side-shows or glorified casinos, the ubiquity 
of equity markets is remarkable. Stock exchanges have been established in nearly every 
country of the world. Governments that struggle to feed their citizens, maintain their 
territorial integrity, or respect human rights still dedicate scarce resources to the creation 
and encouragement of equity markets. The reasons behind stock exchange establishment 
differs from country to country and includes post-colonial economic indigenization; 
economic prestige, growth, and competitiveness; pursuit of financial independence and 
resilience; and the promotion of corporate efficiency. Even more remarkable than the 
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diffusion of stock exchanges across countries are their growth since the late 1980s. In 
lower and middle income countries, average value traded as a percentage of GDP has 
increased from 13 to 60 percent between 1994 and 2014. In that same group of countries, 
average market capitalization as a percentage of GDP increased from 37 to 62 percent 
between 2003 and 2015. Even regions that are considered international laggards in terms 
of stock market development have seen significant increases. For example, post-
communist Central Europe and the Baltics experienced roughly a doubling of both value 
traded and market capitalization to GDP between 1998 and 2012.  
 Political scientists should take note: low levels of equity market development 
should not be construed as political irrelevance. The 2010 Stock Market Scam in 
Bangladesh precipitated riot activity, street fighting, and political scandal even though 
market capitalization and value traded made up only 14 and 15 percent of Bangladesh’s 
GDP. When a botched IPO touched off protests and riots in Shenzhen during the “August 
10 Incident” of 1992, Chinese authorities considered it the most serious social 
disturbance since Tiananmen Square. Yet in the year of the “The Incident,” market 
capitalization and value traded made up only four percent of China’s GDP.  
 In many ways, the events in Bangladesh and China were echoes of similar crises 
experienced by the U.S. and Canada in 1929. The details may vary across countries, but 
the story is the same. Weak and inconsistent regulation combined with poorly supervised 
self-regulatory arrangements precipitated crash or damaging price volatility in 
economically small but rapidly growing equity markets. Even absent dramatic price drops 
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or violent price swings, repeated breaches of market integrity or acts of insider 
opportunism can create more slow-moving crises of investor confidence. In response, 
politicians attempt to reinforce market integrity and investor protection through the 
passage of shareholder friendly financial legislation. But as over a century of crisis, 
panic, fraud, and scandal demonstrate, these legislative commitments are rarely credible 
across booms and busts in asset values. The reasons behind this lack of credibility are 
numerous and have been discussed at length in previous chapters. However, the 
following reality cannot be emphasized enough: in the vast majority of countries a vast 
majority of time, it is the losers of stock market development and who hold the upper 
hand in lobbying and political mobilization. The winners of stock market development 
and investor protection almost always fight an uphill political battle, and their policy 
gains are often confined to the immediate aftermath of crisis or scandal. As a result, 
neglecting investor protection and market integrity is the path of least resistance for 
politicians and the executive bureaucrats they control. 
 Although these asymmetries in interest group mobilization are daunting, many 
stock markets continue to grow and objective measures of investor protection continue to 
improve. This suggests that while all political commitments to investor protection and 
market integrity are vulnerable, not all commitments are equally lacking in credibility. As 
the findings of this dissertation demonstrate, political and regulatory institutions are the 
key to understanding this variation in credibility as well as the patterns of stock market 
development that result from it. 
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Findings Summarized 
 My analysis of within country stock market size and performance finds general 
support for the theoretical expectations detailed in Chapter 2. I expected that both 
regulatory independence and depoliticized self-regulation would increase politicians’ 
credibility with regard to MSP and market integrity. In Chapter 3, I find convincing 
evidence in support of this expectation. When at least some aspects of regulatory 
rulemaking and enforcement are removed from the political uncertainties and instabilities 
that permeate finance ministries, stock markets tend to be larger and better performing. 
However, results indicate that delegation is not the only way that politicians’ credibility 
can be enhanced. Consensual political institutions (i.e. more numerous veto players and 
electoral proportionality) also appear to strengthen politicians’ commitments to investor 
protection. They accomplish this by reducing the frequency and severity of regulatory 
policy change, facilitating contentious corporate governance reforms, and diluting the 
influence of corporate and industry insiders. Given that both regulatory independence and 
consensual political institutions are related to stock market growth and performance, I 
investigated whether the two sets of institutions could act as functional substitutes in 
terms of safeguarding investor protections and promoting equity market development. 
Results confirmed my expectations. Politically independent public regulators have their 
largest effects on stock market size when veto players are fewer in number and where 
elections are more majoritarian than they are proportional.  
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 I also explored Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) claim that industrial and financial 
incumbents have particularly strong reasons to oppose stock market development and that 
these interests should be especially powerful in financially underdeveloped countries. 
Since regulatory independence and consensual political institutions’ credibility effects 
stem in part from their ability to dilute corporate insider lobbying, they should have their 
greatest effects in countries where these interests are particular strong. Although not 
completely robust across estimations, there is evidence supporting this contention. The 
effects of political constraint (i.e. veto players), electoral proportionality, and regulatory 
independence are larger in countries with less developed credit markets. In more 
financially mature countries that are home to more pluralistic interest group 
environments, political and regulatory institutions have smaller effects.  
 The ability of regulatory independence to enhance stock market development 
stems from two closely related sources: 1) their ability to boost investor confidence, and 
2) their capacity to make corporate insiders (i.e. executives and controlling shareholders) 
more cognizant of investors’ rights. In Chapter 4, I explore this second source by 
comparing legal expert evaluations of investor protection strength with the evaluations of 
senior executives. More specifically, I investigate the institutional drivers of executive 
awareness of shareholder rights. Since an independent regulator should more 
consistently, impartially, and stringently enforce minority shareholder protection, I expect 
executives to have a firmer grasp of the strength of minority shareholder protections 
(MSP) in countries with more independent regulators. My findings confirm this 
expectation. As regulatory independence increases, executive and legal expert 
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evaluations of shareholder protections converge. This convergence effect is confined 
largely to countries where executives express overconfidence in the strength of minority 
shareholder protection relative to the experts and where stock markets are not the most 
highly developed. In sum, the more consistent investor protection that results from 
regulatory independence should be the most jarring to corporate elites in richer countries 
with histories of weak MSP and underdeveloped stock markets (e.g. Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, Finland, Qatar, Jordan, and Bahrain). In contrast, executive opinions in 
Anglo-American countries with well-developed markets and poorer countries with 
incomplete property rights seem less affected by regulatory independence. In the former 
case, shareholders hold greater economic power due to more active markets for corporate 
control and the disciplinary effects of stock market liquidity and corporate transparency. 
Since common law affords shareholders better opportunities to defend themselves 
through litigation, they may also be less dependent upon the administrative protections 
enforced by regulators. In the case of poorer countries with weak legal systems, 
regulators’ formal protections from political interference are more likely to be ignored in 
the same way that property rights are ignored. As a result, the formal independence of 
agencies should have a lesser impact on agency performance and therefore a lesser 
impact on executive opinion.   
 In Chapter 5, I present my new measure of depoliticized exchange governance 
and self-regulation (DSRO). I then evaluate whether more apolitical exchange 
governance and greater delegation to SROs is positively associated with stock market 
development and performance. Although sensitive to included controls and alternative 
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estimators, my expectations are mostly confirmed. Self-regulation is positively related to 
both stock market size and performance. Furthermore, this positive relationship survives 
(in many specifications) controls for public regulatory agency independence. This 
suggests that the political autonomy of both public and private regulators make distinct 
contributions to stock market development. Like public regulatory independence, there is 
some tentative evidence that the positive relationship between DSRO and stock market 
size is stronger when elections are more majoritarian. 
 As my brief vignette of the Chinese case suggests, the depoliticized governance of 
stock exchanges and a minimal level of democratic accountability are both essential 
foundations of effective self-regulation. Without the former, politicians are free to 
directly undermine the integrity of self-regulatory arrangements for their own gain. 
Without the latter, they can exploit stock market infrastructures without fear of electoral 
punishment. My findings provide evidence for this assertion in two ways. First, of all the 
indicators that make up my DSRO measure, the indicators regarding the presence of 
politicians, political appointees, and public regulators on exchange boards are the most 
discriminatory. A more barebones measure of SRO intensity without these depoliticized 
exchange governance indicators fails to provide evidence of a link between self-
regulation and stock market development. This suggests that self-regulation will do little 
to boost investor confidence as long as politicians’ credibility problems are directly 
intertwined with exchange governance. Second, analyses of the interaction effects 
between self-regulation and electoral competition suggests that self-regulation’s positive 
effects are only distinguishable from zero if multiple political parties compete in 
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legislative and executive elections. In other words, effective self-regulation is at least 
partially dependent upon a competitive political foundation.  
 In Chapter 6, I explore the credibility effects of regulatory independence, self-
regulation, and political institutions in the context of systemic financial crisis. For a 
variety of reasons, minority shareholders and retail investors are particularly vulnerable 
to insider opportunism, market manipulations, and even expropriation during periods of 
systemic instability. As a result, political constraint, meaningful electoral competition, 
regulatory independence, and depoliticized self-regulation should all be especially 
important during crisis. Results provide evidence of this assertion. Although sensitive to 
controls for portfolio equity flows, more numerous veto players, electoral competition, 
independence, and depoliticized self-regulation all ameliorate crisis period stock index 
price declines. Stated differently, when politicians face future elections, are constrained 
by other veto players, and are prevented from directly interfering in the conduct of 
regulatory agencies and SROs, equity investors have greater confidence in times of crisis. 
However, results also indicate that these positive credibility effects come with costs in the 
form of added stock price volatility. 
 If veto players are more numerous and public and private regulators more 
independent from politicians, coordinating swift and decisive crisis responses can 
become more costly and difficult. More exactly, as executives, legislators, regulators, and 
industry actors haggle over the appropriate policy responses and market interventions, 
stock indices may swing wildly as investors attempt to anticipate the precise shape of the 
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ultimate crisis response. These expectations are largely confirmed by empirical models. 
Higher levels of political constraint, regulatory independence, and depoliticized self-
regulation are all positively related to crisis period index price volatility. This suggests 
that the beneficial credibility effects of these institutions are not without a costly 
downside. That said, this downside is likely worth the costs. While stock prices may 
swing more violently as political constraint and regulatory independence (both public and 
private) increases, the market as whole will ultimately come to rest at higher levels than it 
would if veto players were fewer or regulators more politicized.  
Contributions to the Literature 
 The first and most obvious contribution of this dissertation comes in the form of 
two one of a kind datasets. Although previous researchers have measured the formal 
independence of regulatory agencies, my measure of securities market agency 
independence is unique in terms of its greater number of indicators (25), its country 
coverage (N>130), and temporal scope (1988-2012). In addition to sharing the public 
regulator dataset’s country coverage and time period, my dataset of exchange 
governance, state ownership, and self-regulation is even more novel. No other researcher 
has assembled a complete list of recognized SROs along with stock exchange ownership 
and board governance data. Furthermore, the measures that emerged from both of the 
datasets are only weakly correlated with existing measures of minority shareholder 
protection. This should be a warning to scholars of the regulatory state. Regulatory 
organization and regulatory rules are distinct and may have different effects on regulatory 
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outcomes. Overall, both datasets should be useful to any scholar interested in the politics 
and governance of equity markets.  
 In addition to two new datasets, my results also speak to several debates within 
the political science literature. Most broadly, when evaluating the impact of institutions 
on economic outcomes, scholars of political institutions cannot neglect regulatory 
organization. If sufficiently independent, regulatory agents can become influential veto 
players like any other. As a result, institutionalists must expand their purview beyond 
courts and politicians so that the regulatory state is directly incorporated into their 
theoretical and empirical studies. My results also call into question the findings of Keefer 
and Stasavage (2002) who claim that more numerous veto players are a prerequisite of 
credibility enhancing delegation. Like Gilardi (2007), I find the opposite. At least in 
terms of equity investors’ judgements of politicians’ regulatory commitments, evidence 
suggests that more numerous veto players are a functional substitute rather than a 
complement to independent regulators. In short, there is more than one way for 
politicians to achieve credibility. If consensual (majoritarian) political institutions already 
enhance (diminish) policy stability and consistency, then delegation may be less (more) 
important. Scholars should continue to investigate the interconnections between veto 
players, delegation, and political independence so that any inconsistencies can be 
resolved.  
 Although the finding that more numerous veto players encourages stock market 
development is far from unexpected given previous research, the positive relationship 
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between increasing electoral proportionality and stock market size and performance 
contradicts previous work. More exactly, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) claim that 
consensual political institutions (i.e. many veto players and proportional elections) 
underpin corporatist compromises between insider labor and block shareholders. They 
argue that these compromises come at the clear expense of minority shareholders and 
stock market development. I do not contest that consensual political institutions may have 
once fulfilled this function particularly in Western Europe. Instead, my results highlight 
the temporal and geographic limitations of Gourevitch and Shinn’s argument. My results 
highlight that the connection between consensual political institutions and stock market 
stagnation grows more tenuous as the scope of study moves beyond the first three 
decades of post-War Western Europe. 
Limitations and Future Avenues for Research 
 Although robust, my findings have clear limitations. First, my results establish 
long-run macro correlations between annual country-level political economic measures 
on the one hand, and stock market outcomes on the other.  This highly aggregated 
approach inevitably involves the destruction of important information. In order to get a 
firmer grasp of the causal mechanisms involved, future research on regulatory 
independence and stock market performance should utilize comparative analyses of 
individual countries at lower levels of temporal aggregation (Freeman 2002). A more 
quasi-experimental set-up may reveal institutional dynamics and interrelations that are 
hidden by my more long-run macro approach. For instance, an analysis of abnormal stock 
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returns following the announcement of regulatory agency reorganization could be 
extraordinarily helpful in understanding how investors respond to regulatory change.  
 Other limitations are measurement related. First, I utilize primarily formal or de 
jure indicators. Future work would verify my results with a de facto measure of 
independence such as turnover among agency heads or board members. Second, this 
project did not incorporate measures of individual regulators’ interests. As Adolph’s 
(2013) research on central bank independence demonstrates, the preferences and interests 
of nominally ‘apolitical’ and technocratic experts matter for economic outcomes. Perhaps 
even more disturbingly, their preferences may be shaped by “shadow principals” in 
private industry rather than their formal principals in government. Given that I evaluate 
the financial sector, past career socialization and future career prospects are likely to be 
powerful shapers of regulators’ policy preferences. As a result, measuring securities 
regulators’ educational experiences and career paths would be revealing. Ideally, future 
work would investigate how regulatory institutions, regulators’ interests, and interactions 
between interests and institutions jointly determine patterns of stock market development, 
performance, and stability. Finally, future research on regulatory independence would 
benefit from the adoption of a Bayesian approach to latent measurement. While a 
maximum likelihood approach comes with few costs when measures have many 
indicators and large sample sizes, the ability to incorporate measurement error in 
empirical models has real advantages that should not be neglected by researchers 
indefinitely.  
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 In addition to addressing these questions of measurement, researchers should also 
explore how stock market regulation and development shapes political struggles in other 
policy areas. Most obviously, the perceived integrity of stock markets as well as their 
performance will profoundly shape the political feasibility and sustainability of multi-
pillar pension reforms and privatization. If the general public views financial markets as 
riven with opportunism, fraud, and deceit, movement towards and the success of defined 
contribution retirement plans will suffer. Scholars interested in the politics of inequality 
could also benefit from a closer examination of financial market regulation. Currently, 
the empirical evidence regarding the connection between financial and stock market 
development on the one hand and income inequality on the other is mixed. Possible non-
linearity, period effects, differences between developed and developing countries, and 
inconsistences across estimation approaches have prevented a scholarly consensus from 
emerging (Paşalı 2013). Instead of looking at how financial sector development writ large 
affects inequality, scholars should investigate how specific patterns of regulatory rules 
and organization can make financial development more or less egalitarian in the short and 
long-term.  
Takeaways 
 The recent financial crisis highlighted dramatic short-comings in the U.S. and 
other countries’ regulatory frameworks. The crisis provided yet more examples of how 
the politicization and industry capture of regulatory organizations can undermine their 
performance. That said, judging the legitimacy and effectiveness of regulators based only 
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upon their most recent and spectacular failures is likely to produce a distorted picture. If 
researchers deliberately search for instances regulatory agency failure or capture, they 
will always be able to find it. But they will find similar failures and equally troubling 
examples of corporate and industry influence within legislatures and executive 
bureaucracies. The most important question is not whether real-life regulatory 
organizations fall short of some perfectly impartial publically interested ideal, but 
whether real-life regulatory organizations with more political independence produce 
superior outcomes to organizations with less independence. This relative judgement 
should be made over the long run and include periods of normalcy as well as crisis. To 
reiterate, scholars, commentators, and the public should be under no illusions. Regulatory 
organizations have their flaws and their personnel are often far from being completely 
neutral technocrats. However, as the financial sector grows more complex and dynamic, 
the delegation of rulemaking and enforcement power to independent regulatory agencies 
and SROs will remain important if not indispensable. This delegation will not be costless 
nor will it prevent crisis or instability. The isolation of public regulatory agencies and 
private SROs from the public’s political representatives will continue to fit awkwardly 
with most citizens’ closely held democratic commitments. Ultimately, politicians’ 
commitments to stock market development and financial liberalization more generally are 
political as well as economic challenges. Neither commitment can be sustained without 
some minimal level of public support and participation. Ironically, my findings suggest 
that this public support and participation should be more forthcoming when the public’s 
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political representatives play a smaller role in upholding the public interest in investor 
protection and market integrity.  
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Appendix  III(a) 
      Table 3.13A        
(Untransformed DV) 
DV: Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization%GDP       
       
Market Cap t-1 0.55*** 
(0.08) 
0.55*** 
(0.08) 
0.54*** 
(0.09) 
0.53*** 
(0.08) 
0.54*** 
(0.08) 
0.54*** 
(0.08) 
Regulatory  6.84** 6.85** 6.94** 6.96** 6.97** 6.71** 
Independence (3.09) (3.14) (3.31) (3.18) (3.12) (3.32) 
Political   4.29     
Constraint  (2.62)     
Electoral    1.41    
Proportionality   (1.0)    
Left     0.89   
Government    (1.33)   
Electoral      -0.25  
Competitiveness     (0.25)  
Government      -0.77 
Consumption      (0.55) 
       
GDP Growth 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.45*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 1.45 1.54 1.04 3.04* 1.51 2.05 
 (1.34) (1.4) (1.38) (1.59) (1.39) (1.55) 
ln(Trade) 14.6*** 14.3*** 15.5*** 16.4*** 14.3*** 14.2*** 
 (4.32) (4.38) (5.00) (4.83) (4.33) (4.44) 
Capital Account 10.84*** 11.01*** 11.3*** 8.89*** 10.9*** 11.0*** 
Openness (3.11) (3.17) (3.33) (3.16) (3.15) (3.22) 
∆All World  14.7*** 15.0*** 15.1*** 14.7*** 15.0*** 14.9*** 
Stock Index (1.59) (1.6) (1.7) (1.57) (1.59) (1.6) 
       
Constant -68.0*** -69.5*** -71.4*** -86.2*** -65.4*** -58.2*** 
 (21.7) (23.0) (24.8) (26.4) (23.4) (17.8) 
       
Observations 2,027 2,015 1,832 1,937 2,016 1,998 
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Number of countries 110 109 103 110 109 110 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 3.14A     
 (Blundell-Bond GMM Estimations) 
DV: ln(Market 
Capitalization%GDP) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.69*** 
(0.03) 
0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.05) 
0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.04) 
       
Regulatory  
Independence 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
       
Political   0.29**     
Constraints  (0.11)     
Electoral  
Proportionality 
  0.04 
(0.04) 
   
       
Left Partisanship    -0.06   
    (0.04)   
Electoral  
Competition 
    0.01 
(0.014) 
 
       
General government 
consumption  
     -0.02 
(0.01) 
       
       
GDP growth  0.01** 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -0.02 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.31*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
0.186* 
(0.11) 
0.16* 
(0.09) 
0.19* 
(0.10) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
0.21** 
(0.11) 
Banking crisis   -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.14** -0.14*** -0.15*** 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
∆All World Index 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.42 -1.00** -0.65 -0.71 -0.90* -0.48 
 (0.43) (0.48) (0.45) (0.47) (0.50) (0.46) 
       
Observations 2,027 1,926 1,750 1,937 1,927 1,909 
Number of countries 110 109 103 110 109 110 
Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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          Table 3.15A            
(Blundell-Bond GMM Estimations) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Capitalization%GDP)      
      
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.54*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.03) 
0.66*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.05) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
0.36* 
(0.18) 
0.31* 
(0.17) 
0.48*** 
(0.16) 
0.22 
(0.16) 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
Political  
Constraint 
0.42 
(0.29) 
0.52* 
(0.27) 
0.76*** 
(0.24) 
  
Checks    0.02 0.02 
    (0.02) (0.02) 
Independence X 
Constraint 
-0.31 
(0.41) 
-0.39 
(0.37) 
-0.84** 
(0.33) 
  
Independence X  
Checks 
   -0.011 
(0.03) 
-0.022 
(0.02) 
Electoral  
Competition 
  0.005 
(0.02) 
 0.008 
(0.026) 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
  0.05 
(0.03) 
 0.05 
(0.03) 
General government 
consumption 
  -0.0193* 
(0.01) 
 -0.017* 
(0.01) 
GDP Growth 0.009*** 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.05 -0.006 -0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
0.18* 
(0.10) 
Bank Crisis  -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.18*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
∆All World Index  0.31*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -0.70 -1.05** -0.75 -0.91* -0.60 
 (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) 
      
Observations 2,015 1,926 1,724 1,913 1,712 
Number of countries 109 109 103 109 103 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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                                                           Table 3.16A        
(Blundell-Bond GMM Estimations) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization %GDP)       
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.04) 
0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.66*** 
(0.044) 
0.67*** 
(0.04) 
0.65*** 
(0.04) 
Regulatory 
Independence 
0.21 
(0.15) 
0.29** 
(0.15) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
0.323** 
(0.149) 
0.30** 
(0.14) 
0.36** 
(0.15) 
Electoral  
Proportionality 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
   
Proportional     0.211 0.18 0.31* 
Dummy    (0.179) (0.17) (0.17) 
Independence X 
Proportionality 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.065) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
   
Independence X 
Dummy 
   -0.29* 
(0.17) 
-0.27 
(0.17) 
-0.35* 
(0.19) 
Political   0.20* 0.23*  0.21* 0.256** 
Constraint  (0.12) (0.12)  (0.12) (0.124) 
Electoral  
Competition 
  0.01 
(0.03) 
  0.003 
(0.026) 
General government 
consumption 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.02* 
(0.01) 
       
GDP Growth 0.007** 0.004 0.006* 0.004 0.004 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCap) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.0002 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.036) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.28*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.25*** 
(0.09) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
0.27*** 
(0.089) 
0.18** 
(0.09) 
0.18** 
(0.09) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
∆All World  
Stock Index 
0.30*** 
(0.01) 
0.30*** 
(0.01) 
0.31*** 
(0.01) 
0.30*** 
(0.02) 
0.30*** 
(0.02) 
0.31*** 
(0.02) 
Bank Crisis  -0.17***  -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.17*** 
  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -0.31 -0.81* -0.35 -0.67 -0.79* -0.65 
 (0.37) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.51) 
       
Observations 1,832 1,749 1,806 1,750 1,749 1,724 
Number of countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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               Table 3.17A       
 (Regulatory Established: Market Capitalization) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) 
Capitalization %GDP)    
    
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
    
Regulator Established 0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
Electoral Proportionality 0.10*** 
(0.0272) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Political Constraint 0.16** 0.18** 0.18** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Electoral Competitiveness  -0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
General Government 
Consumption 
 -0.01** 
(0.005) 
-0.01** 
(0.005) 
GDP Growth 0.006** 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Capital Account Openness 0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
Bank Crisis -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆All World Index 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.99** -0.75* -0.75* 
 (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) 
    
Observations 1,774 1,749 1,749 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.68 0.71 
Overall R2 0.80 0.84 0.81 
Year FE NO NO NO 
Number of countries 103 103 103 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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          Table 3.18A     
 (Regulator Established-Interactions)  
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
    
     
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
     
Regulator  
Established 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.15** 
(0.06) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Electoral  
Proportionality 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
Political  0.48*** 0.53*** 0.18** 0.21** 
Constraint (0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) 
Reg. Est. X Political 
Constraint 
-0.34** 
(0.14) 
-0.36*** 
(0.13) 
  
Reg. Est.  X   -0.03 -0.03 
Proportionality   (0.02) (0.02) 
Electoral  
Competitiveness 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
General Government 
Consumption 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.01** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
GDP Growth 0.005* 0.007** 0.005* 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.026 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 
 (0.035) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) 
ln(Trade) 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.23** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
Capital Account  
Openness 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
Bank Crisis -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆All World Index 0.28***  0.28***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Constant -0.81** 0.18 -0.80** 0.64 
 (0.38) (0.67) (0.39) (0.83) 
     
Observations 1,749 1,749 1,749 1,718 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.73 
Overall R2 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.82 
Year FE NO YES NO YES 
Number of countries 103 103 103 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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      Table 3.19A              
(Regulator Established-Interactions: S&P Index Annual % Price ∆) 
DV: %∆S&P  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Indices       
       
Regulatory 
Framework 
Established 
6.71 
(4.87) 
4.50 
(5.52) 
9.83 
(18.4) 
4.47 
(17.18) 
-10.61 
(8.10) 
-22.62 
(14.24) 
Political   -21.68* -10.14 -4.02 -23.11** -8.15 
Constraint  (11.4) (38.34) (35.30) (11.47) (11.05) 
Electoral   6.00** 6.06** 1.76 -2.46 -12.35* 
Proportionality  (2.77) (2.75) (2.79) (4.74) (7.25) 
Reg. Est. X Political 
Constraint 
  -12.68 
(38.42) 
-4.35 
(34.47) 
  
Reg. Est X 
Proportionality 
    8.39** 
(3.60) 
13.72** 
(5.82) 
Electoral   -0.59 -0.59 -1.20 -0.73 -1.01 
Competition  (3.01) (3.00) (2.51) (2.95) (2.55) 
General Government 
Consumption 
 -2.77 
(2.96) 
-2.73 
(2.98) 
-3.33 
(2.73) 
-2.83 
(2.95) 
-5.26 
(4.56) 
GDP Growth 0.66** 0.28 0.28 1.05** 0.25 0.79 
 (0.33) (0.44) (0.44) (0.48) (0.44) (0.49) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -2.1 -1.54 -1.64 -32.6*** -1.70 -44.3** 
 (3.1) (3.51) (3.41) (11.12) (3.47) (20.60) 
ln(Trade) 24.1*** 23.8** 24.01** -11.8 22.4** -23.5 
 (8.67) (9.71) (9.61) (17.51) (9.49) (25.19) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
-1.28 
(8.48) 
-2.26 
(9.53) 
-2.11 
(9.52) 
-6.52 
(9.71) 
-2.29 
(9.47) 
-4.75 
(10.3) 
Bank Crisis -20.3*** -18.8*** -18.9*** -13.6*** -18.8*** -14.1*** 
 (4.59) (4.46) (4.49) (3.92) (4.46) (4.25) 
∆All World  35.5*** 36.4*** 36.4***  36.3***  
Stock Index (1.8) (1.94) (1.95)  (1.94)  
Constant -80.0*** -27.8 -33.2 378.6* -2.08 584.4* 
 (26.6) (59.9) (64.07) (191.0) (61.97) (336.6) 
       
Observations 1,277 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,163 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.30 
Overall R
2 
0.16 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Year FE NO NO NO YES NO YES 
Number of countries 82 76 76 76 76 76 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 3.20A 
(Institutions and Net Foreign Portfolio Equity Inflows) 
DV: Net Portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Equity Inflows  
(Millions) 
      
       
Net Portfolio 1 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 
Inflows t-1 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Regulatory 879.3 841.3 1100 834.7 1188 857.0 
Independence (1454) (1471) (1830) (1472) (1533) (1504) 
Political Constraint  120.7     
  (829.3)     
Electoral    -269.1    
Proportionality   (206.5)    
Left Government    1045   
    (823.6)   
Electoral      -173.6**  
Competition     (76.58)  
Government       -54.75 
Consumption      (68.89) 
       
GDP Growth -56.11* -57.65* -64.14 -57.03* -55.22 -64.91* 
 (33.79) (33.95) (41.34) (34.05) (33.49) (37.44) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 1287** 1294** 1247* 1325** 1308** 1352** 
 (574.0) (580.1) (706.1) (590.5) (584.0) (605.2) 
ln(Trade) 2551* 2436* 2836 2358* 2608* 2780* 
 (1453) (1457) (1875) (1391) (1481) (1546) 
Capital Account -313.3 -286.0 -164.3 -214.5 -313.7 -380.9 
Openness (759.3) (758.8) (908.7) (729.7) (769.6) (799.1) 
∆All World Stock  3132*** 3097*** 3237*** 3139*** 3135*** 3220*** 
Index (1,092) (1,096) (1,180) (1,093) (1,105) (1,121) 
Constant -19979** -19570** -20664* -19813** -18753* -20543** 
 (9804) (9843) (12337) (9750) (9720) (9941) 
       
Observations 2394 2380 2091 2394 2369 2337 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Number of country 125 124 118 125 123 125 
Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 3.21A       
(Net Foreign Portfolio Equity Flows as Control)  
DV: ln(Market  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
LSDV Blundell-
Bond 
LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV 
       
ln(Market 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 
Capitalization) t-1 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Regulatory  0.13*** 0.13 0.12** 0.24*** 0.18** 0.27*** 
Independence (0.05) (0.08) (0.054) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Political  0.14** 0.21*  0.35*** 0.13* 0.15** 
Constraint (0.07) (0.11)  (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) 
Electoral   0.05**  0.082***  
Proportionality   (0.02)  (0.03)  
Independence x    -0.34**   
Constraint    (0.16)   
Independence x 
Electoral 
    -0.04 
(0.03) 
 
Proportionality       
Domestic Credit      0.001** 
      (0.0006) 
Independence x       -0.002*** 
Domestic Credit      (0.0006) 
Net Portfolio  .000001** .000001*** .000001*** .000001*** .000001*** .000001*** 
Equity Inflows (.0000005) (.0000006) (.0000004) (0.0000005) (.0000004) (.0000005) 
GDP Growth 0.01*** 0.007* 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -0.007 -0.05* -0.02 -0.008 -0.015 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 
 (0.06) (0.108) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Capital Account 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
Openness (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
∆All World  0.29*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
Stock Index (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.43 -0.32 -0.40 -0.49 -0.56* -0.55* 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.32) (0.29) (0.33) (0.31) 
       
Observations 1,830 1,830 1,701 1,830 1,700 1,800 
R-squared 0.716  0.714 0.716 0.715 0.716 
Number of 
countries 
103 103 98 103 98 103 
Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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       Table 3.22A          
(Net Foreign Portfolio Equity Flows as Control (∆%S&P Index))  
DV: %∆S&P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country Index       
       
Regulatory  16.2** 16.8** 12.4* 29.3 35.9** -6.46 
Independence (7.33) (7.29) (7.231) (17.95) (14.30) (8.81) 
Political   -21.4*  0.99  -22.6* 
Constraint  (11.5)  (32.0)  (11.7) 
       
Checks     3.27  
     (2.02)  
       
Electoral    3.63   -4.84 
Proportionality   (3.89)   (5.97) 
       
Independence x    -32.8   
Constraint    (42.3)   
Independence x 
Checks  
    -5.32* 
(3.14) 
 
Independence x      10.7** 
Proportionality      (5.18) 
       
Net Portfolio  0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 
Equity Inflows (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
GDP Growth 1.34*** 1.36*** 1.33*** 1.35*** 1.31*** 1.30*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -6.26** -6.51** -5.81* -6.81** -7.01** -6.32** 
 (2.97) (2.94) (3.17) (2.88) (3.04) (3.06) 
ln(Trade) 15.3* 13.5 15.8* 13.7 15.9* 12.7 
 (9.18) (9.07) (9.49) (9.11) (9.28) (9.11) 
Capital Account 8.86 8.03 10.16 8.71 11.38 9.59 
Openness (8.12) (7.92) (8.81) (8.01) (8.04) (8.60) 
∆All World  36.6*** 36.4*** 36.9*** 36.4*** 36.5*** 36.7*** 
Stock Index (1.81) (1.82) (1.86) (1.80) (1.86) (1.85) 
Constant -22.52 -4.53 -32.8 -11.3 -31.6 8.73 
 (23.8) (24.4) (26.2) (26.6) (26.6) (31.2) 
       
Observations 1,218 1,206 1,160 1,206 1,201 1,159 
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32 
Number of countries 79 78 74 78 78 74 
Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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APPENDIX III(b) 
Regulatory Independence Item Indicators w/Discrimination Parameters 
(95% Confidence Intervals in Parentheses) 
 
1) Agency Head Term Length        
Discrimination Parameter: 4.9 (4.0, 5.9)        
0 -- No fixed term or term length at discretion of appointer      
1 --  < 4 year term            
2 -- 4 or 5 year term            
3 -- 6 years or greater            
 
 
2) Board Term Length        
 
Discrimination Parameter: 4.7 (3.9, 5.6)                  
0 -- No fixed term or term length at discretion of appointer         
1 -- < 4 year term            
2 -- 4 or 5 year term             
3 -- 6 years or greater 
 
 
3) Board Appointments Staggered        
Discrimination Parameter: 2.1 (1.6, 2.7)               
0 -- No              
1 -- Yes            
 
 
4) Agency Head Appointment Procedure       
Discrimination Parameter: 5.7  (4.3, 7.0)          
0 -- Executive Officials alone or executive official with non-binding consultation with 
actors outside of the executive          
 333 
 
1 -- Parliament/Legislative Body Alone          
2 -- More than one veto player must agree or more than one actor has appointment power 
(e.g. nominated by executive branch and confirmed by legislative branch, majority 
decision of agency board which must then be approved by another actor, executive must 
select from a list provided by outside group and cannot ignore or demand a new list)  
2 -- Selection by another regulator that is separate from the executive bureaucracy or 
selection by Central Bank            
3 -- Board selects agency head and the selection was not subject to prior approval by a 
political actor 
 
 
5) Board Appointment Procedure         
Discrimination Parameter: 4.0 (3.1, 4.9)        
0 -- Executive Officials alone or executive official with non-binding consultation with 
actors outside of the executive          
1 -- Parliament/Legislative Body Alone         
2 -- More than one veto player must agree or more than one actor has appointment power 
(e.g. nominated by executive branch and confirmed by legislative branch, majority 
decision of agency board which must then be approved by another actor, executive must 
select from a list provided by outside group and cannot ignore or demand a new list)   
2 -- Selection by another regulator that is separate from the executive bureaucracy or 
selection by Central Bank            
3 -- Agency Head selects board and the selection was not subject to prior approval by a 
political actor 
 
 
6) Agency Head Removal        
Discrimination Parameter: 6.8 (4.7, 8.8)         
0 -- Executive Officials alone or executive official with non-binding consultation with 
actors outside of the executive          
1 -- Parliament/Legislative Body Alone         
2 -- More than one veto player must agree         
2 -- Removal by another regulator that is separate from the executive bureaucracy or  
removal by Central Bank           
3 -- Decision of the Agency Board or Judiciary Alone 
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7) Board Member Removal Procedure       
Discrimination Parameter: 4.0 (2.9, 5.2)        
0 -- Executive Officials alone or executive official with non-binding consultation with 
actors outside of the executive          
1 -- Parliament/Legislative Body Alone         
2 -- More than one veto player must agree          
2 -- Removal another regulator that is separate from the executive bureaucracy or  
removal by Central Bank           
3 -- Decision of the Agency Board or Judiciary Alone       
 
 
8) Chief Executive or Management Board Appointment Procedure   
Discrimination Parameter: 5.0 (3.4, 6.5)         
0 -- Executive Officials alone or executive official with non-binding consultation with 
actors outside of the executive         
1 -- Parliament/Legislative Body Alone          
2 -- More than one veto player must agree or more than one actor has appointment power 
(e.g. nominated by executive branch and confirmed by legislative branch, nominated by 
agency and confirmed by executive or legislative branch,  selection from a list provided 
by outside group and political appointer cannot ignore or demand a new list)   
2 -- Selection by another regulator that is separate from the executive bureaucracy or  
selection by Central Bank           
3 -- Agency Alone 
 
 
9) Chief Executive/Management Board Removal Procedure     
 
Discrimination Parameter: 5.1 (3.4, 6.7)        
0 -- Executive or Legislative Officials alone or executive/legislature with non-binding 
consultation with actors outside of the executive        
1 -- More than one veto player must agree  
1 -- Removal by another regulator that is separate from the executive bureaucracy or 
removal by Central Bank            
2 -- Decision of the Agency Board or Judiciary Alone  
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10) Chief Executive or Management Board Term Length   
 
 
Discrimination Parameter: 5.0 (3.9, 6.2)        
If appointed by actors outside of agency        
0 -- <3 years or no term length.          
1 -- 3 or 4 years           
2 -- 4 or 5 years years           
3 -- ≥6 years              
 
If appointed by agency          
3 -- At agency’s discretion alone           
   
 
 
11) Government Ex-Officio Membership      
 
Discrimination Parameter: 5.0 (4.1, 5.9)        
0 --  More than 1 elected/government officials are ex-officio members of agency 
supervisory/executive board           
1 -- 1 elected/government official sits on agency supervisory/executive board   
2 -- No elected/government officials are ex-officio members of agency 
supervisory/executive board 
 
Note: Observers are not considered Ex-Officio Members, only those with voting, that 
ability to require second deliberations, or  formal agenda setting power are counted as 
Ex-Officio members 
 
 
12) Outside Regulator Ex-Officio Membership        
 
Discrimination Parameter: 5.3 (4.4, 6.1)        
0 --  More than 1 outside regulatory official is ex-officio member of agency 
supervisory/executive board (includes central bankers)        
1 -- 1 outside regulatory official sits on agency supervisory/executive board   
2 -- No outside regulatory officials are ex-officio members of agency 
supervisory/executive board 
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Note: Observers are not considered Ex-Officio Members, only those with voting, that 
ability to require second deliberations, or  formal agenda setting power are counted as 
Ex-Officio members 
 
 
13) Budgetary Independence 
 
Discrimination Parameter:   2.1 (1.6, 2.6) 
0 -- Agency is partially or completely dependent upon government     
1 -- Agency has complete budgetary independence from government and (%>90) of 
funding  comes from industry fees, levies, tariffs, penalties, and grants from NGOs.  
 
 
14) Budget Allocation Approval       
Discrimination Parameter: 2.0 (1.5, 2.4)                  
0 -- Planned agency budget expenditures and/or allocations must be approved by elected 
officials             
1 -- Planned agency budget expenditure and allocations are not subject to ex ante 
approval of elected officials 
 
 
15) Rule Approval  
 
Discrimination Parameter: 3.6 (3.1, 4.1) 
0 -- Ministers/executive/legislative officials are the dominant issuers of regulations or 
write a majority of rules.          
1 -- Regulatory agency makes rules and issues regulations, but all regulations and rules 
must be approved or can be vetoed by executive officials, ministers of finance, or 
legislative committees  
2-- Regulatory agency is a significant rule maker, but executive officials retain 
rulemaking power over select areas of substantive importance  
3 -- Regulatory agency is the dominant regulatory rule maker; executive officials do NOT 
have veto power over issued regulations and retain a minor to nonexistent role in 
rulemaking.  
 
 
16) Government Directions  
 
Discrimination Parameter: 5.7 (4.7, 6.7)       
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0 -- Government can issue binding directions to agency about SPECIFIC policies, rules, 
and cases of enforcement             
1 -- Government can issue binding directions to agency about GENERAL policy issues 
and priorities               
2 -- Government CANNOT issue binding directions of any form to agency  
 
 
17) Statement of Independence        
 
Discrimination Parameter: 3.5 (2.9, 4.1)        
0 -- No explicit statement of agency independence or autonomy from government 
officials/ministries within agency statute         
1 -- Explicit statement of agency independence or autonomy from government 
officials/ministries within agency statute 
 
18) Ban on Political/Partisan Officials          
 
 
Discrimination Parameter: 3.0 (2.4, 3.5)         
0 -- No explicit ban on agency officials holding other positions/membership within 
government, political, or partisan organizations       
1 --  Explicit ban on agency officials holding other positions/membership within 
government, political, or partisan organizations  
 
 
19) Agency Head Term Renewal      
 
Discrimination Parameter: 2.3 (1.3, 3.3)        
0 -- No limits on term renewal         
1 -- Agency head term can only be renewed once       
2 -- Agency head can serve for only one term 
 
20) Board Member Term Renewal         
Discrimination Parameter: 2.4 (1.3, 3.4)                  
0 -- No limits on term renewal         
1 -- Board member term can only be renewed once       
2 -- Board member can serve for only one term 
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21) Chief Executive/Management Board Term Renewal       
Discrimination Parameter: 1.7 (0.9, 2.6)        
0 -- No limits on term renewal         
1 -- Management member term can only be renewed once      
2 -- Management member can serve for only one term 
 
 
22) Political Dismissal Language  
 
Discrimination Parameter: 3.0 (2.5, 3.5)        
0 -- Serve at will of appointer or no policy specified        
1 -- Language is broader and does NOT indicate that dismissal involves ONLY gross 
incompetence, criminal guilt, or financial insolvency; language does not rule out 
dismissal on grounds of policy disagreement        
2 -- Language indicates dismissal can ONLY be based upon gross incompetence or 
negligence, criminal guilt, or financial insolvency  
 
 
23)  Annual Report Reception        
 
Discrimination Parameter: 3.3 (2.7, 3.9)                  
0 -- Report sent to minister or executive branch alone       
1 -- Report sent to both minister/executive branch AND a legislative body     
2-- Report sent to parliament/legislature only       
3 -- Report sent to a specialized government auditing body, comptroller, Central Bank, or 
no specific requirement 
 
 
24) Fee Approval  
 
Discrimination Parameter: 2.4 (1.8, 3.0) 
0 -- Fees and levies of agency are either decided or must be approved by an executive 
official              
1 -- Fees and levies of agency determined by legislative statute or must be approved by 
legislative committees          
2 -- Agency can has full autonomy to decide its own fee schedule, tariff levels, and 
penalties 
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25) Organizational Approval  
 
Discrimination Parameter:  2.7  (2.1, 3.3) 
0 -- Organizational structure of agency is either decided or must be approved by an 
executive official           
1 -- Organizational structure of agency determined by legislative statute or must be 
approved by legislative committee          
2 -- Agency can has full formal autonomy to decide its own organizational structure 
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APPENDIX III(c) 
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrices 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Observations 
Market 
Capitalization (% of 
GDP) 
overall 47.46 58.58 0.00 606.00 N =    2310 
 
between 
 
46.34 0.07 312.66 n =     115 
 
within 
 
32.76 -156.80 460.70 
T-bar =  
20.087 
       
ln(1+Market 
Cap/GDP) 
overall 3.26 1.20 0.00 6.41 N =    2310 
 
between 
 
1.12 0.07 5.64 n =      115 
 
within 
 
0.65 -0.51 5.65 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 21 
Regulatory 
Independence 
overall 0.52 0.34 0.00 1.00 N =    3213 
 
between 
 
0.21 0.00 0.96 n =     133 
 
within 
 
0.27 -0.35 1.35 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 24 
∆Regulatory 
Independence 
(Excluding Years w/ 
no Change) 
Overall 0.34 0.35 -0.88 
.9753876 
| 
N= 205 
 
between 
 
0.29 -0.88 0.95 n =     120 
 
within 
 
0.24 -0.19 0.90 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 1.7 
Regulatory 
Independence 
Frequency of ∆ 
overall 1.62 1.13 0.00 7.00 N =    3346 
 
between 
 
1.13 0.00 7.00 n =     134 
 
within 
 
0.00 
  
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 25 
ln (GDP/capita) overall 8.19 1.55 4.58 11.63 N =    3207 
 
between 
 
1.46 5.35 10.95 n =     132 
 
within 
 
0.50 6.38 9.95 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 24 
GDP Growth(%) overall 3.60 5.76 -50.25 88.96 N =    3175 
 
between 
 
2.18 -1.10 12.38 n =     132 
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within 
 
5.38 -51.76 80.53 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 24 
ln(1+Inflation) overall 1.96 1.15 -2.92 8.92 N =     2866 
 
between 
 
0.75 0.20 4.06 n =     130 
 
within 
 
0.88 -2.38 8.17 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 22 
Capital Account 
Openness 
overall 0.54 0.37 0.00 1.00 N =    3036 
 
between 
 
0.31 0.00 1.00 n =     130 
 
within 
 
0.20 -0.26 1.16 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 23 
ln (Trade/GDP) overall 4.32 0.54 2.58 6.11 N =    3144 
 
between 
 
0.49 3.04 5.88 n =     132 
 
within 
 
0.20 2.68 5.09 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 24 
MSCI All World 
Securities Index 
(Price Hundreds) 
overall 2.40 0.84 1.14 4.03 N =     3346 
 
between 
 
0.02 2.40 2.62 n =     134 
 
within 
 
0.84 1.02 4.03 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 25 
Banking Crisis 
(Dummy) 
overall 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 N =    3167 
 
between 
 
0.10 0.00 1.00 n =     132 
 
within 
 
0.29 -0.27 1.06 T = 24 
Lending-Deposit 
Interest Rate Spread 
overall 13.70 263.47 
-
1027.89 
14526.86 N =    3171 
 
between 
 
50.82 0.63 547.78 n =     125 
 
within 
 
258.65 
-
1561.96 
13992.78 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 25 
ln(Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector/ GDP) 
overall 3.56 0.96 -0.04 5.77 N =    3046 
 
between 
 
0.87 1.09 5.26 n =     131 
 
within 
 
0.44 1.22 5.40 
Year Obs.(µ)  
= 23 
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Executive Constraint 
(Polity II) 
overall 5.10 2.05 1.00 7.00 N =    255 
Executive Constraint 
(continued) 
between 
 
1.88 1.00 7.00 n =     125 
 
within 
 
0.87 -0.14 10.56 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 24 
Political Constraint 
III (Heinsz) 
overall 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.72 N =    3199 
 
between 
 
0.17 0.00 0.70 n =     133 
 
within 
 
0.12 -0.20 0.67 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 24 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
(Pagano and Volpin) 
overall 1.55 1.32 0.00 3.00 N =    2660 
 
between 
 
1.27 0.00 3.00 n =     125 
 
within 
 
0.39 -0.70 3.95 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 21 
Left- Wing (Dummy) overall 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 N= 3345 
 
between 
 
0.31 0.00 1.00 n=134 
 
within 
 
0.32 -0.68 1.24 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 25 
Center-Left 
(Dummy) 
overall 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 N =    3345 
 
between 
 
0.34 0.00 1.00 n =     134 
 
within 
 
0.34 -0.60 1.32 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 25 
Right-Wing 
(Dummy) 
overall 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 N =    3345 
 
between 
 
0.29 0.00 1.00 n =     134 
 
within 
 
0.32 -0.67 1.21 
Year Obs.(µ) 
= 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 343 
 
Political Variables Correlation Matrix 
ln(MarketCap) Regulatory Ind.   Political Constraint Executive Constraint Proportionality Left Right Common Law
ln(MarketCap) 1
Regulatory Ind.   0.06*** 1
Political Constraint 0.16*** 0.37*** 1
Executive Constraint 0.15*** 0.39*** 0.77*** 1
Proportionality -0.13*** 0.08*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 1
Left -0.013 0.01 0.03** 0.14*** 0.1*** 1
Center-Left -0.001 0.03** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.85***
Right 0.04* 0.10*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.08*** -0.35*** 1
Common Law 0.14*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.44*** -0.02 0.02 1  
Economic Variable Correlation Matrix 
ln(Mrktcap)                   ln(GDPperCapita)  
GDP 
Growth
ln(1+Inflation) ln(Trade)
 Capital 
Account 
Openness
ln(Domestic 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector/ 
GDP)
Lending-
Deposit 
Interest 
Rate Spread
ln(Mrktcap)                   1
ln(GDPperCapita)  0.55*** 1
GDP Growth 0.03* -0.06*** 1
ln(1+Inflation) -0.39*** -0.43*** -0.13*** 1
ln(Trade) 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.06*** -0.25*** 1
CapitalAccountnt Openness 0.35 *** 0.61*** -0.01 -0.45*** 0.26*** 1
ln(Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector/ GDP) 0.57*** 0.66*** -0.10*** -0.41*** 0.17 *** 0.42*** 1
Lending-Deposit Interest 
Rate Spread  -0.09*** -0.027 -0.07*** 0.28*** -0.01 -0.03 * -0.03 1  
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APPENDIX IV(a)  
     Table 4.4A      
        (Executive Opinions: Prais-Winsten)     
DV: Executive 
Opinions 
Prais-
Winsten 
Prais-
Winsten 
Prais-
Winsten 
Prais-Winsten Prais-
Winsten 
      
      
Regulatory  -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.17*** 
Independence (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Formal MSP Expert  0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.07** 0.041 
Assessment (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Electoral   -0.007*** -0.006** -0.005* -0.009*** 
Competition  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rule of Law  0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.01*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Common Law    0.14*** 0.17*** 
    (0.01) (0.02) 
Political    -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
Constraints   (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Electoral    -0.016*** 0.0003 0.01* 
Proportionality   (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Center-Right   0.003 0.002 0.004 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP growth  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Capital Account  
Openness 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
ln(Trade) -0.003 -0.008 -0.01 -0.015 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.019) (0.02) (0.01) 
ln(1+Inflation)     -0.004 
     (0.008) 
Banking crisis     -0.08*** 
     (0.01) 
Stock price      -0.001* 
volatility     (0.0006) 
Constant -0.078 0.05 0.104 -0.008 0.112 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
      
Observations 860 848 796 796 455 
R
2 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.69 
Number of countries 121 119 114 114 73 
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)/Common AR(1) 
 
 345 
 
           Table 4.5              
(Additional Controls) 
DV: Formal Bias (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random Effects 
GLS 
Random Effects 
GLS 
GLS Cochrane- 
Orcutt 
Prais-Winsten 
w/PCSE 
     
Regulatory  0.14*** 0.12** 0.10** 0.12** 
Independence (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Regulatory  -0.1 -0.06 -0.07** -0.06** 
Quality (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
Electoral  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Competition (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rule of Law -0.0001 0.009 0.004 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
Political  0.10 0.10* 0.04 0.03 
Constraints (0.07) (0.06) (0.049) (0.06) 
Common Law  0.12** 0.08 0.09** 0.09*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Center-Right  -0.01 -0.01 -0.001 0.0001 
Government (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.009 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth  -0.001 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0007 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Account  -0.09 -0.03 -0.1** -0.1 
Openness (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
ln(Inflation) -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Banking Crisis 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Stock Index  0.002** 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 
volatility (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) 
ln(Stock Traded) -0.02** 0.01 -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.99** -0.31 -0.59*** -0.42** 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.22) (0.20) 
     
Observations 480 480 480 480 
Overall R2 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.20 
Within R2 0.31 0.44 0.29 -- 
Year FE NO YES NO NO 
Number of countries 76 76 76 76 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 4.6A  
(w/ County Fixed Effects) 
DV: Formal Bias (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
FE: Prais-
Winsten  
Fixed  
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
      
Regulatory  0.08** 0.06* -0.008 0.10*** 0.06* 
Independence (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Regulatory Quality     -0.02 -0.01 
    (0.05) (0.05) 
Electoral  0.004 0.001 0.006** 0.005 0.002 
Competition (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Rule of Law -0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.009) (0.006) (0.01) (0.01) 
Center-Right  -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 
Government (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.08*** -0.11** -0.01 0.10*** -0.10** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) 
GDP Growth  -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Account  -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.15** -0.13** 
Openness (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
ln(Trade) 0.17*** 0.06 -0.01 0.16*** 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) 
ln(StocksTraded) -0.03*** 0.001 -0.04*** -0.03*** 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -1.47*** 0.64 0.28*** -1.56*** 0.48 
 (0.41) (0.61) (0.04) (0.40) (0.57) 
      
Observations 733 733 632 640 640 
Overall R2 0.0013 0.101 0.12 0.001 0.09 
Within-R2 0.22 0.38 0.12 0.23 0.41 
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES 
Number of countries 101 101 99 100 100 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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          Table 4.7A      
  (Independence-Market Depth Interaction w/Fixed Effects) 
 
DV: Formal Bias (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Country 
FE 
Country 
FE 
FE: Prais-
Winsten  
Country 
FE 
Country 
FE 
FE: Prais-
Winsten  
       
Regulatory  0.22*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.24** 
Independence (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
ln(StockTraded) -0.003 0.028** -0.037** 0.0238 0.061*** -0.0001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Independence X 
ln(StockTraded) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
Electoral  0.003 0.001 0.006** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01** 
Competition (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Rule of Law -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.01 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) 
Center-Right 
Government 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
       
Regulatory     -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 
Quality    (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) 
Political     0.11 0.12* 0.05 
Constraint    (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.08*** -0.12** -0.01 0.07* -0.10 0.002 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) 
GDP Growth -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002 -0.0005 -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
       
ln(Trade) 0.16*** 0.06 -0.02 0.13* 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) 
ln(Inflation)    -0.01** -0.005 -0.001 
    (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Bank Crisis    0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
    (0.019) (0.02) (0.01) 
Stock Index     0.001 0.0004 0.0001 
Volatility    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -1.52*** 0.58 0.27*** -1.65*** 0.23 -0.25*** 
 (0.40) (0.61) (0.04) (0.54) (0.82) (0.08) 
       
Observations 733 733 632 480 480 404 
Overall R2 0.0 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.12 
Within R2 0.22 .37 0.12 0.30 0.42 0.19 
Year FE NO YES NO NO YES NO 
Number of countries 101 101 99 76 76 76 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 4.8A     
 (Independence-Market Interaction with Additional Controls) 
DV: Formal Bias (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
GLS 
Cochrane– 
Orcutt 
Prais-
Winsten w/ 
PCSE 
(AR1) 
     
Regulatory  0.41*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.39*** 
Independence (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
ln(StockTraded) 0.03** 0.06*** 0.02 0.039** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.019 
Independence X  
Stock Traded 
 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Electoral  0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
Competition (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Regulatory Quality -0.1 -0.06 -0.07** -0.06** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
Rule of Law -0001 0.008 0.003 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
Political Constraint 0.10 0.10* 0.04 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Common Law  0.13*** 0.09* 0.10** 0.10*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Center-Right  -0.01 -0.01 -0.0006 0.002 
Government (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.008 
 (0.03) (0.031) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.002 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Account  -0.09 -0.04 -0.09* -0.07 
Openness (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
ln(Inflation) -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Bank Crisis 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Stock Index Volatility 0.001* 0.0008 0.0009* 0.001* 
 (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Constant -1.11*** -0.43 -0.70*** -0.56*** 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.22) (0.21) 
     
Observations 480 480 480 480 
Overall R2 0.32 0.21 0.24 0.23 
Within R2 0.24 0.44 0.30 -- 
Year FE NO YES NO NO 
Number of countries 76 76 76 76 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 4.9A     
 (Independent Regulatory Framework Established) 
DV: Formal Bias (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Random 
Effects 
Country 
FE 
Random 
Effects 
Country 
FE 
GLS 
Cochrane– 
Orcutt 
Prais-
Winsten w/ 
PCSE and  
       
Regulator 
Established 
0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
       
ln(Stock Traded)  -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Reg. Est. x ln(Stock 
Traded) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Electoral  0.009** 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.007** 0.009*** 
Competition (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rule of Law -0.007 0.001 0.007 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.01) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
Common Law  0.06  0.001  0.04 0.03 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.02) 
Center-Right  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.006 -0.003 
Government (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
logGDPcapCur 0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital Account  
Openness 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
ln (Trade) 0.07** 0.17*** 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.002 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.74*** -1.54*** 0.14 0.63 -0.25* -0.04 
 (0.22) (0.41) (0.24) (0.60) (0.15) (0.16) 
       
Observations 739 739 739 739 739 708 
Overall R2 0.05 0.003 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.08 
Within R2 0.20 0.22 0.37 0.36 0.17 -- 
Year FE NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Number of countries 101 101 101 101 101 100 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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       Appendix IV(b)                   
           Table 4.10A       
(Variable Summary) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Formal Bias overall -0.01 0.22 -0.59 0.59 N =     924
between 0.21 -0.47 0.46 n =     126
within 0.09 -0.39 0.40 µT = 7.33333
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests (WEF) overall 0.480706 0.20 0.00 1.00 N =     819
between 0.19 0.08 0.91  n =     124
within 0.07 0.26 0.72  µT = 6.60484
Strength of Minority Investor Protection (World Bank) overall 0.448975 0.19 0.00 1.00 N =    1049
between 0.18 0.00 1.00  n =     134
within 0.05 0.09 0.67 µT = 7.82836
Regulatory Independence overall 0.71 0.20 0.00 1.00  N =    925
between 0.17 0.00 0.99  n =     133
within 0.09 0.04 1.36 µT = 6.95
Regulatory Quality overall 0.21 0.90 -2.21 1.93  N =     922
between 0.90 -1.82 1.92 n =     132
within 0.12 -0.57 0.78  µT = 6.98
Electoral Competition overall 10.61 2.84 0.00 12.00 N =    1038
between 2.64 1.00 12.00 n =     130
within 1.05 0.11 18.86 µT = 7.98
Rule of Law overall 8.92 4.53 0.00 16.00 N =    1061
between 4.51 0.00 16.00 n =     133
within 0.55 5.29 12.79  µT = 7.97744
Political Constraint overall 0.31 0.19 0.00 0.71  N =    1057
between 0.17 0.00 0.70 n =     133
within 0.08 -0.10 0.63 µT=  7.9
Center-Right Government overall 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00  N =    1072
between 0.39 0.00 1.00  n =     134
within 0.25 -0.58 1.17 µT = 8
ln(GDP per Capita) overall 8.73 1.45 5.36 11.63 N =    1059
between 1.44 5.36 11.51  n =     133
within 0.22 7.72 9.37 µT = 7.96
GDP Growth overall 4.12 4.49 -17.95 34.50 N =    1057
between 2.62 -1.38 14.42  n =     133
within 3.65 -16.40 24.47 µT =  7.95
Capital Account Openness overall 0.63 0.37 0.00 1.00  N =    1031
between 0.36 0.00 1.00 n =     130
within 0.08 0.06 1.01  µT =7.99
ln(Trade%ofGDP) overall 4.43 0.48 3.10 6.11 N =    1026
between 0.48 3.22 6.00  n =     133
within 0.09 4.07 5.02  µT = 7.77
ln(Inflation) overall 1.71 0.79 -2.92 7.00  N =    1011
between 0.75 -0.12 6.36  n =     131
within 0.88 -2.13 3.56  µT = 7.71
Bank Crisis overall 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00  N =    934
between 0.23 0.00 0.71  n =     133
within 0.22 -0.61 0.97  µT =      7.02
Stock Price Volatility (Std.Dev Index Price/µIndexPrice) overall 22.51 11.40 2.39 141.58 N =    548
between 7.90 6.23 58.83 n =     82
within 8.52 -16.47 105.27  µT =  6.68293
ln(Stocks Value Traded%GDP) overall 2.25 1.74 0.00 6.61  N =     854
between 1.69 0.00 6.10 n =     110
within 0.49 -0.16 4.53 µT = 7.76364                 
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                 Table 4.11A         
(Correlation Matrix) 
Formal Bias MSP(Expert) MSP(Executive) ln(ValueTraded) ln(MarketCap)
Regulatory 
Independence
Regulatory 
Quality
Formal Bias 1***
MSP(Expert) .52*** 1.00
MSP(Executive) -.60*** .35*** 1.00
ln(ValueTraded) -.24*** .32** .55*** 1.00
ln(MarketCap) -.26*** .27** .54*** .70*** 1.00
Regulatory 
Independence
.23*** .13** -.25*** -.12*** -.14*** 1.00
Regulatory Quality -.21*** 0.44*** .61*** 0.50*** .39*** .21*** 1.00
 
Correlation Matrix Continued 
ln(GDPperCap) Electoral Competition Rule of Law Common Law Political Constraint
ln(GDPperCap) 1.00
Electoral Competition .07** 1.00
Rule of Law .61*** .49*** 1.00
Common Law -.15 -.15*** -.05 1.00
Political Constraint .28*** .57*** .58*** -.12*** 1.00  
 
                                           Figure 4.5A       
(Formal bias and Market Development) 
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         Figure 4.6A            
(Formal bias and Regulatory Independence (2012)) 
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APPENDIX V(a) 
 
     Table 5.12A      
 (DSRO w/Economic Controls Only: Market Cap) 
DV: ln(Market 
Capitalization  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
%GDP)      
      
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Depoliticized 0.27*** 0.24** 0.19 0.16 0.21 
Self-Regulation (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
GDPgrowth  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(GDPcapCur)  0.06** 0.04 0.05 0.07* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(Trade)   0.21*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
lnInflation     -0.001 
     (0.01) 
Capital Account    0.27*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 
Openness   (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Bank Crisis    -0.14*** -0.15*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) 
∆All World Stock    0.29*** 0.29*** 
Index    (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.82*** 0.37* -0.32 -0.91** -1.09*** 
 (0.07) (0.20) (0.31) (0.35) (0.39) 
      
Observations 
µ Panel Size 
2,075 
18 
2,065 
18 
1,972 
17 
1,882 
17 
1,753 
16 
Adj. R2 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.68 
Number of countries 112 112 109 109 107 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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    Table 5.13A     
 (DSRO w/Political Economic Controls Only: Market Cap) 
DV: ln(Market 
Capitalization  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
%GDP)      
      
ln(MarketCap)t-1 0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
      
Depoliticized  0.19 0.21* 0.19* 0.26*** 0.27*** 
Self-Regulation (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Electoral  -0.005    -0.01 
Competition (0.008)    (0.01) 
      
Political   0.22***   0.21*** 
Constraint  (0.07)   (0.08) 
Checks   -0.003   
   (0.008)   
Electoral     0.11*** 0.10*** 
Proportionality    (0.02) (0.02) 
Left Government     -0.01 
     (0.02) 
Government      -0.01** 
Consumption     (0.005) 
GDP growth 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
lnGDPperCapita 0.05 0.05 0.06* 0.01 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.038) (0.03) (0.04) 
ln(Trade) 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Capital Account  0.21*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
Openness (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank Crisis -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆All World  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
Stock Index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.84** -1.02*** -0.96*** -0.99*** -0.87** 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) 
      
Observations 
µ obs per panel 
1,859 
17 
1,858 
17 
1,847 
17 
1,702 
17 
1,677 
16 
Adj. R2 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.70 
Overall R2 0.83 0.83   0.83 0.80    0.80 
Number of countries 108 108 108 102 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 5.14A     
 (DSRO & Independence: Market Cap AR(1)) 
DV: ln(Market  (3) (1) (2) (6) (4) (5) 
Capitalization% 
GDP) 
Prais- 
Winsten w/ 
Country FE 
Prais- 
Winsten w/ 
Country FE 
Prais- 
Winsten w/ 
Country FE 
Cochrane- 
Orcutt 
Cochrane- 
Orcutt 
Cochrane- 
Orcutt 
       
Depoliticized Self- 
Regulation 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
0.35** 
(0.148) 
0.32** 
(0.16) 
0.34** 
(0.14) 
Regulatory  0.12 0.22** 0.12 0.22** 0.23*** 0.22** 
Independence (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Electoral  -0.004   0.005   
Competition (0.009)   (0.008)   
Electoral   0.11**   -0.01  
Proportionality  (0.04)   (0.03)  
Political Constraint   0.24**   0.33*** 
   (0.10)   (0.10) 
GDP Growth 0.01*** 0.012*** 0.01*** 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ln(Trade) 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.72*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.079) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Capital Account 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 
Openness (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Bank Crisis -0.3*** -0.32*** -0.29*** -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.25*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
∆All World  0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 
Stock Index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.14 -0.14 0.13 -4.19*** -3.71*** -4.24*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) 
       
Observations 1,831 1,665 1,830 1,940 1,768 1,939 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Overall R2 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Number of 
countries 
108 100 108 109 103 109 
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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            Table 5.15A       
(DSRO-Electoral Competiveness Interaction: Market Cap) 
DV: ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
Blundell- 
Bond 
Blundell- 
Bond 
Blundell- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano- 
Bond 
       
ln(MarketCap)t-1 
0.68*** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.03) 
0.63*** 
(0.04) 
0.53*** 
(0.05) 
0.44*** 
(0.06) 
0.44*** 
(0.07) 
Depoliticized Self- -0.21 -0.15 -0.33 -0.12 -0.19 -0.54 
Regulation (0.34) (0.32) (0.40) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40) 
Electoral  -0.04*** -0.03** -0.05** -0.03* -0.03 -0.064*** 
Competitiveness (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
Self-Regulation X 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09** 0.07** 0.05* 0.08** 
Competitiveness (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
       
Regulatory   0.11 0.02  0.24** 0.20* 
Independence  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Political Constraint  0.26** 0.18  0.30** 0.24* 
  (0.12) (0.13)  (0.12) (0.13) 
Electoral    0.04   0.04 
Proportionality   (0.03)   (0.04) 
GDP Growth 0.008** 0.007* 0.006 0.01*** 0.008** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -0.02 -0.005 -0.008 -0.06 0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
ln(Trade) 0.28*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.64*** 0.76*** 0.81*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) 
Capital Account  0.27** 0.18 0.14 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.23** 
Openness (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Bank Crisis  -0.14*** -0.17***  -0.21*** -0.25*** 
  (0.05) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.05) 
∆All World Stock  0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
Index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.18 -0.66 -0.47 -1.1 -2.12** -1.69** 
 (0.49) (0.51) (0.49) (0.69) (0.83) (0.75) 
       
Observations 1,948 1,845 1,688 1,827 1,723 1,572 
Number of countries 108 108 102 107 107 99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
f 
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     Table 5.16A       
(DSRO w/Political Economic Controls Only: %∆S&P Price Index) 
DV:%∆S&P  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Index       
       
Depoliticized  28.9*** 27.5** 27.7** 29.4** 26.6** 16.1 
Self-Regulation (10.2) (11.1) (11.1) (11.6) (11.7) (12.7) 
Electoral   -1.52    -0.78 
Competition  (2.1)    (3.33) 
Political    -15.9   -14.9 
Constraint   (13.9)   (12.2) 
Checks    0.05   
    (1.08)   
Electoral      5.39* 5.41** 
Proportionality     (3.12) (2.51) 
General 
Government  
     -4.36 
Consumption      (4.96) 
       
GDP Growth 0.67* 0.67* 0.65* 0.64 0.63 0.17 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.60) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -2.56 -1.90 -2.52 -2.12 -1.85 -0.67 
 (3.22) (3.3) (3.24) (3.24) (3.4) (4.41) 
ln(Trade) 25.0** 25.0** 24.1** 25.3** 26.3** 24.3** 
 (9.99) (10.0) (9.94) (10.1) (10.6) (12.1) 
Capital Account  -7.30 -8.34 -7.84 -7.99 -4.74 -9.80 
Openness (10.8) (11.0) (10.9) (10.9) (12.3) (13.4) 
Bank Crisis -24.0*** -24.2*** -23.8*** -24.3*** -24.1*** -21.4*** 
 (4.96) (4.96) (4.91) (4.98) (5.09) (4.67) 
ln(Inflation) 1.51 1.47 1.63 1.49 2.43 0.32 
 (5.61) (5.79) (5.79) (5.75) (6.89) (4.34) 
∆All World  35.8*** 35.7*** 35.6*** 35.6*** 36.5*** 37.0*** 
Stock Index (2.51) (2.49) (2.5) (2.51) (2.82) (2.91) 
Constant -93.0** -79.4* -81.9** -97.7** -114.3** -12.6 
 (40.9) (46.4) (40.9) (42.5) (47.2) (63.7) 
       
Observations 1,148 1,131 1,131 1,128 1,082 1,071 
Adjusted R
2 
0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 
Overall R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.12 
Number of countries 79 78 78 78 73 73 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 5.17A 
(Untransformed Market Capitalization)  
DV: Market  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization%GDP       
       
Market Cap t-1 0.53*** 
(0.09) 
0.54*** 
(0.08) 
0.54*** 
(0.08) 
0.54*** 
(0.08) 
0.53*** 
(0.09) 
0.53*** 
(0.09) 
Depoliticized Exchange 19.9** 18.5** 20.7*** 19.1** 24.5*** 18.8** 
Governance (8.41) (7.78) (7.74) (7.86) (8.11) (8.68) 
       
Regulatory  2.56  2.44 1.97 1.96 
Independence  (2.69)  (2.63) (2.86) (2.96) 
Political   5.91** 5.39*   
Constraint   (2.81) (2.74)   
Electoral      1.32  
Proportionality     (1.12)  
Electoral  -0.33     -0.34 
Competition (0.28)     (0.28) 
Government -0.72     -0.74 
Consumption (0.58)     (0.59) 
GDP Growth 0.53*** 0.64*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 0.55*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) 
ln(GDPperCap) 1.73 0.79 1.25 0.88 0.462 1.354 
 (1.57) (1.31) (1.36) (1.36) (1.30) (1.58) 
ln(Trade) 13.9*** 14.0*** 13.7*** 13.6*** 14.8*** 14.0*** 
 (4.65) (4.48) (4.55) (4.54) (5.15) (4.71) 
Capital Account 11.2*** 10.7*** 11.2*** 10.9*** 11.3*** 11.0*** 
Openness (3.17) (3.05) (3.10) (3.10) (3.20) (3.18) 
∆All World Stock 15.2*** 14.8*** 15.0*** 15.1*** 15.3*** 15.3*** 
Index (1.62) (1.61) (1.60) (1.61) (1.71) (1.63) 
Constant -61.8*** -69.6*** -75.2** -71.9*** -77.2*** -58.6*** 
 (20.2) (22.5) (24.0) (23.7) (26.0) (20.1) 
       
Observations 1,920 1,945 1,947 1,933 1,770 1,906 
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Number of countries 108 109 108 108 102 108 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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        Table 5.18A       
(DSRO: Net Portfolio Equity Flows)  
DV: Net (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio Equity Flows      Blundell-
Bond 
GMM 
       
Portfolio Equity t-1  0.41*** 
(0.13) 
0.41*** 
(0.13) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
0.42*** 
(0.13) 
0.41*** 
(0.13) 
0.38** 
(0.15) 
       
Depoliticized Exchange 1652 1750 1867 2093 2015 2020 
Governance (1974) (1949) (1952) (2226) (2107) (4865) 
Regulatory  -418.0 -509.7 -724.4 -423.4 823.1 
Independence  (1593) (1577) (1746) (1626) (4336) 
Political   486.6   4135 
Constraint   (1031)   (3467) 
Electoral 
Proportionality 
   -272.9 
(169.9) 
  
Electoral 
Competitiveness 
    -109.8** 
(48.8) 
 
Government 
Consumption 
    -43.6 
(94.2) 
 
       
GDP Growth -69.8 -75.1 -76.3 -85.9 -86.4 -78.3 
 (50.3) (51.2) (51.8) (58.8) (55.1) (92.0) 
ln(GDPperCapita) 1212** 1237* 1246* 1182 1332* 2715 
 (558.5) (634.7) (639.9) (745.5) (689.5) (2033) 
ln(Trade) 2919* 3199* 3054* 3153 3288* 6918 
 (1700) (1821) (1829) (2167) (1911) (5036) 
Capital Account -811.4 -800.9 -767.4 -667.5 -875.9 -1485 
Openness (743.6) (700.4) (706.6) (824.3) (708.1) (2320) 
∆All World Stock 3234*** 3202*** 3167*** 3261*** 3269*** 3754*** 
Index (1118) (1122) (1126) (1198) (1160) (1312) 
Constant -21178** -22395** -22052* -22336 -21785* -52584 
 (9812) (11204) (11250) (13035) (11020) (32209) 
       
Observations 2,100 2,087 2,073 1,908 2,044 1,932 
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19  
Number of countries 121 120 119 114 119 117 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 5.19A         
(DSRO w/Portfolio Flow Control) 
DV:ln(Market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capitalization 
%GDP) 
    Blundell-
Bond GMM 
Blundell-
Bond GMM 
       
ln(MarkCap) t-1 0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.66*** 
(0.03) 
0.67*** 
(0.02) 
0.69*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.03) 
Depoliticized 0.24*** 0.20** 0.21** 0.18* 0.33* 0.28 
Self-Regulation (0.08) (0.9) (0.09) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20) 
Regulatory  0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Independence  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Political   0.15**    0.21* 
Constraint  (0.07)    (0.11) 
Electoral    0.05**    
Proportionality   (0.02)    
Electoral    0.006   
Competition    (0.006)   
Government    -0.01**  -0.01* 
Consumption    (0.004)  (0.008) 
       
Portfolio Equity .000001** .000001** .000001** .000001** .000002*** .000002*** 
Flows (.0000005) (.0000005) (.0000004) (.0000005) (.0000006) (.0000005) 
GDP Growth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ln(GDPper Capita) -0.004 -0.006 -0.017 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) 
ln(Trade) 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.26** 0.29*** 
 (0.065) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.100) 
0.35*** 
(0.10) 
∆All World  0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 
Stock Index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -0.489* -0.518* -0.487 -0.31 -0.17 -0.10 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.43) (0.45) 
       
Observations 1,788 1,762 1,653 1,740 1,774 1,739 
R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.71   
Number of 
countries 
103 102 97 102 103 102 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
 
 
 361 
 
    APPENDIX V(b)    
 Overview of Non-Public Ownership and Governance 
Country Year Non-Private Ownership/Governance
Albania 1996-2012 
1996-2001: Central Bank owenrship and Central Bank board 
representation/appointment ex-officio. 2002-2012:Owned 100% by ministry 
of finance so they can select the whole board.
Alexandria/Cairo/Egypt Exchange 1992-2012
Public institutions with multiple regulator ex-Officio members 1992-1996 
then only one regulator ex-officio member until 2012. 1992-2008 
government appointed an additional member. From 2009 and after the 
government appoints multiple members to the board.
Algeria 1997-2012  100% Ownd by state-owned banks who make up the enterity of the board.
Austria 1989-2012
Privately owned, but a government appointed commissioner is appointed to 
the exchange and they posess powers separate from those exercised by the 
regulator
Azjerbaijan 2000-2012 Minority owned by banks that are in turn minority owned by government. 
Bahrain 1987-2009
Multiple ministers sit on board and other members selected by government. 
Previously a government organization, it was recently corporatized in 2010,  
but government of Bahrain remains its controlling shareholder and political 
officials still dominate its governance. 
Bangladesh 1988-2012
Mandated representation of the central government in the governing body of 
a stock exchange or any of its committees until 1992. From 1992 until  
2012 the Securities  Comission gets representation.
Barbados 1987-2001
Mutual organization with multiple ministers and central banker sitting on the 
board of directors 
Belarus 1998-2012
Owned by government. Mulitple political officials, political appointees, and 
central bank officials sitting on board
Bhutan 1993-1995:1996-2012
After initially being owned by Bhutan Monetary Authority, the exchange 
separated from BMA in 1996 and was then run and owned by state owned 
development banks along with a representative of the government and a 
reprentative from the monetary authority
Botswana 1994-2012
After informal trading began in 1991, the BSE becamse a public entitiy in 
1994; 3 members get appointed by the Minister. 
Bulgaria 1991-2012
Majority owned by government. Government, as shareholder, gets to appoint 
multiple board members
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Non-private Ownership/Governance Continued… 
Cambodia 2010-2012
Korea exchange 49% shareholder, government 51% shareholder. 2 ministers 
,1 regulator (Bank of Cambodia) sits on board with remaining members and 
executive management chosen/nominated by Minister of Finane. KRX can 
make only 2 nominations
Cape Verde  Minister/government  appoints board. 
China
Prior to 1998, exchanges were owned by local governments so they could 
control board appointments. 1998 and on the regulator could select the 
general manager/President of the exchange. The brokerage houses selected 
the rest, but  many of them are partially or completely owned by the state. 
Croatia In 2007, state owned banks took a minority share in the exchange
Cyrpus
Public entity with an executive council appointed by government. From 
1994 until 2000, there was a government appointed commissioner at the 
exchange.
Czech Republic
 From 1992 until 2002 there was a mixture of ownership between  
government, the Central Bank, and commerical banks whose majority 
shareholder was the state. Board of directors reflected this mixture
Denmark 1986-1996
 Civil association with an exechange board/council was appointed by 
government on nomination by several groups. 
Estonia 1995-2001
No appointments, but the State, Central Bank, and state owned banks all held 
minority shares
Fiji 1979-2012
Multiple members of the board of directors appointed by banks/financial 
institutions owned by the state
France 1988-1995 Government appointed commissioner at exchange. After 
Hungary 1990-2000
1990-1995: Regulator appoints exchange commissioner who can  "observe 
and check trading on the exchange, and to attend the general meeting of the 
exchange, and the meetings of the Board of Directors of the exchange and of 
the professional committees."1996-1999: "The representative of the 
Supervisory Commission shall be entitled to attend the general meeting of 
the exchange, the meetings of the board of directors of the exchange, 
supervisory board and the professional committees with a right of 
consultation."
Iceland 1993-1997 Both the Central Bank and the government appoint one member 
India 1988-2012
Prior to 1992, government could appoint multiple public interest directors 
to exchanges. After 1992, regulator can appoint multiple "public interest" 
directors to exchanges. 
Indonesia 1977-1991
During this period the exchange operation is overseen by Capital Market 
Supervisory Agency
(Bapebam), which was a Directorate General of the Ministry of Finance. 
Bapebam appoints multiple board members 
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Non-private Ownership/Governance Continued… 
Iran 1988-2004
Exchange is operated and regulated by its board of directors which included 
mulitple government ministers and a senior official of the Central Bank of 
Iran. Remaining board members are appointed by decision of Iran's 
governing Council 
Israel 1987-2014
Both the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Israel get to appoint one 
member of the board; there is also a nominating committee that appoints 
other "outside" members that includes a representative of the Ministry of 
Justice, the Chairman of the ISA, chairman of the Exchange, and an outside 
expert.  This committee's appointments are not coded since no single actor 
can dictate nomination (which must also be approved by the ISA as a whole)
Italy 1975-1995
Prior to 1995, exchanges owned by local chambers of commerce which are 
considered public entities. Milan Stock exchange (precursor Borsa Italia) 
finish privatization by 1996. Prior to 1996, all members appointed by 
decision of government  of which one is nominated by Tresury or Ministry of 
Finance depending upon the time period. Central Bank also got 1 
nomination. Ex-Officio all receive 0 because government ministry and 
Central Bank do not appoint direct delegates only make nominations. 
Jamaica 1993-2012
Both Minister of Finance and senior official of the Central Bank of Jamaica 
sit on the board of directors of the stock exchange
Jordan 1988-1998
Exchange is both operated and regulated by a government dominated board 
of directors that was appointed by executive decree, and included mulitple 
ministers and a senior official of the Central Bank of Jordan
Kazakstan 1997-2010
During the 1997 to 2010 period, there was either a senior official of the 
Central Bank or a regulator from the Financial center at Almaty sitting on 
the board. From 2011 there were multiple Central Bank officials. 1997-
2012: Board members included senior officials from commercial banks that 
were controlled by government shareholders. 1997 thru 2012: other 
members were also appointed by either the Central Bank or officials form 
the Financial Centre at Almaty. 
Kuwait 1984-2012
Exchange both operated and regulated by a government dominated board that 
includes multiple ministers and a senior official of the Central Bank of 
Kuwait. Remainder of the board is appointed by executive decree. 
Laos 2000-2012
2 members from Bank of Lao; multiple members(standing and non-standing) 
appointed by Bank of Lao in conjunction with Korea Exchange
Lebanon 1983-2012
1 Minister serves on board with the remainder appointed by Executive 
Decree
Lithuania 1992-2005
Regulator or direct representative can attend and participate in meetings of 
Board of Directors
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Non-private Ownership/Governance Continued… 
Luxembourg 1974-1997
 A commissioner from the Ministry of Finance sits on board of directors 
with the power to challenge exchange decisions. 1998-2006 Commissioner 
becomes a representative of the Financial Sector Supervision Commission
Malawi 1990-2012
Majority owned by Central Bank, Central Bank can appoint multiple 
members 
Malaysia 1984-2012
Minister of Finance appoints multiple members to exchange board of 
directors to uphold the "public interest"
Maldives 2002-2007
From 2002 until 2007, the Capital Market Development Authority operated 
an exchange trading floor. The executive board included a member of the 
Maldives Monetary Authority, Minister of Finance, and the Registrar of 
Companies who is an official of the Ministry of Economic Development. 
The remaing exchange officials were employees of the CMDA.
Malta 2002-2012
Executive board appointed by Government given the Government's 100% 
shareholding in the Exchange
Mongolia 1995-2012
Government (State Property committee) appoints multiple members to the 
board as sole owner of exchange. These appointment typcially include 
multiple officials from government ministries and a member from the 
financial regulator
Morocco 1975-2012
1975-1992: Exchange adminstrative council was chaired by a representative 
of the Minister of Finance. Council also included a member from the Bank 
of Morocco and representatives from several government owned 
development banks who were appointed (along with a director) by royal 
decree.  From 1993-2012 exchange regulation was handed to a regulatory 
agency and the exchange was managed by mostly private trading participants. 
However, the government still has a direct delegate that regulates and 
participates in exchange governance. 
Mozambique 1998-2012
The exchange is a institution of public capital whose board is appointed by 
the government.
Namibia 1992-2012
1992-2000; A delegate of the Ministry of Finance served as the stock 
exchange registrar and could participate in exchange governance. 2001-
2012: The registrar became a delegate of an independent financial regulator
Nepal 1994-2012
Exchange board of directors consists of two representatives of the 
government, 2 senior officials of the Central Bank, and 1 appointed by a 
government owned development bank. 
Norway 1988-1999 Government appointed board of directors
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Non-private Ownership/Governance Continued… 
Oman 1989-2012
1989-1997 exchange governed and regulated by a government appointed 
board of directors that included mulitple government officials and a senior 
official of the Central Bank of Oman. From 1998 -2012 two members of the 
board were appointed by the regulator (Capital Markets Authority) and the 
board also consists of a delegate of the Capital Markets Authority as well as 
a delegate of the Central Bank of Oman 
Poland 1991-2012
As the majority and controlling shareholder of the exchange, the Ministry of 
Finance can appoint multiple members to the board of directors
Qatar 1997-2012
1997-2005: the governing board had mulitple government officials and  a 
representative of the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority. 2006-
2012: the governing board had mulitple government officials and  a 
representative of the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority. The 
remainder of the board is directly appointed by the government (100% 
shareholder of the exchange). One of those government appointees is a 
representative of Qatar's soveriegn wealth fund (Qatar Investment 
Authority).
Romania 1995-2004
 Regulator could appoint one member of the exchange to monitor exchange 
governance and act as a liason with the regulatory authority
Russia 1992-2012
Coded for Russian Interbank Currency Exchange and then the Moscow 
exchange: At least 1 member is appointed by the Central Bank and multiple 
appointments made by commerical and development banks that are either 
owned by the government or the Central Bank
Rwanda 2011-2012
One representative of a Government Ministry with the remainder of the 
board appointed by the government
Saudi Arabia 2002-2012
Missing data prior to 2002. The Saudi Exchange's board of directors 
includes several delegates of two government ministries and a representative 
of the Saudi Monetary Agency. The remainder of the board is appointed by 
executive decree
Serbia 1994- 2012
1994-2005: There is a government appointed commission (responsible to 
the government) who "has the right to attend meetings of all organs of the 
stock exchange and to point to the omissions and irregularities in the 
application of the laws and regulations of the Exchange.The Commissioner 
is required to take measures to remedy the identified irregularities." 1994-
2012: As block shareholders both the government of Serbia and  commercial 
banks majority owned by the government have appointed at least one 
member of the board each. However, their appointmentss still must be 
approved by the regulator.  
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Non-private Ownership/Governance Continued… 
Singapore 1988-1999
Statute states: "Nothing in this section shall preclude the Minister from time 
to time appointing any person or persons, who is or are knowledgeable about 
the securities industry and who is or are not associated with a stockbroker or 
dealer, to be on the committee of the stock exchange to represent the public 
interest and the person or persons so appointed —
(a) shall have the same rights, powers, duties and obligations, liberties and 
privileges as any other member of the committee of the stock exchange; and
(b) shall hold office for a period specified by the Minister who may at any 
time revoke such an appointment.
Slovak 1992-2012
1992-1999: Supervision is carried out by a stock exchange commissioner 
(and his deputy) appointed and recalled at will by the government ministers. 
Commissioner can particpate in Stock Exchange chamber meetings and 
suspend its decisions . From 2000-2012 a representative of the regulator 
exercises many of the same participatory and suspending powers  as 
previously exercised by the government appointed commissioner.  1992- 
2004, the government, as a minority shareholder could appoint at least one 
member to the exchange chamber. From 2005-2012, the government became 
the majority owner and therefore has the ability to appoint multiple members 
to exchange governing bodies. From 1992-2000, government owned banks 
held minority block shares in the exchange entitling to make at least one 
appointment to exchange governing bodies 
Slovenia 1991-2007
Commerical banks owned by government had block ownership from 1990-
1994 entitling them to make multiple appointments. From 1995-2007 
government owned commerical banks held minority stakes in the exchange. 
They typcially could make only a single appointment to the exchange
South Africa 1985-2011
1985-1989:  Stock exchange Registrar (representing Finance Ministry) both 
helped to regulate and participated in the governance of the exchange. From 
1990 until 2011, the registrar was a delegate of the Financial regulator, but 
exercised similar powers  
South Korea 
Pre-1988 and 2005-
2012
Prior to 1988, the government made multiple appoints to the exchange 
board. Following privatization, the government approved of all 
appointments. From  2005 until today, both the President and ministries 
combine to appoint multiple members while the regulator appoints multiple 
members as "outside" public interest directors
Sri Lanka 1991-2012 Minister appoints at least 4 members of exchange board of directors
Sudan 1995-2012
Government minister and senior official of Central Bank sit on board of 
directors. Remainder of board members appointed by executive decree. 
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Sweden 1979-1991 Government Appointed board of directors of the Stockholm Stock Exchange
Syria 2006-2011
Financial Regulator and Central Banker both sit on the board of the 
exchange. The remainder of the board is appointed by Executive Decree
Taiwan 1989-2012
Coded for Taiwan Stock Exchange: 1989-2012: A representative of the 
Bank of Taiwan sits on the board, while representatives of state owned 
enterprises make multiple appointments to exchange board. 1987 until 2002 
the financial regulator (part of the ministry of finance) appointed multiple 
outside/independent directors. From 2003-2012, the financial regulator 
(independent) appoints multiple "outside/independent directors" 
Tanzania 1994-2012 Regulator can appoint 1 member to the board.
Thailand 1992-2012 Regulator makes mulitple appointments to governing board
Trinidad and Tobago 1981-1994 Minister of Finance appoints 2 members of the board of directors 
Tunisia 1989-2012
1989-1994: Government dominated board of directors both operated and 
regulated the exchange. Board had mulitple government ministers and 
mulitple board members appointed by government owned commerical, 
development, and agricultural banks. 1995-2012; In addition to the 
regulatory agency, "A government commissioner appointed by the Minister 
of Finance is placed with the Stock Exchange   and is charged with 
monitoring  compliance with legal and regulatory rules." All board 
appointments approved by finance minister with multiple appointments being 
made by financial institutions owned by the state.  
Turkey 1984-2012
1984-2012: Multiple Exchange commissioners can be appointed by Captial 
Markets Board charged with "surveillance of the Exchange operations in the 
name of the CMB and for general administration of service units reporting to 
the commissioner." Furthermore "Chairman, members, Secretary General, 
and Department Heads of the CMB, and other assignees of the CMB and the 
Exchange commissioner may attend the Exchange's General Assembly 
meetings without any voting rights." The Government of Turkey, due to the 
exchanges status as a public institution, appointed at least 1 board member 
and also designated another member from a State-owned enterprise/financial 
institutions. 2012: Government, as majority shareholder, makes multiple 
appointments to governing board
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Uganda 1997-2012
Regulator reserves right to appoint a single director to the board of the 
exchange 
Ukraine 1996-2012
 Regulator Appoints delegate/commissioner to exchange and charges them 
with overseeing compliance and governance.
United Arab Emerites 2000-2012
Government appoints boards of Abu Dhabi and Dubai Financial Market by 
executive decree
Uzbekistan 1991-2012
Exchange organized as a State agency. Executive Board appointed by 
Government 
Venzuela 1975-2009
Caracas Stock Exchange had a delegate representing the securities 
commission on the executive board 
Vietanam 2000-2012
From 2000 until 2006 multiple government officials sat on board including 
a representative of the securities commission (part of the Ministry of 
Finance). From 2007 until 2012 only one member of the government sat on 
the board. From 2000 until 2012, all members of the board are appointed by 
executive decree
Zimbabwe 1975-2007 Government appoints multiple members to the board of directors
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Overview of Self-Regulatory Organizations  
Country Year Exchange Statute SRO Type
Argentina 1975-2011 Full exchange statute   Exchange SRO
Armenia 2000-2006
Full exchange statute (2000-2006); Self-regulation 
mentioned 2007-2012
 Exchange SRO 
Australia 2001- 2009
No specific mention of  SROs ,  but in 2001 Company law 
charges ASX to not only enforce business rules, but all 
statutes in the Securities chapter of the Company law as well 
as  licesensing requirements. From 2010 on, ASX transferred 
its regulatory duties to public regulator.
Strong Exchange SRO
Azerbaijan 2000-2012 Full SRO statute and exchange is designated SRO Exchange SRO
Bahamas 2012-- Full statute in 2012 with exchange is a designated SRO Exchange SRO
Bahrain 2008-2012 Mention of self-regulation, but no full statute
Bangladesh 1992-2012
Regulators duty to encourage self-regulation but not full 
statute
Barbados 2002-2012 Full statute and exchange is designated as SRO Exchange SRO
Bosnia and Hersgovina 2001-2012
Full statute, but independent member-SRO only recieves 
official designation in 2003
Independent Member SRO
Botswana 2006-2012 Full statute, but exchange remains a public organization
Brazil 2007-2012
 Full statute, with exchange receiving recognition in 2007 
and then an independent member SRO established in 2009
Exchange and Member SRO
Canada 1990-2012
Mention of self-regulation from 1990-1993 during which 
time the Toronto exchange exercised signifcant SRO 
responsibility. In 1994 both the TSX and Investment Dealers 
Association (“IDA”) are officially recognized under statute as 
SROs. As of 2002, both the IDA and TSX regulatory powers 
were assumed by a national Independent SRO (Investment 
Indusrty Regulatory Organization of Canada)
Exchange and Member SRO
China 1998-2012
Prior to 1997 exchanges are dominated by local governments. 
Full exchange statute passed in 1998. Independent SRO 
officially  recognized in 1998 and both Chinese Exchanges 
exercise significant regulatory duties
Exchange and Member SRO
Colombia 2005-2012
Full statute enacted in 2005. Independent member SRO 
recognized in 2006
Member SRO
Dominican Republic 2000-2012  Statute declares exchange an SRO Exchange SRO
Ecuador 1993-2012 Full statute and exchange is designated as SRO Exchange SRO
Estonia 2001-2012 Full statute and exchange is designated as SRO Exchange SRO
Georgia 1999-2012
Full SRO statute, and GSE is registered as an SRO. It defines 
an SRO as : "Self-Regulatory Organization or SRO means a 
Stock Exchange, a Central Depository and any other 
organizations which make and enforce rules approved by the 
Commission relating to its members or participants under 
Article 41 of this Law."
Exchange SRO
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Guyana 1998-2012
Full statute with Guyana Stock Exchange Registered under 
the Act
Exchange SRO
Hong Kong 1988-2012
Only a mention of public regulator's duty to  "promote and 
develop appropriate degree of self-regulation in the securities 
and futures industry", but no full statute. However, Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong was officially registered and 
overseen by a public regulator from 1989 until it lost many 
of its self-regulatory powers in 2000
Defacto Exchange SRO prior to 1989
Hungary 1990-2000 Exchange designated an SRO under the statute Exchange SRO
India 1992-2012
 Mention of self-regulation until 2003. Then a full SRO 
framework established in 2004. Throughout period Bombay 
Stock Exchange  wields significant regulatory power
Strong Exchange SRO
Indonesia 1995-2012 It states the exchange has self-regulatory powers Exchange SRO
Iran 2005-2012 2005-6 full statute exists, member SRO recognized in 2007 Member SRO
Japan 1988-2012
Full SRO statute with both exchanges and and independent 
SRO as officially desiganted SROs
Strong Exchange and Member SROs
Kazakstan 2003-2012
Full SRO statute, however the exchange is not officially 
registered as an SRO under the statute
Kenya 2011-2012
Full SRO statute, but neither the Narobi stock exchange or an 
independent SRO registered under the act before 2013
Kyrgyzstan 1998-2012
 Full statute, but exchange is not officially registered as an 
SRO under the act
Macedonia 2005-2012 Full statute and exchange is designated as an SRO Exchange SRO
Malawi 1990-2012  Full statute and exchange is designated as an SRO Exchange SRO
Malaysia 2003-2012
2007-2012 full statute, but Bursa Malaysia does not fall 
under statute despite exercising considerable  powers as both 
an SRO and frontline regulator.
Exchange SRO
Mauritius 2005-2012
Full SRO statute, but the exchange has yet to secure SRO 
status
Mexico 1975-2004
Mention of self-regulation 1975 until 2004;After 2004 full 
SRO statute and exchange is registered under the statute
Exchange SRO
Moldova 1998-2012
Full statute passed in 1998, exchange gains recognition in 
2000
Exchange SRO
Montenegro 1993-2012
Until independence in 2006, Montenegro operated under 
Serbian law which allowed for the formation of Securities 
associations with disciplinary powers. 2006 creates full SRO 
statute for authorized participants. No independent member 
SROs have formed and the exchange does not fall under the 
statute
Morocco 1993-2012
Statutes created the "Professional Association of 
Stockbroking Firms" designed to ensure compliance with 
public law
Independent Member SRO
 
 371 
 
Overview of Self-Regulatory Organizations Continued… 
Nigeria 1999-2012
Full SRO statue and exchange is registered under the the 
statute
Exchange SRO
Oman 2002-2012
Statute mandates "Companies operating in the field of 
securities shall form an association or a guild to ensure the 
adherence to justice, integrity and efficiency in practicing 
brokerage business. Such association or guild shall establish 
a fund to protect the interests of investors who deal with 
Securities or stocks" This became the Omani Securities 
Association
Independent Member SRO
Pakistan 1998-2012
Regulator is charged with "promoting and regulating self-
regulatory organizations including securities industry and 
related organizations such as Stock Exchanges and 
associations
of mutual funds, leasing companies and other NBFIs"
Exchange SRO
Panama 1999-2012
Full statute and exchange is registered under statute until 
2011 when market regulation is spun off into a separate 
entity
Exchange SRO
Poland 1992-2012
There is a Brokers and Investment Advisers association, that 
has official rights to act a representative of the community to 
government. However, membership is not mandatory and they 
are not considered an SRO despite the fact they administer 
exams, hold trainings, and enforce a code of conduct/ethics
Portugal 2007-2012
The securities code states: 
"Article 372 Self-regulation
1. Within the limits of the law and regulations, the 
management entities of the regulated markets, MTFs, 
settlement systems, central counterparty or clearing house and 
central securities depositories may autonomously regulate the 
activities managed."
Romania 2002-2005
Full Statute created in  "Emergency Ordinance No. 28 of 13 
March 2002 
regarding securities, financial investment services and 
regulated markets"TITLE VIII states: ) An entity authorized 
by CNVM as powerfully self-regulatory body may associates: 
financial investment companies, regulated markets, stock 
exchanges, banks, clearing, settlement, depository and 
registrar and associations thereof." Its not clear if the 
exchange ever registered under the statute The SRO statute 
was repealed by a regulated market statute in 2004
Russia 1995-2012
Full statute passed in 1995, and independent broker-dealer 
member SRO established in 1996
Independent Member SRO
Serbia 1996-2001, then 2011-2012
Full statute regarding "Associations" of market 
intermediaries. No specific statute after 2001. Then from 
2011 -2012 there are two references to self-regulatory codes 
of conduct with regards to investment advice and 
recommendations. Articl 87-88
Singapore 1988-2012
No specific reference to self-regulation, but the Singapore 
Exchange is a powerful front-line regulator with significant 
self-regulatory power
South Africa 1988-2012
1988-2012. JSE is the only regulator of securities issuers's 
IPOs and continuous disclosure requirements. As a result, it 
is a fairly powerful SRO despite there being no "full" statute 
with regard to self-regulation prior to 2005.  Due to the 
passage of the Securities Services Act in 2004, the JSE is a 
registered SRO from 2005 on. 
Exchange SRO
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South Korea 1977-2012
Full statute establishes Korean Securities Dealers 
Associations. This SRO merges with other member based 
SROs in 2009 to for the Korean Financial Investments 
Association.  The Korea Exchange also has significant 
responsibilities as a Front Line regulator but is not 
considered an SRO
Independent Member SRO 
Sudan 1995-2012
Mandates creation of a Brokers Association  that can create 
regulations (which the exchange council approves) that are 
binding upon members. 
Member SRO
Switzerland 1995-2012
1995-2007, mention of self-regulation under statute. In 2008 
financial regulator releases more extentive regulation 
regarding SRO rulemaking. However, the Swiss exchange is 
not a registered SRO and no Independent Member securities 
market SRO existed as of 2012
Taiwan 1956-2012
Originally founded as the Taipei Securities Dealers 
association in 1956. In 1999, a merger of all member SROs 
created the Taiwan Securities Association which was 
recognized by the secretary of the interior
Independent Member SRO
Thailand 1992-2012
Besides the TSE acting as a front-line regulator, the 1992 
statute has a section regarding "Associations Related to 
Securities Business." That must have their regulation 
approved regulator and the Associations must be able to 
discipline their members with the object of "promoting the 
securities business". In 2012 the Association of Securities 
Companies of Thailand assumed Self-Regulatory 
Responsibilties. Thai Bond Market Association assumed full 
SRO powers over the bond market in 2005 
Independent Member SRO
Trinidad & Tobago 1981-2012
1981-1994: TTSE board was both the operator and regulator 
of the exchange. 1995-2012 a full SRO statute designated the 
TTSE as an SRO
Exchange SRO
Turkey 1999-2012
Statute mandates creation of the "Association of Capital 
Markets Intermediaries" in 1999, it was officially formed in 
2001. 
Independent Member SRO
Uganda 1997-2012 Mention of Self-Regulation
Ukraine 1996-2012 Full SRO Statute creates an independent broker-dealer SRO Member SRO
United Kingdom 1975-1997
Private (non-registered) SRO's operate without public 
backing until 1985. In 1986, they are officially recognized by 
public authorities (Securities Investments Board). They 
include: Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers 
(AFBD), the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers 
Regulatory Association (FIMBRA), the Investment 
Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), the Life 
Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation 
(LAUTRO), and The Securities Association (TSA).  The 
Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), 
the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) in place of the 
FIMBRA and the LAUTRO in 1994, and the Securities and 
Futures Authority (SFA) replacing the AFBD and TSA in 
1991. Self-Regulation is ended by Labour government in 
1997
Independent Member SRO
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United States 1935-2012
Maloney Act of 1938 creates SRO statute and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers emerges. Exchanges also 
assume  SRO responsibility. However, following 
consolidation, NYSE spins off  regulatory arm into NYSE 
regulation in 2005. NYSE regulation merges with NASD in 
2010 to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. 
However both, Nasdaq and NYSE took back some of its 
regulator power between 2013-2015. Other regulatory duties 
still conducted by a non-profit subsidiary of NYSE that is 
organizationally separate
Independent Member and Exchange SRO
Uruguay 1996-2008 Mention of self-regulation
Zambia 1993-2012
Mention of self-regulation. Duty of regulator it to promote 
self-regulation by the securities exchange
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APPENDIX VI 
     Table 6.9A      
 (Apolitical Organization in Crisis:%∆S&P Index) 
DV:%∆S&P Price 
Index 
(1)  
 
(2)  
 
(3)  
 
(4)  
 
(5)  
 
(6)  
 
       
       
Apolitical 0.73 0.87 0.64 0.83 0.83 0.46 
Organization (0.95) (0.96) (1.05) (1.01) (1.03) (1.04) 
Bank Crisis -76.8*** -75.8*** -77.0*** -49.4*** -49.4*** -50.9*** 
 (21.6) (21.7) (23.3) (14.6) (14.6) (15.5) 
Apolitical Org. x 8.08** 7.95** 8.06** 4.95** 4.95** 5.06** 
Bank Crisis  (3.16) (3.17) (3.4) (2.13) (2.13) (2.2) 
       
Political   -14.7 -13.5  -0.69 1.57 
Constraint  (15.3) (14.2)  (12.0) (11.6) 
Electoral    -1.57   -1.76 
Competition   (2.63)   (2.26) 
Electoral    6.69**   1.53 
Proportionality   (3.35)   (4.12) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.83 -4.24 -3.48 -34.5** -34.5** -37.1** 
 (3.68) (3.68) (3.79) (16.6) (16.7) (17.0) 
GDP Growth 0.65 0.68 0.63 1.38* 1.39* 1.40* 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.746) (0.74) (0.80) 
Capital Account -6.0 -6.29 -3.13 -13.6 -13.5 -10.7 
Openness (11.1) (11.1) (12.4) (11.8) (11.8) (12.5) 
ln(Trade) 21.3** 20.0** 21.7** -8.97 -9.13 -11.50 
 (9.8) (9.7) (10.2) (17.5) (17.5) (18.4) 
ln(Inflation) 1.33 1.64 2.68 3.68 3.71 4.6 
 (5.29) (5.35) (6.52) (4.98) (5.00) (5.91) 
Domestic Credit 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
by Banks (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.47 2.52 1.63 -0.27 -0.344 -1.32 
 (3.39) (3.402) (3.57) (4.35) (4.4) (4.53) 
    (27.8) (28.2) (29.7) 
∆All World  35.9*** 35.8*** 36.6***    
Stock Index (2.68) (2.68) (2.99)    
Constant -58.8* -45.9 -51.3 312.7 313.0 364.6* 
 (32.1) (32.7) (50.1) (195.2) (195.6) (198.3) 
       
Observations 1,120 1,112 1,063 1,120 1,112 1,063 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Overall R2 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.09 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Number of countries 79 78 73 79 78 73 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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                                Table 6.10A       
(Apolitical Regulatory Organization in Crisis: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock Index (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Volatility    Arellano- 
Bond 
Arellano
- Bond 
Arellano
- Bond 
       
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-1 
0.50*** 
(0.02) 
0.50*** 
(0.02) 
0.48*** 
(0.03) 
0.57*** 
(0.03) 
0.55*** 
(0.03) 
0.59*** 
(0.03) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-1 
   -0.24*** 
(0.04) 
-0.23*** 
(0.04) 
-0.28*** 
(0.03) 
Stock Price  
Volatilityt-1 
   0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
Apolitical  0.28 0.20 0.46* 0.50 0.26 0.48 
Organization (0.30) (0.30) (0.26) (0.40) (0.42) (0.39) 
Bank Crisis -3.09 -3.60 -1.89 -4.75 -4.53 -2.44 
 (2.80) (2.67) (2.70) (3.41) (3.36) (4.30) 
Apolitical Org. x 0.90** 0.96** 0.72** 1.47*** 1.43*** 1.03* 
Bank Crisis (0.38) (0.37) (0.36) (0.50) (0.50) (0.57) 
h_polcon3  4.81* 5.01*  7.51*** 6.39** 
  (2.70) (2.79)  (2.71) (2.97) 
Electoral    -0.19   0.03 
Competiveness   (0.15)   (0.40) 
Electoral    -1.73   -0.50 
Proportionality   (1.26)   (1.72) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.72*** -3.71*** -3.50*** -4.40*** -4.44*** -3.93*** 
 (0.93) (0.94) (0.91) (1.04) (1.05) (1.14) 
GDP Growth -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.70*** -0.82*** -0.77*** -0.82*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Capital Account 3.19* 3.41* 2.23 -1.77 -0.92 -0.40 
Openness (1.72) (1.81) (1.81) (2.84) (2.85) (2.64) 
ln(Trade) 1.18 1.51 1.71 -1.39 -0.97 0.50 
 (2.11) (2.15) (2.18) (2.28) (2.38) (2.41) 
ln(Inflation) 1.45*** 1.40*** 1.18* 1.38*** 1.29** 1.36** 
 (0.51) (0.49) (0.63) (0.50) (0.52) (0.60) 
Domestic Credit 0.008 0.001 0.01 0.03* 0.03** 0.01 
by Banks (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.35*** 2.30*** 2.21*** 2.84*** 2.70*** 2.76*** 
 (0.71) (0.69) (0.72) (0.83) (0.86) (0.86) 
∆All World  0.90** 0.93** 0.86* 0.83** 0.83** 0.80** 
Stock Index (0.42) (0.42) (0.44) (0.33) (0.34) (0.37) 
Constant 26.2** 23.4** 26.0** 44.8*** 41.8*** 30.4** 
 (10.5) (10.7) (11.9) (11.2) (12.3) (13.1) 
       
Observations 1,036 1,028 969 925 917 868 
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 -- -- -- 
Overall R2 0.63 0.63 0.56 -- -- -- 
Number of countries 78 77 72 76 75 70 
Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 6.11A         
(Veto Players and Competition w/ Portfolio Controls: %∆S&P Indices) 
DV: %∆S&P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Indices       
       
Political  -31.9** -32.8** -32.8**   -10.0 
Constraint (12.9) (12.9) (13.2)   (14.0) 
Electoral     -1.01 -1.03 -0.79 
Competition    (1.58) (1.41) (1.41) 
Bank Crisis -74.3*** -74.5*** -76.4*** -94.9*** -94.5*** -93.8*** 
 (11.4) (11.4) (13.5) (17.5) (14.5) (14.6) 
Constraint x  120.4*** 120.2*** 123.3***    
Crisis (23.8) (24.0) (27.7)    
Competition x     6.22*** 6.17*** 6.12*** 
Crisis    (1.60) (1.38) (1.39) 
Regulatory   16.8** 15.6*  15.5** 15.9** 
Independence   (8.02) (8.68)  (7.66) (7.77) 
Depoliticized   18.0* 16.2*  21.0** 20.9** 
Self-Regulation  (9.35) (9.35)  (9.39) (9.36) 
Electoral   7.925**    
Proportionality   (3.185)    
Portfolio Equity 0.00003 0.00004 0.00003 0.00002 0.00003 0.00003 
Flows (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -2.56 -5.11 -4.62 -2.29 -4.97 -5.22 
 (3.54) (3.51) (3.79) (3.86) (3.90) (3.83) 
GDP Growth 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.54 0.63 0.62 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Capital Account -0.21 -2.14 0.41 -3.22 -4.88 -4.90 
Openness (10.5) (10.9) (12.2) (10.7) (11.1) (11.1) 
ln(Trade) 23.7** 18.6* 20.3* 24.0** 18.8* 17.9 
 (10.1) (10.5) (11.3) (10.4) (10.9) (10.8) 
ln(Inflation) -3.59 -3.35 -3.46 -3.62 -3.36 -3.19 
 (2.32) (2.34) (2.79) (2.32) (2.34) (2.35) 
Domestic -0.004 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
Credit (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
ln(TurnOverRatio) 2.00 2.00 1.20 2.17 2.12 2.25 
 (3.03) (3.02) (3.23) (3.12) (3.14) (3.15) 
∆All World Stock 35.0*** 35.4*** 35.6*** 35.2*** 35.6*** 35.6*** 
Index (2.02) (2.03) (2.13) (2.10) (2.12) (2.11) 
Constant -57.3* -38.8 -59.2* -59.5 -40.7 -34.3 
 (30.8) (30.5) (33.6) (36.6) (36.1) (35.5) 
       
Observations 1065 1035 998 1065 1035 1035 
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.35 
Number of 
countries 
76 75 71 76 75 75 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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       Table 6.12A       
(Independence and DSRO in Crisis w/Portfolio Controls: %∆S&P Indices) 
DV: %∆S&P (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Indices       
       
Regulatory 14.7* 13.7* 11.3  18.1** 15.5** 
Independence (7.51) (7.63) (8.30)  (7.40) (7.66) 
Depoliticized  19.4** 18.8** 22.9** 18.2** 18.3* 
Self-Regulation  (8.79) (9.10) (10.37) (9.15) (9.58) 
Bank Crisis -40.7*** -40.7*** -37.3** -53.3** -36.3** -33.3** 
 (13.4) (13.4) (15.1) (23.1) (15.1) (15.0) 
Independence x 27.5 27.9 23.0    
Crisis (18.9) (18.8) (20.7)    
       
Depoliticized SRO 
X Crisis 
   15.6 
(20.0) 
18.6 
(18.2) 
15.4 
(18.3) 
       
Political   -11.0 -9.97  -10.9 -11.9 
Constraint  (13.8) (13.7)  (13.7) (13.7) 
Electoral   5.74   5.39 
Proportionality   (3.52)   (3.60) 
Electoral     -1.47 -0.01 1.74 
Competition    (2.02) (1.64) (1.66) 
Portfolio Equity 0.00002 .00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00003 
Flows (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) (.00003) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.58 -5.22 -4.68 -3.09 -4.43 -4.34 
 (3.85) (3.81) (4.13) (3.89) (3.96) (4.18) 
GDP Growth 0.60 0.68 0.61 0.65 0.66 0.61 
 (0.49) (0.51) (0.50) (0.43) (0.50) (0.50) 
Capital Account -5.43 -5.90 -3.98 -8.98 -7.09 -4.49 
Openness (10.9) (10.8) (12.0) (11.1) (11.1) (12.5) 
ln(Trade) 19.9* 17.2 18.0 24.1** 17.0 17.5 
 (11.0) (11.0) (11.6) (10.4) (11.0) (11.5) 
ln(Inflation) -3.15 -3.05 -3.51 1.53 -2.95 -3.39 
 (2.30) (2.36) (2.76) (5.65) (2.38) (2.78) 
Domestic Bank 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.008 
Credit (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.70 2.51 1.75 2.56 2.52 1.87 
 (3.10) (3.11) (3.28) (3.21) (3.13) (3.31) 
∆All World  35.3*** 35.6*** 35.7*** 35.6*** 35.4*** 35.7*** 
Stock Index (2.07) (2.09) (2.19) (2.54) (2.04) (2.16) 
Constant -54.9 -38.4 -51.5 -71.9* -45.5 -73.8* 
 (34.3) (33.3) (35.6) (40.6) (38.0) (39.4) 
       
Observations 1,062 1,035 998 1,115 1,035 998 
R2 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.35 0.35 
Number of countries 77 75 71 78 75 71 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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     Table 6.13A      
 (Institutions in Crisis w/Portfolio Controls: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Price Volatility  Blundell- 
Bond  
 Blundell- 
Bond  
 Blundell-
Bond  
Stock Price 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.49*** 0.54*** 0.49*** 0.57*** 
Volatility t-1 (0.036) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Stock Price  -0.23***  -0.24***  -0.27*** 
Volatility t-2  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Stock Price  0.08  0.08  0.10** 
Volatility t-3  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Political  2.98 5.12 5.56*  5.17* 6.47** 
Constraint (2.90) (3.33) (2.8)  (2.9) (3.20) 
Electoral  -0.11  -0.40*** 0.38 -0.12 0.20 
Competition (0.20)  (0.15) (0.30) (0.23) (0.41) 
Electoral -0.90  -0.74  -1.26 0.10 
Proportionality (0.93)  (0.83)  (1.01) (1.44) 
Bank Crisis -2.16 -1.31 -15.2** -9.52** 4.19*** 4.66** 
 (2.28) (3.33) (6.12) (4.31) (1.16) (2.31) 
Constraint x 11.0** 14.5**     
Bank Crisis (4.93) (7.07)     
Competition x   1.52*** 1.28***   
Crisis   (0.51) (0.38)   
Proportionality      -0.75 -0.37 
X Crisis     (0.50) (0.91) 
Regulatory 4.05**  3.73**  4.12** 2.93 
Independence (1.84)  (1.77)  (1.76) (2.76) 
Depoliticized 2.49  2.76  2.72 -6.35 
Self-Regulation (2.65)  (2.54)  (2.74) (5.45) 
Portfolio Equity .00001 .00002 .00001 .00001 .00001 .00001 
Flows (.000009) (.00001) (.000009) (.00001) (.00001) (.00001) 
ln(GDPper -3.33*** -3.61*** -3.29*** -4.01*** -3.45*** -3.15** 
Capita) (0.89) (1.05) (0.86) (1.170) (0.95) (1.26) 
GDP Growth -0.78*** -0.86*** -0.800*** -0.85*** -0.77*** -0.91*** 
 (0.103) (0.133) (0.102) (0.124) (0.10) (0.13) 
Capital Account  3.01 -2.282 2.85 -2.93 2.60 -0.69 
Openness (1.86) (3.300) (1.86) (3.17) (1.85) (3.05) 
ln(Trade) 2.01 -1.420 2.30 -2.25 1.82 -0.60 
 (2.14) (2.408) (2.20) (2.53) (2.25) (2.80) 
ln(Inflation) 1.47** 1.242** 1.55** 1.40** 1.46** 1.53** 
 (0.58) (0.614) (0.601) (0.59) (0.60) (0.70) 
ln(Turnover 2.24*** 2.69*** 2.22*** 2.87*** 2.26*** 2.68*** 
Ratio) (0.69) (0.84) (0.71) (0.83) (0.69) (0.87) 
∆All World  0.76** 0.68* 0.81** 0.73** 0.75* 0.587 
Stock Index (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) (0.39) (0.439) 
Constant 19.1* 41.1*** 19.8* 45.2*** 20.8* 32.7** 
 (10.8) (13.5) (10.6) (13.4) (11.2) (15.1) 
Observations 930 890 930 890 930 835 
R
2 0.52  0.52  0.51  
Number  of countries 71 73 71 73 71 69 
Huber/White Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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         Table 6.14A      
  (Independence & DSRO in Crisis w/Portfolio: Index Volatility) 
DV: Stock (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price Volatility  Blundell-
Bond 
 Blundell-
Bond 
     
Stock Price 0.50*** 0.53*** 0.50*** 0.53*** 
Volatility t-1 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Stock Price  -0.22***  -0.21*** 
Volatility t-2  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Stock Price  0.072  0.06 
Volatility t-3  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Regulatory  1.17 0.03 2.49  
Independence (1.95) (3.18) (1.855)  
Depoliticized  1.02 -6.77 0.232 -7.22 
Self-Regulation (2.86) (5.96) (2.802) (6.20) 
     
Bank Crisis -2.51* -0.12 -0.14 6.27* 
 (1.46) (1.94) (3.75) (3.59) 
Independence X 7.59*** 7.20**   
Bank Crisis (2.08) (2.85)   
Depoliticized SRO X   3.54 -1.92 
Bank Crisis   (4.45) (4.16) 
Political Constraint 5.42** 7.36*** 4.59* 6.15** 
 (2.50) (2.63) (2.73) (2.72) 
Portfolio Equity 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002* 
Flows (0.000001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
ln(GDPperCapita) -3.63*** -3.48*** -3.54*** -3.51*** 
 (0.96) (1.1) (0.96) (1.13) 
GDP Growth -0.74*** -0.87*** -0.73*** -0.86*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) 
Capital Account 3.48* -2.49 3.78** -2.18 
Openness (1.86) (3.19) (1.89) (3.03) 
ln(Trade) 2.07 -1.78 1.57 -2.33 
 (2.12) (2.54) (2.27) (2.61) 
ln(Inflation) 1.63*** 1.28** 1.67*** 1.27** 
 (0.49) (0.64) (0.49) (0.645) 
Domestic  0.008 0.01 0.009 0.024 
Bank Credit (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) 
ln(TurnoverRatio) 2.35*** 
(0.69) 
2.96*** 
(0.88) 
2.37*** 
(0.70) 
2.92*** 
(0.87) 
∆All World Stock 0.85** 0.71* 0.78** 0.60 
Index (0.36) (0.39) (0.36) (0.40) 
Constant 19.4* 45.1*** 17.9* 44.8*** 
 (10.6) (13.8) (10.4) (14.2) 
     
Observations 977 873 977 873 
R
2 0.520  0.517  
Number of countries 75 73 75 73 
Robust standard errors clustered by country (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
